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Supreme Court Overturns Delhi HC Order on Caste Slur Case, Upholds Magistrate’s Order

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CASE TITLE – Priti Agarwalla & Ors. v. The State of GNCT of Delhi & Ors.

CASE NUMBER – Criminal Appeal No(s). 348 of 2021 & 349 of 2021

DATED ON – 17.05.2024

QUORUM – Justice S.V.N Bhatti & Justice M.M. Sundresh

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Olympic Riding and Equestrian Academy, Eastern Jaunapur, New Delhi (for short, “OREA”), is a training facility for enthusiastic equestrian athletes. Mr. Kapil Nath Modi administers and runs the said training facility. Appellant Nos. 2, 3, 6 and Respondent No. 2 were the trainee athletes in OREA. Appellant No. 1 is the mother of Appellant No. 2. Appellant Nos. 4 and 5 are the parents of Appellant No. 6. The equestrian sport dates back to the ancient Greek era and has been an Olympic sport from 1900 onwards. The dressage sport is popularly known as horse ballet. The riders and their horses are judged based on their movement, calmness, suppleness and flexibility. The controversy considered in the present appeal reflects whether the athletes under training at OREA, who wanted to control the mind and body of a horse, have lost the calmness, suppleness and flexibility while being trained at OREA. On 03.04.2018, Appellant No. 4 filed a complaint before SHO, P.S. Fatehpur Beri, against the administrator of OREA. The said complaint is not made under any specific section of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The administrator, however, considering the nature of the allegations in the FIR lodged against him before SHO, P.S. Fatehpur Beri, on 06.04.2018, moved an application for anticipatory bail before the Saket District Court, Delhi. On 11.04.2018, the anticipatory bail application of the administrator stood dismissed. On 12.04.2018, Appellant No. 1 and her husband filed yet another complaint against the administrator of OREA, on the alleged illtreatment meted out to their son/Appellant No. 2 by the administrator. Daksh Mittal wrote a letter dated 21.04.2018 to the administrator, informing the conspiracy being hatched by the members of the “Alliance” WhatsApp group to kill the administrator and attack Respondent No. 2 by pouring acid on Respondent No. 2. The administrator, on 22.04.2018, by referring to the letter dated 21.04.2018, filed a complaint before SHO P.S. Fatehpur Beri for protection and also to prevent any plan being executed either on the administrator or Respondent No. 2 by a few members of the WhatsApp group, “Alliance”. The Criminal Appeal concerns the complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 on 29.04.2018 before SHO P.S. Fatehpur Beri, South Delhi under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, “the Act of 1989”) against the Appellants herein

 

ISSUE

  1. Whether the order dated 09.07.2018 of the Metropolitan Magistrate conforms to the material on record and satisfies the mandate of section 156(3) of the CrPC?
  2. Whether the complaint(s) dated 29.04.2018/09.05.2018 make out a prima facie case of an offence under section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act 1989?

 

CONTENTIONS BY THE APPELLANTS

The Learned Counsel representing the Appellants argued that the order under appeal had not appreciated the full conspectus of the controversy preceding the filing of the complaint dated 29.04.2018. He stated that the administrator of OREA had encouraged Respondent No. 2 to file a complaint alleging the commission of offences under the Act of 1989, though none existed over the years. The administrator, having been unsuccessful in getting anticipatory bail, etc., in the FIRs filed by the Appellants, had pursued or pressurized Respondent No. 2 to initiate prosecution by filing a complaint dated 29.04.2018 and the application dated 09.05.2018 under the Act of 1989 against the appellants. It was argued that these complaints are false and motivated. He argued that the complaint dated 29.04.2018 and the application dated 09.05.2018 do not disclose that an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force had been made out. The offence alleged against Appellants as stated under section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act of 1989, and to constitute an offence under section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989, the complaint must aver that the commission or omission has been made in public view, and stated that the allegations in the complaints are vague and indefinite and do not constitute an offence arising under the Act of 1989, independent of examination of any other material.

