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HIGH COURT: BEING EMPLOYED IN PAKISTAN DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MAKE ONE A CITIZEN OF PAKISTAN.

The Custodian of Enemy Property for India has listed up to sixty-eight immovable properties in Kerala as ‘enemy properties,’ and thus, the High Court’s order can alleviate other similar cases as well. undefined

Thiruvananthapuram: In a recent relief to the 74-year-old man from Malappuram in Kerala, the Kerala High Court has set aside the restrictions placed on the property owned by him by the Custodian of Enemy Property for India, claiming that the man had purchased the land from his father who used to work in the neighbouring country, Pakistan.

A single bench of Justice Viju Abraham stated in the order produced on Monday that if a person went to an enemy nation in order to find a job, then it could not be assumed that he was a person from enemy nation.

There are as many as 68 immovable properties in Kerala which have been classified by the Custodian of Enemy Property for India as ‘enemy properties,’ and thus the HC order may mean relief in other similar cases as well.

P Ummer Koya, a retired police official and a native of Chettippadi in Malappuram challenging the archaic practice when the Parappanangadi village officer in Malappuram rejected his request to pay the land tax of 20. 5 cents of land for which he had recorded from his father Kunji Koya who once worked in Pakistan for few years.

The respective revenue authorities stated that the property in question was taken over under the provisions of the Enemy Property Act, 1968 and was under investigation by the Custodian of Enemy Property for India as the petitioner’s father was suspected to be an ‘enemy’ (Pakistan national) as per the definition contained in the said Act and, therefore, the property in question was also considered to be an ‘enemy property’. Hence, on the land, the restriction was imposed by the Custodian of Enemy Property for India.

The petitioner Ummer, with advocate M A Asif, argued that his father was born in Malappuram in 1902 and was domiciled in India when the Constitution was enacted in 1950. He visited Pakistan in 1953 in order to search for a job he had been a helper in a hotel in Pakistan for a short period of time.

He also said his father felt threatened by the police when he was still a national of Pakistan and approached the centre to know his citizenship status and the centre advised him that Kunji did not take the Pakistani citizenship willingly, therefore he still remains an Indian citizen. For this reason, the said property could not be rightly regarded as ‘enemy property’ as contended by Ummer’s counsel. Kunji also passed away in India and was buried in Malappuram district.

The court directed that since the father of the petitioner can not be termed as an ‘Enemy’ and his properties can not be termed as ‘Enemy Property’, the restriction imposed on the land should be quashed.

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JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

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Supreme Court quashes petitions; States that without proving the said testamentary instrument, the petitioners cannot not challenge the judgment of the High Court.

CASE TITLE –  Mohideen Abdul Khadar (Dead) Through Lrs. Versus Rahmath Beevi (D) Thr. Her Lrs. And Ors

CASE NUMBER – 2023 INSC 969 (Neutral Citation)

