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Flaws in the initial investigation, unskilled prosecution and also the passive involvement of the trial judge led to acquittal of all accused. The Kerala High Court ordered re-trial in the rape death case citing the above stated reasons. The ratio was laid down by J. A Hariprasad & J. M.R. Anitha in the case of State of Kerala Vs. Madhu & Ors., [CRL.A. No. 1357 of 2019].

There was a case of rape and death of two sisters, aged 13 and 9 years respectively, in Walayar in Kerala in 2017. The two sisters belonged to Schedule Caste community. The elder sister was found hanging in her house on January 17, 2017 and two months later the younger sister was found hanging in her house. The postmortem reports showed that both the girls were subjected to sexual assault. The autopsy report of the younger girl suggested the possibility of homicidal hanging. The police did not explore the angle of murder and in their final report against the four accused included charges of suicide, rape, unnatural sex under the IPC and POSCO Act. The police report further stated that the girls committed suicide due to intolerable sexual assault by the accused persons. The trial court acquitted the four accused and due to this the State Government filed an appeal against the acquittal.

The High Court set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered a retrial of the case. Further the court was of the opinion that, “We are of the considered view that two important functionaries in the criminal trial have egregiously failed to perform their duties. Faulty initial investigation and slipshod prosecution throughout are the established reasons prompting us to find that the trial was an empty formality. Besides, lack of involvement by the trial Judge has also contributed to a great extent in not digging out the true facts. We are of the considered view that the appellate court cannot shirk its responsibility to interfere and set things right when it is established that the functionaries in a criminal trial unjustly failed to perform their assigned roles resulting in miscarriage of justice. We have no hesitation to hold in the facts and circumstances of the cases, as borne out from the records, that the accused cannot clinging on to the unmerited acquittals in the sham trials.”

Lastly the court was of the opinion that, “we are fully convinced that the perfunctory initial investigation and cursory, desultory and unskilled prosecution coupled with the lack of involvement by the trial Judge resulted in miscarriage of justice and the consequential unmerited acquittals in all these cases. Certainly, the fact situations in these cases reveal extraordinary circumstances requiring extraordinary remedies. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that trial in all the above Sessions Cases have been lowered to the level of mock trials.”

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Higher Courts cannot use their inherent power under Article 227 of the Constitution to interject the arbitral proceedings before the award is given except in rare and exceptional cases. The Supreme Court bench consisting of J. N V Ramana, J. Surya Kant and J. Hrishikesh Roy, explained upon the principle of unbreakability and jurisdictional conflict of an already appointed arbitrator in the matter of Bhaven Construction through Authorised Signatory Premjibhai K. Shah v. Executive Engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. & Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 14665 of 2015].

The Respondent entered into a contract with the Appellant to manufacture and supply bricks. The said contract had an arbitration clause. As some dispute arose regarding the payment in furtherance of the manufacturing and supplying of bricks, the appellant issued a notice seeking appointment of a sole arbitrator in accordance with Clause 38 of the contract. The respondent replied and did not agree to the appellant’s request on two main grounds – 1. That the disputes between the parties were to be adjudicated in accordance with the Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992 and 2. That the arbitration was time barred and neither of the parties were entitled to claim if the arbitrator had not been appointed within 30 days after the defect liability period. Regardless, the appellants appointed a sole arbitrator who rejected the application of the respondent holding that he had the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.

Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a Special Civil Application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court which was further dismissed on the grounds that “the only remedy available to the petitioner is to wait till the award is passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator and to challenge the same under Section 34 of the Act…”. Aggrieved again, the respondents preferred a Letters Patent Appeal in Special Leave Application which was allowed by the HC holding that “the appellant denied that in view of Clause-38, wherein it is provided that, ‘provision of Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 and any statutory modification thereof will be applicable’, the respondent cannot appoint a sole arbitrator and thereafter cannot contend that now that the Arbitrator is already appointed and he (the arbitrator) has already exercised power under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the petitioner has to wait till the arbitration award is passed, to challenge the same under Section 34 and Section 37 of the 1996 Act”.

Hence, the present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by the appellants who argued that the Division bench of HC had erred in interfering with the previous order and the fact that the final award had been passed by the arbitrator and was now challenged  by the respondent showed that the respondent was attempting to bypass the framework laid down. The respondent argued that since the Gujarat Act was enacted, the respondents could invoke writ jurisdiction of the HC at any time to set aside the arbitration which was a nullity as it was in conflict with the State enactment. The SC found that the HC had erred in utilising its discretionary power under Article 226 and 227 and thus, allowed the appeal further allowing the respondent to raise an legally permissible objections regarding the jurisdictional question in the pending Section 34 proceedings. The SC, relying on M/s Deep Industries Limited v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited [(2019) SCC Online SC 1602], also added that “It must be noted that Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, necessarily mandates that the issue of jurisdiction must be dealt first by the tribunal, before the Court examines the same under Section 34. Respondent No. 1 is therefore not left remediless, and has statutorily been provided a chance of appeal”.

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Calculation of Notional Income of Homemakers must be on the basis of their work, labour and sacrifices. The Supreme Court while deciding upon an insurance claim case gave utmost importance to promote gender equality in the country. The bench also observed that, “furtherance of our Nation’s International Law obligations and our Constitutional Vision of Social Equality and ensuring dignity to all.” The Supreme Court presided over by J. N.V. Ramana, J. S.A. Nazeer & J. S. Kant laid down this ratio in the case of Kriti & Anr. Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, [Civil Appeal Nos. 19-20 of 2021].

