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Karnataka HC upholds that signing Jaya Bharata Jananiya Tanujate the State anthem in a particular tune will not infringe the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19(1)(a) and (1)(g)

Case title: Kikkeri Krishna Murthy and the State of Karnataka and Ors.

Case no: Writ petition No. 19801 of 2022

Dated on: 24th April, 2024

Quorum: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Krishna S Dixit

Facts of the case:    petitioner is a well- known singer who has filed a complaint before the court by filing a writ petition against the State Govt of Karnataka order dated on 25.09.2022 whereby the State Government had directed the rendition of the State anthem ‘Jaya Bharata Jananiya Tanujate’ in a specific tune or raaga that was composed by Shri. Mysore Ananthaswamy .

Contentions of the appellant:

The impugned order constitutes an unreasonable restriction onto right to expression guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) of the constitution, asking citizens to sing a song in a particular tune or raaga is constitutionally impermissible unless it is authorized by law. There is no restrictions for citizens prescribed to sing any particular tune or raaga. Just because, a committee had recommended a particular tune or raaga in which the Naadageethe needs to be sung the impugned order does not get validated.

Contentions of the respondent:

Petitioner has not mentioned as to which right of his has been infringed by the impugned order. After, taking the unanimous report of the committee into consideration the State has prescribed a particular tune or raaga for rendering the naadageethe. In schools, Naadageethe has to be sung in a certain manner in order to maintain uniformity amongst the students; Similarly, in offices or Governmental bodies it’s made compulsory to sing in official occasions only. It is always open to citizens the said song in any tune or raaga of their choice. Under, the provisions of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983. The Govt has power to issue the impugned order which otherwise also has executive power that is vested under Article162 of the Indian Constitution.

Legal provisions:

Section 3(1) of Karnataka Education Act, 1983- generates general education, professional education, medical education, technical education at all levels in accordance with provisions of the act.

Article 19(1) (a) and 19 (1) (g)- guarantees its citizens the freedom of speech and expression. Also, grants its citizens the freedom to practice any profession or trade or business of his/her choice.

Article 162- extent of executive power of the state.

Issue:

Whether the action of the State Govt in prescribing a particular raaga or tune for the State anthem is arbitrary and unreasonable?

Court analysis and judgement:

The impugned order does not come in his way of singing the naadageethe in his tune or raaga . Despite the vehement submissions the petitioner isn’t in a position to demonstrate his right to sing in qualified spaces like schools, governmental bodies that is composed by other stalwarts in the variance once specified. Since, the impugned order does not infringe any right of the petitioner to sing naadageethe in any raaga anywhere anytime except in certain qualified places; he is not an “aggrieved person”. No school has come forward to challenge the order and the petitioner is not supporting cause of any school and hence the impugned order does not give a proper cause of action in maintaining the petition. Permission of singing the national anthem in any specified raaga is permissible under Article 162 of the constitution. In, Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur V. State of Punjab (1955) 2 SCR 225 it was observed that when there is an residue of government function that remains after legislative and judicial function are taken away that is when the executive powers come into actions, and if such action effects rights of citizen the authority of law would be required. The contention of petitioner that his right to speech and expression under Art. 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) has been infringed by imposing unreasonable restrictions does not merit acceptance. The question of adjudging reasonable restrictions arises when the substantive right and curtailment is demonstrated. However, such demonstration lacks in the case. As, the petition is devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed.

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Bail Refused to Defendant Charged Under UAPA for Supporting ISIS Ideology and Organizing Illegal Weapons: Delhi High Court

Case title: Jamsheed Zahoor Paul v. State of NCT of Delhi

Case no: CRL.A. 51/2024

Dated on: 24th April, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain

Facts of the case:

Special Cell (New Delhi Range), Lodhi Colony received information that two persons i.e. Parvaiz Rashid Lone and Jamsheed Zahoor Paul (appellant herein) were radicalized youths of Jammu & Kashmir, having allegiance to banned terrorist organization ISIS/SI/DAESH. As per intelligence inputs, they had procured arms and ammunition from UP for their cadres for executing some terrorist act in Jammu & Kashmir and would come at Netaji Subhash Park, near Lal Quila (Red Fort), Delhi on 07.09.2018 to proceed to Kashmir. Both the aforesaid named suspects were found moving towards Lal Qila. Search of the appellant yielded recovery of one pistol, containing five live cartridges in its magazine. From the possession of Parvaiz Rashid Lone (A-1) also, one pistol was recovered. These were seized. The police tracked them. They were found to be juvenile in conflict with law (JCL) and, therefore, separate report was prepared against them, which was filed before concerned Juvenile Justice Board (JJB). During investigation, both the accused divulged that they were propagating ideology of terrorist outfit ISIS in India and were in touch with another ISIS militant, namely, Abdullah Basith. Though, initially, FIR had been registered for commission of offence under Section 25 Arms Act, after detailed investigation and on the basis of the incriminating material collected during investigation, penal provisions of Section 18 & 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) were added. Both the accused were accordingly charge-sheeted for commission of offences under Section 25 Arms Act and for Sections 18 & 20 of UAPA. Main charge-sheet was submitted on 28.02.2019. Appellant had earlier also moved one application seeking bail which was dismissed and it was withdrawn on 06.06.2019. He moved another bail application which, too, was dismissed on 01.05.2020, feeling aggrieved, he preferred Criminal Appeal 345/2021 which was, however, not pressed and resultantly, the same was dismissed by this court on 31.01.2022 charges were framed on 25.04.2022. It was thereafter only that the appellant moved another bail application which also did not find favour and was dismissed by the learned trial court. When Appellant was interrogated, he revealed names of various cadres of ISIS (J&KModule) with whom he was in touch through social media, Black Berry Messenger (BBM) and Facebook etc. Some of such cadres of ISIS had already been shot dead in encounter. The mobile phones, recovered from both the accused, were sent to CERT-In for retrieval of data and its forensic analysis. Such analysis indicated that they both were not only involved in procuring sophisticated weapons for banned terrorist organization but also shared information about the movement of Army to other terrorists in Kashmir. Role, involvement and complicity of the appellant also stood exposed whose profile picture on BBM contained four terrorists, two of whom carrying AK-47 Rifles.

Contentions of the appellant:

According, to the learned counsel for appellant, allegations on record, even if those are taken on their face value, do not show commission of any offence under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA and at best, without admitting anything, it can be said to be a case of recovery of arms. It is contended that though the charges have been ascertained by the learned Trial Court and these have not been assailed so far, it is still legally permissible for the appellant to seek bail and to demonstrate that the bar provided under Section 43D (5) of UAPA does not stand attracted. There is no material to show that appellant had indulged into any unlawful or terrorist act, much less attribution of any overt act on his part. The entire case of prosecution is dependent upon the disclosure statements of the accused persons and these statements have no evidentiary value, being inadmissible in law. There is nothing to indicate that any message or BBM chat retrieved from the electronic device of the appellant had any potential to indicate that he was in contact with any terrorist. Appellant could not be branded as “terrorist‟ or a “person involved in terrorist act” merely on the basis of the recovery of a pistol and, therefore, invocation of draconian provision of UAPA is totally mis-founded and unwarranted. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant was a member of ISIS or their purported fronts. There is nothing to suggest that he was radicalized and was associated or was otherwise furthering the activities of ISIS. Merely because there was some BBM Chat retrieved from the electronic devise of his co-accused, appellant could not have been held to be a co-conspirator. Mere framing of charge does not create any embargo against grant of bail as the consideration for framing the charge is different from the one required for grant of bail. At the stage of consideration of bail, Court is merely required to undertake surface-level analysis of probative value of the evidence in order to satisfy test of “prima facie true” and if such analysis is carried out, it would clearly go on to show that there is no admissible evidence on record indicating commission of offences under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA. Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than five and half years and the trial is not likely to conclude any time soon and, therefore, his fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been seriously jeopardized, entitling him to be released on bail on that count alone.

Contention of the respondent:

There are serious allegations against the appellant and the learned Trial Court has already come to a definite conclusion that there is a prima facie case against him for offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. According to the respondents, there are following clearcut allegations and if all these allegations are read conjunctively, it would clearly reveal his complicity qua offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. One loaded pistol was recovered from his possession and he disclosed that he had purchased the same from four juveniles. Such fact was found to be correct as the police was able to reach those juveniles and they were apprehended and admitted that weapons in question had been sold by them to the accused persons, in lieu of money. Appellant was found in possession of two electronic devices and when the data was retrieved, it was found that he was found using Black Berry Messenger for communicating with his associates. His BBM ID was deciphered and the profile picture of Black Berry Messenger depicted four terrorists holding AK47 rifles and pistols in their hands. Appellant and his co-accused had procured illicit arms and had come to Delhi together and were to leave for Kashmir together in furtherance of their conspiracy. BBM chats retrieved from the electronic devices from his co-accused clearly suggested that there was incriminating communication of precarious nature between him and Adil Thokar. Appellant had, on the directions of Omar @ Umar Iban Nazir, met one Abdullah Basith. Such Abdullah Basith was later arrested by NIA and the fact of there being a meeting between them was confirmed and substantiated by NIA. Motive of such meeting was to procure weapons for terrorist activity and the record of Shaka Guest House confirmed his such visit. appellant with his co-accused not only conspired to commit terrorist act but also procured weapons and in pursuit of their abominable objective for perpetuating terror, they both, on the direction of Adil Thokar and Umar Iban Nazir, arranged weapons through JCLs and came to Delhi via flight and even sent the images of recovered pistol to their handlers through BBM. The BBM chats from the electronic device of his coaccused clearly indicated that he was even discussing about the movement of Army in Kashmir which clearly exposes their nefarious design.

Legal Provisions:

Section 18 & 20 of UAPA- Punishment for Organizing Terrorist Camps-Anyone who engages in conspiracies, preparations, or attempts to organize a terrorist camp or provides encouragement, advice, or instigation for such activities shall be subject to imprisonment. The term of imprisonment shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Additionally, a fine may also be imposed. Punishment for Being a Member of a Terrorist Gang or Organization If an individual knowingly becomes a member of a terrorist gang, organization, or supports such entities, they shall be liable for punishment. The imprisonment term shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Furthermore, they may also be fined. Section 43D(5) of UAPA- makes it virtually hard to grant a bail.Section 10 of Evidence Act- pertains to the admissibility of evidence in cases involving conspiracy.

Issue:

  1. Whether in view of the fact that charges have already been framed and such charges have not been challenged by the appellant, whether bail plea can be considered and whether the court can go on to opine that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true?
  2. What should be the level of scrutiny for believing the same? Whether the appellant has been able to show that there is no prima facie case against him? Whether despite such statutory bar being in place and when prima facie is found to be made out, bail can still be granted in order to safeguard his fundamental rights.