DATED ON – 01.11.2023

QUORUM – Justice Aniruddha Bose & Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitions have been filed by two nephews of Mohideen Abdul Khadar, who died on 14.06.2019. He had interest in two blocks of lands, adjacent to each other located in Thenkasi Taluk, Kadayanallurpet within the Kadayanallur municipal limits in the State of Tamil Nadu. The petitioners bring this action in the capacity of legatees of said Mohideen. The dispute relates to title of Mohideen in respect of one block out of the two, described as first scheduled property in his plaint which triggered off the suit giving rise to this proceeding. The other part of the dispute is over retention of his possession and tenancy right in respect of second scheduled property, as described in his plaint. The first scheduled property measures approximately 15×15 sq. feet over which Mohideen claimed title whereas the second scheduled property measures approximately 15×18 sq. feet. There is some dispute on its measurement. In respect of the latter block of land, one Rahmath Beevi sued for delivery of vacant possession whereas Mohideen asked for protection of his possession in his suit. The original owner of both these properties was one Ameenal Beevi (since deceased) and she had conveyed the first scheduled property to Mohideen on 16.08.1989 through a deed of sale. So far as the second scheduled property is concerned, the case of the petitioners is that it was rented out to their predecessor by Ameenal Beevi only. Said Ameenal Beevi had conveyed this property to Rahmath Beevi (since deceased) on 30.05.1995 through another deed. Original Suit No. 172 of 1995 was instituted by Mohideen in the Court of Principal District Munsif Judge, Thenkasi. In this suit Mohideen claimed benefit of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. This Statute gives certain additional protection to a class of tenants beyond what is contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter ‘1882 Act’). Mohideen along with one Sahul Hameed, who also appears to have had been in occupation of part of the land conveyed to Rahmath Beevi by Ameenal Beevi had been served with notices to quit by Rahmath Beevi in terms of Section 106 of the 1882 Act both dated 11.08.1995. Mohideen wanted declaration of title to the first scheduled land and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing his peaceful possession over the second scheduled property. So far as status of first scheduled property is concerned, Mohideen’s title is not in much dispute. In their counter-affidavit, petitioners claiming to be the legal representatives of Rahmath Beevi (henceforth referred to as the respondents) have taken a plea that Mohideen himself had sold the first scheduled property on 06.12.2017 to his two nephews. They appear to be the petitioners before us. Rahmath Beevi’s (second defendant in O.S. No.172 of 1995, represented by her legal representatives before us) stand has been that she had become owner of the second scheduled property on the basis of the aforesaid registered sale deed. Rahmath Beevi, in the suit instituted by her (O.S. No.464 of 1995) in the same Court claimed relief of mandatory injunction seeking removal of Mohideen and Sahul Hameed from the properties specified by her. They were the first and the second defendants respectively in Rahmat Beevi’s suit. In this suit, she also claimed ground rent from the defendants in that suit. In her suit, she referred to four schedules to describe the suit property representing different interests. The first schedule in O.S. No.464 of 1995 matches with the first schedule of O.S. No.172 of 1995. As regards the second scheduled property, it was Rahmath Beevi’s case that it involved an area of 15×18 sq. feet. The third scheduled property in her plaint comprised of an area of 6.2×6.9 sq. feet within second scheduled land. As recorded in the judgment of the Trial Court in respect of the third scheduled property, Sahul Hameed was the tenant thereof, but he did not contest the suit. It was held by the Trial Court that three-fourth portion of the third scheduled property was within the second scheduled land and the rest of the third scheduled property fell in the first scheduled land. Said Sahul Hameed, as it appears from the cause title of this petition, is the son of Rahmath Beevi. It was the case of Rahmath Beevi that Mohideen had taken on rent the fourth scheduled land from Ameenal Beevi and put up a “temporary shop” there. The pleading in the plaint gives an impression that it was a temporary structure. In her suit, Rahmath Beevi wanted vacant possession of the fourth scheduled property and removal of the construction set up thereon. The Trial Court granted declaration in favour of Mohideen in respect of first scheduled property. His claim on second scheduled property was dismissed.

 

ISSUES

  1. Whether the notice under Section 106 of the 1882 Act is valid.
  2. Whether the petitioners were entitled to protection of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act or not.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

Mohideen appealed against the judgment and decree in both the suits. The First Appellate Court sustained the Trial Court’s finding in O.S. No.172 of 1995 as regards first scheduled property, but the Trial Court’s judgment on second scheduled property was set aside. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court in O.S. No.464 of 1995 was set aside. Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had dealt with the matters by a common judgment (of each Court). Rahmath Beevi had filed two appeals before the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the High Court also disposed of both the appeals by a common judgment delivered on 25.09.2018. It is this judgment which is assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the petitioners. Respondents argued that without proving the said testamentary instrument, the petitioners could not challenge the judgment of the High Court in the capacity of legatees. It was further argued that tenancy could not be a subject of disposition under any testamentary instrument. So far as locus of the petitioners is concerned, the Supreme Court had allowed their plea for substitution by an order passed on 31.08.2021. Now by proceeding on the basis that the petitioners were substituted would not determine finally their locus to maintain the present petitions deriving their right from the said testamentary instrument. But as the court have held against the petitioners on merit, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not find the need to examine the issues. The present petitions were accordingly dismissed.

