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Bail Refused to Defendant Charged Under UAPA for Supporting ISIS Ideology and Organizing Illegal Weapons: Delhi High Court

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Case title: Jamsheed Zahoor Paul v. State of NCT of Delhi

Case no: CRL.A. 51/2024

Dated on: 24th April, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain

Facts of the case:

Special Cell (New Delhi Range), Lodhi Colony received information that two persons i.e. Parvaiz Rashid Lone and Jamsheed Zahoor Paul (appellant herein) were radicalized youths of Jammu & Kashmir, having allegiance to banned terrorist organization ISIS/SI/DAESH. As per intelligence inputs, they had procured arms and ammunition from UP for their cadres for executing some terrorist act in Jammu & Kashmir and would come at Netaji Subhash Park, near Lal Quila (Red Fort), Delhi on 07.09.2018 to proceed to Kashmir. Both the aforesaid named suspects were found moving towards Lal Qila. Search of the appellant yielded recovery of one pistol, containing five live cartridges in its magazine. From the possession of Parvaiz Rashid Lone (A-1) also, one pistol was recovered. These were seized. The police tracked them. They were found to be juvenile in conflict with law (JCL) and, therefore, separate report was prepared against them, which was filed before concerned Juvenile Justice Board (JJB). During investigation, both the accused divulged that they were propagating ideology of terrorist outfit ISIS in India and were in touch with another ISIS militant, namely, Abdullah Basith. Though, initially, FIR had been registered for commission of offence under Section 25 Arms Act, after detailed investigation and on the basis of the incriminating material collected during investigation, penal provisions of Section 18 & 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) were added. Both the accused were accordingly charge-sheeted for commission of offences under Section 25 Arms Act and for Sections 18 & 20 of UAPA. Main charge-sheet was submitted on 28.02.2019. Appellant had earlier also moved one application seeking bail which was dismissed and it was withdrawn on 06.06.2019. He moved another bail application which, too, was dismissed on 01.05.2020, feeling aggrieved, he preferred Criminal Appeal 345/2021 which was, however, not pressed and resultantly, the same was dismissed by this court on 31.01.2022 charges were framed on 25.04.2022. It was thereafter only that the appellant moved another bail application which also did not find favour and was dismissed by the learned trial court. When Appellant was interrogated, he revealed names of various cadres of ISIS (J&KModule) with whom he was in touch through social media, Black Berry Messenger (BBM) and Facebook etc. Some of such cadres of ISIS had already been shot dead in encounter. The mobile phones, recovered from both the accused, were sent to CERT-In for retrieval of data and its forensic analysis. Such analysis indicated that they both were not only involved in procuring sophisticated weapons for banned terrorist organization but also shared information about the movement of Army to other terrorists in Kashmir. Role, involvement and complicity of the appellant also stood exposed whose profile picture on BBM contained four terrorists, two of whom carrying AK-47 Rifles.

Contentions of the appellant:

According, to the learned counsel for appellant, allegations on record, even if those are taken on their face value, do not show commission of any offence under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA and at best, without admitting anything, it can be said to be a case of recovery of arms. It is contended that though the charges have been ascertained by the learned Trial Court and these have not been assailed so far, it is still legally permissible for the appellant to seek bail and to demonstrate that the bar provided under Section 43D (5) of UAPA does not stand attracted. There is no material to show that appellant had indulged into any unlawful or terrorist act, much less attribution of any overt act on his part. The entire case of prosecution is dependent upon the disclosure statements of the accused persons and these statements have no evidentiary value, being inadmissible in law. There is nothing to indicate that any message or BBM chat retrieved from the electronic device of the appellant had any potential to indicate that he was in contact with any terrorist. Appellant could not be branded as “terrorist‟ or a “person involved in terrorist act” merely on the basis of the recovery of a pistol and, therefore, invocation of draconian provision of UAPA is totally mis-founded and unwarranted. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant was a member of ISIS or their purported fronts. There is nothing to suggest that he was radicalized and was associated or was otherwise furthering the activities of ISIS. Merely because there was some BBM Chat retrieved from the electronic devise of his co-accused, appellant could not have been held to be a co-conspirator. Mere framing of charge does not create any embargo against grant of bail as the consideration for framing the charge is different from the one required for grant of bail. At the stage of consideration of bail, Court is merely required to undertake surface-level analysis of probative value of the evidence in order to satisfy test of “prima facie true” and if such analysis is carried out, it would clearly go on to show that there is no admissible evidence on record indicating commission of offences under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA. Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than five and half years and the trial is not likely to conclude any time soon and, therefore, his fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been seriously jeopardized, entitling him to be released on bail on that count alone.

