0

“The Uncovering of the Golden Robbery: The Supreme Court’s Decision on the Intertwined Webs of Robbery, Theft, and Dacoity Concerning Priceless Gold Instruments”

Blog , , ,

Case Title: Hansraj v The State of M.P. 

Case No.: SLP (Crl.) No(s). 4626 of 2024  

Dated On: 19th April, 2024 

Quorum: Justice B R Gavai and Justice Sandeep Mehta 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE:  

This is an appeal filed by one Hansraj against the judgment of a single judge bench of M.P. High Court. The appellant was found guilty of the crimes specified in Section 394 read with Section 397 of the IPC and was found guilty of seven years of hard labour in prison, a fine of Rs. one thousand, and three months of additional hard labour if the amount is not paid.  

On December 12, 1998, at around 10:30 am, as the complainant Bhagu Bai was making her way to her field, someone approached her from behind, forced her to close her eyes, attacked her with a knife, and took her silver bracelet, necklace, and anklet. Following the commission of the crime and causing harm to the complainant, the attacker fled the scene. In the First Information Report (FIR), the complainant claimed that she was unable to see or identify the attacker.  

The complainant, Bhagu Bai, was on her way to her field when someone approached her from behind, forced her to close her eyes, attacked her with a knife, and took her silver jewellery (satte), which she was wearing on her feet, along with a silver chain. The claimed individual fled the scene after carrying out the mentioned deed. The case is unique in that the complainant herself admitted in her First Information Report that she was unable to see or identify the subject of the complaint. 

On December 14, 1998, the appellant was taken into custody due to suspicions. It is purported that the accused appellant made a confession or disclosure statement while being questioned by the police, and such statement was documented as Memorandum (Exhibit P-11). It is also claimed that the Investigating Officer (PW-12), acting on the aforementioned disclosure statement, retrieved the silver goods that the defendants are alleged to have looted after committing an assault against the complainant.  

Exhibit P-12 shows that these items were taken in accordance with the panchnama. The prosecution further asserted that the complainant had provided the identification of the objects that had been confiscated at the accused’s request to an executive magistrate. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT: 

The appellant’s learned counsel argues that the appeal was chosen because the trial court’s decision and order were not in line with the case’s facts or the law. The submission goes on to say that the accused was not immediately seen or identified by the complainant or other witnesses, as evidenced by the complainant’s filed police report and the witness statements that were recorded by the police.  

However, in the witness statements that were taped in front of the trial court, they claimed to have seen the appellant, recognised him, and filed the complaint using his name. He goes on to say that no identification was provided for the products or property that was seized. On the basis of the recovery of the objects alone, the appellant/accused cannot be linked to the offence because the seizure was not proven, and the property was not identified.  

The primary contention of the appellant’s learned counsel was that the Executive Magistrate identified the articles/ornaments according to the prosecution’s findings, but the prosecution has not produced the relevant Executive Magistrate for evidence before the learned trial Court. Therefore, it is dubious that the identification of the items or jewellery purportedly retrieved from the appellant can be trusted, and therefore cannot be the basis for a conviction. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: 

The respondents vehemently alleged that only a cursory examination of the excerpted section of the investigating officer’s deposition would indicate that he did not recount the accused’s exact words when he made the disclosure statement. 

Respondents strongly contended that a simple review of the segment of the investigating officer’s deposition that was excerpted would show that the officer did not accurately recall the accused’s comments at the time of the disclosure statement. 

The state’s or the respondent’s learned public prosecutor has prayed for the criminal appeal to be dismissed and supported the trial court’s ruling. He also claimed to have taken the accused to the Beed and recovered the silver ornaments, not that the accused had guided him to the location where the objects were hidden.  

The learned public prosecutor for the state or the respondent has pleaded for the criminal appeal to be dismissed and supported the decision made by the trial court. It was not that the accused had led him to the place where the items were concealed; rather, he asserted that he had escorted the accused to the Beed and retrieved the silver ornaments. 

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS: 

  • S.374(2) of CrPC- Anyone found guilty at a trial conducted by a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge, or any other court in which they or any other person found guilty at the same trial have been sentenced to more than seven years in prison. 
  • S.394 IPC- Voluntarily causing hurt by committing robbery. Any individual who intentionally causes harm during the commission or attempt of a robbery, along with any other parties involved, faces a maximum sentence of one year in prison or a harsh sentence of up to ten years in prison, as well as a fine. 
  • S.397 IPC- Robbery, or dacoity, with an attempt to cause death or grievous hurt. should the perpetrator employ a lethal weapon during the robbery or dacoity, inflict serious injury on anyone, or attempt to cause death or serious injury to any individual, they will be sentenced to a minimum of seven years in jail.  