 

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Judgement Reviewed by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

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Madhya Pradesh High Court stressed on establishing substantial question of law for admitting a second appeal

CASE TITLE- Vishnu Singh S/O Jagdish Singh Vs Kamal Singh and Ors.

CASE NUMBER- Second Appeal No. 76 of 2021

DATED ON- 18.06.2024

QUORUM- Honourable Justice Avanindra Kumar Singh

FACTS OF THE CASE

The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants for declaration of title regarding the suit property situated in village Sukakhedi, total land measuring 9.962 hectares in full part and on 6.985 hectares for declaring the title on 1/2 part along with declaring that sale-deed as null and void and injucting plaintiffs by permanent injuction to interfere in the possession and use of suit land by plaintiff. On an appeal by the plaintiff, learned Second Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 63 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant contented that, there was a Will dated in favour of the plaintiff. Santribai, wife of late Nepal Singh had willed the suit property to him as she was issueless but defendants partitioned the suitland on false ground and obtained a revenue order in favour of Indira Bai.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The defendant contented that late Nepal Singh, husband of Santribai had purchased the suit land from joint family income in his name, therefore, Santribai and Indirabai, both were entitled.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court analyzed that, plaintiff witness No.2 Gulzar Singh as per Section 63 of Hindu Succession Act has not stated that Santribai had signed the Will before him therefore, the execution of the Will was proved is incorrect.  Even otherwise, plaintiff Vishnu Singh admitted that Nepal Singh did not have any other extra income besides agricultural income and regarding the statement that land was purchased from the gold and jewellery received from father and mother of Santribai, there were no pleadings of the plaintiff in the suit, therefore, evidence without pleading cannot be accepted. Moreover, the suit should have been filed within three years but the suit was filed after the limitation time bar. The court held that no substantial question of law arises on which this second appeal can be admitted and the appeal got dismissed.

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Judgement Reviewed By- Shreyasi Ghatak

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Supreme Court Upheld the Decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court on Registration of Sale Deed.

Case Name: Kanwar Raj Sing (D)TH.LRS vs. Gejo (D)TH.LRS
Case Number: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9098 OF 2013
Dated: January 02, 2024
Quorum: Honourable Justice ABHAY S. OKA

FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondents are the legal representatives of the Plaintiff Gejo. There are total 8 defendants Plaintiff claimed a declaration of ownership over the land measuring 71 kanals 8 marlas (“suit property”) based on the sale deed executed on 6th June 1975 and registered on 23rd July 1975. According to the case of the original plaintiff – Smt. Gejo, before registration of the sale deed, an interpolation was made in the sale deed by the first defendant by adding that only 1/3rd share measuring 23 kanals and 8 marlas was being sold. The suit was contested by the first defendant, contending that what was sold was the area of 23 kanals and 8 marlas, which was his 1/3rd share in the suit property.

The Trial Court decreed the suit and held that what was sold to the original plaintiff was the entire land measuring 71 kanals 8 marlas. The first and eighth defendants preferred an appeal before the District Court. On 23rd August 1984, the Additional District Judge allowed the said appeal and held that the correction made in the sale deed was bona fide and was not fraudulently made. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal before the High Court. The plaintiff died during the pendency of the second appeal. High court passed a order in favour of plaintiff and then the unsuccessful defendant moved an appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order of high court.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  • Section 47 of The Registration Act, 1908

Time from which registered document operates —A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.”

  • Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1984

“Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made. —Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.

  • Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.
  • Contract for sale—A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties.

It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.”

Issues raised:

  1. Whether the sale deed as originally executed will operate?
  2. The corrections unilaterally made by the first defendant after the execution of the sale deed without the knowledge and consent of the purchaser will have to be ignored?

Submissions:

Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that as the price of the property subject matter of the sale deed was only Rs. 30,000/-, it is impossible that a vast area of 71 kanals 8 marlas was sold under the sale deed. Learned counsel submitted that the sale took effect from the date on which the sale deed was registered and not from the date on which it was executed. He submitted that what is conveyed by the sale deed is what is mentioned in the registered sale deed. He submitted that even the agreement for sale executed before the execution of the sale deed refers to the sale of 1/3rd share of the first defendant and not the entire property. He submitted that the entry of the name of the original plaintiff in the revenue records as the owner of the whole area would not confer any title as what is relevant is the description of the property in the registered sale deed.