 

CONTENTIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS

The Learned Counsel representing the Respondents argued that the word “Faggot” used in the WhatsApp group “Alliance”, is a casteist remark, and should be punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and stated the Parliament, realizing the need to protect the marginalized sections of the Indian society from caste slurs or abetment of offences against people and property, enacted the Act of 1989, and that the grievances of Respondent No. 2 made through Complaint dated 29.04.2018 fell on deaf ears of the police. He argued that Respondent No. 2, considering his background, suffered in silence the slurs alleged at him for months and years, and filed the complaint and application on 29.04.2018 and 09.05.2018, respectively, so the delay, would not lead to any adverse inference on the alleged commission of an offence under section 3(1)(r) of the Act of 1989, and the argument on “public view” as sine qua non for attracting section 3(1)(r) is untenable in the circumstances of the case. He further stated that although OREA is a private training institute, the utterances satisfy as having been made within the academy. Therefore, these utterances once are made in OREA satisfy as having been made in public view, and the absence of names of witnesses or the public who witnessed this slur is not fatal.

 

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble Supreme Court after going through the facts of the case, summed it up and understood it as the accusation of intentionally abusing and humiliating Respondent No. 2 which spans over a period of two years between 2016 and 2018, and that the allegation prima facie appears to be an omnibus and ambiguous allegation, but however, does not refer to the place nor the public view before whom it was made. They stated that the accusations in the complaints do not satisfy as having been made in any place within public view. Thereby, directing registration of FIR and further steps as unsustainable. And also disagreed with the observations of the High Court of Delhi directing the registration of an FIR, for the reasons they had recorded stated is untenable and warrants interference in the appeal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court then held that the criminal appeal is allowed, and the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate dated 09.07.2018 should be upheld, which was against the directions of the High Court.

 

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The legal strategy unveiled: The High court of Delhi dismisses writ petition for failure to explore alternative avenues

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CASE NUMBER- W.P.(C) 4455/2017 & CM APPL. 19463/2017

DATED ON- 14.05.2024

QUORUM- HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioners/workmen joined the services of the respondent no. 2 (State Bank of Mysore (merged with State Bank of India) as Sweeper/Sweeper-cum-Peon at various branches of the Delhi region on temporary basis. Thereafter, due to the proposed merger of six subsidiary/associate banks including the respondent no. 2 with the State Bank of India, the petitioners on 31st March, 2017, were served with the retrenchment notice. The terms of the said merger scheme contained a condition that only the permanent employees on the rolls of the six associate banks will be absorbed and continue their services with State Bank of India. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have approached the Court seeking reinstatement as well as regularization of their services and setting aside of the said retrenchment notice. The petitioners filed writ of Mandamus and Certiorari before the Honorable Court.

ISSUE RAISED

No such issue was raised before the Hon’ble court. However, the court decided on whether the instant petition is maintainable before the court of law or not?

LEGAL PROVISION

Article 226 of Indian Constitution- Every High Court shall have powers to issue orders or writs including habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, to any person or any government for the enforcement of fundamental rights and other purpose.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS

The contention is that the respondent no. 2 wrongfully terminated the services of the workmen and failed to take into consideration the fact that the petitioners had been working with the respondent for over ten years and the duties and nature of work performed by the them were of a permanent nature. The petitioners were entitled to be regularized on the basis of seniority as the respondent no.2 had a policy in place for regularizing the services of their employees on the basis of seniority. But the respondent did not prepare a seniority list for the same. The petitioners were earlier assured that they will be regularized before the merger, but they were served with retrenchment notices. The said merger scheme is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the petitioners had worked with the respondent no. 2 for over 240 days in a calendar year for the last 10 years and should have been regularized, but the same was not done. Therefore, the petition may be allowed.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent opposed the instant petition, that the same is liable to be dismissed. The petition is not maintainable as the petitioners being “workmen” have an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under which all the disputes pertaining to employment and retrenchment are mandated to be adjudicated by an Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India is discretionary in nature and cannot be invoked when an alternative statutory remedy is available. It is submitted that the impugned retrenchment order falls under the ambit of section 25-F of the Act, whereby, the prescribed mandate under the said section i.e., compensation of 15 days of pay for every completed year of service was paid to the petitioners. If there has been a wrongful termination of services of a daily wager due to non-compliance of section 25-F of the Act, the aggrieved person is entitled to monetary compensation and not reinstatement. Furthermore, the petitioners were employed on a temporary basis and were called intermittently as per requirement, hence, there was no continuity of service. It is further submitted that it is a settled position of law that by mere completion of requirement of 240 days, does not entitle the workman to be eligible for regularization in service. Therefore, the instant petition is liable to get dismissed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court held that, the writ jurisdiction of a High Court although, is supervisory, discretionary and extraordinary, in nature however, the same does not confer an unlimited discretion upon the Courts to entertain each and every kind of claim under the writ jurisdiction. the writ jurisdiction must be invoked to protect infringement of legal or fundamental rights and only in the event when alternative remedy has been exhausted. The writ courts have discretion to grant reliefs under the above said provision if there is established exceptional case warranting such interference. The court observed that both the parties have the recourse to approach an appropriate forum under the Act which is the efficacious alternative remedy. Furthermore, the petitioners have failed to demonstrate a case for ‘exceptional circumstances’ for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the present petition is not maintainable under Article 226 and got dismissed for the failure of the petitioners to exhaust the alternative remedy. This Court also stated that the time taken for the disposal of the present petition shall not affect the limitation period to raise the industrial dispute.

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The amount accumulated in the Fund is to be utilized in terms of Section 58 for welfare of consumer : Delhi High Courtss.

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CASE TITTLE: SVERA AGRO LIMITED V COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL TAX AND GST, GST DELHI

CASE NO: W.P.(C) 11926/2023 & CM. APPLS. 46666/2023, 711/2024

ORDER ON:  29.02.2024

QUORUM: JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA, JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The facts leading to the present petition in question is that, the Petitioner seeks a direction to the respondent to sanction the Refund claim of the petitioner for the period August 2020 to March, 2021. Petitioner further seeks withdrawal of the deficiency memos Issued by the respondent in response to the refund claim of the Petitioner for the period May, 2019 to July, 2019.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 talks about Refund of tax

Section 57 the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides for constitution of a Consumer Welfare Fund

CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER:

The petitioner through their counsel submits that the refund Application was being rejected by issuing deficiency memos requiring The petitioner to furnish a certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant in terms of Rule 89 (2)(l) (m) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

The Learned counsel for respondent submits that the Circular No.125/44/2019 dated 18.11.2019 requires the assessee seeking refund Of unutilized Input Tax Credit to furnish a self-declaration under Rule 89(2)(l) if the amount claimed is less than Rs.2 lakh, otherwise furnish A certificate as required under Rule 89(2)(m).

COURTS ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT:

The court on considering the facts and contentions of the counsel opined that  Section 57 provides for constitution of a Consumer Welfare Fund. The amount accumulated in the Fund is to be utilized in terms of Section 58 for welfare of consumer. Section 54 sub-section (8) stipulates that notwithstanding Anything contained in sub-section (5), the refundable amount instead Of being credited to the Fund is to be paid to the applicant if such Amount is relatable inter-alia to refund of unutilized Input Tax Credit Under sub-section (3).the court further contented that the deficiency memos issued To the petitioner, requiring the petitioner to furnish a certificate of the Chartered Accountant are not sustainable.hence the court accordingly set Aside.  We are informed that pending these proceedings the court further contended that Since part of the amount was denied on account of deficiency Memos, which we have not found to be sustainable in view of the Proviso to Rule 89 (2) (l)(m), the court further holds that petitioner is entitled to Interest on the delayed refund in terms of Section 56 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 at the rate notified by the Government within a period of four weeks from today. the court further noticed that the submission of learned counsel For the petitioner that the online portal of the respondent Was not accepting the refund applications and this Court had permitted The petitioner to file the refund applications for period August, 2019, October, 2019 and December, 2019, physically. As per the petitioner, in view of pendency of the present Petition, further claims could not be lodged. Accordingly, on petitioner Filing such refund applications, the Department shall not reject the Same solely on the ground of limitation.the court accordingly disposed of the petition in above terms.