 

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The court was of the view that it is important to note that complainant Bhagu Bai (PW-3) attempted to strengthen her case during her sworn testimony by identifying the accused in court. However, the learned trial court and the High Court did not rely on this identification evidence, and the case was found proven solely on the basis of the recovery of ornaments.  

The court futher observed that Bhagu Bai (PW-3), the complainant, stated that she was able to identify the ornaments that were found during test identification procedures at the accused’s request. Under cross-examination, she did, however, frank admit that she had recognised her jewellery after the police had identified it.  

It’s also critical to remember that the Investigating Officer (PW-12), who took the accused’s disclosure statement and carried out the recovery, failed to provide the legal proof of the disclosure memo.  

The court further held that it had no reluctance in stating that the prosecution utterly failed to substantiate the allegations made by the accused to the Investigating Officer (PW-12), which resulted in the recovery of the silver items that the accused had allegedly stolen from the complainant. It’s also critical to remember that the prosecution did not present any proof that the seized items were kept safe in the malkhana or that they were sealed when they were recovered.  

Because of this, the law does not respect the recovery of the jewellery at the accused’s request or the identification of it, and it is not reliable. To link the accused appellant to the offence, the prosecution presented no additional evidence.  

Therefore, the accused appellant’s guilt, as found by the learned trial court and upheld by the High Court, could not be supported by any concrete or trustworthy evidence that was accessible on file. Thus, the appeal was justified and granted as such. Hereby, the challenged rulings from the learned trial court and the high court, dated October 20, 1999, and December 21, 2022, respectively, were quashed and set aside. 

 

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.” 

 

Judgment reviewed by Riddhi S Bhora  

 

Click to view judgment.

0

“The Supreme Court has acquitted the defendant, citing the unreliability and lack of corroboration in the eyewitness accounts, as well as the questionable nature of the recovered evidence, which casts doubt on the entirety of the prosecution’s case.”

Blog, Supreme court

Case Title – Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others Vs. State of Karnataka

Case Number – Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010

Dated on – April 19, 2024

Quorum – Justice Mehta

 FACTS OF THE CASE

In The Case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, the appellants namely Babu Sahebagouda (A-1), Alagond Sahebagouda Rudragoudar (A-2) and Gadegappa Rudragoudar (A-3) along with Sahebagouda Gadegappa Rudragoudar (A-4), Basappa Avvanna (A-5) and Basappa Dundappa (A-6) herein are tried and charged under IPC Section 143, Section 147, Section 48, Section 506(2), and Section 302 read with Section 149. In The Case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, the complainant, Chanagouda (PW-1) is the owner of an agricultural land and a house in the village named Babanagar, Bijapur, Karnataka. In this case, the prosecution alleges that in the morning of September,19,2001, the deceased, Malagounda along with the labourers Revappa (PW-2), Siddappa (PW-3, Hiragappa (PW-4) and Suresh (PW-5) had gone to put up a dam check on their land. At around 12 in the afternoon, the complainant (PW-1) packed up some lunch for these five people and headed towards the field where the farming procedures were undertaken. The work lasted till 3:30 P.M. Afterwards, the PW-2,3,4 and 5, along with Malagounda, the deceased in the said case and the PW-1, headed back to the village. They reached near the land belonging to Ummakka Kulkarni by around 4:00 PM. Abruptly, A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 appeared and menaced the group. They declared their intention to avenge Sangound’s murder by inflicting the same punishment on the complainant’s party. Armed with a Jambai, two axes and a sickle, A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 respectively attack Malagounda, causing him to collapse to the ground. The attackers then threatened the complainant that if he dared to intervene, he would suffer the same fate as his son. Being threatened for his life, the complainant fled from that location and hid behind the bushes to avoid being beaten by the accused.

