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“Hindu Woman Without Own Income Can Enjoy Property Given by Deceased Husband, But Cannot have Absolute Rights Over It: Delhi High Court”

Case title: Manmohan Singh & Anr v. Shital Singh & Ors.

Case no.: CM(M) 1333/2017 & CM APPL. 42656/2017

Dated on: 24th April 2024

Quorum: Justice Prathiba M. Singh

FACTS OF THE CASE

The legal proceedings in question have been conducted through a hybrid mode, blending physical and virtual hearings to ensure accessibility and efficiency. At the heart of the matter is a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by Manmohan Singh and Ravinder Singh, sons of the late Gurcharan Singh, challenging an order dated 26th September 2017.

The impugned order, issued by the Additional District Judge, West, Tis Hazari, Delhi, favored the plaintiffs in a suit concerning the partition of property. The suit, titled ‘Shital Singh v. Manmohan Singh’, involved a dispute over a property located in New Delhi. The plaintiffs, Shital Singh, Raghbir Singh, Harbhajan Singh, and Kawaljit Kaur, sought partition and injunction against the defendants, including Manmohan Singh and Ravinder Singh.

Central to the dispute is the interpretation of the Will executed by Gurcharan Singh on 13th January 1989. The Will delineated the distribution of his properties, including the subject property in question, among his heirs. Specifically, it granted a life estate to his wife, Mahinder Kaur, with certain rights and restrictions.

The petitioners, in their defense, argued that the suit itself was not maintainable under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as Mahinder Kaur’s rights were limited by the terms of the Will. They contended that upon her death, the property should devolve according to the stipulations laid out in the Will.

Conversely, the respondents, relying on legal precedents such as the Supreme Court judgment in ‘Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna’, asserted that Mahinder Kaur’s life estate transformed into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. They argued that her right to the property was not merely for maintenance but constituted an absolute right, regardless of the specific terms of the Will.

The legal battle has traversed various stages, from the trial court to the appellate court, with each step bringing forth new arguments and interpretations. The trial court, in its impugned order, relied on legal principles elucidated by the Supreme Court to rule in favor of the respondents. It held that Mahinder Kaur’s life estate evolved into absolute ownership, thus dismissing the petitioners’ claims based on the terms of the Will.

However, the petitioners, dissatisfied with the trial court’s decision, have sought recourse through the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The appellate court’s intervention has further complicated the matter, prompting a thorough examination of legal precedents and statutory provisions.

At the heart of the legal dispute lies the question of whether Mahinder Kaur’s right to the property was limited to a life estate or whether it conferred absolute ownership upon her. This hinges on the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the applicability of legal precedents to the factual matrix of the case.

While the petitioners advocate for a strict interpretation of the terms of the Will, the respondents contend that broader principles of succession law and equitable considerations dictate a different outcome. The evolving nature of property rights, especially concerning women’s rights and maintenance, adds another layer of complexity to the debate.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS

Interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, The Petitioners contend that the Trial Court erred in interpreting Section 14 of the 1956 Act. They argue that recent jurisprudence, particularly the Supreme Court’s judgment in Jogi Ram (supra), clarifies the distinction between Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the 1956 Act. It emphasizes whether the wife had an interest in the property prior to the Will’s execution. They assert that Section 14(2) preserves a man’s right to bequeath his self-acquired property to his wife for life and thereafter to other legal heirs.

Relevance of Jupudy Pardha Sarathy (supra) The Petitioners argue that the judgment in Jupudy Pardha Sarathy is inapplicable to the present case due to its historical context and specific factual circumstances. They highlight that Jupudy Pardha Sarathy pertained to a Will from 1920, pre-dating the enactment of the 1956 Act. They emphasize distinctions, such as the widow being issueless and the absence of any other assets given to her by her husband.

Lastly, the Petitioners emphasize the importance of upholding the testator’s intentions as expressed in the Will. They argue that the Will clearly outlines the manner in which the property should devolve and that it should be honoured accordingly.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, Mr. Raghav Anthwal, maintains that the decision of the ld. Trial Court was correct and should not be interfered with by this Court. They argue that the subject property should devolve via successorship in accordance with the Trial Court’s interpretation of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

It is asserted that the bequest of rentals from the subject property to the wife indicates that it was intended for her maintenance, thereby granting her an absolute interest beyond her lifetime. This interpretation aligns with Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act, according to which a property given in lieu of maintenance confers absolute ownership upon the recipient.

