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Karnataka HC upholds that accidental fall from train entitles to receive compensation from the railway tribunals even if that falls within the ambit of “self-infliction”‘.

Case title: Rojamani (since deceased represented by LRs) and Union Bank of India.

Case no: M.F.A. NO.3651/2016 (RCT)

Dated on: 19thApril, 2024

Quorum: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.P. Sandesh

Facts of the case:

On 22.02.14 the deceased Jayamma along with her sister went to Channapatna railway station and purchased the railway ticket to go to Ashokapuram Mysore. Both the of them had to board the Tuticorin express and realised that the said train would not go to Ashokapuram they alighted from the train while alighting the deceased lost her balance and sustained injuries resulting in her death. The respondent railway disputed the claim and denied their liability by stating that the death was not due to accidental fall, within the Section 123 of the railway Act alighting from train which amounts to self-inflicted injuries by virtue of provision of sect124 of railway act. The railway tribunal while affirming that deceased was a bona-fide passenger but denied the compensation on the grounds that the fall of deceased was due to her own voluntary act.

Contentions of the appellant:

Tribunal failed to appreciate that the deceased was an aged person and not a daily commuter. So, when she realized that she boarded the wrong train she alighted suddenly and lost her balance resulting to fatal injuries. In Jameela V. UOI, the counsel for the appellant held that the act amount to mere negligence and not criminal negligence. The counsel relied on the judgement of the SC of Rina Devi V. UOI , reported in 2018 AIR (SC) 2362 that death or injury in course of boarding or deboarding the train will be an untoward incident. Victim will be entitled to compensation and wont fall under section124A merely on plea of negligence as contributory factor. In, Anuradha V. UOI held that “Even the deceased boarded in a wrong train having a valid journey ticket and died while alighting the train that does not mean that he was not a bona fide passenger and on that ground claim cannot be rejected”.

Contentions of the respondent:

The counsel of respondents contended that it’s a clear case of attempt to deboard from running train when it was noticed that they boarded the wrong train for which they relied on Kerala court decision on Joseph P.T. V. UOI AIR 2014, Kerala. Held that passenger moving from a boarded train off side is amounting to carelessness and would be self-inflicting and cannot claim compensation.

Legal provisions:

Section 16 of Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987- A person seeking any relief in respect of the matters referred to in sub-section (1) 8 [or sub-section (1A)] of section 13 may make an application to the Claims Tribunal.

Section 124A of Indian Railway Act, 1989- Section 124A of the Indian Railways Act, 1989 pertains to compensation for untoward incidents.

Issue:

Whether the fall amounts to accidental fall within the purview of section of 123 of the Indian Railways Act?

Court analysis and judgement:

Its clear that from section 124 of the act has no compensation if passenger dies or suffers from injuries due to suicide, self- inflicted harm or due to insanity. The court considered that principles laid down in Jameela V UOI, that the deceased dead is not criminal and railway cannot claim compensation. The court has relied on apex court on UOI V. Prabhakaran held that strict liability can hold railways for compensation due to his own fault. The court goes ahead and states that strict liability is also to be considered. Principles laid down in Rine devi and Anuradha’s case is also applicable to the present case. In view of the aforesaid appeal the miscellaneous appeal was allowed and the order of railway tribunal is set aside by compensating an amount of 4,00,000 with 7% interest from date of filing. The tribunal committed in envoking section 124 of Indian Railways Act by concluding that it’s a self -inflicted injury and reasoning of tribunal is erroreneous and judgements referred above by appellants comes to their aid. The court says that if the compensation is less than 8,00,000 it will be compensated compeletly.

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Bail Refused to Defendant Charged Under UAPA for Supporting ISIS Ideology and Organizing Illegal Weapons: Delhi High Court

Case title: Jamsheed Zahoor Paul v. State of NCT of Delhi

Case no: CRL.A. 51/2024

Dated on: 24th April, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain

Facts of the case:

