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25 Jun

SUPREME COURT GIVES ACTIVIST MAHESH RAUT INTERIM BAIL IN THE BHIMA-KOREGAON CASE.

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Mahesh Raut, an activist and one of the defendants in the Bhima-Koregaon case, was recently granted interim release by the Supreme Court for two weeks so that he could attend rites when his grandmother passed away.

Raut was granted temporary bail by a vacation bench consisting of Justices Vikram Nath and SVN Bhatti from June 26 to July 10.The bench mandated Raut’s unconditional surrender on July 10. It further stated that the Special NIA court’s terms and conditions will apply to the interim bail.

“Taking into account the facts and circumstances, the length of Raut’s previous incarceration, and the nature of the request, we are inclined to give interim bail of two weeks to the applicant, which may begin on June 26 and expire on July 10. The NIA Special Court will specify the conditions of release. NIA may ask the trial court to set strict requirements. The judgement from the highest court said that the petitioner must surrender on July 10.

The 33-year-old Raut’s request for temporary release was rejected by the National Investigation Agency (NIA). Raut’s attorney informed the supreme court on the final day of the trial that he was pleading for an interim release so he could go to Gadchiroli to attend funeral rites following the passing of his grandmother.

The Bombay High Court’s September 21 ruling allowing Raut, who was detained in June 2018 and is now being held in judicial custody at the Taloja jail, bail was challenged by NIA, and the supreme court granted the stay. Prosecution claims that comments made during the gathering, which was reportedly sponsored by the CPI(M), a banned terror organisation, were provocative and inflammatory, and that this ultimately resulted in violence in Koregaon Bhima hamlet, close to Pune, in 2018.

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WRITTEN BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

25 Jun

SUPREME COURT SET ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT OF HIGH COURT AND AWARDED BENEFIT OF DOUBT TO APPELLANT CONVICTED UNDER SECTION – 302 OF IPC.

CASE NAME: PARSHURAM VERSUS STATE OF M.P.

CASE NUMBER: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.—– OF 2023. [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1718 of 2022]

DATED ON: NOVEMBER 03, 2023

Quorum: HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI, JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA & JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA.

INTODUCTION:

The appeals challenge the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior, which upheld the judgment and order of 30th March 2005, passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Shivpuri. The High Court convicted the appellants and sentencing them to life imprisonment for offences punishable under Section 302 and Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellants were also sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years, six months, three months, and three months for offences punishable under Section 323 and Section 148 of the IPC. The appeals seek to overturn the previous ruling.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The prosecution alleges that appellant Jalim Singh built a shed in a village that was damaged by a buffalo belonging to the complainant party. Singh beat and drove the buffalo away, then entered Chironji’s house and broke the doors and beat Madan, Leelabai, and Kailash. Chironji fled, and when he returned, he was informed about the incident. The case highlights the dangers of allowing others to exploit vulnerable situations.

On 6th October 2001, a group of people, including the complainant party, were on a tractor to lodge a complaint when accused persons, armed with lethal weapons, waylaid them and caused injuries. The original First Information Report was registered for offences punishable under Sections 307, 323, 452, 147, 148, and 149 of IPC. The accused persons, nine of whom denied charges, were arrested and charged in a land dispute case.

The trial court found that the prosecution’s evidence proved that the accused formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted the complainant and his family members, killing one in furtherance of their unlawful assembly. The trial court convicted and sentenced the accused, Parshuram & Others and Jalim Singh, with all sentences running concurrently.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

INDIAN PENAL CODE

Section – 147 Punishment for Rioting;

Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

Section – 148 Rioting, armed with deadly weapon;

Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Section – 149 Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object;

If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.

Section – 302 Punishment for murder;

Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

Section – 307 Attempt to murder;

Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

Attempts by Life Convicts: When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
Section – 323 Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt;

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

Section – 324 Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means;

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Section – 326 Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means;

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

ISSUES RAISED:

whether the common object of the unlawful assembly was to cause the death of the deceased or not.

whether, the prosecution has brought on record the real genesis of the incident or not.

whether, the conviction under Section 302 of IPC would be tenable or not.

CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANTS:

Shri Malhotra argued that the High Court and trial court erred in convicting the appellants, claiming that the prosecution failed to attribute a specific role to them. He argued that the conviction under Section 302 of IPC would not be tenable without this information. The counsel argued that the appellant’s role was only holding the lathi, and no injuries caused the deceased’s death could be attributed to him. The counsel also argued that the trial court acquitted two accused persons who were attributed to holding hand-bombs, making the appellants conviction unsustainable. The counsel cited a recent judgment in Nand Lal and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh 2023 SCC Online SC 262, which ruled that non-explanation of injuries is fatal to the prosecution case. Shri Sirajudeen, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-Jalim Singh in appeal in the same case also advanced arguments on the same lines.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:

Shri Singh argued that both the trial court and the High Court found the prosecution’s case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the appellants were part of an unlawful assembly. He argued that the unlawful assembly’s purpose was to kill the complainant party members, and no interference was warranted in the trial court’s conviction. Singh also argued that the deceased’s injuries were caused by deadly weapons.

COURT’S ANALYSIS:

Chironji is the first informant about an incident involving accused persons assaulting Madan, Lila, and Kamlesh. They were waylaid by Mangal, Roopa, Sewak, Ram Sahai, Parshuram, Lakhan, Jalim, Diwan, Siya, and 4-5 others while on a tractor to the Police Station for complaint lodging. Sewak beat Gupti, Roopa stabbed him, and Lakhan stabbed Madan, causing him to become unconscious. Madan died at the Police Station.

In Masalti v. State of U.P. [1964] 8 SCR 133, a Constitution Bench discussed the law regarding conviction under Section 302 and Section 149 of IPC. The bench ruled that not all individuals in an unlawful assembly must be active for convicting, but must be a member of the assembly and have entertained the common object.

The appellants and accused persons claimed they first reported the attack by the complainant party, who assaulted them upon returning from the police station. They claimed they tried to save themselves, leading to a free fight resulting in injuries, including Madan’s death. The trial court ruled that the complainant party did not use fatal weapons, while the accused used fatal weapons. However, the court disagreed, as Ramrup @ Roopa sustained injuries with a sharp weapon.

In the case of Lakshmi Singh and Others v. State of Bihar (1976) 4 SCC 394, the court observed that non-explanation of injuries sustained by the accused during a murder case can lead to inferences such as the prosecution suppressing the genesis and origin of the occurrence, unreliable witnesses, and a defence version that explains the injuries, potentially tarnishing the prosecution case.

Witnesses are interested in the case, but the prosecution’s failure to explain the injuries sustained by three accused persons raises doubts about the incident’s true origin. A cross case was registered against the complainant party for the injuries sustained by the accused.
The accused claim the complainant party assaulted them after returning from the police station, leading to a fight resulting in injuries, including Madan’s death. The incident was caused by a buffalo, possibly to teach a lesson.

JUDGEMENT

The court considered the view that, the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt. The conviction under Section 302 IPC would not be sustainable. The prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the unlawful assembly had an intention to cause the death of the deceased. As such, we find that the case would fall under Part-II of Section 304 of IPC.

In the result, the appeals are disposed of with the following directions:

(i) The conviction under Section 302 IPC is altered to Part-II of Section 304 of IPC;

(ii) The appellants are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 years.

Click here to view the full judgement: PARSHURAM VERSUS STATE OF M.P.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

24 Jun

HIGH COURT’S DECISION TO RESERVE IS DEEMED “UNUSUAL” BY THE SC, WHICH ADJOURNS ARVIND KEJRIWAL’S CASE AGAINST STAY ON BAIL.

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In his appeal against the Delhi High Court’s suspension of his bail, Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal sought quick relief from the Supreme Court on Monday, but the court denied him. Although the High Court’s conduct was seen somewhat “unusual,” a vacation bench consisting of Justices SVN Bhatti and Manoj Mishra decided to postpone the case until June 26.

Orders in stay applications are often not reserved. They are immediately passed. It is quite peculiar. Judge Mishra stated, “Anyway, we will have it day after tomorrow,” as the bench opted to hold off until the High Court issued an order.

