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27 Jun

SUPREME COURT UPHELD THE JUDGEMENT OF HIGH COURT IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT UNDER SECTION – 302 OF IPC.

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CASE NAME: NANHE VERSUS STATE OF U.P.

CASE NUMBER: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2791OF 2023.

DATED ON: NOVEMBER 21, 2023

QUORUM: HON’BLE JUSTICE ABHAY S. OKA & JUSTICE PANKAJ MITHAL

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On 30.05.2007, an incident occurred in a market area, resulting in injuries and a death of Mahendra Hussain, son of Mohd. Ali. Two cases were registered against the accused, Nanhe, under Section 304 and 308 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. Both cases were tried as Sessions Trial Nos. 1097 of 2007 and 1212 of 2007 by Special Judge, S.C./S.T.(P.A.) Act,1989. The trial court found Nanhe guilty of Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5000/-.

The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentencing of the accused in criminal appeal No.4474 of 2010, which was filed by the accused in both cases. The accused has appealed against the High Court’s judgment and order through this appeal, highlighting the single appeal filed by the accused against his conviction.

ISSUES RAISED:

Whether the said offence is liable to be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder falling under second part of section 304 IPC.
Whether the offence committed in the state of intoxication can be taken into consideration for convicting the same .
Whether the known level of intoxication can be determined factor in convicting the accused.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

INDIAN PENAL CODE

Section-86: Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated.—In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

Section-301: Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended. – If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.

Section-302: Punishment for murder – Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

Section-304: Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;
Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

CONTENTION OF APPELLANT:

The learned counsel for appellant argues that the deceased’s death was accidental, not intentional. The appellant was heavily intoxicated and unaware of his actions. The incident occurred on 30.05.2007 when Mohd. Ali, his son, and his son, Saddam Hussain, argued. Sant Ram, Mahendra’s brother, intervened and asked Nanhe to leave. Nanhe fired a shot, piercing Mahendra’s neck and killing him. Saddam was taken to a hospital where he died.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:

The counsel for the respondent argues that the action of the Nanhe (appellant) which inflicted to the death of Saddam Hussain was intentional and not accidental. The appellant was arguing with Mahendra and then, the Sant Ram intervened and asked appellant to leave the place. After walking 15 -20 steps he moved back and fired with his country made pistol in the state of intoxication, which shows the clear intention of the appellant to murder.

COURT’S ANALYSIS:

Saddam Hussain died from a firearm shot received in his neck, fired from a country-made pistol owned by appellant Nanhe. The weapon and cartridges were recovered from him. The trial court and High Court concluded that Nanhe is guilty of an offense under Section 302 IPC. The question is whether the offense can be reduced to culpable homicide, not murder, under Section 304 IPC, given Nanhe’s intention to settle his score with Mahendra and the impact of his intoxication at the time of the incident.

The appellant argued that he had no intention to kill the deceased and was accidentally killed, despite firing a shot on Mahendra, a person he had a quarrel with earlier. Section 301 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is relevant, as it embodies the doctrine of transfer of malice or transmigration of motive. The court in Shankarlal Kacharabhai & Ors Vs. The State Of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1260 stated that to invoke Section 301, an offender must not have any intention to cause the death or knowledge of the potential harm.

In Rajbir Singh vs. State of U.P. and Anr., (2006) 4 SCC 51, the court ruled that the High Court’s decision to set aside a Special Judge’s order based on the fact that the shooting was not aimed at the victim and he was accidently injured was in ignorance of Section 301 IPC. In Jagpal Singh Vs. State Of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 982, the court ruled that the accused was punishable under Section 302 IPC (simplicitor) under the ‘Doctrine of Transfer of Malice or Transmigration of Motive’ under Section 301 IPC.

The appellant is found guilty of culpable homicide under section 302 IPC, based on the doctrine of transfer of malice or transmigration of motive. The offence was committed by a person under intoxication and incapable of understanding the nature of their act. The court ruled in Basdev Vs. State Of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488, that if no evidence shows an accused’s incapacity to understand their actions due to intoxication, the killing would be an offence of murder.

