#JudicialAnalysis Archives

25 Apr

“Article 14 is not violated, Delhi High Court upholds JNU’s 80% Admission Quota for B.A. (Hons) First-Year in Foreign Languages Program”

Blog, Delhi High Court #AcademicQuotas, #article14, #ConstitutionalValidity, #delhihighcourt, #EducationalPolicy, #HigherEducation, #JNUAdmissions, #JudicialAnalysis, #LegalJudgment 1

Case title: Vaibhav v. Jawaharlal Nehru University

Case no.: W.P.(C) 12771/2023

Dated on: 24^th April 2024

Quorum: Justice C. Hari Shankar

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Vaibhav, a Scheduled Caste (SC) student, challenged Clause 12 of the Admission Policy and Procedure of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) for the B.A (Hons) course in Foreign Languages for the 2023-2024 academic session. Clause 12 segregated candidates into Code I and Code II based on whether they passed the Senior Secondary School Certificate (10+2) examination in the year of admission or the previous year. Vaibhav passed his Class XII examination in 2021 and applied for admission to the B.A. (Hons) Chinese course at JNU based on his Central University Entrance Test (CUET) scores. Despite being ranked 12th among SC category students in Code II, he was not admitted.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER

Mr. Bhagabati Prasad Padhy represented Vaibhav, arguing that Clause 12’s distinction lacked a rational nexus with its objective and violated Article 14 of the Constitution. He cited relevant case law to support his contention.

Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar (2019) 20 SCC 117: The petitioner relied on this case to argue that the classification made by Clause 12 of the Admission Prospectus of JNU, which distinguished between students based on the year they cleared their Class XII examination, violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The case emphasizes that any classification must be based on intelligible differentia and must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952 SCC Online 1): This case was cited to argue that any classification must be based on a real and substantial distinction that bears a just and reasonable relation to the objective sought to be achieved. It highlights the principle that classification should not be arbitrary but must have a rational basis.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Ms. Monika Arora, CGSC, along with Mr. Subhrodeep Saha and Ms. Radhika Kurdukar, argued for JNU. Mr. Saha submits that the division of the candidates in Code-I and Code-II is legitimate and is in fact based on an intelligible differentia, having a rational nexus with the object of the distinction. The aim of creating this distinction, he submits is to ensure a fair and transparent admission process, giving preference to recent academic qualifications to streamline the procedure and provide opportunity to students who had recently completed their Senior Secondary examinations, so as to ensure that those possessing most upto date knowledge and skills are given priority.

Mr. Saha submits that the idea is to encourage freshers, even while ensuring that older candidates, who may have passed their Class XII examination much earlier in time, are not completely blocked. In order to draw a balance between the two categories of candidates, he submits that the JNU took a policy decision to reserve 80% of the seats for admission to B.A. (Hons) Chinese courses in Foreign Languages for candidates, who had cleared their Class XII that year or in the year immediately preceding the year in which the admission was being sought and 20% for the candidates, who had cleared their Class XII examination earlier.

Mr. Saha also submits that the judgments, on which Mr. Padhy places reliance, are completely distinguishable on facts and in law.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Clause 12 of the Admission Policy and Procedure of JNU for the academic session 2023-2024. The clause establishes quotas for admission to the B.A (Hons) First Year in Foreign Languages, with 80% of the seats earmarked for candidates who passed their Senior Secondary School Certificate (10+2) exam in the year of admission or the previous year (Code I), and the remaining 20% for candidates who meet the eligibility requirements but passed their exam earlier (Code II).

Article 14 of the Constitution of India: The petitioner argues that Clause 12 violates Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination.

ISSUE –

Whether Clause 12 of JNU’s Admission Policy violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether Vaibhav’s challenge against the quota system is valid.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

Justice C. Hari Shankar analyzed the validity of Clause 12, considering the constitutional principles and academic policy. While acknowledging the prima facie appearance of arbitrariness, the judge emphasized the limited scope of judicial interference in academic matters. He noted that JNU’s decision aimed to balance the interests of freshers and older candidates.

The judge rejected Vaibhav’s challenge, asserting that the classification under Clause 12 was not arbitrary. He emphasized the importance of recent academic qualifications for collegiate courses and upheld JNU’s right to prioritize such candidates.

Regarding Vaibhav’s challenge against the quota system, the judge ruled it impermissible, citing the principle of estoppel. Vaibhav had previously sought admission under the same provision and failed.