Court Analysis and Judgment:

The Hon’ble court referred section 47 of Registration Act,1908 and also took precedence from Ram Saran Lall v. Domini Kuer and analyzed that Section 47 applies to a document only after it has been registered, and it has nothing to do with the completion of the sale when the instrument is one of sale. It was also held that once a document is registered, it will operate from an earlier date, as provided in Section 47 of the Registration Act.

After referring section 54 of Transfer of Property Act,1984 the Court has observed Every sale deed in respect of property worth more than Rs. 100/- is compulsorily registerable under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, a sale deed executed by the vendor becomes an instrument of sale only after it is registered.

After considering the facts of this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed The first defendant admittedly made the said interpolation after it was executed but before it was registered. In terms of Section 47 of the Registration Act, a registered sale deed where entire consideration is paid would operate from the date of its execution. Thus, the sale deed as originally executed will operate. The corrections unilaterally made by the first defendant after the execution of the sale deed without the knowledge and consent of the purchaser will have to be ignored. Only if such changes would have been made with the consent of the original plaintiff, the same could relate back to the date of the execution. It is not even the first defendant’s case that the subsequent correction or interpolation was made before its registration with the consent of the original plaintiff.

Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the decision of High Court and dismissed the appeal.

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JUDEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

Click here to view full judgement: Kanwar Raj Sing (D)TH.LRS vs. Gejo (D)TH.LRS

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Delhi HC dismisses appeal; Upholds daughter’s Class I inheritance rights.

CASE TITLE – Ms. Veeneta (Since Deceased) Through Lrs. v. Ms. Jyoti Gupta

CASE NUMBER – FAO(OS) 143/2023 & C.M.Nos.67425-67426/2023

DATED ON – 22.05.2024

QUORUM – Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice Ms. Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Appeal has been filed under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, challenging the impugned order dated 28th November, 2023, passed by the learned Single Judge in CS (OS) No. 392/2019, dismissing the I.A. No. 14019/2021 filed by the Appellants. Late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta was the defendant no.1 in the civil suit filed by Respondent seeking partition, possession, rendition of accounts and ancillary reliefs qua the estate of late Sh. Parmanand Gupta. The suit properties relevant for the present appeal are: (a) Property No. D-133, Mahendru Enclave, Delhi – 110033; (b) Plot No. D-136, Mahendru Enclave, Delhi; (c) Plot No. D-114, Mahendru Enclave, Delhi; and (d) House No. 1601, Outram Lane, Kingsway Camp, Delhi – 110009

ISSUES

Whether the Appellants are entitled to the properties from the late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta, by virtue of previous unregistered purchase agreements.

Whether the past settlement between Sh. Parmanand Gupta and his first wife (Respondent’s mother) extinguish the Respondent’s inheritance rights.

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, prescribes the order of Class-I heirs.

Section 16 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, prescribes the rights of a spouse in inheritance.

Section 278 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, prescribes the process of obtaining a grant of letters of administration for an intestate estate.

 