The incident occurred due to a quarrel between the appellant and Mahendra, with which Saddam was killed. Hussain had no connection to the firing, but Saddam was killed by accident. The appellant may have accidentally killed Saddam intoxicated, but there is no evidence to prove he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that it was dangerous enough to cause death. Therefore, Section 86 IPC would not apply and Hussain would not be entitled to a reduction of his sentence.

JUDGEMENT:

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we find no illegality in the impugned judgment and order of the High Court in confirming the conviction and punishing the appellant under Section 302 IPC.

The appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to cost. The appellant can apply for remission under the current state policy, which the State is expected to consider on its merits promptly.

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Click here to view the full judgement: NANHE VERSUS STATE OF U.P.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

26 Jun

SUPREME COURT UPHELD AND THE JUDGEMENT OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR ELECTRICITY AND SET ASIDE THE CIVIL APPEAL.

CASE NAME: MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED VERSUS RATNAGIRI GAS AND POWER PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.

CASE NUMBER: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1922 OF 2023

DATED ON: NOVEMBER 09, 2023
QUORUM: HONOURABLE CIJ Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JUSTICE P.B. PARDIWALA & JUSTICE MANOJ MISHRA.

INTRODUCTION

The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) in New Delhi dismissed an appeal against an order from the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) in 2013. The first respondent, Ratnagiri Gas And Power Private Limited, filed a petition against Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., seeking resolution of issues related to non-availability of domestic gas, alternate fuel contracts, and fixed charges. CERC held the appellant liable, which was upheld by APTEL. The court granted the appellant the liberty to move the court again if necessary. The first respondent filed an execution petition, seeking payment of Rs 5287.76 crores and Rs 1826 crores, in accordance with the APTEL order.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The first respondent, RGPPL, a joint venture of NTPC Ltd., Gas Authority of India Ltd, MSEB Holding Company, ICICI, IDBI, SBI, and Canara Bank, took over the assets of Dabhol Power Company Limited after its operations were closed down. The first respondent owns a gas-based generating station in Ratnagiri, Maharashtra, with 95% allocated to the State of Maharashtra and the rest to Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli. The appellant, MSEDCL, entered into a Power Purchase Agreement with the first respondent in 2007 for 25 years. The first respondent received gas supply from RIL until September 2011, but a decline in supply was attributed to low-yielding KG-D6 gas fields. The issue was raised with the Central Government and placed before the Empowered Group of Ministers on 24 December.

The first respondent entered into a Gas Supply Agreement/Gas Transportation Agreement with GAIL to supply Recycled Liquid Natural Gas under spot cargo. The appellant, however, refused to schedule power at the agreed rates, claiming that the first respondent failed to obtain their approval before entering into the agreement. The appellant argued that the declaration of capacity on RLNG was unilateral and arbitrary, violating Clause 5.9 of the Power Purchase Agreement. The first respondent filed a petition under Section 79 of the Electricity Act 2003 to resolve the issue of non-payment of fixed charges, the reservations of beneficiaries to enter alternate contractual arrangements for fuel, and the revision of the NAPAF.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT

Clause (4.3) Declared Capacity

“Primary Fuel for RGPPL is LNG/Natural gas and/or RLNG. Normally capacity of the station shall be declared on gas and/or RLNG for all three power blocks. However, if agreed by MSEDCL, RGPPL shall make arrangements of Liquid fuel(s) for the quantum required by MSEDCL. In such a case the capacity on liquid fuel shall also be taken into account for the purpose of Availability, Declared Capacity and PLF calculations till the time Liquid fuel(s) stock agreed/requisitioned by MSEDCL is available at site.”

Clause (5.9) Gas Supply Agreement (GSA)/ Gas Transportation Agreement (GTA)

The gas supply agreement for 1.5 MMTPA R-LNG up to September 2009 is in place, sourced through Petronet LNG Ltd and re-gasified at their Dahej terminal. Commercial implications of the GSA/GTA contract will be signed separately with MSEDCL. The total gas/LNG will be procured through short-term and long-term contracts through GAIL, under GoI’s direction. RGPPL must obtain MSEDCL’s approval on contracting terms and price before entering the contract.