Special Cell (New Delhi Range), Lodhi Colony received information that two persons i.e. Parvaiz Rashid Lone and Jamsheed Zahoor Paul (appellant herein) were radicalized youths of Jammu & Kashmir, having allegiance to banned terrorist organization ISIS/SI/DAESH. As per intelligence inputs, they had procured arms and ammunition from UP for their cadres for executing some terrorist act in Jammu & Kashmir and would come at Netaji Subhash Park, near Lal Quila (Red Fort), Delhi on 07.09.2018 to proceed to Kashmir. Both the aforesaid named suspects were found moving towards Lal Qila. Search of the appellant yielded recovery of one pistol, containing five live cartridges in its magazine. From the possession of Parvaiz Rashid Lone (A-1) also, one pistol was recovered. These were seized. The police tracked them. They were found to be juvenile in conflict with law (JCL) and, therefore, separate report was prepared against them, which was filed before concerned Juvenile Justice Board (JJB). During investigation, both the accused divulged that they were propagating ideology of terrorist outfit ISIS in India and were in touch with another ISIS militant, namely, Abdullah Basith. Though, initially, FIR had been registered for commission of offence under Section 25 Arms Act, after detailed investigation and on the basis of the incriminating material collected during investigation, penal provisions of Section 18 & 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) were added. Both the accused were accordingly charge-sheeted for commission of offences under Section 25 Arms Act and for Sections 18 & 20 of UAPA. Main charge-sheet was submitted on 28.02.2019. Appellant had earlier also moved one application seeking bail which was dismissed and it was withdrawn on 06.06.2019. He moved another bail application which, too, was dismissed on 01.05.2020, feeling aggrieved, he preferred Criminal Appeal 345/2021 which was, however, not pressed and resultantly, the same was dismissed by this court on 31.01.2022 charges were framed on 25.04.2022. It was thereafter only that the appellant moved another bail application which also did not find favour and was dismissed by the learned trial court. When Appellant was interrogated, he revealed names of various cadres of ISIS (J&KModule) with whom he was in touch through social media, Black Berry Messenger (BBM) and Facebook etc. Some of such cadres of ISIS had already been shot dead in encounter. The mobile phones, recovered from both the accused, were sent to CERT-In for retrieval of data and its forensic analysis. Such analysis indicated that they both were not only involved in procuring sophisticated weapons for banned terrorist organization but also shared information about the movement of Army to other terrorists in Kashmir. Role, involvement and complicity of the appellant also stood exposed whose profile picture on BBM contained four terrorists, two of whom carrying AK-47 Rifles.

Contentions of the appellant:

According, to the learned counsel for appellant, allegations on record, even if those are taken on their face value, do not show commission of any offence under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA and at best, without admitting anything, it can be said to be a case of recovery of arms. It is contended that though the charges have been ascertained by the learned Trial Court and these have not been assailed so far, it is still legally permissible for the appellant to seek bail and to demonstrate that the bar provided under Section 43D (5) of UAPA does not stand attracted. There is no material to show that appellant had indulged into any unlawful or terrorist act, much less attribution of any overt act on his part. The entire case of prosecution is dependent upon the disclosure statements of the accused persons and these statements have no evidentiary value, being inadmissible in law. There is nothing to indicate that any message or BBM chat retrieved from the electronic device of the appellant had any potential to indicate that he was in contact with any terrorist. Appellant could not be branded as “terrorist‟ or a “person involved in terrorist act” merely on the basis of the recovery of a pistol and, therefore, invocation of draconian provision of UAPA is totally mis-founded and unwarranted. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant was a member of ISIS or their purported fronts. There is nothing to suggest that he was radicalized and was associated or was otherwise furthering the activities of ISIS. Merely because there was some BBM Chat retrieved from the electronic devise of his co-accused, appellant could not have been held to be a co-conspirator. Mere framing of charge does not create any embargo against grant of bail as the consideration for framing the charge is different from the one required for grant of bail. At the stage of consideration of bail, Court is merely required to undertake surface-level analysis of probative value of the evidence in order to satisfy test of “prima facie true” and if such analysis is carried out, it would clearly go on to show that there is no admissible evidence on record indicating commission of offences under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA. Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than five and half years and the trial is not likely to conclude any time soon and, therefore, his fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been seriously jeopardized, entitling him to be released on bail on that count alone.