Kejriwal was given regular bail in the Liquor Policy Scam Case by the Delhi High Court, which had granted a stay of the lower court’s ruling. His attorneys contended today that the High Court disregarded the established rule that there is a distinction between “bail granted” and “bail declined” while granting the stay, calling the action “unprecedented.”

A bail grant is not the same as a bail reversal. On the first day, there is a new method for staying bail. In my advantage is the convenience balance. Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi stated during the arguments that “if the plea is denied, he goes back to jail and ends up back where he was when he surrendered under Supreme Court order three weeks ago.”

He further claimed that the challenged decision was given without any justification, and it is after the order that arguments were heard while noting that once bail is granted. It is not so simply undone.

“We suggest that the HC order be entered into the record so that we can continue the matter the following week. The court asked, “How do we proceed without the order?” as it deferred the case and declined to comment on the merits.

WRITTEN BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

24 Jun

SUPREME COURT HAS SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT & TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT

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CASE NAME: ASHOK KUMAR MEWARI V. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS
CASE NUMBER: CIVIL APPEAL NO.—– OF 2023 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5921 of 2019)

DATED ON: DECEMBER 05, 2023
Quorum: Honourable Justice J.K. MAHESHWARI & Justice K.V. VISWANATHAN

FACTS OF THE CASE:

An employee of the Railways applied for voluntary retirement due to medical ailments, intending to appoint his son Mukesh Mewari on compassionate grounds. The Union of India partially accepted the request but did not consider the request. Dissatisfied, the appellant filed an Original Application No. 200/00398/2015 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench, Jabalpur, which was granted on 11.2.2016. The Tribunal issued directions that the respondent’s counsel’s reliance on the Railway Board’s circular No. E(NG)II/2009/RC-1/CR/2 dated 12.11.2014 is misplaced, and the respondents’ reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in S.S. Grewal Vs. State of Punjab and others, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 234 cannot strengthen their case. The original application is allowed, and respondents are directed to consider the applicant’s claim for appointment of his son on compassionate grounds within three months.

The said order was challenged in Writ Petition No. 7540 of 2016 before the High Court regarding appointment and invalidation on medical grounds, partially allowed in 2017. The court remitted the matter with observations, stating the Tribunal had made an error by not considering a circular from 2006. The application for compassionate appointment was rejected without challenge, raising questions about its maintainability. The court allowed the petition, quash the order, and remanded it for reconsideration. The appellant’s review was dismissed, leading to a subsequent Writ Petition, which was dismissed, resulting in this appeal.

SCHEME FOR COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT

Clause-7: Determination/availability of vacancies

(a) Appointment on compassionate grounds should be made only on regular basis and that too only if regular vacancies meant for that purpose are available.

(b) Compassionate appointments can be made upto a maximum of 5% of vacancies falling under direct recruitment quota in any Group ‘C’ or ‘D’ post.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the compassionate appointment can be awarded for voluntary retirement in the employment under Indian Railways.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER

The petitioner argues that accepting a voluntary retirement prayer is not justified, as it was made in a composite prayer asking for voluntary retirement and compassionate appointment to his son. The court relies on the Food Corporation of India and Another v. Ram Kesh Yadav and Another case, 9 SCC 531. The petitioner’s argument is supported by the Tribunal and High Court orders, which show that the Railways’ clarification issued on November 12, 2014 applies to the petitioner’s case, despite the request for voluntary retirement and appointment to his son prior to the clarification. The order accepting voluntary retirement was passed on September 18, 2013.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT

The counsel for the Railways argues that the Circular dated 12.11.2014 is a clarification and will apply to the main Circular. However, the counsel is unimpressed by the petitioner’s application dated 18.06.2013, which was a composite request for voluntary retirement and compassionate appointment to his son. The Department accepted the request before the clarification was issued. The counsel believes it is appropriate to give the respondent one chance to decide the petitioner’s claim for compassionate appointment.