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If substance of complaint fulfills section 141 of NI Act,the complainant can proceed in accordance with law: Delhi High court

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CASE TITTLE: SHIKHA SHAH V RENU PROMOTERS PVT LTD

CASE NO: CRL.M.C. 456/2022 & CRL.M.A. 2059/2022

ORDER ON: 29.02.2024

QUORUM: . JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Petition filed by the petitioner herein challenges the order dated 03.12.2019 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, in the complaint filed by the respondent herein under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

The facts leading to the present petition in question is that, The above complaint has been filed by the respondent alleging that the accused no.1 therein, that is, Govind Radhe Real Estate Private Ltd. approached the Director of the respondent company through the accused no.2 therein, Narsingh Shah, who is the husband of the petitioner, seeking financial assistance. It was further alleged that the accused no.1, through the accused no.2, had a business relationship with the Director of the respondent company. Further, the accused no.2 and the petitioner herein, who has been arrayed in the Complaint as the accused no.3, were tenants of the respondent’s sister company- M/s BDR Developers Pvt. Ltd., due to which, the respondent advanced a loan of Rs.1,85,00,000/- to the accused no.1. It was the understanding between the parties that the loan advanced by the respondent shall be repaid on or before 20.09.2019 along with interest @24% per annum. It is further alleged that in the month of February, 2019 the accused no.2 in the said complaint, approached the respondent and expressed his difficulty in paying the monthly interest/ installments of the loan. It is alleged that the accused no.1 with the consent of the petitioner herein and the accused no.2, who both are the Directors of the accused no.1, under the signatures of the accused no.2, handed over a cheque for a sum of Rs.2,35,00,000/- to the respondent with specific understanding that the respondent shall be at liberty to encash the said cheque and the same shall be honoured on presentation. It is alleged that relying upon the assurance, the cheque was duly presented by the respondent, however, the same was returned dishonoured with the remark ‘Account Blocked’. It is alleged that the respondent sent a legal notice dated to the accused, including the petitioner, however, no reply was received thereto within the stipulated period. Based on the above averments, the subject complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court. After hearing the arguments and considering the pre-summoning evidence, the learned Trial Court summoned the accused, including the petitioner vide order dated 03.12.2019. Aggrieved of the said order, the petitioner challenged the same by way of a revision petition before the learned PD&SJ, which came to be dismissed by the Order impugned herein.hence this petition.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 lays down that,  returning of a cheque unpaid constitutes an offence only if such return is due to want of funds.

Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, talks about the offence by company

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., talks about the inherent powers of High Court.

CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER:

The petitioner through their counsel rellied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla & Anr and submitted that the complaint lacks the basic and essential averments and, in the absence thereof, the petitioner cannot be summoned in the said complaint. The counsel further submits that  there is no averment made in the complaint that the petitioner was in-charge of or was responsible to the accused no.1 company for the conduct of the business of the said company. further counsel comtented that mere averment that the cheque was issued with the consent of the petitioner, would not be sufficient to charge the petitioner of the offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

The Respondent through their counsel rellied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.P.Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Dr.Snehalatha Elangovan and further submitted that Section 141 of the NI Act is in two parts, while the Sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the NI Act makes a person, who is in-charge of or was responsible to the company for its conduct, liable for the acts of the company,the counsel further contents that, Subsection (2) of Section 141 of the NI Act makes an official of a company including, inter alia, a Director on whose consent, connivance or neglect the offence is committed by the company, liable to be proceeded against.the counsel further submits tha, in the present case, the respondent has not only pleaded that the petitioner being a Director of the accused no.1 company was in-charge of and in control of the affairs of the accused no.1 company, but has also pleaded that the cheque which has been dishonoured was issued with the consent of the petitioner.counsel further submitted that, the summoning order has rightly been passed by the learned Trial Court.counsel also further submits that to the legal notice, a joint reply was given by the accused, including the petitioner herein. He submits that in the said reply also, there is no denial by the petitioner to the fact that the cheque was issued with her consent