The subject property is described as the self-acquired property of the deceased, Gurcharan Singh, who bequeathed a life estate to his wife. Despite his passing, his wife enhanced the property by completing the construction of additional floors and continued to collect rent from it during her lifetime.

The counsel relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (1977 INSC 91) to argue that a wife’s right to maintenance constitutes absolute ownership of the property, emphasizing that it cannot be construed as a limited interest. They further cite the recent Supreme Court case of Munni Devi Alias Nathi Devi (Dead) v. Rajendra Alias Lallu Lal (Dead) (2022 INSC 590) to reinforce this position.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute Property: This section deals with the nature of property rights of a Hindu female and the effect of certain dispositions made in her favor.
  • Any property possessed by a Female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
  • Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.

Subsections (1) and (2) of this section are particularly relevant in the context of the arguments presented by both parties regarding the interpretation of bequests and maintenance.

  1. Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA): The submissions reference provisions of this Act concerning maintenance rights of Hindu wives and the implications of property bequests made in lieu of maintenance.

ISSUE

The main issue in the case is whether the wife of the testator, who was bequeathed a life estate in the subject property under the Will, acquired an absolute interest in the property upon her husband’s death, or whether her interest remained restricted to a life estate.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court analyzed the provisions of Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which deal with the nature of property rights of Hindu females. It concluded that Section 14(1) aims to create an absolute interest in case of a limited interest owed to the wife under the law as it stood then. However, it observed that Section 14(2) allows for a restricted estate in favor of the female in cases where a Will creates an independent and new title for the female, distinct from a pre-existing right.

The court emphasized that the objective cannot be to automatically convert a limited estate into an absolute interest, as it would undermine the testator’s intent. In the case at hand, the testator clearly intended to provide only a limited life interest to his wife, with the remainder going to his son after her demise. Therefore, the court held that the provisions of Section 14(2) applied, and the wife only had a life interest in the property.

Additionally, the court referred to precedents such as Jogi Ram v. Suresh Kumar, where it was observed that giving absolute ownership to the wife in every case where the husband had self-acquired property would be against the interest of women and could lead to unintended consequences.

In summary, the court found that the wife’s interest in the subject property remained restricted to a life estate as per the terms of the Will. Consequently, the sale deeds in favor of the respondents, who claimed absolute ownership of the property, were deemed unsustainable.

Therefore, the court set aside the trial court’s order and ruled in favor of the petitioners and respondent No. 5. The matter was directed to proceed for final arguments before the trial court, with the issue regarding the existence of the Will decided in favor of the petitioners and respondent No. 5.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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“Single instance of Adultery does not disentitle the Wife to Maintenance under Section 125(4) of the Cr.P.C: HC of MP while Interpreting Adultery”

Case title: Vijendra v. Rekhabai & Anr.

Case no.: Criminal Revision No.790 of 2019

Dated on: 15th April 2024

Quorum: Justice Prem Narayan Singh

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the realm of family law, the issue of maintenance often stands at the forefront, especially in cases where divorce has been granted on grounds such as adultery. The case in question, brought before the court as a criminal revision petition under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act read with Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., revolves around the award of maintenance to the respondent and her daughter by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhar M.P. The petitioner, aggrieved by the judgment, seeks a reduction in the maintenance amount.

The petitioner, having obtained a divorce decree on the grounds of adultery, contends that the respondent, his former wife, is disqualified from claiming maintenance. The learned trial Court had awarded Rs. 3000/- per month each to the respondent and their daughter. The petitioner bases his argument on the findings of adultery by the family court and cites precedents from the Madras and Karnataka High Courts to support his claim.

On the other hand, the respondent, while acknowledging her subsequent marriage, denies the accusations of adultery, asserting that mere allegations without substantial evidence cannot disqualify her from receiving maintenance. She relies on a judgment of the Delhi High Court to argue that only continuous and repeated acts of adultery warrant the disqualification from maintenance.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The petitioner’s counsel argues that the decree of divorce, based on the finding of adultery, is conclusive evidence of the respondent’s disqualification from maintenance. He cites precedents from the Madras and Karnataka High Courts to reinforce this argument.