The said case was tried in the Sessions Court, Bijapur where the accused pleaded not guilty of the charges imposed on them and requested for a trial. The trial court concluded that the opinion of the Medical Officer regarding the time of the death of the deceased in the said case was totally a contradiction to the case set up by the prosecution witness in their evidence regarding the time of the incident. Thus, an acquittal was provided to the accused. Further, an instant appeal was instituted by the complainants for challenging the acquittal of the accused.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS

  1. The appellants, through their counsel in the said case, contented that the High Court disregarded the established legal principles set by the Sessions Court regarding appeals against acquittals.
  2. The appellants, through their counsel in the said case, contented that the eyewitness accounts of the case are suspicious. They stated that the PW-1,2,3,4, and 5 supposedly witnessed the brutal attack on Malagounda. However, they allegedly did nothing to help him get out of that situation. They neither checked on his conditions nor did they report the said crime right away to the police and suggests that the accusation is based on simply a pre-existing feud and not on concrete evidence.
  3. The appellants, through their counsel in the said case, contented that the Medical Officer performed an autopsy on the victim’s body around 9 Am on 20th September,2001 which resulted the time of death of the victim was more than 24 hours which was a contradiction to the statement given by the eyewitnesses.
  4. The appellants, through their counsel in the said case, contented that the Investigating Officer provided false testimony regarding the disclosure statements made by the accused and the subsequent recovery of the weapons, as the PW-1 clearly stated in his testimony that the police had shown him the weapons on the same day as the day of the incident and that neither the disclosure statement nor the recovery memo contains any signatures or thumb impressions of the accused, thus making it impossible to attribute the recoveries to them.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

  1. The respondents, through their counsel in the said case, contented that the Court, in reviewing the appeal against the acquittal, scrupulously re-evaluated the evidences presented to it and arrived at an independent and well-considered conclusions that the testimony of the witnesses were compelling and devoid of significant contradictions or weaknesses and that this assessment led them to disagree with the trial court’s decision to disregard their testimonies and to acquit the accused of the charges.
  2. The respondents, through their counsel in the said case, contented that there was no significant delay in filing the FIR that could have raised the doubts about the credibility of the prosecution’s account. The contradictions and discrepancies alleged, highlighted by the trial court in the eyewitnesses’ testimonies were minor and inconsequential and that the acquittal of the accused, based on the trial court’s dismissal of the eyewitness testimonies, was flawed, and had an unacceptable reasoning.
  3. The respondents, through their counsel in the said case, contented that the decision of the High Court in overturning the acquittal of the accused in the judgment challenged was justified and that there is no ground for interference in this appeal, as the High Court judgment stands on solid grounds.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 143 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, prescribes the Punishment for Unlawful Assembly. It states that whoever is a member of an unlawful assembly shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
  2. Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, prescribes the Punishment for Rioting. It states that whoever is guilty of rioting shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
  3. Section 48 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, prescribes the definition of “Vessel”.
  4. Section 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, prescribes the Punishment for Criminal Intimidation which mentions “If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.”
  5. Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which prescribes the Punishment for Murder. It states that whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable for fine.
  6. Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which states “Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object”.

ISSUES

  1. The main issue of the case revolved around whether for the purpose of conviction of the appellant for the offenses of unlawful assembly, rioting and murder, the statement of the eyewitnesses furnished was enough?
  2. Whether the disparity between the time of the death of the victim as determined by the autopsy performed by the Medical Officer and false testimony of the Investigating Officer regarding the statement of disclosure and the recovery of weapons are a basis of doubt on the credibility of the narrative of the prosecution?
  3. Whether the delay in filing FIR and contradictions in eyewitnesses’ testimonies affect the credibility of the case of the prosecution?
  4. Whether the decision of the High Court in overturning the acquittal of the accused was justified, considering the evidences and the legal principles applied?