COURTS ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT:

The court on having considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, having pursued the meterials on record, refereed to various judicial decisions and interpreted the legal provisions, court further observed that it is apparent that the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash a complaint has to be exercised very sparingly and where, read as a whole, the complaint does not lay the foundation for the offence,the court further opined that, if the substance of the allegations made in the complaint fulfill the requirement of Section 141 of the NI Act, the complaint has to proceed in accordance with law, The court further opined that,It is not necessary to reproduce the language of Section 141 of NI Act verbatim in the complaint, and the complaint is required to be read as a whole. Thev court further interpreted, Section 141 of the NI Act is in two parts. While Sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the NI Act extends the liability to be prosecuted to every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was incharge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, irrespective of whether such person is a Director, Manager, Secretary or other Officer of the Company, Sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the NI Act makes any person with whose consent or connivance or due to whose neglect as a Director, Manager, Secretary, or other Officer of the company, the offence has been committed by the Company, vicariously liable. The burden of proving the consent, connivance or neglect on behalf of the Director or other Officer of the company would rest upon the complainant. Therefore the court further opined that, In the present case, both the above factors are equally present. The respondent in its legal notice and also in the complaint, has made specific averments that the cheque in question was issued with the consent of the petitioner, who is a Director of the accused no.1 company. Though the complaint was filed with an averment that the reply to the legal notice had not been received, the respondent has now placed on record the copy of the reply dated 20.11.2019, which was received after the statutory period by the respondent from the accused including the petitioner herein. The court furthercontented that the  same does not deny the above averment of the respondent that the cheque in question was issued with the consent the petitioner herein. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in S.P.Mani & Mohan Dairy (supra), therefore, the court further is of the view that, no fault can be found in the Impugned Order.the couirt further observed that in exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., does not act as a Court of appeal. The court further opined that, Its jurisdiction is confined to see that there is no miscarriage of justice.the court further opined that It cannot enter into a detailed examination of the evidence. However the court is of the view that, It is equally important to remind oneself of the limited scrutiny required at the stage of summoning the accused. The Court was not expected to minutely scrutinise the averments made in the Complaint as if they were statute. The Complaint has to be read as a whole and in reasonable manner, keeping in mind also the object of Section 138 of the NI Act. Applying the above principles as well, the court on finding  no merit in the present petition, accordingly, dismissed. Off the same

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Delhi HC upholds student rights to readmission for attendance issues

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Case Title: Tripurari Kumar Jha v. Faculty of Law, University of Delhi & Anr.

Case Number: LPA 703/2023

 Dated On: Reserved on 03.05.2024, Pronounced on 31.05.2024 

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Rajiv Shakdher, Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Bansal

