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Long time in concluding trial, is no ground for leniency : Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court while partly allowing the present appeal stated that just because long time has been taken by the trial court does not mean that leniency can be shown in punishment imposed. The appellant was acquitted under Section 498A of IPC. However, considering the present age of the appellant which is 80 years, the court reduced the period of imprisonment from one year to three months. The appeal was brought before a supreme court bench comprising Justice Mr. Shah and Justice B.V. Nagarathna in the matters between Meera v State By the Inspector of Police Thiruvotriyur Police Station Chennai, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 31 OF 2022 decided on January 11th, 2022.

The appellant filed an appeal after being unsatisfied by the decision of High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 30.04.2019 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 748 of 2010.The appellant was booked under Section 498A of IPC for torturing her deceased daughter-in-law for jewels due to which immolated herself.

It was submitted by the appellant that the deceased did not want her husband to move to Saudi Arabia which led to her quarrel with the husband and other members of the family and was the root cause of the suicide. The appellant’s counsel pleaded that her(appellant’s) act did not amount to harassment under Section 498A of IPC and alternatively pleaded a lenient view while imposing the sentence since she is 80 years old.

The court observed that after going through the records of the trial court and the High court and the evidences submitted by PW1 & PW2 (mother & father of the deceased)  it was stated that their daughter was constantly subjected to harassment for jewels. With regard to all the observations, the court said that the appellant is guilty under Section 498A.

With regard to the pleading on leniency, the court stated that merely because long time has passed in concluding the trial and/or deciding the appeal by the High Court, is no ground not to impose the punishment and/or to impose the sentence already undergone. When an offence is committed by a woman to another woman, it becomes more serious. Since, the deceased was alone due to her husband being abroad, she needed support from her mother-in-law instead of harassment for jewels. The cruelty made her more vulnerable which led to her suicide. Therefore, the court rejected leniency in this matter. However, keeping the age of the appellant in consideration, the court proposed to reduce the sentence to three months R.I. from one year.

The appeal was partly allowed and the appellants bail bond was cancelled, and she was charged under Section 498A IPC.

Click here to view the judgement

Reviewed by Namisha Choudhary

 

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ILLIQUID STOCK OPTIONS DISPLAY AN UNREAL PICTURE OF THE MARKET: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA

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Illiquid stock options not only displays an unreal picture of market activity to other investors but also defeats the basic premise of screen based electronic trading system and price discovery mechanism by execution of pre-decided reversal trades at irrational/arbitrary prices, as was held by Rajesh Gujjar, ADJUDICATING OFFICER, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA, in the matter of dealing in Illiquid Stock Options at the BSE [ADJUDICATION CRDER NO: Order/RG/NM/2021-22/14719/3], on 13.01.22.

The facts of the case were that the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) conducted investigation into the trading activity in illiquid stock options on Bombay Stock Exchange Limited (BSE) for the period April 01, 2014 to September 30, 2015, observing large scale reversal of trades in the Stock Options segment of the BSE. Pursuant to investigation, it was observed that during the period, total of 2,91,744 trades comprising substantial 81.41% of all the trades executed in stock options segment of BSE were non genuine trades. The non genuine trades resulted into creation of artificial volume to the tune of 826.21 crore units or 54.68% of the total market volume in stock options segment of BSE during the IP. It was observed that Shri Ankit Katiyar HUF (Noticee) was one of the various entities who indulged in execution of reversal trades in stock options segment of BSE during the IP. Such trades were observed to be non-genuine in nature and created false and misleading appearance of trading in terms of artificial volumes in stock options segment and therefore were alleged to be manipulative, deceptive in nature. In view of the same, SEBI initiated adjudication proceedings against the Noticee for violation of the provisions of Regulations 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4(1) and 4(2)(a) of SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP Regulations, 2003). SEBI appointed the undersigned as Adjudicating Officer under Section 15-I of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act, 1992) read with Rule 3 of the SEBI (Procedure for Holding Inquiry and Imposing Penalties) Rules, 1995 (Adjudication Rules, 1995) vide order dated July 02, 2021 to inquire into and adjudge under Section 15HA of the SEBI Act, 1992 against the Noticee for the alleged violation of aforesaid provisions of PFUTP Regulations, 2003. The appointment of the AO was communicated vide communique dated July 06, 2021.

The Adjudicating Officer, Securities and Exchange Board of India, held that dealing in Illiquid stock options not only displays an unreal picture of market activity to other investors but also defeats the basic premise of screen based electronic trading system and price discovery mechanism by execution of pre-decided reversal trades at irrational/arbitrary prices. Such activity deliberately or otherwise damages market integrity apart from presenting wrong picture of liquidity to gullible investors which could affect their trading/investment decisions. Options as financial instruments, ordinarily, provide hedging avenues to investors. It was observed that the trading of the Noticee in the instant matter was abnormal and was clearly designed to create artificial volumes in the illiquid stock option contracts, fail to justify any of the normal strategies of hedging/ arbitrage. In my view, the abuse of such financial instruments, which are made available to the investors for the purpose of protection of their investment portfolios from the risks of adverse price movement, needs to be dealt with strictly. It was also noted that while the stock exchange provides a platform for carrying out the trades, the obligation to ensure genuineness of the trades executed on the exchange platform primarily lies on the Noticee.