Contention of the respondent:

There are serious allegations against the appellant and the learned Trial Court has already come to a definite conclusion that there is a prima facie case against him for offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. According to the respondents, there are following clearcut allegations and if all these allegations are read conjunctively, it would clearly reveal his complicity qua offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. One loaded pistol was recovered from his possession and he disclosed that he had purchased the same from four juveniles. Such fact was found to be correct as the police was able to reach those juveniles and they were apprehended and admitted that weapons in question had been sold by them to the accused persons, in lieu of money. Appellant was found in possession of two electronic devices and when the data was retrieved, it was found that he was found using Black Berry Messenger for communicating with his associates. His BBM ID was deciphered and the profile picture of Black Berry Messenger depicted four terrorists holding AK47 rifles and pistols in their hands. Appellant and his co-accused had procured illicit arms and had come to Delhi together and were to leave for Kashmir together in furtherance of their conspiracy. BBM chats retrieved from the electronic devices from his co-accused clearly suggested that there was incriminating communication of precarious nature between him and Adil Thokar. Appellant had, on the directions of Omar @ Umar Iban Nazir, met one Abdullah Basith. Such Abdullah Basith was later arrested by NIA and the fact of there being a meeting between them was confirmed and substantiated by NIA. Motive of such meeting was to procure weapons for terrorist activity and the record of Shaka Guest House confirmed his such visit. appellant with his co-accused not only conspired to commit terrorist act but also procured weapons and in pursuit of their abominable objective for perpetuating terror, they both, on the direction of Adil Thokar and Umar Iban Nazir, arranged weapons through JCLs and came to Delhi via flight and even sent the images of recovered pistol to their handlers through BBM. The BBM chats from the electronic device of his coaccused clearly indicated that he was even discussing about the movement of Army in Kashmir which clearly exposes their nefarious design.

Legal Provisions:

Section 18 & 20 of UAPA- Punishment for Organizing Terrorist Camps-Anyone who engages in conspiracies, preparations, or attempts to organize a terrorist camp or provides encouragement, advice, or instigation for such activities shall be subject to imprisonment. The term of imprisonment shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Additionally, a fine may also be imposed. Punishment for Being a Member of a Terrorist Gang or Organization If an individual knowingly becomes a member of a terrorist gang, organization, or supports such entities, they shall be liable for punishment. The imprisonment term shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Furthermore, they may also be fined. Section 43D(5) of UAPA- makes it virtually hard to grant a bail.Section 10 of Evidence Act- pertains to the admissibility of evidence in cases involving conspiracy.

Issue:

  1. Whether in view of the fact that charges have already been framed and such charges have not been challenged by the appellant, whether bail plea can be considered and whether the court can go on to opine that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true?
  2. What should be the level of scrutiny for believing the same? Whether the appellant has been able to show that there is no prima facie case against him? Whether despite such statutory bar being in place and when prima facie is found to be made out, bail can still be granted in order to safeguard his fundamental rights.