ELECTICITY ACT, 2003

SECTION-79: FUNCTION OF CENTRAL COMMISSION

(1) The Central Commission shall discharge the following functions :–

The Act regulates the tariffs of generating companies owned or controlled by the Central Government, those with a composite scheme for electricity generation and sale in multiple states, and inter-state transmission of electricity. It determines tariffs for inter-state transmission, issues licenses for transmission licensees and electricity traders, adjudicates disputes involving generating companies or transmission licensees, levies fees for the Act, specifies Grid Codes and Standards, enforces quality, continuity, and reliability of service by licensees, sets trading margins in inter-state electricity trading, and discharges other functions assigned under the Act.

(2) The Central Commission shall advise the Central Government on all or any of the following matters :–

The Central Commission is responsible for formulating National Electricity Policy and tariff policy, promoting competition, efficiency, and economy in the electricity industry, promoting investment, and addressing other government-referred matters. It ensures transparency and is guided by the National Electricity Policy, National Electricity Plan, and tariff policy.

ISSUSES RAISED:

whether the CERC and APTEL were justified in affixing liability to pay fixed charges on the appellant.
Whether the dispute in the particular case primarily turns on the terms of the Power Purchase Agreement or not.

CERC ORDER DATED 30 JULY 2023 AND APTEL JUDGEMENT AND FINAL ORDER DATED 22 APRIL 2015.

The CERC allowed a petition and held the appellant liable to pay fixed capacity charges under the Power Purchase Agreement. It ruled that the appellant’s decision not to schedule RLNG influenced variable charges, not fixed charges. Further, the appeal in APTEL was made and they directed that if the appellant wanted to not pay for RLNG, it must compensate the first respondent, as it is liable under Article 5.2 of the PPA. No prior consent was required for liability to arise. APTEL dismissed the appeal. The Civil Appeal against APTEL’s decision was initially disposed of by this Court. Since the appellant was not facing any punitive action for recovery, and the appellant was granted the liberty to approach the court when needed. The present appeal is before the Supreme Court of India.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The appellant challenged APTEL’s judgment and final order, arguing that the CERC divided Clause 4.3 and Clause 5.9 of the PPA into two separate categories, absolving the appellant of paying for declared capacity due to RLNG. The placement of the prior approval clause in clause 5.9 suggests it applies to both clause 5.2 and clause 5.3 energy charges. The decision to adopt RLNG has commercial implications, so the prior approval requirement in clause 5.9 is invoked. The compartmentalization of clauses 4.3 and 5.9 is flawed, and the plant availability factor would be less than 70%, reducing capacity charges in accordance with CERC Regulations 2009.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The first Respondent urged that, The appellant established a generating station to meet their electricity needs. After the failure of M/s Enron International and M/s Dabhol Power Company, the station was revived and its assets transferred to RGPPL. The appellant held 13.51% shares in the first respondent. The capacity declaration and demand for charges are in accordance with Clauses 4.3 and 5.2 of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). The PPA is valid for 25 years and the appellant is bound by Clauses 6.6. and 6.7, which stipulate paying 95% of charges during a dispute.

COURT’S ANALYSIS:

TERMS OF PPA

The PPA outlines two types of tariff charges for MSEDCL: capacity charges and energy charges. The former are fixed and subject to revision by the Government of India or Maharashtra, while the latter are calculated using a formula. MSEDCL must schedule energy sending from RGPPL and obtain approval from CERC for provisional billing. The total gas requirements are procured through GAIL, with RGPPL obtaining approval before entering into a GSA/GTA.

The first respondent argues that an alternate arrangement with GAIL and capacity declarations based on RLNG was necessary due to a nationwide fuel shortage. The appellant argues that the unilateral decision to declare capacity based on RLNG violated the mandatory approval requirement under clause 5.9 of the PPA, exempting it from liability to pay fixed capacity charges.

FACTUAL CONTEXT AND THE INTENTION OF PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT

The first respondent was established due to the failure of M/s Enron International and M/s Dabhol Power Company to meet Maharashtra’s energy needs. The tariff requirements were determined to preserve the unit’s viability. The appellant’s liability for the former is actual delivery agnostic, as long as the declared capacity is made in terms of the PPA.