CONTENTIONS BY THE APPELLANT

The Learned Counsel for the Appellants stated that Appellant No. (ii) i.e., Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Singhal (‘SKS’) is the brother of the late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta. He stated that Appellant No. (ii) had purchased properties bearing no. D-114 and D-136, Mahendru Enclave, Delhi, from late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta in the year 2006 by way of the customary documents i.e., Agreement to Sell (ATS), General Power of Attorney (GPA), receipt and Will. He stated that though there is no registered sale deed in favour of Appellant No. (ii), these customary documents are sufficient to entitle the said Appellant to be impleaded as a legal representative of late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta in the suit proceedings. He stated that in the alternative, it was also the case of the Appellants herein that properties bearing no. D-114 and D-136, Mahendru Enclave, Delhi and property no. 1601, Outram Lane, Kingsway Camp, Delhi – 110009 were purchased by late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta from late Sh. Parmanand Gupta in the year 1999-2000. He stated that at the relevant time, the sale consideration for purchase was provided by Appellant Nos. (i) and (ii) to late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta. He stated that, therefore, the interest of late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta in these three properties would devolve upon the Appellants herein. The Learned Counsel further stated that during the divorce by mutual consent of late Sh.Parmanand Gupta with his first wife, Smt. Madhu Gupta (i.e., the mother of Respondent), a settlement was arrived at between the said parties. He stated that as per the said settlement, all rights of the Respondent qua late Sh. Parmanand Gupta stood settled. He stated that, therefore, Respondent is not entitled to any inheritance from the estate of late Sh. Parmanand Gupta

 

CONTENTIONS BY THE RESPONDENT

The Learned Counsel for the Respondent stated that as held by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order, it is the Respondent herein, who is the natural legal heir of late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta as per Section 15(1)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (‘Act of 1956’). He stated that, therefore, the Appellants are not entitled to substitution in the suit, and that after the death of late Sh. Parmanand Gupta, his mother late Smt. Bhagwati had filed a probate petition bearing PC No. 42284/2016, under Section 278 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (‘Act of 1925’) seeking a grant of letters of administration for his estate. The said petition was opposed by the late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta, who filed her objections admitting the ownership of the late Sh. Parmanand Gupta qua the suit properties but claimed the exclusive right of inheritance based on an unregistered Will dated 12th December, 2003. He stated that the late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta propounded the said unregistered Will for contending that the subject properties have devolved upon her exclusively. The Trial Court after concluding evidence, vide judgment dated 17th March, 2018, returned a categorical finding that the said unregistered Will dated 12th December, 2003 was not genuine and that Sh. Parmanand Gupta died intestate. The aforesaid finding in the said judgment has not been challenged by late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta and the same has become final, and is binding on any person claiming through her.

 

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi noticed that the underlying suit for partition had been filed qua the estate of late Sh. Parmanand Gupta by his only daughter i.e., the Respondent herein. In the suit, the Respondent impleaded her stepmother, Ms. Vaneeta Gupta, as defendant no. 1 and her grandmother, Smt. Bhagwati, as defendant no. 2. With the death of Ms. Vaneeta Gupta and Smt. Bhagwati, the Respondent is the sole surviving Class-I legal heir of late Sh. Parmanand Gupta. They also took notice of the case between the parties which took place before the Trial Court, where, the Trial Court vide its judgment dated 17th March, 2018, concluded that the Will dated 12th December, 2003, was not genuine and declared that late Sh. Parmanand Gupta died intestate. The findings returned by the Probate Court in the said judgment had not been challenged and has attained finality, and stated that the ownership of late Sh. Parmanand Gupta of the suit properties is not in dispute. The Hon’ble High Court held that the said findings of the learned Single Judge are correct on a plain reading of Sections 15 and 16 of the Act of 1956, and that the submission of the Appellants that the properties which (i) were purchased by the late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta and also, (ii) which devolved on late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta from late Sh. Parmanand Gupta, would both be inherited by the Appellants under the Act of 1956 is contrary to law and without any merits. The Appellants are, therefore, not entitled to inherit late Ms. Vaneeta Gupta’s estate under the Act of 1956. They further stated that the contention of the Appellants that the Respondent is not entitled to claim succession under the Act of 1956 to the estate of late Sh. Parmanand Gupta due to the settlement recorded between late Sh. Parmanand Gupta and late Ms. Madhu Gupta during their divorce was without any basis, and that there was no stipulation in the said settlement that the Respondent’s rights to succession under Act of 1956 shall stand extinguished. The Hon’ble High Court held that the Respondent is admittedly the Class-I legal heir of late Sh. Parmanand Gupta as per Section 8 of the Act of 1956 and the said settlement does not curtail her rights of succession under the Act of 1956, and the appeal was thereby dismissed, stating that is had no merits.

 

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Judgement Reviewed by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

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