Contention of the respondent:

There are serious allegations against the appellant and the learned Trial Court has already come to a definite conclusion that there is a prima facie case against him for offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. According to the respondents, there are following clearcut allegations and if all these allegations are read conjunctively, it would clearly reveal his complicity qua offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. One loaded pistol was recovered from his possession and he disclosed that he had purchased the same from four juveniles. Such fact was found to be correct as the police was able to reach those juveniles and they were apprehended and admitted that weapons in question had been sold by them to the accused persons, in lieu of money. Appellant was found in possession of two electronic devices and when the data was retrieved, it was found that he was found using Black Berry Messenger for communicating with his associates. His BBM ID was deciphered and the profile picture of Black Berry Messenger depicted four terrorists holding AK47 rifles and pistols in their hands. Appellant and his co-accused had procured illicit arms and had come to Delhi together and were to leave for Kashmir together in furtherance of their conspiracy. BBM chats retrieved from the electronic devices from his co-accused clearly suggested that there was incriminating communication of precarious nature between him and Adil Thokar. Appellant had, on the directions of Omar @ Umar Iban Nazir, met one Abdullah Basith. Such Abdullah Basith was later arrested by NIA and the fact of there being a meeting between them was confirmed and substantiated by NIA. Motive of such meeting was to procure weapons for terrorist activity and the record of Shaka Guest House confirmed his such visit. appellant with his co-accused not only conspired to commit terrorist act but also procured weapons and in pursuit of their abominable objective for perpetuating terror, they both, on the direction of Adil Thokar and Umar Iban Nazir, arranged weapons through JCLs and came to Delhi via flight and even sent the images of recovered pistol to their handlers through BBM. The BBM chats from the electronic device of his coaccused clearly indicated that he was even discussing about the movement of Army in Kashmir which clearly exposes their nefarious design.

Legal Provisions:

Section 18 & 20 of UAPA- Punishment for Organizing Terrorist Camps-Anyone who engages in conspiracies, preparations, or attempts to organize a terrorist camp or provides encouragement, advice, or instigation for such activities shall be subject to imprisonment. The term of imprisonment shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Additionally, a fine may also be imposed. Punishment for Being a Member of a Terrorist Gang or Organization If an individual knowingly becomes a member of a terrorist gang, organization, or supports such entities, they shall be liable for punishment. The imprisonment term shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Furthermore, they may also be fined. Section 43D(5) of UAPA- makes it virtually hard to grant a bail.Section 10 of Evidence Act- pertains to the admissibility of evidence in cases involving conspiracy.

Issue:

  1. Whether in view of the fact that charges have already been framed and such charges have not been challenged by the appellant, whether bail plea can be considered and whether the court can go on to opine that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true?
  2. What should be the level of scrutiny for believing the same? Whether the appellant has been able to show that there is no prima facie case against him? Whether despite such statutory bar being in place and when prima facie is found to be made out, bail can still be granted in order to safeguard his fundamental rights.