In view of the facts, circumstances, and claims in the instant case, as well as placing reliance on precedents, the Adjudicating Officer held that the trading behaviour of the Noticee confirms that such trades were not normal and wide variation in prices of the trades in the same contract in a short time without any basis for such wide variation, all indicate that the trades executed by the Noticee were not genuine trades and being non-genuine, created an appearance of artificial trading volumes in the contract. Thus, it was found that the allegation of violation of provisions of Regulation 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4(1) and 4(2)(a) of PFUTP Regulations, 2003 by the Noticee stand established.

The Adjudicating Officer imposed a penalty of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh only) upon the Noticee, under Section 15HA of the SEBI Act, 1992 for violation of provisions of Regulation 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4(1) and 4(2)(a) of the PFUTP Regulations, 2003. Additionally, the Noticee was directed to remit / pay the said amount of penalty within 45 days of receipt of the present Order.

Click here to read the judgement.

Judgement reviewed by Bhargavi

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Committee appointed for independent enquiry into security breach issue: Supreme Court

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The petitioner, an NGO named Lawyer’s Voice filed a petition in the supreme court and demanded recognition of the issue of serious security lapse and probe an independent enquiry committee to find out the reasons of the breach. The petition was brought before a supreme court bench comprising of CJI NV Ramana, Justice Surya Kant and Justice Hima Kohli in the matters between Lawyer’s voice v State of Punjab & Others. WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 13 OF 2022 decided on 12th January, 2022.

The issue arose after an incident on 5th of January, 2022, where the convoy of the Prime Minister (PM) was stuck on a flyover for twenty minutes, while he was on visit to Hussainiwala, District Firozpur, State of Punjab. The matter was taken up on 7th of January, 2022 in the Supreme Court where the arguments were presented by Mr. Maninder Singh, Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner and by Mr. Tushar Mehta, SGI, on behalf of Union of India and Mr. DS Patwalia, learned advocate on behalf of State of Punjab.

Before the hearing, a committee was constituted by the State of Punjab to issue a probe into the lapses that led to the PM’s security breach on his visit to the State. However, it was submitted by the petitioners that it is unfair to make the State a judge of its own actions and an independent enquiry into the issue is needed. It was submitted by the respondent’s council that the Ministry of Home Affairs and Government of India had already held the State of Punjab ‘guilty’ for this security lapse even though there was no omission of responsibility from their side. Adding to this, the state expressed its willingness for an independent enquiry.

The matter was discussed at length going into the provisions of Special Protection Group Act, 1908 and the Bluebook. It was observed that the solution is not only to hold the officers responsible for this liable but also look into the seriousness of the matter and ensure that such incidents do not take place.

The court ruled out that there is a need for independent enquiry into this issue and for that appointment for a committee is required. A committee comprising of Justice Indu Malhotra, a former Judge of the Supreme Court of  India­ Chairperson; Director General or his nominee not below the rank of Inspector  General of  Police of  National  Investigation Agency­ Member; Director   General   of   Police,   Union   Territory   of Chandigarh­ Member; Additional Director General of Police (Security), State of Punjab­ Member; and Registrar General, Punjab and Haryana High Court- Member ­cum ­Coordinator has been appointed by the Supreme Court to probe an independent enquiry into the breach of security issue and  to look into the causes of the breach; find out the extent of responsibleness and suggest measures which can avoid such instances.

Click here to view the entire judgement.

Reviewed by Namisha Choudhary.

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Electricity is one of the Fundamental Rights for existence under Article 21 of the Constitution of India: High Court of Delhi

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Electricity is one the Fundamental Rights for existence under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, subject to the complementation with other requirements. Therefore, the right to have electricity would not be construed as recognising any tenancy or possessory rights with regard to the subject property. These were stated by the High Court of Delhi, consisting Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva in the case of Ashish Gupta vs. Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited [W.P.(C) 890/2022] on 14.01.2022.

The facts of the case are that the petitioner is a tenant in the subject property in which there are certain disputes between the petitioner and landlord. The petitioner filed a suit for mandatory injunction seeking restoration of electricity connection. However, the said suit was rejected on the ground that there is a suit for possession filed by the landlord against the property and the relief of restoration of electricity could be agitated in the said proceedings. Petitioner seeks a direction to respondent/Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited (TPDDL) to either restore the electricity supply or install a fresh connection in the property.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that it is a settled proposition of law that electricity is one the Fundamental Rights for existence under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, subject to the complementation with other requirements. Further, it was submitted that on vacating the premises or being evicted and surrender of the electricity meter, petitioner shall be entitled to refund of the security deposit subject to adjustment of any dues of the respondent.