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The respondent reiterated their understanding and relied on the circular dated November 12, 2014. The Government of India, Ministry of Railways, issued a letter of clarification dated March 3, 2009, during the hearing. The subsequent clarification dated November 12, 2014 is based on the same letter, and the findings as recorded by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court are in conformity with the said letter.

The Ministry of Railways, through the Railway Board, has laid down that if an employee is medically invalidated or de-categorised and the administration cannot find alternative posts, they may be kept on a supernumerary post in their regular grade until a suitable post can be identified or until retirement. The Circular dated June 14, 2006, which was issued on June 14, 2006, is considered valid and applicable regardless of the clarification of the Board’s letter dated November 12, 2014 regarding medical categorisation of employees. The application for voluntary retirement was made on June 18, 2013, before the classificatory circular dated November 12, 2014. The Board’s letter dated March 3, 2009, was never placed before the Tribunal or High Court to support the contention, and there is no reference to the letter in the Circular of November 12, 2014.

The appellant’s request for voluntary retirement was made instead of offering him an alternative post and his son Mukesh Mewari, a B.Com pass, to be appointed at his place. This means that his request for voluntary retirement can only be allowed if his simultaneous request for compassionate appointment of his son is accepted. This Court had the occasion to consider a similar issue in the case of Food Corporation of India and Another vs. Ram Kesh Yadav and Another (2007) 9 SCC 531, wherein this Court considered whether a conditional voluntary retirement application can be partially accepted, by granting only the request for voluntary retirement without acceding to the condition.

The appellant applied for voluntary retirement under the condition that his son Mukesh Mewari be appointed in his place. The request for voluntary retirement and the request for compassionate appointment were composite. The respondents only accepted the request for voluntary retirement without accepting the request for compassionate appointment to the appellant’s son. The board should accept both requests compositely, accepting both or rejecting them in total. The employer had the option to inform the employee that compassionate appointment could not be given due to existing norms, but this was not done in this case. The appellant’s request for compassionate appointment was not considered.

JUDGEMENT

In view of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and setaside the orders passed by the Tribunal in the Original Application and review respectively and the order dated 13.11.2018 of the High Court. We also quash the order dated 10.11.2023 passed by the West Central Railway, Jabalpur Division, Jabalpur.

we direct that compassionate appointment, in the applicable post, be given to the Appellant’s son Mukesh Mewari within a period of 4 weeks from the date of communication of this order. No order as to costs.

Click here to view the full judgement: ASHOK KUMAR MEWARI VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

21 Jun

SUPREME COURT HAS SET ASIDE GUJRAT HIGH COURT JUDGEMENT AND RELEASED THE ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE OF ROBERRY & MURDER

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CASE NAME: THAKORE UMEDSING NATHUSING V. STATE OF GUJARAT
CASE NUMBER: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1102 OF 2024

DATED ON: FEBRUARY 22, 2024
QUORUM: Honourable Justice B.R. Gavai & Justice Sandeep Mehta

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The appellants, Thakore Laxmansing Halsing, Thakore Pravinsing Rajsing, Thakore Umedsing Nathusing, Thakore Khemsing Halsing, and Thakore Prabhatsing Kapursing, were tried in Sessions Case Nos. 107 and 143 of 1990 respectively. They were convicted under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000/. The trial court acquitted them of the charges under Sections 302 read with Section 34 and Sections 396 and 397 IPC. The appellants appealed, while the State appealed, seeking acquittal.

A man named Vithalbhai Kachrabhai Barot was accused of murdering a man who used to drive a Jeep. The case was registered at Gadh Police Station, Taluka Palanpur, Gujarat, and an investigation began. On March 2, 1990, a jeep was driven away at high speed near Charannagar, Ahmedabad. Four persons alighted from the jeep and tried to run away. One of them, Laxmansing (A1), was chased down and confessed to the murder and looting of the vehicle. The remaining four accused were apprehended, and a blood-stained knife was recovered.