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, a student in the LLB program at Delhi University, was detained due to insufficient attendance during the first term of the academic year. The University asserted that there was no provision for readmission if a student was detained for attendance issues in the first term. Delhi University maintained that the amendments made to Ordinance V, specifically Appendix II, in 2007, prohibited the readmission of students who failed to meet the attendance criteria in the first term. This stance was supported by a resolution passed by the University’s Academic Council on December 12, 2007. On July 12, 2012, an amendment to Ordinance IV introduced Article 5(b), which allowed for the readmission of students detained due to a shortage of attendance. This amendment came after the changes to Ordinance V and was argued to supersede it. The appellant argued that the readmission provision in Ordinance IV should prevail over the earlier amendments to Ordinance V. The appellant asserted that under Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV, the University had the power to readmit students, and this provision should apply to all disciplines, including professional courses like LLB. The University cited previous judgments to support its position that provisions in the Prospectus or Information Bulletin are binding on students. However, these cases dealt with different contexts and did not specifically address readmission due to attendance shortfalls. The Bar Council of India indicated that students could be readmitted if they failed to meet attendance requirements for genuine reasons. The BCI suggested that such students could be accommodated in the subsequent academic year within the sanctioned seats. The court analysed the hierarchical structure and powers conferred by the DU Act, highlighting that the Court is the supreme authority with the power to review acts of the Executive Council (EC) and the Academic Council (AC). The court found that the provision for readmission in Ordinance IV, added later, should prevail over the earlier amendments to Ordinance V. The court concluded that the University’s contention was flawed and that it indeed had the power to readmit students under Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV. The court emphasised the need for the University to exercise compassion and consideration for students facing genuine difficulties, aligning with the BCI’s perspective on maintaining educational standards while accommodating genuine cases.

ISSUES

  • Whether the amendments to Ordinance V in 2007 restricting readmission were superseded by the later insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV in 2012.
  • Whether the powers of university bodies like the EC, AC, and Court in matters of readmission were clearly defined under the Delhi University Act.
  • Whether the university’s policies on readmission were in line with BCI recommendations, especially in accommodating students facing genuine difficulties.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  • Delhi University Act: The primary legislation governing the establishment, structure, and functioning of the University of Delhi.
  • Statutes: Rules and regulations derived from the Delhi University Act, providing detailed provisions on various aspects of the university’s administration and operations.
  • Ordinances: Specific regulations within the university’s framework, derived from the Delhi University Act and statutes, detailing procedures and criteria for matters such as admission, promotion, examination, and readmission.
  • Bar Council of India (BCI) Guidelines: External standards and recommendations provided by the Bar Council of India, particularly relevant in matters concerning legal education, curriculum, and student welfare within the university’s law programs.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant argued that the power of readmission for students detained due to attendance issues is vested in the University under Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV. The amendments made to Ordinance V in 2007, which seemingly restricted readmission, were superseded by the subsequent insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV in 2012. The University’s contention that the provision for readmission in Ordinance IV was inapplicable to professional courses, such as LLB, is flawed. The University’s failure to exercise the power conferred upon it by Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV resulted in the erroneous denial of readmission to the appellant. These contentions formed the basis of the appellant’s argument challenging the University’s decision regarding student readmission.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent argued that the provision for readmission in Ordinance IV did not apply to professional courses like LLB. They contended that the amendments made to Ordinance V in 2007, which restricted readmission, were still applicable and had not been superseded by the insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV. The University maintained that the appellant’s admission was cancelled due to a shortfall in attendance, and they did not have the authority to grant readmission under the prevailing ordinances. Additionally, the University asserted that accommodating readmissions for students like the appellant would adversely affect available seats for fresh admissions, creating logistical challenges. These contentions formed the core of the respondent’s defence against the appellant’s claims regarding readmission.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court examined the provisions of Ordinance IV and Ordinance V to determine the university’s authority regarding readmission for students detained due to attendance issues. It concluded that the insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV in 2012 superseded the amendments made to Ordinance V in 2007, thereby conferring the power of readmission to the university.

The court clarified the authority of various university bodies, including the Executive Council (EC), the Academic Council (AC), and the Court, in matters related to readmission. It emphasised that the university had the power to grant readmission, particularly in cases where genuine reasons, such as illness, warranted leniency.

The court highlighted the importance of aligning university policies with the guidelines and recommendations of the Bar Council of India (BCI). It emphasised the need for compassion and understanding towards students facing genuine difficulties, as advised by the BCI.

In conclusion, the court ruled in favour of the appellant, allowing the appeal and directing the university to re-admit the appellant with suitable adjustments. The judgement underscored the university’s responsibility to consider genuine reasons for readmission and ensure alignment with BCI guidelines to maintain high standards in education.

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