The Supreme Court was dealing with an Insurance Dispute in this case. In the year 2014 a couple met with an accident and died. The husband was working as a teacher and the wife was a housewife. The couple had three surviving dependents i.e. two minor daughters and father of the deceased. The Court while deciding upon the insurance claim was deciding upon the monthly income of the deceased woman who was a homemaker.

The Supreme Court on this particular issue was of the opinion that, “Any compensation awarded by a Court ought to be just, reasonable and consequently must undoubtedly be guided by principles of fairness, equity, and good conscience.” Further, on the deciding how to determine the notional income of homemakers stated that, “On an average, women spend nearly 299 minutes a day on unpaid domestic services for household members versus 97 minutes spent by men on average. Similarly, in a day, women on average spend 134 minutes on unpaid caregiving services for household members as compared to the 76 minutes spent by men on average. The total time spent on these activities per day makes the picture in India even more clear­ women on average spen 16.9 and 2.6 percent of their day on unpaid domestic services and unpaid caregiving services for household members respectively, while men spent 1.7 and 0.8 percent.”

The Court further elaborating upon Gender Equality & Analysis stated that, “The sheer amount of time and effort that is dedicated to household work by individuals, who are more likely to be women than men, is not surprising when one considers the plethora of activities a housemaker undertakes. A housemaker often prepares food for the entire family, manages the procurement of groceries and other household shopping needs, cleans and manages the house and its surroundings, undertakes decoration, repairs and maintenance work, looks after the needs of the children and any aged member of the household, manages budgets and so much more.”

Lastly the court stated that, “The attempt of the Court in such matters should therefore be towards determining, in the best manner possible, the truest approximation of the value added by a homemaker for the purpose of granting monetary compensation.”

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The party seeking an injunction must show that irreparable damage will be caused if the injunction is refused. This was decided by the Delhi high court bench consisting of Hon’ble Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw and Hon’ble;e Justice Asha Menon in Shrivats Rathi and Anr. vs. Anil Rathi and Ors.[First Appeal Order (Comm) No.119 of 2020].

This appeal was filed in response to an order that set aside interim applications filed in cases concerning infringement of a trademark. The background facts to this case are that a company named Rathi Steels Rolling Mills (RSRM) came into existence in 1986. In 1969, it split into K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. and G.D Steels Rathi Ltd. which were looked after the male descendants of the family. Later in the year 1975, all members of the family applied for and obtained the registration of the trademark ‘RATHI’ to preserve the quality of the products manufactured. However after a MOU was signed among the family members to not allow outsiders use the name, the appellant began granting a license to a third party for usage of the trademark. When the matter was taken to court, the judge issued a restraining order from issuing any license in the future.

The High Court stated that an appellate court has limitations on matters dealing with an injunction, especially for the assessment of the material grounds on which decision by the lower court was made. It could only interfere when certain principles of law had been ignored while the lower court exercised its discretion.

The court then discussed the different ingredients that justify its interference in the grant of an injunction by referring to the Supreme Court judgement made in the case Dalpat Kumar vs. Prahlad Singh (1992) 1 SCC 719, It was held “the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence that there is a ‘prima facie case’ in his favor. The court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in ‘irreparable injury to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction’. The third condition is that ‘the balance of convenience’ must be in favor of granting injunction which means that the court must find the amount of substantial mischief which is like to be caused if the injunction is refused”.

Applying the above principles the court held that the appellant failed in presenting a prima facie case by not disclosing any right to issue licenses for use of trademark “RATHI”. Besides, the respondent showed that injury would be caused to the Rathi family by the unregulated use of this trademark. This damage would be irreparable and the balance of convenience swings in favor of the respondent.

After finding no reason to intervene n the judgement given by the first instance court, the court dismissed the appeal.

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If any soldier’s whereabouts are unknown or who has not been heard of from the last ten years will be presumed “dead”. The Jammu & Kashmir High Court presided over by Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Dhar in the case of Madhu Devi V/s Union of India & Ors., [OWP 1440 of 2017].

Desertion is an act of abandonment of military duty without permission and with an intention of not returning back for more than 10 years.

In the instant case, it was found that husband of Madhu devi (Petitioner), serving as Head constable in 16 Battalion CRPF went missing in June 2010. Petitioner was being informed by the Company Commander Unit about the missing of her husband. Both respondent and petitioner tried to contact the soldier, but were unable to do so. As a result, on September 6, 2010, petitioner’s husband was declared as ‘Deserter’ from CRPF by the court.

Later on, Petition was being filed by the petitioner asking to declare her husband as ‘Dead’ and not ‘Deserter” on the grounds that from the last 7 years since she’s been trying to find her husband and has also issued notices on different media platforms but all her efforts went in vain. Petitioner also argued that respondents themselves couldn’t trace her husband’s whereabouts in the last more than 7 years i.e, w.e.f 3-06-2010.

The court relied on the case of N. Pankajam V/s State of Tamil Nadu (Writ Petition No. 5480) where Madras court dealt with somewhat similar circumstances.

The Court after hearing the arguments of both the parties came to a conclusion that since it’s been more than 7 years from the day soldier went missing and none of the parties have been able to trace and prove if the soldier is still alive, he’s no more to be considered as ‘Deserter’ and must be presumed ‘Dead’ according to Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act.

The HC stated that “Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act casts burden of proving that a person is alive, who has not been heard of for seven years upon the person who affirms it”.

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