Court analysis and Judgement:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2024 SCC On-Line SC 109, the impact of Section 43D (5) of UAPA was delineated and it was observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence – bail is the rule and jail is the exception – does not find any place in UAPA. It further observed that exercise of general power to grant bail under UAPA is severely restrictive in scope. It went on to hold that in view of said statutory bar contained under Section 43D (5) of UAPA, if the
offences fall under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of UAPA and there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, bail must be rejected as a rule. Gurwinder Singh (supra) also discussed National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali: 2019 SCC On-Line SC 461 which lays down elaborate guidelines about the approach that the Courts must partake in, while considering bail application under UAPA. In context of the meaning attributable to “prima facie true‟, it observed that material collected by the investigating agency, on the face of it, must show the complicity of the accused in relation to the offence and must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence. It also observed that at the stage of giving reasons for grant or rejection of bail, the elaborate examination or dissection of evidence was not required and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. Thus, once charges are framed, it can be easily assumed that there is a very strong suspicion against the accused. Therefore, in such a situation, the task of any such accused becomes much more onerous and challenging as it is never going to be easy for anyone to satisfy that the same set of material, which compelled the court to frame charges on the basis of strong prima facie case, would persuade it to hold to the contrary, by declaring that such accusation was not prima facie true. Be that as it may, there can never be any restriction or embargo on moving application seeking bail. Such unfettered right remains available as long as the proceedings are alive. Moreover, in view of specific observations made in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) as elaborated in Gurwinder Singh (supra), Court can always consider such bail application, even after framing of charges, the rider being the onus on accused would be much more rigorous in such a situation. The first two facets stand answered accordingly. As per allegations appearing on record and facts and circumstances placed before the court, the appellant was continuously in touch with his co-accused, travelling with him and arranging weapons. He was in touch with militants as well and met one of them in Delhi. Conspiracy, as the cliché goes, is hatched in secrecy and very rarely, there would be any visible evidence suggesting clear-cut conspiracy. On most of the occasions, conspiracy has to be inferred by connecting dots from bunch of circumstances. Moreover, Section 10 of Evidence Act cannot be kept aside which visualizes such type of situation and makes the actions and the statements of coconspirator to be relevant as against the others. Such action or statement can even be used for proving the existence of conspiracy. Thus, at this stage, appellant does not seem to be in any position to wriggle out of the statutory bar contained in proviso of Section 43D (5) of UAPA as there are clear-cut allegations which go on to indicate that accusation against him is prima facie true. This observation is based on broad probabilities and surface analysis of material collected by respondent. Each case has to be evaluated in the backdrop of its factual background. Moreover, in view of our forgoing discussion and material on record, the appellant seems part of conspiracy and when a full-fledged trial is already underway, we would refrain from embarking upon a mini-trial to dissect each circumstance, threadbare. The appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which is sufficient to give insight of his culpable mind. In Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2023) 8 SCC 745, it has been observed that mere membership of banned organization is also sufficient to incriminate, without there being any overt act. Moreover, the factum of connection and association with any banned outfit has to be inferred from the attendant circumstances and the activities of the person concerned. There will never be a tangible piece of evidence or any kind of documentary proof in this regard, particularly once any such organization is banned. Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed that accused has already undergone incarceration for more than 5 ½ years and trial is not likely to conclude in near future. It is argued that he was just 19 years of age when he was arrested and at that time, he was at an important threshold of his educational and professional career. It is argued that though case is already at the stage of trial and the prosecution has examined nine out of cited twenty-seven witnesses, there is no likelihood of case getting disposed of in near future and, therefore, on the strength of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, it is prayed that despite the aforesaid statutory bar, Constitution Court can always grant bail so that the right of speedy trial and that of life and liberty do not stand defeated.
Thus, as per K.A. Najeeb (supra), despite the above statutory restriction contained in UAPA, the Constitutional Courts can consider grant of bail on the ground of violation of Part-III of the Constitution. However, in the case in hand, the maximum sentence provided under Section 18 & 20 UAPA is imprisonment for life and there is nothing which may indicate that prosecution is acting in a manner which is detrimental to his fundamental rights as provided under Part-III of the Constitution of India. Trial Court Record does not suggest any deliberate attempt on the part of prosecution to slow down the trial and, therefore, at this juncture, merely because of the above incarceration period, the accused does not become entitled to bail. The learned trial court has already observed that it, being already conscious about such fundamental right of the accused, was taking up the matter diligently by giving shortest possible dates. Therefore, there is no further requirement of passing any further direction in this regard. 

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Judgement reviewed by- Parvathy P.V

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Delhi High Court’s Jurisdiction Limited to Cases of Perversity in Industrial Tribunal Decisions

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Case title: Director General, Delhi Doordharshan Kendra v. Mohd. Shahbaz Khan, Tej Pal Manohar Paswan, Danvir Hans Raj.

Case no: LPA 242/2024, LPA 243/2024, LPA 244/2024, LPA 245/2024, LPA 246/2024,

Dated on: 22nd March, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Rekha Palli and Hon’ble DR. Justice Sudhir Kumar Jain.

Facts of the case:

Appeals filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent LPA 242/2024 & other connected appeals to assail five similar orders dated 12.12.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in a batch of Writ Petitions. Vide the impugned order dated 12.12.2023, the learned Single Judge has rejected the Appellant’s challenge to the award dated 15.10.2007 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal (Tribunal), wherein the learned tribunal after holding that the termination of the respondents’ service by the Appellant was illegal, has directed the Appellant to reinstate them with 25% back wage.