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT

The court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, the court observed that there are strict limitations when a court of appeal can overturn a lower court’s decision to acquit a defendant. The court observed that it can only happen when the lower court’s decision is clearly wrong or illogical, there has been utter ignorance or misinterpretation on the part of the lower court while taking into consideration the furnished evidences, the furnished evidences leave no room for reasonable doubt and is direly suggestive of the guilt of the defendant. The court analysed that the conviction of the defendants in the present case by the High Court violated the aforementioned conditions. The court observed that the case of the prosecution is suspicious and that the presence of the deceased and their servants at the crime scene at that specific time is unexplained. The court interpreted that the members of the prosecution might have fabricated the accounts of the witnesses and might have hidden the true cause of the events as well. The court specified that the precedents have established that a motive can be a double-edged sword. The fact that the members of the prosecution were previously accused of murder could also explain the reason behind why they falsely implicated the defendants in this case. Further the court observed that the evidences furnished to convict the defendants are unreliable. Neither the statements of the witnesses nor the supposed recovered weapons were proven authentically. The weapons were found in open areas, raising doubts about their connection to the crime. Additionally, no scientific testing was conducted to link the weapons to the scene of crime as such. The court stated that since the accounts of the eyewitnesses are not reliable and uncorroborated and the recovered evidence is questionable, the entire case of the prosecution is doubt-casted. Therefore, the court agreed with the decision of the lower court to acquit the defendants. The court believed the judgment of the lower court was apt and reasonable and was duly supported by the evidences. The court, finally, reversed the decision of the High Court and acquitted the defendants of all the charges levied on them and were set free on bail and they did not need to surrender. The court discharged the bail application of the defendants in the said case, thus, allowing the appeal and considered any pending applications related to the case as settled.

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

Judgement Reviewed by – Sruti Sikha Maharana

Click Here to View Judgment

0

“Supreme Court Validates Lower Court’s Acquittal in Karnataka State Case.”

Blog, Supreme court , , , ,

Case Title – Parteek Bansal Vs State of Rajasthan and Ors.

Case Number – Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2520/2017

Dated on – 6th March,2017

Quorum – Justice Vikram Nath

FACTS OF THE CASE

In The Case of Parteek Bansal Vs State of Rajasthan and Ors., the Appellant and the Respondent No. 3 initially met each other online in June 2014. The father of the Respondent No. 3, who is the Respondent No.2 in the present case, visited the appellant in Udaipur, the appellant who is a Chartered Accountant based in Hisar, was approached by the Respondent No.2 regarding a wedding proposal for his daughter, the Respondent No. 2 in the present case, who was at the time working as the Deputy Superintendent of Police in Udaipur, Rajasthan. The engagement of the Respondent No. 3 and the appellant took place in Udaipur on 18th February,2015 followed by a wedding on the 21st of March,2015. However, on 10th October, 2015, the Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint against the appellant at the Hisar Police Station under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A similar complaint was also filed by the Respondent No. 2 at the Udaipur Police Station on the 15th of October,2015, five days later of the complaint, leading to the registration of FIR NO. 156 on the 1st of November,2015. Initially, the first FIR registered in Hisar implicated several family members of the appellant, but after conducting further investigation, only the appellant was proceeded with the charge under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Thereafter, the trail commenced against the appellant in the court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Hisar. Concurrently, the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 before the High Court of Rajasthan and sought to quash the second FIR registered in Udaipur. However, the High Court of Rajasthan dismissed the petition on the 6th of March, 2017 citing the precedence of the complaint in Udaipur and lack of awareness by the Rajasthan Police regarding the earlier complaint in Hisar. Being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court of Rajasthan, the appellant appealed the case before the Supreme Court of India, which further stayed for investigation in the Udaipur FIR until further orders. Adhering to the decision of the High Court of Rajasthan, the trial in Hisar concluded and the Trial Court acquitted the appellant on the 2nd of August, 2017. The judgment and the acquittal order revealed that the prosecution called upon several witnesses, including the Investigating Officer and other members of the police force. However, they were unable to bring forward the complainant and the victim to testify during the proceedings of the court, resulting in the conclusion of the evidence of the prosecution and proceedings with the statement recording of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before ultimately acquitting the appellant.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

  1. The appellant, through their counsel, in the said case pointed out two complaints, the acquittal judgments and the ostensible errors in the impugned orders and that these errors lead to the series of events, with the complaint at Udaipur was former than that at Hisar and secondly, the Rajasthan Police having no knowledge of the proceedings being conducted at Hisar.
  2. The appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the complainants were well-aware of the multiplicity of the complaints registered in Hisar as well as the Udaipur Police Station but they did not take any requisite step to withdraw their complaint stating that it was wrongly registered in Hisar or that it may be transferred to Udaipur for the purpose of investigation.
  3. The appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the impugned proceeding were nothing but an abuse of the process of law and that the only motive of the complainant was to harass the appellant and make him face the prolonged trial of the courts.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

  1. The respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the court at Hisar had no territorial jurisdiction to conduct the trial of the present case as the offense was committed in Udaipur. Therefore, the acquittal judgment delivered by the Hisar Court was void.
  2. The respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the complaint should have been looked into and investigated by the Rajasthan Police. However, because of the interim order issued by the court, the investigation had been stalled. Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes the punishment for Husband or Relative of Husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty
  2. Section 482 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes the punishment for using a false property mark
  3. Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prescribes the power to examine the accused.