The appellant’s interpretation of the PPA contradicts the original purpose and intendment of the parties, as it implies that capacity charges can be avoided and made subject to the appellant’s consent. A deviation from the plain terms of the contract is warranted only when it serves business efficacy better. The appellant’s arguments would require reading in implied terms contrary to the contractual provisions, which is permissible only in a narrow set of circumstances.

JUDGEMENT:

In the present context, bearing in mind the background of the establishment of the first respondent, and the shortfall of domestic gas for reasons beyond the control of the first respondent, such a deviation from the plain terms is not merited and militates against business efficacy as it has a detrimental impact on the viability of the first respondent.

The execution proceedings pursuant to the above-mentioned execution petition before the APTEL be continued. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

Click here to view the full judgement: MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED VERSUS RATNAGIRI GAS AND POWER PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.

25 Jun

SUPREME COURT SET ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT OF HIGH COURT AND AWARDED BENEFIT OF DOUBT TO APPELLANT CONVICTED UNDER SECTION – 302 OF IPC.

CASE NAME: PARSHURAM VERSUS STATE OF M.P.

CASE NUMBER: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.—– OF 2023. [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1718 of 2022]

DATED ON: NOVEMBER 03, 2023

Quorum: HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI, JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA & JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA.

INTODUCTION:

The appeals challenge the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior, which upheld the judgment and order of 30th March 2005, passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Shivpuri. The High Court convicted the appellants and sentencing them to life imprisonment for offences punishable under Section 302 and Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellants were also sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years, six months, three months, and three months for offences punishable under Section 323 and Section 148 of the IPC. The appeals seek to overturn the previous ruling.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The prosecution alleges that appellant Jalim Singh built a shed in a village that was damaged by a buffalo belonging to the complainant party. Singh beat and drove the buffalo away, then entered Chironji’s house and broke the doors and beat Madan, Leelabai, and Kailash. Chironji fled, and when he returned, he was informed about the incident. The case highlights the dangers of allowing others to exploit vulnerable situations.

On 6th October 2001, a group of people, including the complainant party, were on a tractor to lodge a complaint when accused persons, armed with lethal weapons, waylaid them and caused injuries. The original First Information Report was registered for offences punishable under Sections 307, 323, 452, 147, 148, and 149 of IPC. The accused persons, nine of whom denied charges, were arrested and charged in a land dispute case.

The trial court found that the prosecution’s evidence proved that the accused formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted the complainant and his family members, killing one in furtherance of their unlawful assembly. The trial court convicted and sentenced the accused, Parshuram & Others and Jalim Singh, with all sentences running concurrently.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

INDIAN PENAL CODE

Section – 147 Punishment for Rioting;

Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

Section – 148 Rioting, armed with deadly weapon;

Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Section – 149 Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object;

If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.

Section – 302 Punishment for murder;

Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

Section – 307 Attempt to murder;

Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

Attempts by Life Convicts: When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
Section – 323 Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt;

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

Section – 324 Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means;

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Section – 326 Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means;

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

ISSUES RAISED:

whether the common object of the unlawful assembly was to cause the death of the deceased or not.

whether, the prosecution has brought on record the real genesis of the incident or not.

whether, the conviction under Section 302 of IPC would be tenable or not.

CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANTS:

Shri Malhotra argued that the High Court and trial court erred in convicting the appellants, claiming that the prosecution failed to attribute a specific role to them. He argued that the conviction under Section 302 of IPC would not be tenable without this information. The counsel argued that the appellant’s role was only holding the lathi, and no injuries caused the deceased’s death could be attributed to him. The counsel also argued that the trial court acquitted two accused persons who were attributed to holding hand-bombs, making the appellants conviction unsustainable. The counsel cited a recent judgment in Nand Lal and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh 2023 SCC Online SC 262, which ruled that non-explanation of injuries is fatal to the prosecution case. Shri Sirajudeen, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-Jalim Singh in appeal in the same case also advanced arguments on the same lines.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:

Shri Singh argued that both the trial court and the High Court found the prosecution’s case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the appellants were part of an unlawful assembly. He argued that the unlawful assembly’s purpose was to kill the complainant party members, and no interference was warranted in the trial court’s conviction. Singh also argued that the deceased’s injuries were caused by deadly weapons.