Court analysis and Judgement:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2024 SCC On-Line SC 109, the impact of Section 43D (5) of UAPA was delineated and it was observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence – bail is the rule and jail is the exception – does not find any place in UAPA. It further observed that exercise of general power to grant bail under UAPA is severely restrictive in scope. It went on to hold that in view of said statutory bar contained under Section 43D (5) of UAPA, if the
offences fall under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of UAPA and there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, bail must be rejected as a rule. Gurwinder Singh (supra) also discussed National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali: 2019 SCC On-Line SC 461 which lays down elaborate guidelines about the approach that the Courts must partake in, while considering bail application under UAPA. In context of the meaning attributable to “prima facie true‟, it observed that material collected by the investigating agency, on the face of it, must show the complicity of the accused in relation to the offence and must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence. It also observed that at the stage of giving reasons for grant or rejection of bail, the elaborate examination or dissection of evidence was not required and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. Thus, once charges are framed, it can be easily assumed that there is a very strong suspicion against the accused. Therefore, in such a situation, the task of any such accused becomes much more onerous and challenging as it is never going to be easy for anyone to satisfy that the same set of material, which compelled the court to frame charges on the basis of strong prima facie case, would persuade it to hold to the contrary, by declaring that such accusation was not prima facie true. Be that as it may, there can never be any restriction or embargo on moving application seeking bail. Such unfettered right remains available as long as the proceedings are alive. Moreover, in view of specific observations made in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) as elaborated in Gurwinder Singh (supra), Court can always consider such bail application, even after framing of charges, the rider being the onus on accused would be much more rigorous in such a situation. The first two facets stand answered accordingly. As per allegations appearing on record and facts and circumstances placed before the court, the appellant was continuously in touch with his co-accused, travelling with him and arranging weapons. He was in touch with militants as well and met one of them in Delhi. Conspiracy, as the cliché goes, is hatched in secrecy and very rarely, there would be any visible evidence suggesting clear-cut conspiracy. On most of the occasions, conspiracy has to be inferred by connecting dots from bunch of circumstances. Moreover, Section 10 of Evidence Act cannot be kept aside which visualizes such type of situation and makes the actions and the statements of coconspirator to be relevant as against the others. Such action or statement can even be used for proving the existence of conspiracy. Thus, at this stage, appellant does not seem to be in any position to wriggle out of the statutory bar contained in proviso of Section 43D (5) of UAPA as there are clear-cut allegations which go on to indicate that accusation against him is prima facie true. This observation is based on broad probabilities and surface analysis of material collected by respondent. Each case has to be evaluated in the backdrop of its factual background. Moreover, in view of our forgoing discussion and material on record, the appellant seems part of conspiracy and when a full-fledged trial is already underway, we would refrain from embarking upon a mini-trial to dissect each circumstance, threadbare. The appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which is sufficient to give insight of his culpable mind. In Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2023) 8 SCC 745, it has been observed that mere membership of banned organization is also sufficient to incriminate, without there being any overt act. Moreover, the factum of connection and association with any banned outfit has to be inferred from the attendant circumstances and the activities of the person concerned. There will never be a tangible piece of evidence or any kind of documentary proof in this regard, particularly once any such organization is banned. Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed that accused has already undergone incarceration for more than 5 ½ years and trial is not likely to conclude in near future. It is argued that he was just 19 years of age when he was arrested and at that time, he was at an important threshold of his educational and professional career. It is argued that though case is already at the stage of trial and the prosecution has examined nine out of cited twenty-seven witnesses, there is no likelihood of case getting disposed of in near future and, therefore, on the strength of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, it is prayed that despite the aforesaid statutory bar, Constitution Court can always grant bail so that the right of speedy trial and that of life and liberty do not stand defeated.
Thus, as per K.A. Najeeb (supra), despite the above statutory restriction contained in UAPA, the Constitutional Courts can consider grant of bail on the ground of violation of Part-III of the Constitution. However, in the case in hand, the maximum sentence provided under Section 18 & 20 UAPA is imprisonment for life and there is nothing which may indicate that prosecution is acting in a manner which is detrimental to his fundamental rights as provided under Part-III of the Constitution of India. Trial Court Record does not suggest any deliberate attempt on the part of prosecution to slow down the trial and, therefore, at this juncture, merely because of the above incarceration period, the accused does not become entitled to bail. The learned trial court has already observed that it, being already conscious about such fundamental right of the accused, was taking up the matter diligently by giving shortest possible dates. Therefore, there is no further requirement of passing any further direction in this regard. 

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Mere membership of banned organizations is a sufficient ingredient to incriminate without there being an overt act :SC

Case title: Jamsheed Zahoor Paul V. State of NCT of Delhi.

Case no: CRL.A. 51/2024.

Dated on: 24th April, 2024.

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain.

Facts of the case:

Special Cell (New Delhi Range), Lodhi Colony received information that two persons i.e. Parvaiz Rashid Lone and Jamsheed Zahoor Paul (appellant herein) were radicalized youths of Jammu & Kashmir, having allegiance to banned terrorist organization ISIS/SI/DAESH. As per intelligence inputs, they had procured arms and ammunition from UP for their cadres for executing some terrorist act in Jammu & Kashmir and would come at Netaji Subhash Park, near Lal Quila (Red Fort), Delhi on 07.09.2018 to proceed to Kashmir. Both the aforesaid named suspects were found moving towards Lal Qila. Search of the appellant yielded recovery of one pistol, containing live cartridges. These were seized. During investigation, both the accused divulged that they were propagating ideology of terrorist outfit ISIS in India and were in touch with another ISIS militant, namely, Abdullah Basith. Though, initially, FIR had been registered for commission of offence under Section 25 Arms Act, after detailed investigation and on the basis of the incriminating material collected during investigation, both the accused were accordingly charge-sheeted for commission of offences under Section 25 Arms Act and for Sections 18 & 20 of UAPA. Appellant had earlier moved one application seeking bail which was dismissed, and it was withdrawn on 06.06.2019. He moved another bail application which, too, was dismissed on 01.05.2020, feeling aggrieved, he preferred Criminal Appeal 345/2021 which was, however, not pressed and resultantly, the same was dismissed by this court on 31.01.2022. It was thereafter only that the appellant moved another bail application which also did not find favor and was dismissed by the learned trial court vide impugned Order dated 16.11.2023. Such, Order is under challenge now.