Contentions of the appellant:

The learned Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge have failed to appreciate that the respondents were never employed with the Appellant but had in fact, been engaged by one M/S Navnidh Carriers who was engaged by the appellant on 31.07.1998, to provide manpower services as and when required. The learned Tribunal has not examined as to whether the Respondents had completed 240 days of continuous service in the year immediately preceding their termination, which aspect the learned Single Judge also over looked. Instead of placing the onus to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship on the respondents, the learned Single Judge has wrongly shifted the said onus on the Appellant.

Contentions of the respondent:

The learned Tribunal has, as a matter of fact, found that the respondents had been working with the Appellant/Organization much prior to 31.07.1998, i.e; the date when the appellant had, with malafide intention, engaged M/S Navnidh Carriers for providing manpower services and therefore, it was evident that the respondents had initially been engaged by the appellant itself. The experience certificate dated 13.07.1999 issued by the appellant to one of the respondents wherein it has been categorically stated that he had been working with the appellant as a casual labourer since July 1997 and was an honest and hardworking worker. The appellant admittedly does not have any licence to engage workmen through a contractor as is mandated under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (the CLRA Act), it is evident that the respondents were to be treated as employees of the appellant itself. He, therefore, prays that the appeals be dismissed.

Legal provisions:

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (the CLRA Act)- regulated the employment of contract labor in certain establishments and provides for its abolition in certain circumstances. Article 226 of the Constitution- gives the High court the power to issue orders, directions and writs to any person or the authority including the Govt for the enforcement of Fundamental rights.

Issue:

Whether Respondents were engaged by the Appellant and were illegally terminated? When can Writ Court interfere with the factual findings of fact of Labour/Industrial Tribunal?

Courts judgement and analysis:

The learned Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge, after taking into account the gate passes as also experience letter dated 13.07.1999 issued by the appellant to one of the respondents have come to a conclusion that the respondents were employed with the appellant/ organisation and had been illegally terminated. Both the learned Single Judge as also the learned Tribunal found upon appreciation of evidence that the purported contract by the appellant in favor of M/s Navnidh Carriers was sham and an attempt to conceal the engagement of the respondents with the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to give any explanation whatsoever for the issuance of the said experience certificate if the respondent namely Mohd. Shahbaz Khan was not their employee. The Appellant did not have any license, as mandated under the CLRA Act, 1970, to engage workmen through a contractor, hence it is evident that they were directly engaged by the appellant. In the light of these categoric factual findings by the learned Tribunal, which cannot, in any manner, said to be perverse or contrary to the evidence lead before the learned Tribunal, we are of the view that it was neither open for the learned Single Judge to interfere with these findings in exercise of its writ jurisdiction nor is it open for this Court to examine these questions of fact. In Dinesh Kumar v. Central Public Works Department, 2023 SCC On-Line Del 6518, wherein the co-ordinate Bench after examining various decisions of the Apex Court held that writ Court can interfere with the factual findings of fact recorded in the industrial award only if the same are perverse or are entirely unsupported by evidence. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters is quite limited. In Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Limited v. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193, the Apex Court, held that the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals as the case be is the final court of facts, unless the same is perverse or not based on legal evidence, which is when the High Courts can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Devi Dutt, (2006) 13 SCC 32, has held that the writ Court can interfere with the factual findings of fact only if in case the Award is perverse; the Labour Court has applied wrong legal principles; the Labour Court has posed wrong questions; the Labour Court has not taken into consideration all the relevant facts; or the Labour Court has arrived at findings based upon irrelevant facts or on extraneous considerations. In the present case, the Labour Court has arrived at a conclusion based upon the evidence adduced by the parties and the learned Single Judge has affirmed the findings of fact again after minutely scanning the entire evidence, and therefore, the question of interference by this Court does not arise. In the light of the aforesaid, we find absolutely no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge to hold that the respondents were engaged by the appellant and were illegally terminated. The appeals being meritless are, along with all pending applications, dismissed.

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Judgement reviewed by- Parvathy P.V.

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Interim relief cannot be seeked for an International Arbitration Case: SC

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Case title: Ilwohnibrand Co. Ltd. V. Mahakali Food Pvt.Ltd and Ors.