Court analysis and Judgement:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2024 SCC On-Line SC 109, the impact of Section 43D (5) of UAPA was delineated and it was observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence – bail is the rule and jail is the exception – does not find any place in UAPA. It further observed that exercise of general power to grant bail under UAPA is severely restrictive in scope. It went on to hold that in view of said statutory bar contained under Section 43D (5) of UAPA, if the
offences fall under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of UAPA and there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, bail must be rejected as a rule. Gurwinder Singh (supra) also discussed National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali: 2019 SCC On-Line SC 461 which lays down elaborate guidelines about the approach that the Courts must partake in, while considering bail application under UAPA. In context of the meaning attributable to “prima facie true‟, it observed that material collected by the investigating agency, on the face of it, must show the complicity of the accused in relation to the offence and must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence. It also observed that at the stage of giving reasons for grant or rejection of bail, the elaborate examination or dissection of evidence was not required and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. Thus, once charges are framed, it can be easily assumed that there is a very strong suspicion against the accused. Therefore, in such a situation, the task of any such accused becomes much more onerous and challenging as it is never going to be easy for anyone to satisfy that the same set of material, which compelled the court to frame charges on the basis of strong prima facie case, would persuade it to hold to the contrary, by declaring that such accusation was not prima facie true. Be that as it may, there can never be any restriction or embargo on moving application seeking bail. Such unfettered right remains available as long as the proceedings are alive. Moreover, in view of specific observations made in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) as elaborated in Gurwinder Singh (supra), Court can always consider such bail application, even after framing of charges, the rider being the onus on accused would be much more rigorous in such a situation. The first two facets stand answered accordingly. As per allegations appearing on record and facts and circumstances placed before the court, the appellant was continuously in touch with his co-accused, travelling with him and arranging weapons. He was in touch with militants as well and met one of them in Delhi. Conspiracy, as the cliché goes, is hatched in secrecy and very rarely, there would be any visible evidence suggesting clear-cut conspiracy. On most of the occasions, conspiracy has to be inferred by connecting dots from bunch of circumstances. Moreover, Section 10 of Evidence Act cannot be kept aside which visualizes such type of situation and makes the actions and the statements of coconspirator to be relevant as against the others. Such action or statement can even be used for proving the existence of conspiracy. Thus, at this stage, appellant does not seem to be in any position to wriggle out of the statutory bar contained in proviso of Section 43D (5) of UAPA as there are clear-cut allegations which go on to indicate that accusation against him is prima facie true. This observation is based on broad probabilities and surface analysis of material collected by respondent. Each case has to be evaluated in the backdrop of its factual background. Moreover, in view of our forgoing discussion and material on record, the appellant seems part of conspiracy and when a full-fledged trial is already underway, we would refrain from embarking upon a mini-trial to dissect each circumstance, threadbare. The appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which is sufficient to give insight of his culpable mind. In Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2023) 8 SCC 745, it has been observed that mere membership of banned organization is also sufficient to incriminate, without there being any overt act. Moreover, the factum of connection and association with any banned outfit has to be inferred from the attendant circumstances and the activities of the person concerned. There will never be a tangible piece of evidence or any kind of documentary proof in this regard, particularly once any such organization is banned. Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed that accused has already undergone incarceration for more than 5 ½ years and trial is not likely to conclude in near future. It is argued that he was just 19 years of age when he was arrested and at that time, he was at an important threshold of his educational and professional career. It is argued that though case is already at the stage of trial and the prosecution has examined nine out of cited twenty-seven witnesses, there is no likelihood of case getting disposed of in near future and, therefore, on the strength of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, it is prayed that despite the aforesaid statutory bar, Constitution Court can always grant bail so that the right of speedy trial and that of life and liberty do not stand defeated.
Thus, as per K.A. Najeeb (supra), despite the above statutory restriction contained in UAPA, the Constitutional Courts can consider grant of bail on the ground of violation of Part-III of the Constitution. However, in the case in hand, the maximum sentence provided under Section 18 & 20 UAPA is imprisonment for life and there is nothing which may indicate that prosecution is acting in a manner which is detrimental to his fundamental rights as provided under Part-III of the Constitution of India. Trial Court Record does not suggest any deliberate attempt on the part of prosecution to slow down the trial and, therefore, at this juncture, merely because of the above incarceration period, the accused does not become entitled to bail. The learned trial court has already observed that it, being already conscious about such fundamental right of the accused, was taking up the matter diligently by giving shortest possible dates. Therefore, there is no further requirement of passing any further direction in this regard. 

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Accused presumed to be innocent unless proved to be guilty- burden lies on the prosecution: SC