ISSUES

  1. The main issue in the present case revolves around whether the filing of two FIRs for the same incident is valid?
  2. Whether the decision of the High Court to dismiss the petition was appropriate, considering the circumstance and timing of filing of the FIRs in both the jurisdictions?
  3. Whether the trial adhered to the principles of a fair and just trial and due process?
  4. Whether the acquittal was justified on the basis of the inability of the prosecution to present important witnesses?

 COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT

The court in the case of Parteek Bansal Vs State of Rajasthan and Ors., observed that the Respondent No. 2 and 3 were misusing their official powers by lodging complaints one after another. The court, further, observed that the deportment of the Respondent No. 2 and 3 of not presenting themselves before the Trial Court in Hisar nor withdrawing their complaint, signifies their sole intention to harass the appellant.  The court observed that even before this court, the respondent no. 2 and 3 vigorously opposed the quashing of the FIR in Udaipur. It was alleged in the FIR filed in Hisar that the Respondent No. 2 and 3 demanded a sum of Rupees 50,00,000 and an Innova Car while visiting the appellant. Thus, the court was of the opinion that the argument that no offense was committed in Hisar but only in Udaipur was incorrect. The court stated that the misuse of the state machinery for ulterior intentions and harassment of any individual warrants castigation. Therefore, the court imposed costs on Respondent No. 2 to compensate the appellant. The court in the present case, allowed appeal and quashed the order of the High Court as well as the proceedings registered as FIR No. 156/2015 dated 1st November,2015 at the Women Police Station, Udaipur are also quashed. The court ordered the Respondent No. 2 to pay costs of Rupees 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs Only), which was ordered to be deposited mandatorily with the Registrar of the Court within four weeks. The court stated that upon deposit of the total amount specified, % shall be paid to the appellant and another % shall be transferred to the Supreme Court Legal Service Committee.

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

Judgement Reviewed by – Sruti Sikha Maharana

Click Here to View Judgment

0

“We are bothered by the decision rendered by the High Court in the instance of extreme provocation and assault; Supreme Court overturns decision of higher court in case of grave assault.”

Blog , , , , ,

Case Title: Ramayan Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 

Case No.: SLP (Crl.) No.14988 of 2023 

Dated On: 19th April, 2024 

Quorum:  Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma  

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

The facts of the case revolves around one Ramayan Singh who is the appellant and also the original complainant. The facts of the case reveal that a First Information Report (the “FIR”) was lodged by the Appellant i.e., the Original Complainant, on 03.01.2022 stating that on 02.01.2022 at around 3:30 PM, the Appellant along with his uncle i.e., Jitendra Singh (the “Deceased”) and his driver i.e., Rahul were returning from Bankati Bazar when their vehicle was stopped by the accused person(s) including inter alia (i) Respondent No. 2; and (ii) Punit Pal. The accused persons verbally abused the Deceased and proceeded to shatter the windows of the vehicle with iron rods. Subsequently they dragged the Deceased out of the vehicle – and physically assaulted the Deceased with iron rods, hockey sticks and bats with an intention to kill him. 

Upon stealing the deceased’s gold chain and mobile phones from both the driver and the deceased, the accused fled the scene of the incident. After being taken to the Primary Health Centre in Bankati, the deceased was taken to the District Hospital in Basti and then to Sahara Hospital in Lucknow, where he passed away on February 10, 2022, as a result of his severe injuries.  

The deceased person had injuries to his or her head, hand, and knee, according to an inquest report that was written on the same day, February 10, 2022. (ii) A post-mortem was performed, and the results showed that the deceased had four serious antemortem head injuries. Crucially, ante mortem head injuries were found to be the cause of death, leaving the patient in a coma. 

The Original Complainant, who filed the current appeals, is the appellant in this case. In it, he challenges the validity of the order(s) that the High Court issued, expanding (i) Respondent No. 2 and (ii) placing Punit Pal on bail in connection with the FIR.  

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT: 

The appellant contended, rather vehemently, The High Court lacked jurisdiction to grant bail to Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal given the following facts: (i) accusations had been made against the accused individual(s); (ii) Respondent No. 2 had been found to be the owner of the weapon used in the assault of the deceased; and (iii) the Trial Court had issued well-reasoned orders rejecting bail requests for Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal.  