Case no: Arbitration case No.of 2023

Dated on: 3rd April, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadikhari  and Hon’ble Shri Justice Devnarayan Mishra

Facts of the Case:

The petitioner had business relationship with the respondent no.1 to 3. A sale contract was entered into between the petitioner and the respondents on 18.09.2019 for supply of 2014 MT ‘ Full-Fat Soya Grits’. However, respondents committed a breach of contract wherein there was neither the quantity supplied according to the contract nor the quality. Even for the sub-standard material supplied by the respondent, the authorities conducted raid and sealed the premises of the petitioner. Petitioner notified the respondent about the breach. Respondent though admitted the supply of substandard quality under the contract and promised to compensate the petitioner but no such compensation was ever paid. Another contract was entered into between the petitioner and the respondent wherein respondent insisted for enhanced rate and issued proforma invoice and payment was duly made by the petitioner. However, respondent again committed breach of contract by not supplying the material as per the timeline mandated in the contract and in fact only supplied goods worth $1,42,500 despite receiving advance payment of $375,000 and thereafter respondent did not make any supply and stopped answering the calls. Again, with malicious intent, respondents communicated that it shall pay the balance amount to the petitioner, but no heed has been paid. Efforts to resolve the dispute failed since the respondent did not want to and stopped making communication with the petitioner. Since, the contract between parties provides for resolution of dispute by way of arbitration to be conducted in India, the petitioner filed petition under the Section 9 (1)(i) of the Conciliation Act of 1996 before the Commercial Court which was dismissed for want of jurisdiction with liberty to the petitioner to approach appropriate forum. Hence, the present petition had been filed. Shri Aniket Naik, appointed as Amicus Curiae submitted that petitioner has already approached the Commercial Court under Section 9 of the Act of 1996 seeking interim protection. However, learned Commercial Court dismissed the application filed by the petitioner holding the same as not maintainable for want of jurisdiction as the matter pertains to international commercial arbitration and not domestic arbitration.

Contentions of the Appellant:

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that evidence of breach committed by the respondent are available and, therefore, an order of interim protection securing the amount involved in the arbitration is required to be passed since despite sending several reminders, respondent kept making false promises, but neither exported the balance shipment nor compensate for the delivery of sub-standard quality of products thereby putting the petitioner to suffer irreparable loss. In terms of section 2(e) and (f) of the act of 1996, the petition can by heard by this court being the jurisdictional court and the present arbitration being an international commercial arbitration. In an identical situation the apex court , in S.D. Containers V. Mold Tek Packaging Ltd., had remanded the case to the court to be tried under its original civil jurisdiction where the court held that while invoking its powers under clause (9) of the letter patent read with rule 1(8) of chapter IV of the rules of the exercise its extra ordinary civil jurisdiction. Hence, the petition which is made under Section9 of the Act 1996 is exclusively triable by this court, therefore, the present petition to be deleted from the category of  the arbitration case and be listed under  the relevant category before appropriate single bench.

Contentions of the Amicus Curiae:

Petitioner has already approached the commercial court under Section 9 of the Act of 1996 seeking interim protection. But the court dismissed saying that the same is not maintainable as it pertains to international arbitration. Thereafter,

Petitioner has preferred the present application under section 9 (2)(1)(f) of the act of 1996 which is not maintainable in the view the fact that as per the Chapter 2 Rule 3 of Rules, 2008 an application under section 11 of the act of 1996 shall be registered as arbitration case which deals with the appointment of the arbitrator.  Court to sub-rule 8 Rule 10 Chapter 2, of the High Court rules 2008 which says that these cases can be considered as a  Miscellaneous Civil Case and also to be registered as a Miscellaneous Civil Case if they do not fall under the ambit of the first seven clauses which is not interlocutory to any proceedings. It is submitted that petitioner can very well file Miscellaneous Civil Case in terms of sub-rule 8 of Rule 10 of Chapter 2 of Rules of 2008, which can be entertained and appropriate orders can be passed.

Legal Provisions:

Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act-  Seeking interim reliefs before, or during the arbitral proceedings, or at any time after the passing of the award but before it is enforced.

Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act- Appointment of the arbitrator.

Sub-rule 8 of Rule 10 of Chapter 2 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh rules of 2008- Filing miscellaneous civil cases.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to seek interim measure of protection and securing the amount involved in the arbitration   under section 9 of Arbitration act 1996 and section 10 of the commercial courts act,2015?