M.Chinna Karuppasamy vs. Kanimozhi wherein, the Court has observed that “A divorced wife, who lives in adultery, is disqualified from claiming maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.”

Shanthakumari vs. Thimmegowda wherein the Court has observed that “the oral and documentary evidence produced clearly establish that the petitioner is not honest towards husband and she has got extramarital affairs with neighbour Mahesh and all along, she asserted that she used to stay with him. When the petitioner is staying in adultery, the question of she claiming maintenance does not arise at all. the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner is a legally wedded wife and entitled for maintenance cannot be accepted in view of the conduct of petitioner, who is not honest and is leading adulterous life.”

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The respondent’s counsel refutes the allegations of adultery, emphasizing the lack of substantial evidence to support such claims. She contends that even if adultery occurred, it does not automatically disqualify the respondent from receiving maintenance, as per precedents set by the Delhi High Court.

Sh. Pradeep Kumar Sharma vs. Smt. Deepika Sharma, wherein the Court observed that “only continuous and repeated acts of adultery or cohabitation in adultery would attract the rigours of the provisions under Section 125(4) of Cr.P.C.”

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act: This provision allows for the filing of revision petitions against judgments passed by Family Courts.

Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. (Code of Criminal Procedure): This provision grants the power of revision to higher courts over proceedings in subordinate courts.

Section 125(4) of the Cr.P.C.: This provision deals with the disqualification of a wife from receiving maintenance if she is “living in adultery.”

Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act: This provision states that a judgment or decree on a particular matter, having attained finality, is relevant evidence for deciding similar matters in subsequent cases.

ISSUE

  • Whether the finding of adultery, leading to divorce, disqualifies the respondent from claiming maintenance.
  • What constitutes “living in adultery” as per the relevant legal provisions.
  • Whether the maintenance awarded by the trial court is excessive or justified.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court delves into the legal precedents cited by both parties to ascertain the definition and implications of adultery in maintenance cases. It emphasizes the distinction between isolated acts of adultery and continuous, repeated conduct, which is necessary to disqualify a spouse from maintenance.

In Ashok v. Anita, the HC of Madhya Pradesh interpreting the said provision and observed as reproduced –

A perusal of the provisions of section 125(4) of Cr. P.C. makes it clear that a stray act of adultery on the part of the wife does not amount to adultery within the meaning of section 125(4) and further does not disentitle the wife to maintenance.

Relying on the principles laid down by various High Courts, including the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the court concludes that mere allegations or isolated acts of adultery are insufficient to deny maintenance. It reaffirms that the term “living in adultery” implies a continuous adulterous conduct rather than occasional lapses.

In light of the evidence and legal precedents, the court finds no grounds to interfere with the trial court’s judgment. It upholds the maintenance awarded to the respondent and her daughter, considering the prevailing circumstances and the principles of justice.

The case serves as a significant interpretation of the legal provisions surrounding maintenance in cases of adultery. It underscores the importance of continuous, repeated conduct in establishing disqualification from maintenance, while also emphasizing the need for substantial evidence to support such claims. In upholding the trial court’s decision, the judgment ensures fair treatment and support for the dependent parties involved.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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Bombay High Court: Disposed A Application Challenging The Order Of J.M.F.C As No Issue Regarding Jurisdiction Was Made By Applicant

Title : Nitin Vikas Karake v Mrs.Chetana Nitin Karake

Citation: Criminal Revision Application No.355 Of 2023

Decided On: 28th November, 2023.

Coram: Justice Rajesh S. Patil

Introduction:

This Criminal Revision Application filed under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenges the impugned judgment and order dated 26 September 2023 passed by the Sessions Court, Satara in PWDV Criminal Appeal No.5 of 2023 and order dated 1 February 2023.

Facts:

The Applicant husband and Respondent wife got married on 18 December 2014 at Satara. Respondent wife was earlier married, but since her first husband died, at the time of time of her second marriage, with the Applicant, she was a widow. There are no issues out of the present marriage. As there were disputes and differences between the husband and wife ; wife filed Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.481 of 2022 under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short “D.V. Act”) under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 23 before J.M.F.C., Satara. In the said Application, it was pleaded that she was residing in Pune for the purpose of studying computer education at Pune, and she used to time and again go to Satara. It is further stated that the brother of the wife one Mr.Akshay Arun Patil, is residing at Satara, along with parents and he is taking care of monetary aspect as to education, medical expenses and day to day expenses of the Respondent / wife.