Contentions of the appellant:

There is no material to show that appellant had indulged into any unlawful or terrorist act. The entire case of prosecution is dependent upon the disclosure statements of the accused persons and these statements have no evidentiary value, being inadmissible in law. There is nothing to indicate that any message or BBM chat retrieved from the electronic device of the appellant had any potential to indicate that he was in contact with any terrorist. Appellant could not be branded as “terrorist‟ or a “person involved in terrorist act” merely on the basis of the recovery of a pistol and, therefore, invocation of draconian provision of UAPA is totally mis-founded and unwarranted. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant was a member of ISIS or their purported fronts. Mere framing of charge does not create any embargo against grant of bail as the consideration for framing the charge is different from the one required for grant of bail. Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than five and half years and the trial are not likely to conclude any time soon and, therefore, his fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been seriously jeopardized, entitling him to be released on bail on that count alone.

Contention of the respondent:

There are serious allegations against the appellant and the learned Trial Court has already come to a definite conclusion that there is a prima facie case against him for offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. According to the respondents, there are following clear-cut allegations and if all these allegations are read conjunctively, it would clearly reveal his complicity qua offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. One loaded pistol was recovered possession and the fact he had purchased the same from four juveniles was found to be correct. Appellant was found in possession of two electronic devices, and it was found that he was found using Black Berry Messenger for communicating with his associates. Appellant and his co-accused had procured illicit arms and had come to Delhi together and were to leave for Kashmir together in furtherance of their conspiracy.

Legal Provisions:

Section 18 & 20 of UAPA- Punishment for Organizing Terrorist Camps
Punishment for Being a Member of a Terrorist Gang or Organization
Section 43D(5) of UAPA- makes it virtually hard to grant a bail.
Section 10 of Evidence Act- pertains to the admissibility of evidence in cases involving conspiracy.



Issue:

  • Whether in view of the fact that charges have already been framed and such charges have not been challenged by the appellant, whether bail plea can be considered and whether the court can go on to opine that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true?

  • What should be the level of scrutiny for believing the same? Whether the appellant has been able to show that there is no prima facie case against him?
  • Whether despite such statutory bar being in place and when prima facie is found to be made out, bail can still be granted in order to safeguard his fundamental rights.




Court analysis and Judgement:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2024 SCC On-Line SC 109, the impact of Section 43D (5) of UAPA was delineated and it was observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence – bail is the rule and jail is the exception – does not find any place in UAPA. It further observed that exercise of general power to grant bail under UAPA is severely restrictive in scope. In National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali: 2019 SCC On-Line SC 461 elaborate guidelines was laid about the approach that the Courts must partake in, while considering bail application under UAPA. In context of the meaning attributable to “prima facie true‟, it observed that material collected by the investigating agency, on the face of it, must show the complicity of the accused in relation to the offence and must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence. It also observed that at the stage of giving reasons for grant or rejection of bail, the elaborate examination or dissection of evidence was not required and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. Thus, once charges are framed, it can be easily assumed that there is a very strong suspicion against the accused. Therefore, in such a situation, the task of any such accused becomes much more onerous and challenging as it is never going to be easy for anyone to satisfy that the same set of material, which compelled the court to frame charges on the basis of strong prima facie case, would persuade it to hold to the contrary, by declaring that such accusation was not prima facie true. Be that as it may, there can never be any restriction or embargo on moving application seeking bail. Such unfettered right remains available as long as the proceedings are alive.  As per allegations appearing on record and facts and circumstances placed before the court, the appellant was continuously in touch with his co-accused, travelling with him and arranging weapons. He was in touch with militants as well and met one of them in Delhi. Conspiracy has to be inferred by connecting dots from bunch of circumstances. Moreover, Section 10 of Evidence Act cannot be kept aside which visualizes such type of situation and makes the actions and the statements of co- conspirator to be relevant as against the others. Appellant does not seem to be in any position to wriggle out of the statutory bar contained in proviso of Section 43D (5) of UAPA as there are clear-cut allegations which go on to indicate that accusation against him is prima facie true.  The appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which is sufficient to give insight of his culpable mind. In Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2023) 8 SCC 745, it has been observed that mere membership of banned organization is also sufficient to incriminate, without there being any overt act. Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed that accused has already undergone incarceration for more than 5 ½ years and trial is not likely to conclude in near future. It is argued there is no likelihood of case getting disposed of in near future and, therefore, on the strength of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, it is prayed that despite the aforesaid statutory bar, Constitution Court can always grant bail so that the right of speedy trial and that of life and liberty do not stand defeated.  However, in the case in hand, the maximum sentence provided under Section 18 & 20 UAPA is imprisonment for life and there is nothing which may indicate that prosecution is acting in a manner which is detrimental to his fundamental rights. The learned trial court has already observed that it, being already conscious about such fundamental right of the accused, was taking up the matter diligently by giving shortest possible dates. Therefore, there is no further requirement of passing any further direction in this regard. Resultantly, finding no substance in the appeal, we hereby dismiss the same.