Courts Judgement and Analysis:-

The present petition itself is not maintainable on twin grounds:

(i) Firstly , the petitioner resorting to the liberty granted by the Commercial Court has filed present petition under Section 9 r/W Section 2(1)(f) of the Act of 1996 seeking interim protection before this Court which cannot be entertained by this Court.

(ii) Secondly, as rightly pointed out by Amicus Curiae, in terms of Chapter 2 Rule 3 of the Rules of 2008, an application Section 11 of the Act of 1996 shall be registered as an arbitration case which deals with appointment of Arbitrator which is not the case herein.

In the considered opinion of this Court, looking to the nature of case and the relief as sought for by the petitioner, the same does not fall within the category of an Arbitration Case. Rather the same ought to have been filed as a Miscellaneous Civil case falling within the ambit and scope of any other application of civil nature, not falling under any of the specified categories in terms of sub-rule 8 of Rule 10 of Chapter 2 of Rules of 2008. In view of the above   discussion, its hereby rejected. Accordingly, the present petition is hereby dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to file miscellaneous civil case in terms of sub-rule 8 of Rules of 2008.

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“Supreme Court Invalidates Auction Sale Due to Absence of Mandatory 30-Days Notice to Borrower”

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Case title: Govind Kumar Sharma & Anr. v. Bank of Baroda & Ors.

Case no.: Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24155 of 2018)

Dated on: 18th April 2024

Quorum: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case revolves around an auction sale conducted by Bank of Baroda (Respondent no. 1) under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The appellants, Govind Kumar Sharma & Anr., were the highest bidders in the auction and obtained a sale certificate for the property in question. They were initially tenants but became owners after the auction sale was confirmed.

However, the borrowers (Respondent nos. 3 and 4) filed an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, seeking to set aside the sale due to non-compliance with statutory procedures, particularly regarding notice requirements. The Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) set aside the sale, directing the bank to refund the auction money with interest, and the same decision was upheld by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) and the Allahabad High Court.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The Appellants contented that sale is liable to be quashed for the non-compliance of Rule 8(6) and 8(7) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. The auction purchaser set up his case that he has spent huge money on improvement of property in question.

They sought compensation not only for the auction money but also for the investments made.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The Bank admitted non-compliance with statutory procedures but argued that appellants shouldn’t be compensated for improvements made. Borrowers claimed to have paid outstanding dues and sought a No Dues Certificate.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, Application against measures to recover secured debts.

Rule 8(6) and 8(7) of Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, which required a mandatory notice of 30 days to the borrower, had neither been issued nor served upon the borrower.

ISSUE –

  • Whether the auction sale should be set aside due to non-compliance with statutory procedures.
  • The status of the appellants as tenants or owners after setting aside the sale.
  • Compensation for the appellants for property improvements.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

  1. The Court affirmed the setting aside of the auction sale due to the Bank’s admission of non-compliance with statutory notice requirements.
  2. The appellants’ status reverted to tenants after the sale was set aside, with no obligation to hand over physical possession to the Bank.
  3. The Court directed the Bank to refund the auction money with compound interest of 12% per annum to the appellants.
  4. Borrowers were to receive a No Dues Certificate upon settlement of accounts with the Bank.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Govind Kumar Sharma & Anr. v. Bank of Baroda & Ors. provides clarity on the consequences of non-compliance with statutory procedures in auction sales under the SARFAESI Act. It underscores the importance of adhering to legal requirements and ensures fair treatment of parties involved in such transactions.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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“Supreme Court Validates Lower Court’s Acquittal in Karnataka State Case.”

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Case Title – Parteek Bansal Vs State of Rajasthan and Ors.