COURT’S ANALYSIS:

Chironji is the first informant about an incident involving accused persons assaulting Madan, Lila, and Kamlesh. They were waylaid by Mangal, Roopa, Sewak, Ram Sahai, Parshuram, Lakhan, Jalim, Diwan, Siya, and 4-5 others while on a tractor to the Police Station for complaint lodging. Sewak beat Gupti, Roopa stabbed him, and Lakhan stabbed Madan, causing him to become unconscious. Madan died at the Police Station.

In Masalti v. State of U.P. [1964] 8 SCR 133, a Constitution Bench discussed the law regarding conviction under Section 302 and Section 149 of IPC. The bench ruled that not all individuals in an unlawful assembly must be active for convicting, but must be a member of the assembly and have entertained the common object.

The appellants and accused persons claimed they first reported the attack by the complainant party, who assaulted them upon returning from the police station. They claimed they tried to save themselves, leading to a free fight resulting in injuries, including Madan’s death. The trial court ruled that the complainant party did not use fatal weapons, while the accused used fatal weapons. However, the court disagreed, as Ramrup @ Roopa sustained injuries with a sharp weapon.

In the case of Lakshmi Singh and Others v. State of Bihar (1976) 4 SCC 394, the court observed that non-explanation of injuries sustained by the accused during a murder case can lead to inferences such as the prosecution suppressing the genesis and origin of the occurrence, unreliable witnesses, and a defence version that explains the injuries, potentially tarnishing the prosecution case.

Witnesses are interested in the case, but the prosecution’s failure to explain the injuries sustained by three accused persons raises doubts about the incident’s true origin. A cross case was registered against the complainant party for the injuries sustained by the accused.
The accused claim the complainant party assaulted them after returning from the police station, leading to a fight resulting in injuries, including Madan’s death. The incident was caused by a buffalo, possibly to teach a lesson.

JUDGEMENT

The court considered the view that, the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt. The conviction under Section 302 IPC would not be sustainable. The prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the unlawful assembly had an intention to cause the death of the deceased. As such, we find that the case would fall under Part-II of Section 304 of IPC.

In the result, the appeals are disposed of with the following directions:

(i) The conviction under Section 302 IPC is altered to Part-II of Section 304 of IPC;

(ii) The appellants are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 years.

Click here to view the full judgement: PARSHURAM VERSUS STATE OF M.P.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

24 Jun

Daughter’s Right in Coparcenary Property: Bombay High Court Affirms.

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Uncategorized #appeal, #bombayhighcourt, #HinduSuccessionAct

Case Title – Kamalakar Purushotam Inamdar & Ors. vs. Smt. Rajani Shriram Madiwale & Ors.

Case No. – Second Appeal No. 335, 336 of 2015

Dated on – 14^th June, 2024

Quorum – Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh

Facts of the Case –

Purushotam, upon his death, left behind two properties: Kashidwadi (self-acquired) and Padali (ancestral). Dispute arose over the inheritance of these properties, particularly concerning the applicability of the 2005 Amendment Act to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which granted daughters equal coparcenary rights in ancestral properties. The main issue was whether Purushotam’s daughters, Defendant Nos. 7 and 8, could claim coparcenary rights in Padali despite their mother’s death before the enactment of the amendment. The case revolved around interpreting the retroactive application of the amended law to determine the inheritance rights of the parties involved.

Issues –

Whether the finding of the 1st Appellate Court that the suit property was the self-acquired property is based on misreading of the evidence on record and the evidence which has come on record?
Whether on proper appreciation of the evidence the Plaintiff can be stated to have discharged the burden of proving that the suit properties are the self-acquired properties?
Whether the Courts have properly interpreted amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 2005, while granting equal share to the Plaintiffs?

Legal Provisions –

Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Contentions of the Appellant –

The appellant in this case primarily contends that the lower court erred in its classification of the properties in question, specifically Kashidwadi and Padali, as self-acquired and ancestral, respectively. It is argued that the evidence presented clearly establishes Kashidwadi property as ancestral, contrary to the lower court’s finding of it being self-acquired. This classification discrepancy is crucial because it impacts the appellant’s entitlement to a share in the ancestral property under Hindu Succession laws. Additionally, the appellant disputes the lower court’s calculation of shares in both properties, asserting that their entitlement has been incorrectly determined. The appeal further challenges the application of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, concerning the appellant’s deceased ancestor, Indira, and the effect on her inheritance rights vis-à-vis the ancestral Padali property. Therefore, the appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court’s decisions regarding property classification and shares, based on a correct interpretation of the law and evidence presented.

