#HighCourt Archives - Prime Legal

19 Apr

“The Supreme Court addresses fundamental rights, justice, and judicial accountability while disapproving of the High Court’s ruling in a murder case.”

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Blog # Supreme Court, #accused, #HighCourt, #murder, culpable homicide, exceptions to murder, s.302, s.304

Case Title: Manikandan v. State by The Inspector of Police

Case No.: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 407 OF 2019

Dated On: 5th April, 2024

Quorum: Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Pankaj Mithal

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The case centres on the murder of a man named Balamurugan who resided with his parents. The deceased allegedly gave accused no. 1 instructions to deliver idlis, and later that evening, upon discovering that accused no. 1 had neglected to do so, he went to his residence to confront him, according to the prosecution.

It seems that his altercation with Accused No. 1 was the cause of the disturbance. The prosecution claims that upon hearing the disturbance, PW-2 (mother of the deceased) and PW-3 (the brother-in-law of the dead) raced over to the location. Accused no. 2 was in the area. Following that, Accused No. 1 went into his home, took a billhook with him, and used it to beat the deceased. The deceased’s right index finger took the first blow. The deceased then fled to a neighbouring property belonging to a Karunanidhi. The accused trailed after him. While accused no. 1 was assaulting the deceased by placing a billhook around his neck, accused no. 2 was holding the deceased. subsequent to that, both the accused ran away.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT:

The appellants claimed that the initial information report indicated that the incident happened about 10.30 p.m., according to the skilled attorney representing the appellant. That being said, based on the post-mortem reports’ mention of the estimated time of death, it seems that the incident had to have occurred prior to 7 pm. The second claim he makes is that the prosecution primarily examined witnesses who were close to the dead, even though there were other impartial eyewitnesses present.

In his second admission, he alleges that despite the fact there were numerous unaffiliated eyewitnesses, the prosecution had only decided to question those who were interested and directly connected to the killed.

He claimed that the post-mortem records revealed the dead had one small cut on his finger and one cut on his neck. He added that there was an unexpected altercation between the dead and the accused number one, and that during that altercation, the accused number one attacked the deceased without any warning. Consequently, he would argue that this is an instance in which Section 300 of the IPC’s Exception 4 will apply, making it an offence under Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

Asserting that there are no significant inconsistencies or omissions in the evidence of PWs 2 through 5, which instils confidence, was the learned counsel representing the respondent, the State.

He contended that there was a clear intention on the part of accused no. 1 to assault the deceased, as evidenced by the fact that, following a disagreement with the deceased, he entered his home, brought a billhook, and attacked the victim. Learned counsel argued that the deceased sought to flee after the accused number one struck him once on the index finger.

The dead was chased by both accused; accuser no. 2 restrained the deceased, and accused no. 1 then fatally struck the deceased in the neck with a billhook. He recommended the exclusion of this case from the provisions of Section 300 of the IPC’s Exception 4.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

S.300 provides the exceptions to Murder. Exception 4- If the crime is done in the midst of a furious argument, without any prior planning, and without the perpetrator taking unfair advantage of the situation or acting in an unusually harsh way, it is considered culpable homicide rather than murder.

S.302 of The IPC- It prescribes punishment for intentionally causing the death of another person, in simpler terms, Murder.

COURT’S ANANLYSIS AND JUDGMENT:

The Court pronounced the judgment by initially stating that during PW2’s main cross-examination, she tried to establish a case that the accused had disparaged her daughter-in-law. To be fair, she didn’t say as much in the police-recorded statement. Most significantly, she said during cross-examination by accused no. She stated “Yesterday, my husband, myself, and other witnesses went to the Haridwar Mangalam Police station.” There, we received instruction on how to present evidence from the police.

The Court further laid down that It is important to remember that PW-1 through PW-5’s evidence was recorded on November 20, 2008. It is evident from this that on November 19, 2008, the first five interested witnesses—PW-1 through PW-5—who were close relatives of the dead were summoned to the police station, where they received instruction from the police on how to make a deposition against the accused.

It’s important to remember that the prosecution refrained from asking the witness any questions throughout the re-examination. The investigating officer provided no justification for this. Since the first five witnesses were “taught” how to depose at the Police Station, the court was compelled to proceed on that premise.

This leads to the situation that appears, which is that PWs 1 through 5 were called to the Police Station and instructed on how to depose exactly one day prior to their testimony being recorded before the Trial Court. What would happen if witnesses in a police station were “taught”? It is conceivable. The cops are clearly trying to influence the material witnesses for the prosecution with this brazen action. As interested witnesses, they were all of them. Since it is quite likely that the aforementioned witnesses received instruction from the police on the previous day.