Case title: C. Bala Malleshwar Rao, G Chandrashekhar, Syed Anwar Hussain, G. Damodar, K.L. Rama
Rao, V. Satyanarayana.
Case No: Criminal appeal No.729 of 2007, Criminal Appeal No.737 OF 2007, Criminal Appeal No.793 OF
2007, Criminal Appeal No.828 OF 2007, Criminal Appeal No.850 OF 2007.
Dated on: 16th April,2024.
Quorum: Hon’ble Sri Justice K. Surender.
Facts of the case:
The Registrar of Osmania University addressed a letter dated 03.12.1993 in the form of complaint to the Director General, Anti -Corruption Bureau alleging that: there was large scale embezzlement in payment of over time allowances contrary to the financial rules and procedure; Printing material purchased by Director-A1 along with other employees resulted in misappropriation of funds; Purchase of press equipment by A1 along with other employees deliberately without usage to gain illegally. Accordingly, the case was registered on 01.01.1994 and investigation was taken up. During 1990-91 to 1992-93, A1 issued self-cheques amounting to Rs.28,99,343.43ps. The said cheques were encashed by A2 and A4. The said amount meant for overtime allowances to the employees were disbursed to an extent of Rs.11,13,339.59 ps and misappropriated the balance of Rs.17,86,003.84 ps punishable under Section 13(1) (c ) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. A1, for the very same orders issued self-cheques and third-party cheques to an extent of Rs.54,71,964.18ps to A2, A3, A7 to A11, who have encashed the cheques. It was shown that printing material worth Rs.36,55,560/- was purchased. However, the remaining amount of Rs.18,16,404-18 ps was not accounted, punishable under Section 13(1)(c)and Section 34 of IPC. A1 has issued self-cheques amounting to Rs.5,08,502.50ps and A2, A5 and A6 encashed the said cheques. An amount of Rs.25,470/- was given for private orders and the remaining amount of Rs.4,83,032.50 ps was misappropriated, punishable under Section 13(1)(c) of Section 34 of IPC. A1, A3 to A5 and A7 to A11 have entered into criminal conspiracy while discharging their duties and misappropriated the amounts to an extent of Rs,17,86,003.84 PS, Rs.18,16,404.18 PS, Rs.1,18,10,000.26ps and Rs.4,83,032.50 PS for purchase of printing material, punishable under Section 409 A1, A3 to A5 and A7 to A11 have falsified accounts willfully with an intention to defraud the institution and caused wrongful loss to the printing press, Osmania University, Hyderabad to an extent of Rs,17,86,003.84 PS, Rs.18,16,404.18 PS, Rs.1,18,10,000.26ps and Rs.4,83,032.50 PS, punishable under Section 477-A 120-B The ACB, during the course of investigation, having collected documents and examining witnesses filed charge sheet for the offences under Sections 13(1)(c ) r/w 13(2) Section 13(1)(d)(1) & (ii) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, under Section 409 r/w 120-B IPC and Section 477A r/w Section 120-B IPC. Learned Special Judge convicted A3 to A5 and A7 to A11 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each under Sections 13(1) (c), 13(1)(d) (1) & (ii) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 r/w 34 IPC, Section 409 r/w 120-B IPC, Section 277-A r/w 120-B IPC. Aggrieved by the conviction recorded by the Principal Special Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad vide judgment in C.C.No.17 of 2000 dated 15.06.2007 for the offences punishable under Sections 13(1)(c ) r/w 13(2) Section 13(1)(d)(i) & (ii) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, under Section 409 r/w 120-B IPC and Section 477A r/w Section 120-B IPC, these Criminal Appeals are filed.
Contentions of the appellant:
The learned Special Judge has relied heavily on the enquiry conducted by P.W.2 against A1, A3 and A4 and the enquiry report Exs.P15, 16 and 17 respectively. The findings in the enquiry report were made without examining the witnesses. The documents Exs.P1 to P14, P22 to P247 which are overtime bills, cash books, bank statements, cheques and registers were all marked through P.W.1, who was Assistant Registrar, Osmania University. Merely marking the said documents cannot form basis for the Court to rely upon the gist of all the documents. The prosecution ought to have exhibited before the Court as to how the misappropriation was done by the appellants herein. Enquiry was conducted only against A1 to A4 and there is no enquiry against any of the other accused. Merely on the basis of conclusions drawn in the enquiry, all the accused were convicted. It was A1 who had the cheque power, drawing and disbursing power and responsible for the accounts of the Osmania University press. It was A1 who had informed and acknowledged that the amounts received were in fact paid to the persons who had executed job work which are the outside agencies. Learned counsel for A5 and A7 submits that enquiry was not conducted against A5 and A7. That itself reflects that even the department did not have any doubt about the alleged involvement of A5 and A7. It was specifically stated by investigating officer that A3 to A11 were not concerned with purchase of printing material. Learned counsel appearing for A4 argued that A4 was not entrusted with any amounts and whatever amounts were asked to be disbursed by A1, was disbursed. The allegation that A4 was maintaining overtime allowance register and other record were not proved by the prosecution. The Learned Special Judge had relied on the alleged confession of A4 before the enquiry officer/P.W.2 that he had withdrawn amount and was also maintaining the records pertaining to overtime allowances, which formed basis for conviction, which is incorrect.
Contentions of the respondent:
It is not in dispute that amounts were entrusted to A1 as the Director for the purpose of disbursing overtime allowances and also purchase of stationery and other material. The amounts that were withdrawn by A1, who had the power to disburse amounts and make payments for purchase of stationery, has to account for the same. In the absence of giving details of payments made after withdrawing the amounts, would clearly reflect that A1 along with other accused have misappropriated the amounts that were entrusted to them. The entire documents that were collected during the course of investigation and examined by PWs.1