It was also further alleged that there is a genuine and likely risk to the accused person(s)’s capacity to influence witnesses given the tremendous influence they have in the area—including Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal, among others—that all of the businesses close to the scene of the incident stayed closed for ten (10) days following the incident.  

The counsel on behalf of the appellants alleged that Punit Pal and Respondent No. 2 have abused their power. Specifically, it was argued that Appellant himself was the target of threats from Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal, and that a named witness had previously requested police protection from the Trial Court due to threats made against him while the case was pending.  

that Punit Pal and Respondent No. 2 have abused their power. Specifically, it was argued that Appellant himself was the target of threats from Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal, and that a named witness had previously requested police protection from the Trial Court due to threats made against him while the case was pending.  

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: 

In a vehement argument, Senior Counsel for Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal made the following claims in court: That while Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal have been complying with the trial, the Appellant has put the proceedings before the Trial Court on hold. 

That the accusation made against Punit Pal and Respondent No. 2 about the extension of threats to the appellant was completely false and, in reality, was part of a deliberate attempt to discredit Punit Pal and Respondent No. 2.  

It was further alleged that there was no formal agreement regarding the purported deal between the appellant and Mr. Pankaj Sharma and his wife Mrs. Ashu, even though the second respondent (Vivek Pal @ Vikki Pal) claimed to have given the appellant Rs. 1 lakh in cash. Remarkably, the complainants in this instance were not Mr. Pankaj Sharma or Mrs. Ashu, from whose bank account the money was purportedly moved. Despite these contentions, the second respondent did not appear to contest the matter. 

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS:  

  • S.147 OF IPC- Punishment for rioting. If someone is found guilty of rioting, they could face up to two years in prison of any kind, a fine, or both.  
  • S.148 OF IPC- Rioting, armed with deadly weapon. Anyone found guilty of rioting, carrying a lethal weapon, or using anything else that could be used as a weapon of offence and result in death can be penalised with a fine, three years’ worth of jail, or both.  
  • S.120B OF IPC- Punishment of criminal conspiracy. If this Code does not specifically address the punishment of a criminal conspiracy, then anyone found guilty of conspiring to commit an offence that carries a sentence of death, 2[life imprisonment], or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or more will be punished as though they had assisted in the commission of the offence. 
  • S. 323 OF IPC- Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt. Anyone who intentionally causes harm, with the exception of situations covered by section 334, faces a period of imprisonment of any kind up to a year, a fine up to a thousand rupees, or both. 
  • S.504 OF IPC- PINISHMENT FOR INSULTING SOMEONE INTENTIONALLY. Anybody who willfully offends someone and provokes them in the hope that the person will break the peace or commit another crime faces a maximum two-year sentence in either type of jail, a fine, or both.  

 

 

COURT’S ANANLYSIS AND JUDGMENT:  

The court meticulously solved the issue at hand by observing that the accused person was involved in a widespread daylight murder that resulted in the closure of a market for a prolonged period of ten (10) days due to their overwhelming influence in the area. As a result, in our considered opinion, the High Court ought not to have granted Respondent No. 2 and Punit Pal bail in relation to the proceedings arising from the FIR on account of (i) the seriousness of the crime; (ii) the conduct of the accused person(s); and (iii) the overall impact of the crime on society at large.  

The court held that as a result, the contested orders, dated 24.04.2023 and 31.10.2023 respectively, which granted accused Vivek Pal @ Vikki Pal and Punit Pal bail, cannot be upheld in the previously described circumstances and are now set aside.  

The court, In the above terms, accepted the appeals.  The accused Vivek Pal @ Vikki Pal and Punit Pal’s bail bond(s) were revoked. The person or people mentioned above were placed under custody right away. To facilitate further action and required compliance, a copy of this judgement was sent to the Trial Court in Basti, Uttar Pradesh. The Trial Court was then further instructed to wrap up the case as soon as possible, ideally within a year of receiving a copy of this judgement.   

 

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.” 

Judgment reviewed by Riddhi S Bhora  

Click to view judgment.