The investigation concluded that the accused took the jeep taxi of Bharatbhai (deceased) on hire and murdered the victim and looted the jeep. Two separate charge sheets were filed against the accused, and both sets were committed to the Sessions Court, Banaskantha, at Palanpur. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. After hearing the arguments and appreciating the evidence, the trial court acquitted A1, A2, A3, and A5 in entirety. They were convicted for the offense punishable under Section 392 of the IPC and sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/¬. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted them for the offenses punishable under Sections 302 and 396 IPC, sentenced them to life imprisonment, and maintained the fine and default sentence imposed by the trial court.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

INDIAN PENAL CODE:

Section-34: Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention ; When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
Section-302: Punishment for murder; Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section_392: Punishment for Robbery; Whoever commits robbery shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the robbery be committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise, the imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years.
Section-396: Dacoity with Murder; If any one of five or more persons, who are conjointly committing dacoity, commits murder in so committing dacoity, every one of those persons shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Section-397: Robbery or dacoity, with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt; If, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person, so attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished shall not be less than seven years.

ISSUES RAISED:

Two fundamental issues are presented for adjudication in these appeals:

The scope of interference by High Court in an appeal challenging acquittal of the accused by the trial Court;
The standard of proof required to bring home charges in a case based purely on circumstantial evidence.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED APPELLANTS:

The learned counsel for accused appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove the ownership or possession of a jeep bearing registration No. GJ-08-114 by the deceased. They also argue that the incriminating articles were never examined through the Forensic Sciences Laboratories (FSL), and only blood samples were sent for serological examination. The accused also argue that there is no reliable evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that the convictions of A2, A3, and A5 are based solely on the confessional statement of A1, which is inadmissible in evidence under Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The accused contend that the High Court’s findings are based on conjectures and surmises, and they are entitled to an acquittal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT STATE:

Appearing for the respondent State vehemently opposed the submissions advanced by the learned counsel representing the accused appellants. She submitted that the High Court, after thorough and apropos appreciation of the substantial and convincing circumstantial evidence led by the prosecution, has recorded unimpeachable findings holding the accused guilty of the offences. She thus implored the Court to dismiss the appeals and affirm the judgment of the High Court.

COURTS ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT:

The court has analysed the impugned judgement and the evidence available on record, finding that the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, including disclosures, recoveries, and discoveries, to bring home the guilt of the accused. The most important recovery is attributed to A1, who was apprehended by PSI J.N. Chaudhary on 02nd March, 1990. He forwarded a report/communication dated 2nd March, 1990, wherein A1 confessed to the crime of murdering the jeep driver and looting the jeep and named the other accused persons as particeps criminis.

The court found that the confession of an accused in custody recorded by a police officer is inadmissible in evidence as the same would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution did not even attempt to prove the confessional part of the communication . The court also found that the identity of A2, A3, and A5 as the assailants on the basis of the disclosure statement of A1 were primarily convicted on the basis of the recoveries of knives and clothes.

The court found that the recoveries were highly doubtful and tainted, as they did not lead to any conclusive circumstance in form of Serological report establishing the presence of the same blood group as that of the deceased. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to lead the link evidence mandatorily required to establish the factum of safe keeping of the muddamal articles, making the recoveries irrelevant.

The court has already doubted the veracity of the disclosure statement of A1 as recorded by and concluded that the evidentiary value of the confession of one co-accused against the other cannot be treated as substantive evidence.

The prosecution failed to provide reliable evidence to prove the accused’s guilt for murder under Section 302 IPC. The High Court did not record any finding that the trial court’s view was perverse or unfavorable. The judgment is based on conjectures and surmises, rather than substantive or reliable circumstantial evidence. The conviction for Section 392 is also based on the same set of inadmissible and unreliable links of circumstantial evidence.

CONCLUSION: 

The High Court of Gujarat in Ahmedabad has quashed and set aside two previous judgements, Criminal Appeal No. 1012 of 1993 and Criminal Appeal No. 949 of 1994, which were based on the same record. The trial court’s judgment dated 21st August, 1993, convicting and sentencing the accused for offences punishable under Section 392 IPC, is also quashed and set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges and are directed to be set at liberty immediately, unless otherwise required.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

Click here to view the full judgement: THAKORE UMEDSING NATHUSING V. STATE OF GUJARAT

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