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The Meghalaya High Court has clarified that Section 23 of the POCSO Act holds individuals responsible for revealing a minor’s identity when reporting or contributing to news.

Title: Shri Eric Ranee & 2 Ors. Vs. State of Meghalaya & Anr

Decided on: 06.10.2023

Writ C No. – 79 of 2023

CORAM: Hon’ble Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Three petitioners contested their participation as co-accused in a case involving the disclosure of a child victim’s identity in violation of the POCSO Act in the Meghalaya High Court’s case Crl. Petn. No. 79 of 2023. They contended that they were exempt from liability under Section 23(3) of the POCSO Act because they were social workers and media correspondents.

 After weighing their arguments, the court maintained their criminal liability, ruling that news reporters and contributors are covered by Section 23 of the POCSO Act. The case pertained to the construal and implementation of child protection statutes concerning the revelation of victims’ identities in the press.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Meghalaya High Court decided in Crl. Petn. No. 79 of 2023 that three petitioners might face criminal charges under the POCSO Act for their roles in revealing a child victim’s identity to the media. Their claim that they were exempt from liability because they weren’t employed by the relevant newspapers was denied by the court. The case made clear how crucial it is to shield child abuse victims’ identities from the public eye.

 

COURTS ANALYSIS AND DECISION 

The court stressed how crucial it is to preserve the identity of minors who have been sexually abused by interpreting Section 23 of the POCSO Act to include news reporters and contributors. The need to protect the identities of child victims and the legal and moral obligations of news reporters are highlighted by this case.

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Written by- Kusuma R

Meghalaya Hc (4)

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The Calcutta High Court has emphasized that maritime claims require supporting evidence and should not be characterized by harsh or oppressive measures.

Title: Hindustan Aegis LPG Ltd. vs. Owners of Vessel MT TSM Pollux.

Decided on:  19th October, 2023.

Writ C No. – 9266889

CORAM: Hon’ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya.

INTRODUCTION

Alleged carelessness and damage to marine loading arms at Haldia Oil Jetty Port I give rise to an admiralty jurisdiction dispute in the case of Hindustan Aegis LPG Ltd. vs. Owners of Vessel MT TSM Pollux. The plaintiff requests compensation, but the court challenges the claim’s validity and emphasizes the need for supporting documentation and just compensation. The case brings to light the intricacies of admiralty law, and an order is made for a joint survey to evaluate the harm.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In this instance, an incident happened in September 2023 at Haldia Oil Jetty Port I, where the ship MT TSM Pollux harmed Hindustan Aegis LPG Ltd.’s marine loading and unloading arms.

The plaintiff filed a claim under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, alleging the owners of the vessel were negligent. As long as the loss is predictable and a direct result of the breach, Section 73 provides compensation for losses resulting from contract violations.

The plaintiff’s claim was examined by the court, which emphasized the need for supporting documentation and just compensation.

 To evaluate the damage, a cooperative survey was mandated. This case serves as a reminder of the intricacies involved in admiralty law and how Section 73 is applied to determine compensation.

COURTS ANALYSIS AND DECISIONThe court acknowledges the plaintiff’s claim for damages caused to marine equipment by the vessel MT TSM POLLUX. Due to the urgency of the matter, the court orders the arrest of the vessel to secure the plaintiff’s claims. The document specifies the conditions for the arrest order, including a deadline for the plaintiff to pay court fees and the possibility of the order being vacated if the defendant deposits a specified amount as security. Various authorities are instructed to assist in implementing the arrest order, and the document sets a returnable date for the application. It also warns that failure to pay the court fees will result in the dismissal of the suit. 

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer. “

Written by- Kusuma R

Calcutta Hc

 

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