The husband appeared in the proceedings and thereafter filed an application on 29 November 2022, before J.M.F.C. seeking rejection of the complaint filed under D.V. Act on the ground of want of jurisdiction. J.M.F.C. heard the parties and by his judgment and order dated 1 February 2023, rejected the application of the husband. Being aggrieved by the order dated 1 February 2023, passed by J.M.F.C., Husband filed Criminal Appeal under Section 29 of the D.V. Act before the Sessions Court, Satara bearing PWDV Criminal Appeal No.5 of 2023.

The Sessions Court, consequently after hearing the parties in PWDV Criminal Appeal No.5 of 2023, dismissed the appeal by its judgment and order dated 26 September 2023. he present Criminal Revision Application is filed by the husband challenging both the judgment an order passed by J.M.F.C., Satara and Sessions Court.

Court’s Analysis and Judgement:

It is an admitted fact that before the marriage, Respondent wife was residing with her parents at Satara. After the marriage, the husband and wife stayed at Navi Mumbai and also at Pune in a leave and license premises. In the D.V. proceedings filed by the wife at J.M.F.C., Satara, the address of the wife is that of Satara. So also in paragraph 34, it has been stated that she has been taking education of computer at Pune and she has been, time and again going to Satara.

In the present proceedings, it is not the case of the wife that she was temporarily residing at Satara. In fact, her case is that her permanent address is at Satara, which is her parent’s residence. Before marriage she stayed at Satara, there is no permanent address of wife at Pune. Hence, at the most, her residence at Pune can be called as temporary place of residence, and her permanent place of residence would be at Satara. Even the husband has his native place of residence at Karad, which is 50 k.m. away from “Satara city”, even though the husb

Taking into consideration of the above facts, there is no perversity in the finding of J.M.F.C., Satara and Sessions Court, Satara. Hence, this Criminal Revision Application is dismissed.

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Written By : Sanjana Ravichandran

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FIRST WIFE CAN FILE APPLICATION U/S 11 HINDU MARRIAGE ACT FOR DECLARATION OF HUSBAND’S SECOND MARRIAGE AS VOID: ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

CASE TITLE: Garima Singh v. Pratima Singh and Another [First Appeal No. 623/2022]

DECIDED ON: 27.7.2023

CORAM: Hon’ble Saumitra Dayal Singh, J. Hon’ble Vinod    Diwakar, J.

INTRODUCTION:

The Allahabad High Court has affirmed the entitlement of the initial wife to submit an application under Section 11 (void marriages) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking the invalidation of her husband’s second marriage. The Court’s ruling emphasizes that the Hindu Marriage Act, as a socio-welfare law, aims to safeguard the rights of the first wife. An overly narrow interpretation of the Act’s provisions would be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Smt. Garima Singh, the second wife, presented her case to the high court, contending that the first wife lacks the standing to file a case under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, against the second wife and her deceased husband, as only the parties directly involved in the marriage agreement can seek a declaration under Section 11. The division bench had to address the legal question of whether the first wife is entitled to file a case under sections 11 and 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking the annulment of her husband’s marriage with another woman.

CASE ANALYSIS AND DECISION:

The court ruled that the Hindu Marriage Act, as a social and welfare legislation, should be interpreted in a way that promotes the purpose of the law. It emphasized the need for a purposive interpretation when dealing with socio-welfare legislation.

The court disagreed with the reasoning of the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Lakshmi Ammal v. Ramaswami Naicker and another. In that case, it was held that only parties directly involved in the marriage could file a Section 11 application. The court, however, stated that the first wife always has the option to file a suit to declare the husband’s second marriage as void.

The Court has now recognized that the objective of the Hindu Marriage Act is to eradicate the practice of polygamy, and therefore, it is essential to interpret and apply the law in a manner that achieves this objective. It emphasized the importance of adopting a pragmatic approach when interpreting provisions of socio-welfare legislations and subsequently dismissed the appeal filed by the Second Wife.

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Written by- Mansi Malpani