Contentions of the Respondent –

The respondent in this case maintains that the lower court’s classification of the properties, Kashidwadi and Padali, as self-acquired and ancestral respectively, was correct based on the evidence presented during trial. They argue that the lower court properly applied the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in determining the nature of these properties and the entitlements of the parties involved. The respondent contends that the appellant’s challenge to this classification lacks merit and is based on a misinterpretation of the evidence and legal principles. Furthermore, they assert that the calculation of shares by the lower court was accurate and in accordance with the applicable laws, particularly with regard to the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The respondent emphasizes that the rights of the parties, including those of the deceased ancestor Indira, were correctly adjudicated by the lower court, ensuring equitable distribution as per the legal framework governing succession. Therefore, the respondent opposes the appeal and seeks to uphold the lower court’s decisions regarding property classification, shares, and the application of relevant laws.

Court Analysis and Judgement –

The court analyzed the appeal in light of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, particularly focusing on the amendments introduced in 2005. It deliberated on the nature of the properties in question—Kashidwadi and Padali—deciding Kashidwadi was self-acquired by Purushotam and Padali was ancestral. The court scrutinized the evidence to ascertain whether the properties were correctly classified. It upheld the lower court’s determination that Kashidwadi was self-acquired and Padali was ancestral, dismissing the appellant’s challenge.

Regarding shares, the court affirmed the lower court’s distribution under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It concluded that Plaintiffs and Defendant No.1 each were entitled to 7/36th share in Padali, with Defendant Nos.4 to 6 collectively entitled to 7/36th share, and Defendant Nos.7 and 8 collectively to 1/36th share. The court maintained the calculation and distribution of shares were legally sound.

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Judgement Reviewed By- Anurag Das

Click here to read the Judgement.

24 Jun

Madhya Pradesh High Court stressed on establishing substantial question of law for admitting a second appeal

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Uncategorized #appeal, #CrPc, #HinduSuccessionAct, #property, highcourtofmadhyapradesh

CASE TITLE- Vishnu Singh S/O Jagdish Singh Vs Kamal Singh and Ors.

CASE NUMBER- Second Appeal No. 76 of 2021

DATED ON- 18.06.2024

QUORUM- Honourable Justice Avanindra Kumar Singh

FACTS OF THE CASE

The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants for declaration of title regarding the suit property situated in village Sukakhedi, total land measuring 9.962 hectares in full part and on 6.985 hectares for declaring the title on 1/2 part along with declaring that sale-deed as null and void and injucting plaintiffs by permanent injuction to interfere in the possession and use of suit land by plaintiff. On an appeal by the plaintiff, learned Second Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 63 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant contented that, there was a Will dated in favour of the plaintiff. Santribai, wife of late Nepal Singh had willed the suit property to him as she was issueless but defendants partitioned the suitland on false ground and obtained a revenue order in favour of Indira Bai.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The defendant contented that late Nepal Singh, husband of Santribai had purchased the suit land from joint family income in his name, therefore, Santribai and Indirabai, both were entitled.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court analyzed that, plaintiff witness No.2 Gulzar Singh as per Section 63 of Hindu Succession Act has not stated that Santribai had signed the Will before him therefore, the execution of the Will was proved is incorrect. Even otherwise, plaintiff Vishnu Singh admitted that Nepal Singh did not have any other extra income besides agricultural income and regarding the statement that land was purchased from the gold and jewellery received from father and mother of Santribai, there were no pleadings of the plaintiff in the suit, therefore, evidence without pleading cannot be accepted. Moreover, the suit should have been filed within three years but the suit was filed after the limitation time bar. The court held that no substantial question of law arises on which this second appeal can be admitted and the appeal got dismissed.

Judgement Reviewed By- Shreyasi Ghatak

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