The court was rather disappointed by the Police and further, to put it mildly, held that this type of police meddling in the legal system was disturbing. This was a blatant abuse of authority on the part of the police apparatus. The prosecution witness cannot be tutored by the police. Even if there are more eyewitnesses, their statements were concealed, making this behaviour even more terrible.

The court, while pronouncing the judgment, held that the appellants were wrongfully convicted by both the Sessions Court and the High Court. The appeals were therefore granted. The appellants were found not guilty of the charges brought against them, and the contested judgements and decrees are overturned. Their bail bonds were cancelled.

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Judgment reviewed by Riddhi S Bhora

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10 Apr

Supreme Court: Moving the High Court’s jurisdiction to seek release of seized vehicles without engaging the magistrate deemed inappropriate.

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Blog #GujaratProhibitionAct, #HighCourt, #Jurisdiction, #LegalProcedure, #SupremeCourt

Case title: Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. The State of Gujarat

Case no.: Criminal Appeal No.1547 Of 2024

Order on: 8^th April 2024

Quorum: Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Justice Pankaj Mithal

FACTS OF THE CASE

In this case, the appellant claimed ownership of a vehicle, an Eicher 10.80 (Blue) bearing no. GJ 05-BT-0899, which was seized by police as Muddamal Article in connection with FIR no. 11200038231465/2023. The FIR was lodged under various sections of the Gujarat Prohibition Act and IPC at the Pardi Police Station, District Valasad. The police intercepted the vehicle based on secret information and alleged that it was carrying English Liquor (1240.200 Liters) worth rupees 7 lakhs without any pass or permit. The appellant, claiming to be the owner, filed a Special Criminal Application No.6465 of 2023 before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad seeking release of the seized vehicle. However, the High Court dismissed the application through an order dated 08.06.2023, leading to the present appeal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant contended that the vehicle should be released, claiming ownership, without approaching the concerned criminal court under Section 451 of the Cr.P.C. Instead, they filed a Special Criminal Application directly in the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The State of Gujarat, represented as the respondent, contended that Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act 1949 forbids the release of the vehicle until the final judgment of the court if the quantity of seized liquor exceeds the prescribed limit.

In this case, the seized quantity of liquor was 1240 liters, far exceeding the prescribed quantity of 20 liters as per the relevant notification.

In case of Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai vs. State of Gujarat, it is of no use to keep the seized vehicles at the police stations for a long period and it is for the magistrate to pass appropriate orders for the proper custody of the said such vehicles during the pendency of the trial. However, as observed earlier, the appellant without approaching the concerned criminal court under Section 451 of the Cr.P.C seeking custody of the vehicle in question, directly approached the High Court by filing Special Criminal Application under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, which was not the proper course as adopted by the appellant.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 65 of Gujarat Prohibition Act, Sub-Section:

(a) imports or exports any intoxicant 1 [ ( other than opium ) ] or hemp.

(e) sells or buys any intoxicant 1 [ (other than opium) ] or hemp.

Section 81 of Gujarat Prohibition Act – Whoever, attempts to commit or abets the commission of an offence be punished for such attempt or abetment.

Section 98(2) of Gujarat Prohibition Act – Any receptacle, package or covering in which any of the articles liable to confiscation by the order of the Court.

Section 132 of Gujarat Prohibition Act – Article seized – [When anything has been seized, under the provisions of this Act by a Prohibition Officer exercising powers under section 129 or by an Officer in-charge of a Police Station].

ISSUE –

Whether the vehicle seized in connection with the offense under the Gujarat Prohibition Act could be released pending trial.
Whether the appellant’s approach, directly filing a Special Criminal Application in the High Court, was appropriate.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court analyzed Section 451 of the Cr.P.C., which deals with the custody and disposal of property during an inquiry or trial. It emphasized that the criminal court has the jurisdiction to pass orders regarding custody or disposal of the property. The appellant’s direct approach to the High Court was deemed inappropriate, as there existed a specific statutory provision under Cr.P.C. for seeking custody of the seized property.

Regarding the prohibition against the release of the vehicle under Section 98(2) of the Gujarat Prohibition Act, the court noted the ambiguity in its wording. It observed that the provision lacked coherence in its construction and did not clearly establish a relationship between its parts. However, considering the broader context of the Act and Cr.P.C., the court concluded that the vehicle could not be released without proper legal procedure being followed.

The court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the appellant should approach the concerned criminal court for custody of the vehicle during the trial. It clarified that the dismissal didn’t bar the appellant from seeking relief through the appropriate legal channels.

Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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2 Apr

Appeals against the Contempt orders of Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) available only before the Supreme Court and not High Court: Allahabad High Court

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Blog #allahabadhc, #Appeals, #Article226, #CAT, #centraladministrativetribunal, #ContemptofCourtOrders, #HighCourt, #Jurisdiction, #Section17ofAdministrativeTribunalAct, #Section19ofContemtofCourtAct, #SupremeCourt, #writpetition

Case title: Dr Brajendra Singh Chauhan & Ors. Vs Central Administrative Tribunal & Ors

Case no.: Writ Application No. – 602 of 2024

Order on: March 22nd, 2024

Quoram: Justice Vivek Kumar Birla and Justice Donadi Ramesh

Facts of the case

The petitioners who were initially appointed as Short Term Medical Officers had approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Allahabad Bench and sought to issue an order to the respondents for their appointment as regular Assistant Medical Officers. The CAT ruled in favour of the petitioners. However, the petitioners alleging non-compliance of the order by the respondents again approached the CAT by filing a contempt petition under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Tribunal noting a substantially compliance of the order by the respondents disposed of the application. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners appealed before the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Respondent’s Counsel submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 by citing Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (AT Act) in conjunction with Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (CC Act).

Legal Provisions

Article 323A – It empowers the Parliament to enact the law providing for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals and specifies the jurisdiction and powers of such Tribunals including their power to punish for contempt.

Section 14 & Section 15 of the AT Act – It specifies the jurisdiction, powers and authority for the Central Administrative Tribunal and State Administrative Tribunal respectively.

Section 17 of the AT Act – It empowers the Tribunal to punish for contempt of court and exercise its power similar to the High Court with regard to provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Section 12 of the CC Act – It provides Punishment for Contempt of Court.

Section 19 of the CC Act – It provides that the appeals against the orders of Tribunal shall lie as a matter of right to the Bench of at least two Judges of High Court, where the contempt order is passed by the Single Judge and it shall lie to the Supreme Court where the order is passed by the Bench.

Court’s Analysis and Judgement

The Court addressing the question of maintainability of writ petition filed before the High Court against the orders passed under the Contempt of Courts Act delved into Article 323 A, Sections 14 & 17 of the AT Act and Sections 11, 12 & 19 of the CC Act. It drew a distinction between the orders passed by the Tribunal under Section 14(1) of the AT Act and the order passed under Section 17 of the AT Act. The Bench noted that the while there is no statutory remedy of appeal available under the former, the latter provides the same by virtue of Section 19 of the CC Act. Further, it noted that since the contempt proceeding under Section 17 of the AT Act is dealt with by a bench of not less than two members, the orders passed would be appealable only before the Supreme Court. Hence, it ruled that any order or decision of the Tribunal under the Contempt of Courts Act shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order.

The Court heavily relied on the precedence laid down in the cases of T. Sudhakar Prasad Vs Government of A.P. and L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and held that the orders of the Tribunal under the Contempt of Courts Act shall be appealable only before the Supreme Court and no writ petition against the same shall be maintainable before the High Court under Article 226 / 277 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, it dismissed the present petition citing the lack of maintainability. This judgement thus, throws light on the jurisdictional scope of appeals arising from contempt proceedings under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and clears line on the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in matters regarding contempt orders issued by the Tribunal.

Judgement Reviewed by – Keerthi K

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12 Mar

Bombay High Court: Tendering Authority’s actions are arbitrary in GST matters

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Blog #HighCourt, #tender, #writ

Case Title: M/s. H.P.Ghumare versus The state of Maharashtra, The Principal Secretary, The District Collector and The Resident Deputy Collector.

Case No: Writ Petition No.12103 of 2023

Decided on: 6th March,2024

Quorum: Judge SMT. Vibha Kankawadi and Judge S.G.Chapalgaonkar.

Facts of the case:

Respondent 4 invited petitioners and the other two lowest bidders to negotiate the rendering authority. Due to the petition’s delay, the respondent no. 3 passed a decision on November 20, 2023, disqualifying the petitioner even though he was the highest bidder and deemed competent. On July 13, 2023, the district collector respondent number three issued an e-tender notification. The request for bids to provide the district with water tankers. The petitioner provided all necessary paperwork. There were eight bidders that entered this tender. They were all deemed eligible to receive tender notices. During the financial bid opening, L1 was the petitioner’s lowest bidder. Additionally, his proposal was 43% less than the reported estimate of the price in E notification of tender. According to the petitioner, who stated that the tender was GST-exempt, three bidders were called to negotiate in the respondent’s office. However, a different bidder qualified for the bidding procedure even though they did not submit their GST numbers. In his statement, the petitioner acknowledged that his GST registration had been canceled. He was found ineligible on the grounds that he had not complied with Tender Condition No. 11.The petitioner’s learned attorney, Miss Pradnya Talekar, argued that condition no. 11 of the tender was not necessary because services for the task under tender are GST exempt. In the technical review that followed the tender notice on July 13, 2023, the petitioner and the other bidders were found to be qualified.