 

 

 

0

“Imposing a penalty greater than the one in force at the time of the commission of the offence has no application”: Supreme Court

Blog, Supreme court , , , , , , ,

Case title: Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Case no.: Civil Appeal Nos. 5062-5099 of 2024 Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 26571-26608 of 2017

Dated on: 19th April 2024

Quorum: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Aravind Kumar

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant is a sub-licensee under the M.P. Excise Act, 1915 for manufacture, import and sale of Foreign Liquor, regulated under the Madhya Pradesh Foreign Liquor Rules, 1996. Sub-licensees importing Foreign Liquor are granted transit permits in which the origin, quality, quantity and point of delivery of the imported liquor are recorded. At the point of destination, the consignment is verified for quality and quantity, and a certificate under Rule 13 is granted. Rule 16 prescribes the permissible limits of loss of liquor in transit due to leakage, evaporation, wastage etc. The purpose and object of this Rule is to prevent illegal diversion of liquor for unlawful sale and also to prevent evasion of excise duty. If the permissible limits of loss of liquor are exceeded, the 1996 Rules prescribe imposition of penalty. Rule 19 providing for penalty that could be imposed during the relevant license period of 2009-2010 was about four times the maximum duty payable on foreign liquor. Facts reveal that no action was initiated during the license year of 2009-2010. On 29.03.2011, Rule 19 was substituted by an amendment.

Despite this amendment, a demand notice dated 22.11.2011 was issued, directing payment of penalty for violations that occurred during the license year of 2009-2010, under the old, more stringent rule. The appellant contested this, arguing that the substituted rule should apply as it was in force when the demand notice was issued.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Mr. Pratap Venugopal, Ld. Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that the effect of substitution is to repeal the existing provision from the statute book in its entirety and to enforce the newly substituted provision. He would further submit that even for incidents which took place when the old Rule was in force, it is the substituted Rule that would be applicable, and therefore, the demand notice dated 22.11.2011 seeking payment of penalties under old Rule is illegal.

In Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., this Court brought out the distinction between supersession of a rule and substitution of a rule, and held that the process of substitution consists of two steps – first, the old rule is repealed, and next, a new rule is brought into existence in its place.

In Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, Court referred to the legislative practice of an amendment by substitution and held that substitution would have the effect of amending the operation of law during the period in which it was in force.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The state authorities argued that the penalty should be imposed according to the rule in force during the license year in question, i.e., the old rule that existed when the violation occurred.

Mr. Saurabh Mishra, learned A.A.G. for the State, came up with an attractive argument that the State of M.P. can continue to apply the repealed Rule for the transaction of 2009-2010 by virtue of specific provisions under the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957.

He brought to our notice Section 10 of the Act which is as follows – Effect of Repeal. Where any Madhya Pradesh Act repeals any enactment then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not – (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed;

LEGAL PROVISIONS

The M.P. Excise Act, 1915, Rule 16. Permissible limits of losses – An allowance shall be made for the actual loss of spirit by leakage, evaporation etc., and of bottled foreign liquor by breakage caused by loading, unloading, handling etc. in transit, at the rate mentioned hereinafter. The total quantity of bottled foreign liquor transported or exported shall be the basis for computation of permissible losses.

The M.P. Excise Act, 1915, Rule 19 providing for Penalty that could be imposed during the relevant license period of 2009-2010 was about four times the maximum duty payable on foreign liquor.

licensee shall be liable to pay penalty at a rate exceeding three times but not exceeding four times the maximum duty payable on foreign liquor at that time.

Rule 19 was substituted by an amendment. The relevant portion of substituted provision is as follows: Licensee shall be liable to pay penalty at a rate not exceeding the duty payable on foreign liquor at that time.

ISSUE –

  • Applicability of the relevant rule for imposition of penalty: Whether it is the rule that existed when the violation occurred during the license period of 2009-10 or the rule that was substituted in 2011 when proceedings for penalty were initiated.
  • Whether the substituted rule can be given retrospective effect.
  • Interpretation of statutory provisions regarding repeal and substitution.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court accepted the appellant’s contention that the substituted rule should apply to pending proceedings. It determined that the purpose of the amendment was to achieve a proper balance between the offense and penalty. Therefore, the Court directed that the substituted rule alone would apply to pending proceedings.

The Court rejected the arguments of both the single judge and the Division Bench of the High Court. It clarified that the substituted penalty only mitigated the severity of the law by reducing the penalty, and therefore, the bar of imposing a penalty greater than the one in force at the time of the offense did not apply. The Court emphasized the importance of a plain and simple understanding of laws and their processes, in line with their purpose and objectives.

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

Click here to view Judgement

1 2 3 … 1,664