The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that respondents have no objection in granting electricity connection in the name of the petitioner, provided the petitioner clears the pending electricity dues, if any, in respect of the above connection and further makes a fresh application for grant of a connection in his name and further subject to payment of additional security deposit over and above the regular security deposit.

The High Court of Delhi held that the application of the petitioner shall be processed and electricity connection shall be installed within two working days of the petitioner completing all the formalities and petitioner shall not seek adjustment of the security deposit. However, on the petitioner vacating the premises or being evicted and surrender of the electricity meter, petitioner shall be entitled to refund of the security deposit subject to adjustment of any dues of the respondent. The Court observed the order to be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and therefore, shall not be construed as recognising any tenancy or possessory rights of the petitioner with regard to the subject property and would be without prejudice to the pending dispute with the landlord. It was held that no special equities will flow in favour of the Petitioner because of this order. The writ petition was disposed of in the above terms.

Judgment reviewed by Shristi Suman. Read Judgment

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A change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria: High Court of Delhi

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A person may have a “legitimate expectation” of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. A change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. To dismiss a legitimate claim, simply on the account of a technicality would cause grave and irreparable harm to faith of general public in welfare schemes. These were stated by High Court of Delhi, consisting Justice Rekha Palli in the case of Shakti Industries vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) 6916/2020] on 13.01.2022.

The facts of the case are that on 10.04.2007, the MOFPI launched the TUEM Scheme, with a view to advance the technology used in the industry by reducing the wastage of agricultural and horticultural produce for the purpose of assisting entrepreneurs to set up food processing units. As per the guidelines, issued under the TUEM Scheme, the Banks/Financial Institutions were assigned the responsibility of receiving the application of grants-in-aid. The petitioner, a registered partnership firm involved in the business of producing Khachighani Mustard oil, being eligible applied under the TUEM Scheme. The said application for grant-in-aid was of Rs 24,53,000. This amount was payable in two instalments, and based on the petitioner’s application, the first instalment of Rs 12,26,500/- was released in the favour of the petitioner on 16.02.2017. The petitioner then, armed with a utilization certificate dated 27.03.2017, in respect of the first instalment as per the terms of the TUEM Scheme applied for the second instalment, through its nodal bank (Punjab National Bank) on 28.03.2017. After a period of one year, the respondent communicated certain deficiencies in the petitioner’s application, with a direction to rectify the same within a period of 45 days. The bank after seeking certain clarifications from the petitioner, submitted its reply to the respondents after rectification of the deficiencies. However, since the amount of the second instalment was not released, the petitioner made representations to the respondent on 27.07.2019, 12.08.2019, 29.08.2019, 10.09.2019 but received no response thereto. Finally the petitioner sent a legal notice on 20.12.2019, in response whereto the impugned communication, rejecting the petitioner’s prayer, was issued. The petitioner was informed that since the TUEM Scheme already stood closed.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that once the petitioner’s application for ‘grant-in-aid’ for setting up a food processing unit was approved on 09.04.2009 before the TUEM Scheme was closed, the petitioner’s prayer for release of the second instalment could not be rejected on the ground that the TUEM Scheme stood closed. Furthermore, the respondent having itself released the amount towards the first instalment on 16.02.2017, it could not have refused to process the petitioner’s application for the second instalment, on the ground that it was submitted after the closure of the said TUEM Scheme on 01.04.2012. He, further submitted that the petitioner had after approval of its application under the TUEM Scheme expanded its Mustard Oil unit and therefore, the respondent could not refuse to release the amount already sanctioned in its favour, merely on the ground of purported delay.

The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that once the TUEM Scheme had already come to an end, the respondent had no obligation to consider the petitioner’s claim at such a belated stage. He, therefore, contended that the impugned communication rejecting the petitioner’s claim was rightly passed and the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

The High Court of Delhi held that there was absolutely no merit in the respondent’s plea as despite the TUEM Scheme came to an end on 01.04.2012, the respondent required the petitioner to submit the necessary documents on 27.03.2018, thus, it is evident that the respondent was well aware that merely because the aforesaid TUEM Scheme was no longer in operation, the beneficiaries like the petitioner who had already been registered there under could not be deprived of their entitlement in terms of the TUEM Scheme. TUEM Scheme was beneficial in nature, and therefore has to be interpreted in a purposive manner and keeping in mind the objective behind the scheme, which was to promote small scale industries by granting them financial assistance. A change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. To dismiss a legitimate claim, simply on the account of a technicality would cause grave and irreparable harm not only to the petitioner but also the faith of general public in these welfare schemes. The respondent was therefore, directed to consider the petitioner’s claim on its own merits as petitioner’s claim cannot be rejected solely on the ground of delay. The petition was accordingly allowed in the aforesaid terms.

Judgment reviewed Shristi Suman. Read Judgment

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