to 4 during enquiry that was conducted against A1 to A4 can be looked into by the criminal Court for the purpose of adjudicating upon the criminal acts committed by these public servants. In the said circumstances, learned Special Judge was right in convicting the accused.
Legal provisions:
Sections 13(1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act: states that a public servant is guilty of an offence if he dishonestly converts property for his public use. Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act: any public servant who commits a misconduct will be sent for a rigorous punishment for a year. Section 13(1)(d) (1) & (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act: obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt means. Section 409 IPC: criminal breach by a servant or the banker. Section 120-B IPC: being a part of a criminal offence with death penalty or imprisonment. Section 477A IPC: falsification of accounts. 
Issue:
Whether the statements that were prepared on the basis of the documents available in the department can form basis to infer misappropriation and falsification of accounts, without there being any independent witnesses examined to support the allegation of drawing or
disbursing amounts in the names of individuals and Firms, or that such persons have not received amounts; Whether such statements prepared on the basis of enormous documents that were examined by witnesses can form basis to conclude guilt in the absence of proving each and every document before the Court below; Whether the learned Special Judge was right in invoking Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act on the basis of statements prepared by P.Ws.1 to 7 to convict the accused on the ground that the accused failed to discharge burden shifted on to them.
Courts judgement and analysis:
Appellants have totally denied the allegations leveled against them regarding any kind of misappropriation. Not a single witness is examined by the investigating agency to show that amounts were drawn, or cheques issued in favor of an individual or a firm and such amounts were not paid. Learned Special Judge believed the version of the prosecution witnesses regarding statements that were prepared and concluded that under Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act, the burden is on the accused to explain regarding the amounts that were withdrawn as such withdrawals and usage was to the exclusive knowledge of the accused. It is not in dispute and admitted that. The entire basis of P.W.2 finding A1, A3 and A4 guilty of the charges of misappropriation are the statements that were prepared under Exs.P1 and P35. The Court and the Investigating 30 Officer/P. W 8 heavily relied on Exs.P15 to P19 enquiry reports of P.W.2. The accused denied execution of any of the documents that were placed by the prosecution to show entrustment of the funds to them by A1.
Departmental enquiry conducted by any enquiry officer, who is appointed will conduct enquiry on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and inferences or conclusions will be drawn on the basis of the evidence that is placed before him and/or collected. However, in criminal cases, the principle of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, contrary to the procedure followed in the departmental enquiry. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand held that when the prosecution has offered evidence which can be believed by the Court and convincing regarding the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt, then the burden shifts on to the accused to present evidence regarding the facts peculiarly which are within the knowledge of the accused. The approach of the learned Special Judge in shifting the burden on to the accused to explain the opinion and inferences drawn during departmental enquiry is incorrect and it does not fall within the purview of Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act to draw adverse inference against accused and convict the accused. In view of above discussion, in the absence of any proof and direct evidence against the accused apart from the inferences drawn by P.Ws.1 to 3 and P.W.38, on the basis of the record found in the office, there cannot be any conviction for the offences alleged. The factum of entrustment to the appellants herein are assumptions on the basis of the withdrawals from Banks and payments made by A1 through cheques. Admittedly, self cheques were drawn and signed by A1. Not a single bank
witness is examined to show that at any point of time, self-cheques or the cheques of others were encased in the bank by any of these appellants.
The prosecution ought to have produced witnesses from the Bank to prove that cheques signed by A1 were withdrawn by the appellants herein. In the absence of any such proof, the question of these appellants abetting A1 in committing alleged misappropriation of the funds entrusted to A1 would not arise. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jayalalitha held that entrustment has to be proved for establishing an offence of criminal misappropriation. The case is one of circumstantial evidence. The burden is on the prosecution to prove the circumstances of the case by admissible and legal evidence. All such circumstances cumulatively should form a complete chain pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v.  Suhasi, Haricharan v. State of Rajasthan held that where if there are missing links in the chain of evidence adduced by the prosecution, benefit of doubt should go to the accused.
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Dismissal of companies appeal in compensation case, commissioner Upholds penalty: Bombay High court.