The writ petition was dismissed, and no costs were imposed. The court upheld Clause 12 of JNU’s Admission Policy, emphasizing deference to academic policy and the principle of estoppel.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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24 Apr

“Single instance of Adultery does not disentitle the Wife to Maintenance under Section 125(4) of the Cr.P.C: HC of MP while Interpreting Adultery”

Prime Legal

Blog, High Court of Madhya Pradesh #AdulteryCase, #CriminalProcedure, #DivorceDecree, #evidenceact, #FamilyCourt, #familylaw, #HighCourtPrecedents, #JudicialAnalysis, #LegalInterpretation, #LegalPrecedents, #Maintenance, #MaintenanceClaim, #MaintenanceDispute, #RevisionPetition, #SpousalSupport

Case title: Vijendra v. Rekhabai & Anr.

Case no.: Criminal Revision No.790 of 2019

Dated on: 15^th April 2024

Quorum: Justice Prem Narayan Singh

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the realm of family law, the issue of maintenance often stands at the forefront, especially in cases where divorce has been granted on grounds such as adultery. The case in question, brought before the court as a criminal revision petition under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act read with Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., revolves around the award of maintenance to the respondent and her daughter by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhar M.P. The petitioner, aggrieved by the judgment, seeks a reduction in the maintenance amount.

The petitioner, having obtained a divorce decree on the grounds of adultery, contends that the respondent, his former wife, is disqualified from claiming maintenance. The learned trial Court had awarded Rs. 3000/- per month each to the respondent and their daughter. The petitioner bases his argument on the findings of adultery by the family court and cites precedents from the Madras and Karnataka High Courts to support his claim.

On the other hand, the respondent, while acknowledging her subsequent marriage, denies the accusations of adultery, asserting that mere allegations without substantial evidence cannot disqualify her from receiving maintenance. She relies on a judgment of the Delhi High Court to argue that only continuous and repeated acts of adultery warrant the disqualification from maintenance.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The petitioner’s counsel argues that the decree of divorce, based on the finding of adultery, is conclusive evidence of the respondent’s disqualification from maintenance. He cites precedents from the Madras and Karnataka High Courts to reinforce this argument.

M.Chinna Karuppasamy vs. Kanimozhi wherein, the Court has observed that “A divorced wife, who lives in adultery, is disqualified from claiming maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.”

Shanthakumari vs. Thimmegowda wherein the Court has observed that “the oral and documentary evidence produced clearly establish that the petitioner is not honest towards husband and she has got extramarital affairs with neighbour Mahesh and all along, she asserted that she used to stay with him. When the petitioner is staying in adultery, the question of she claiming maintenance does not arise at all. the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner is a legally wedded wife and entitled for maintenance cannot be accepted in view of the conduct of petitioner, who is not honest and is leading adulterous life.”

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The respondent’s counsel refutes the allegations of adultery, emphasizing the lack of substantial evidence to support such claims. She contends that even if adultery occurred, it does not automatically disqualify the respondent from receiving maintenance, as per precedents set by the Delhi High Court.

Sh. Pradeep Kumar Sharma vs. Smt. Deepika Sharma, wherein the Court observed that “only continuous and repeated acts of adultery or cohabitation in adultery would attract the rigours of the provisions under Section 125(4) of Cr.P.C.”

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act: This provision allows for the filing of revision petitions against judgments passed by Family Courts.

Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. (Code of Criminal Procedure): This provision grants the power of revision to higher courts over proceedings in subordinate courts.

Section 125(4) of the Cr.P.C.: This provision deals with the disqualification of a wife from receiving maintenance if she is “living in adultery.”

Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act: This provision states that a judgment or decree on a particular matter, having attained finality, is relevant evidence for deciding similar matters in subsequent cases.

ISSUE –

Whether the finding of adultery, leading to divorce, disqualifies the respondent from claiming maintenance.
What constitutes “living in adultery” as per the relevant legal provisions.
Whether the maintenance awarded by the trial court is excessive or justified.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court delves into the legal precedents cited by both parties to ascertain the definition and implications of adultery in maintenance cases. It emphasizes the distinction between isolated acts of adultery and continuous, repeated conduct, which is necessary to disqualify a spouse from maintenance.