Case Number – Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2520/2017

Dated on – 6th March,2017

Quorum – Justice Vikram Nath

FACTS OF THE CASE

In The Case of Parteek Bansal Vs State of Rajasthan and Ors., the Appellant and the Respondent No. 3 initially met each other online in June 2014. The father of the Respondent No. 3, who is the Respondent No.2 in the present case, visited the appellant in Udaipur, the appellant who is a Chartered Accountant based in Hisar, was approached by the Respondent No.2 regarding a wedding proposal for his daughter, the Respondent No. 2 in the present case, who was at the time working as the Deputy Superintendent of Police in Udaipur, Rajasthan. The engagement of the Respondent No. 3 and the appellant took place in Udaipur on 18th February,2015 followed by a wedding on the 21st of March,2015. However, on 10th October, 2015, the Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint against the appellant at the Hisar Police Station under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A similar complaint was also filed by the Respondent No. 2 at the Udaipur Police Station on the 15th of October,2015, five days later of the complaint, leading to the registration of FIR NO. 156 on the 1st of November,2015. Initially, the first FIR registered in Hisar implicated several family members of the appellant, but after conducting further investigation, only the appellant was proceeded with the charge under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Thereafter, the trail commenced against the appellant in the court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Hisar. Concurrently, the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 before the High Court of Rajasthan and sought to quash the second FIR registered in Udaipur. However, the High Court of Rajasthan dismissed the petition on the 6th of March, 2017 citing the precedence of the complaint in Udaipur and lack of awareness by the Rajasthan Police regarding the earlier complaint in Hisar. Being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court of Rajasthan, the appellant appealed the case before the Supreme Court of India, which further stayed for investigation in the Udaipur FIR until further orders. Adhering to the decision of the High Court of Rajasthan, the trial in Hisar concluded and the Trial Court acquitted the appellant on the 2nd of August, 2017. The judgment and the acquittal order revealed that the prosecution called upon several witnesses, including the Investigating Officer and other members of the police force. However, they were unable to bring forward the complainant and the victim to testify during the proceedings of the court, resulting in the conclusion of the evidence of the prosecution and proceedings with the statement recording of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before ultimately acquitting the appellant.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

  1. The appellant, through their counsel, in the said case pointed out two complaints, the acquittal judgments and the ostensible errors in the impugned orders and that these errors lead to the series of events, with the complaint at Udaipur was former than that at Hisar and secondly, the Rajasthan Police having no knowledge of the proceedings being conducted at Hisar.
  2. The appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the complainants were well-aware of the multiplicity of the complaints registered in Hisar as well as the Udaipur Police Station but they did not take any requisite step to withdraw their complaint stating that it was wrongly registered in Hisar or that it may be transferred to Udaipur for the purpose of investigation.
  3. The appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the impugned proceeding were nothing but an abuse of the process of law and that the only motive of the complainant was to harass the appellant and make him face the prolonged trial of the courts.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

  1. The respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the court at Hisar had no territorial jurisdiction to conduct the trial of the present case as the offense was committed in Udaipur. Therefore, the acquittal judgment delivered by the Hisar Court was void.
  2. The respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the complaint should have been looked into and investigated by the Rajasthan Police. However, because of the interim order issued by the court, the investigation had been stalled. Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes the punishment for Husband or Relative of Husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty
  2. Section 482 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes the punishment for using a false property mark
  3. Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prescribes the power to examine the accused.

ISSUES

  1. The main issue in the present case revolves around whether the filing of two FIRs for the same incident is valid?
  2. Whether the decision of the High Court to dismiss the petition was appropriate, considering the circumstance and timing of filing of the FIRs in both the jurisdictions?
  3. Whether the trial adhered to the principles of a fair and just trial and due process?
  4. Whether the acquittal was justified on the basis of the inability of the prosecution to present important witnesses?

 COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT

The court in the case of Parteek Bansal Vs State of Rajasthan and Ors., observed that the Respondent No. 2 and 3 were misusing their official powers by lodging complaints one after another. The court, further, observed that the deportment of the Respondent No. 2 and 3 of not presenting themselves before the Trial Court in Hisar nor withdrawing their complaint, signifies their sole intention to harass the appellant.  The court observed that even before this court, the respondent no. 2 and 3 vigorously opposed the quashing of the FIR in Udaipur. It was alleged in the FIR filed in Hisar that the Respondent No. 2 and 3 demanded a sum of Rupees 50,00,000 and an Innova Car while visiting the appellant. Thus, the court was of the opinion that the argument that no offense was committed in Hisar but only in Udaipur was incorrect. The court stated that the misuse of the state machinery for ulterior intentions and harassment of any individual warrants castigation. Therefore, the court imposed costs on Respondent No. 2 to compensate the appellant. The court in the present case, allowed appeal and quashed the order of the High Court as well as the proceedings registered as FIR No. 156/2015 dated 1st November,2015 at the Women Police Station, Udaipur are also quashed. The court ordered the Respondent No. 2 to pay costs of Rupees 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs Only), which was ordered to be deposited mandatorily with the Registrar of the Court within four weeks. The court stated that upon deposit of the total amount specified, % shall be paid to the appellant and another % shall be transferred to the Supreme Court Legal Service Committee.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Sruti Sikha Maharana

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