Petitioner Contentions :

The petitioner contends that he is a reputed contractor and since 2021, has undertaken the work of water supply through tankers under various contracts. Respondent No. 3: District Collector, Beed, had floated an E-Tender notice Dated 12.07.2023, inviting bids for the supply of water tankers in District Beed. As per Schedule, the petitioner submitted his bid along with the requisite documents. All eight bidders participated in the tender process. On technical scrutiny, all eight (8) participants were declared qualified. She relies on the observations of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Poddar Steel Corporation vs Ganesh Engineering Works and others reported in [(1991) 3 SCC 273] to contend that the tendering authority is entitled to give up tender conditions of little or no significance. Considering the nature of the contract and the non-applicability of GST for the work under tender, such a condition was waived. It is well settled that tendering. Authority may deviate from and not insist upon the strict literal compliance of the condition in appropriate cases. The aforesaid aspect has been considered by the Supreme Court of India in the case of C.J. Fernandez vs State of Karnataka reported in (1990) 2 SCC 488, and also in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489.

Respondent Contentions:

Respondent no.3 issued a communicated dated 17/20.11.2023 disqualifying the petitioner from E-Tender process giving reason that false information regarding ‘GST’ number was incorporated in the tender submitted by the petitioner. He submitted representation for execution of the agreement, however, to his surprise, he received a communication/notice dated 25.9.2023 by which 3 (two) lowest bidders including the petitioner were invited for negotiations in the office of Respondent No.3. Petitioner objected to such notice being contrary to the terms of tender as well as the government circulars and rule-book published by the Government. Petitioner has further pointed out that he has successfully supplied the requisite number of the tankers in past and possess best experience. The court quashed the communication, declared the petitioner qualified as the Lowest Bidder (L-1), and allowed participation in the E-Tender process initiated on 13.7.2023. The writ petition was disposed of ruling in favor of the petitioner without costs.

Court Analysis and Judgement:

The court found the actions of the tendering authority arbitrary .The petitioner’s objections regarding GST registration were considered, leading to the decision in the petitioner’s favor. It is therefore, evident that waiver of condition No.11 by the Tendering Authority was based on rationality. Such a waiver is neither a mistake of fact or accidental omission. This appears to be a thoughtful decision to waive unessential tender condition. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner invited our attention to the similar tenders floated in various other districts, by which the condition regarding GST has been waived by the Tendering Authority. We are therefore, of the considered view that the Tendering Authority/Respondent no.3 has chosen not to insist on condition no.11 since it was of little or no significance or it was classified as non-essential condition of eligibility being ancillary or subsidiary with main object to be achieved by the condition. It is well settled that Tendering Authority may deviate from and not to insist upon the strict literal compliance of the condition in appropriate cases. The judgment was delivered by S.G. Chapalgaonkar and Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, quashing the communication and subsequent disqualification order. The case is ruled in favor of the petitioner, partially allowing the Writ Petition.

Judgement Analysis Written by – K.Immey Grace

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27 Feb

Producing the documents during cross examination is permissible under law: Supreme Court

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The case of Mohammed Abdul Wahid Vs Nilofer & Anr. (Special Leave Petition (Civil)No.14445 of 2021), there were two contradictory judgements by the high court of Bombay single bench. The judgements address the difference between a party to a suit and a witness in a suit, as well as when it is permissible to produce documents directly during cross-examination. The court determined that a witness and a party to a suit are not the same, and evidence cannot be produced during cross-examination. On appeal, the division bench upheld the decision. The current petition concerns the validity of Bombay High Court judgements.

The court concluded that neither a witness nor a party to a suit serves a different purpose in the witness box and that Order XVI Rule 21’s “so far as it is applicable” clause does not suggest otherwise. It was noted that neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant is prohibited from appearing before the court to present evidence by the term “witness.”

In regards to the production of evidence, the court decided that the parties to the lawsuit would also profit from the freedom to produce documents for the two purposes of cross-examining witnesses and refreshing one’s memory. The court noted that if these documents are not used to properly ask questions of and receive answers from either party in a lawsuit, the other party may not be able to adequately prove their case, which could seriously jeopardise the proceedings. As a result, the proposition that the law distinguishes between a party to a suit and a witness for the purposes of evidence is invalid. It is well established law that what is not pleaded cannot be argued, because the other party must be aware of the contours of the case in order to adjudicate it.

Written by – Surya Venkata Sujith

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