In Ashok v. Anita, the HC of Madhya Pradesh interpreting the said provision and observed as reproduced –

A perusal of the provisions of section 125(4) of Cr. P.C. makes it clear that a stray act of adultery on the part of the wife does not amount to adultery within the meaning of section 125(4) and further does not disentitle the wife to maintenance.

Relying on the principles laid down by various High Courts, including the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the court concludes that mere allegations or isolated acts of adultery are insufficient to deny maintenance. It reaffirms that the term “living in adultery” implies a continuous adulterous conduct rather than occasional lapses.

In light of the evidence and legal precedents, the court finds no grounds to interfere with the trial court’s judgment. It upholds the maintenance awarded to the respondent and her daughter, considering the prevailing circumstances and the principles of justice.

The case serves as a significant interpretation of the legal provisions surrounding maintenance in cases of adultery. It underscores the importance of continuous, repeated conduct in establishing disqualification from maintenance, while also emphasizing the need for substantial evidence to support such claims. In upholding the trial court’s decision, the judgment ensures fair treatment and support for the dependent parties involved.

Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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16 Apr

“Lack of Discipline Among Disciplined Forces Deemed as the Gravest Act of Misconduct: Punjab and Haryana High Court”

Prime Legal

Blog #CourtJudgment, #disciplinaryproceedings, #DismissalFromService, #JudicialAnalysis, #LegalPrecedents, #naturaljustice, #PoliceMisconduct, #punjabhighcourt 5

Case title: The State of Punjab and others v. Ex. Constable Amarjit Singh

Case no.: RSA-4995 of 1999

Dated on: 22^nd February 2024

Coram: Justice Namit Kumar

FACTS OF THE CASE

Ex. Constable Amarjit Singh filed a suit for declaration challenging his dismissal from service by the Comdt. 13th Bn PAF Jalandhar Cantt. The plaintiff alleged that the dismissal order was illegal, void, and violated principles of natural justice. He claimed reinstatement with all monetary benefits attached to the service. The plaintiff argued that the disciplinary proceedings against him were conducted ex parte without proper notice or opportunity to defend himself. The defendants, on the other hand, contended that the plaintiff wilfully absented himself from duty, leading to the departmental inquiry and subsequent dismissal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Argued that the plaintiff’s absence from duty for 44 days and 23 hours constituted grave misconduct, justifying his dismissal. They claimed that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the law and principles of natural justice.

A Division Bench of the Court in State of Haryana and others v. Gurdev Singh, 1981(3) SLR 130 observed as under: “To our mind, the cases with regard to misconduct on the part of the police officers while on duty have not to be interfered with by the Courts lightly unless it is found that the action has been taken wantonly or arbitrarily.”

State of Punjab and others v. Chamkaur Singh – has held that act of absence from duty by a member of disciplined force without information shows the lack of discipline.

No representation on behalf of the respondent.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules reads as under: – Dismissal – (1) Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension.

(2) If the conduct of an enrolled police officer leads to his conviction on a criminal charge and he is sentenced to imprisonment, he shall be dismissed: Provided that a punishing authority may, in an exceptional case involving manifestly extenuating circumstances for reasons to be recorded and with the prior approval of the next higher authority impose any punishment other than that of dismissal: Provided further that in case the conviction of an enrolled police officer is set aside in appeal or revision, the officer empowered to appoint him shall review his case keeping in view the instructions issued by the Government from time to time in this behalf.

ISSUE –

Whether the orders of dismissal passed against the respondent were legal and justified.
Whether the suit filed by the respondent is maintainable & Locus standi of the plaintiff.
Validity of notice under Section 80 CPC.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Court examined the relevant provisions, including Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, which govern dismissal from service. It considered precedents highlighting the gravity of misconduct in disciplined forces and the importance of maintaining discipline.

The Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s absence from duty, especially during basic training, demonstrated a lack of discipline, a fundamental requirement in the police force. It cited case law supporting the view that interference with disciplinary action should be minimal unless the action is wanton or arbitrary.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the dismissal order was justified given the gravity of the misconduct. The plaintiff’s short service tenure and absence without leave further supported this decision. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts and dismissing the plaintiff’s suit.

The case underscores the significance of discipline in disciplined forces and the courts’ reluctance to interfere with disciplinary actions unless they are arbitrary or disproportionate. It reaffirms the principle that grave misconduct warrants appropriate disciplinary measures, including dismissal from service.

Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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