Commissioner upholds penalty, dismisses company’s appeal in compensation case: Bombay HC

Title: Shipping Corporation of India Limited Vs Mr. Dasu M. Kutty

Citation: FIRST APPEAL NO. 708 OF 1996

Coram: Justice M.M. SATHAYE

Date: 05/01/24

Facts

The case involves a compensation claim by Mr. Dasu M. Kutty, who worked as a seaman for the Appellant since 1958. Mr. Kutty was employed by the Appellant from 1958 until his retirement. He filed a claim for benefits for injuries caused while working, claiming in particular 1991 chest problems that required by-pass surgery and rendered him unfit to serve in the maritime industry. The claimant contended that his hard work while serving on the ship affected his pre-existing heart disease. The claim was opposed by the employer, who denied the claim of a lifelong damage and denied any hard and stressful work. The Employer Shipping Corporation of India Limited has filed an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, challenging a judgment from 13.02.1996. In that decision, the company was directed to pay the deceased Claimant’s family compensation of Rs. 3,16,688/- with 6% interest from 14.07.1991. Additionally, a penalty of Rs. 75,000/- and costs of Rs. 1000/- were imposed. The widow and daughter of the deceased Claimant are now pursuing the case.

Laws Involved

Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.

“An order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half- monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum”. This means that instead of receiving compensation in regular installments, the injured worker or their dependents can opt to receive a one-time lump sum amount.

 N.M.B. Agreement

It refers to the National Maritime Board Agreement, which typically governs terms and conditions of employment for seafarers in the maritime industry, including provisions related to compensation and benefits in case of injuries or disabilities.

Issues

Whether the Claimant’s entitlement to 100% disability compensation under the N.M.B. Agreement, is sustainable?

Judgement

After reviewing, The Appellant argued that a penalty should not have been imposed, citing the absence of such provision in the N.M.B. Agreement. However, the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, while not contested for jurisdiction, justified the penalty and interest under the Act due to non-payment of compensation since 1991. The judgment upheld the Commissioner’s decision, pointing to laws allowing penalties for late compensation, and the appeal was rejected without any additional costs.

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Appellate Court Upholds Determination of Coparcener Rights in Ancestral Property Dispute: Bombay HC

Title: Sau. Ushabai Vs Smt. Mainabai and ORS.

Citation: SECOND APPEAL NO. 326/2015

Coram: Justice SMT. M.S. JAWALKAR

Date: 22/12/23

Facts

The case involves the plaintiff, who filed R.C.S. No.1794/1999 for the specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 24/09/1998. The decree in her favor was issued on 18/10/2001, leading to the execution of a sale deed on 17/10/2003. In R.D. No.06/2002, the plaintiff sought possession of the property, with J.Dr.-1 (son) and J.Dr.-2 (mother) as respondents. Following the death of J.Dr. No.1 in 22/07/2005, respondents No.2 to 5, his legal representatives, were brought into the case. They objected on 11/07/2008, claiming the agreement wasn’t for legal necessity due to J.Dr.-1’s alcohol addiction. The objection was rejected on 01/01/2011, leading to the trial court directing the issuance of a possession warrant. Respondents No.2 to 5 then filed First Appeal No.97/2011 in the District Court. The appellant argues that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, challenging the modified decree in R.C.S. No.1794/1999 based on the objection under Section 47 filed by respondents No.2 to 5 in the execution proceeding. The appeal court not only allowed the appeal but also issued an independent decree for partition and separate possession, which is contested in the present appeal. This second appeal pertains to a case where the appellant is dissatisfied with the judgment and decree issued by the District Judge-9 in Nagpur. The matter involves the rejection of objections under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the dispute exists between the concerned parties. Additionally, the appellant contends that the Appellate Court shouldn’t have granted a decree for partition and separate possession in response to the execution proceeding, considering that the suit property had already been sold in compliance with the original decree favoring the appellant.

Laws Involved

Section 96 of Criminal Procedure Code

Appeal from original decree “It outlines the right of a party to appeal to the appellate court against a decree passed by the court of first instance. The section specifies that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such court.

Section 47 of Criminal Procedure Code

Deals with questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree. It specifies that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.

Section 115 of Criminal Procedure Code

Empowers the High Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts. This provision is invoked when the High Court believes that the subordinate court has either exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise jurisdiction when it should have.

Section 20 of Hindu Succession Act,1956

Deals with the devolution of interest in coparcenary property or self-acquired property of a deceased Hindu.

Issues

  • Whether the Regular Civil Appeal is Maintainable challenging the rejection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure or it is only a revision Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Whether the lower Appellate Court was right in passing a decree for separate possession of the property particularly when the sale deed has already been executed pursuant to decree passed in suit for specific performance of contract?

Judgement

In this judgment, the court affirms the decision of the learned Appellate Court (District Judge-9, Nagpur) in R.C.A. No.97/2011. The appellant failed to establish legal necessity for selling the ancestral property, and the court notes that the objectors, being coparceners with a share in the property, have the right to retain possession in their share. The court finds no infirmity in the Appellate Court’s order, emphasizing that the executed decree is not binding on the share of the objectors. Consequently, the substantial question of law is answered in the affirmative, and the appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree dated 23/02/2015. The court orders the decree to be drawn up accordingly.

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