0

Pending Criminal Charges Against The Superintendent Of Cbcid: In The High Court Of Judicature At Madras

The charges pressed against Ex- CBCID officer Chakrapani are offenses under Section 342 & 354 of IPC, declared by the learned Single Judge J.SATHYA NARAYANA PRASAD, J in W.P.No.4373 of 2009 dismissing the writ petition. In the judgment passed on 10.01.2022 in the case G.CHAKRAPANI Vs. THE PRL SECRETARY TO GOVT (W.A.No.2913 of 2012).

Facts of the Case – On 14.07.1976, the appellant was hired as a Junior Assistant in the office of the Commissioner of Police by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission. He was then promoted to Assistant on December 7, 1983, and Superintendent on December 28, 1996. He was suspended from service on 08.02.1999 while working as a Superintendent in the Crime Branch Criminal Investigation Department (CBCID) in Chennai due to outstanding criminal accusations. During his suspension, the Commandant, Tamil Nadu Special Police VIII Battalion issued a Show Cause Notice in P.R 19/99 for charges under Rule 17(a) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955, for delinquencies from May 9, 1997, to October 31, 1999. The appellant did not respond to the Show as mentioned earlier in Cause Notice. The Commandant, Tamil Nadu Special Police VIII Battalion, punished increment delay for three years without cumulative effect on the appellant in proceedings in F.PR 19/99 dated 05.12.1999. On the other hand, the appellant did not file an appeal against the proceedings.

The appellant was found guilty of violating Sections 342 and 354 of the Indian Penal Code by a Criminal Court decision dated 28.06.2002. The Deputy Inspector General of  Police was discharged from service by proceedings in K1/CB/2352/99 (DO 665/2002) dated 03.12.2002. The appellant challenged the order and was passed in 2006, and the respondents filed a Special Leave Petition; however, the same came to be dismissed in 2007.

The appellant requested the second respondent be reinstated into service with all the advantages that come with it. As no order had been issued, the appellant filed a writ petition in this Court in 2007, requesting that the dismissal order dated 03.12.2002 be quashed and that the third respondent therein is ordered to restore him in service with all service benefits, including monetary benefits. This Court, by judgment dated 06.10.2007, dismissed the writ petition.

The third respondent, in proceedings dated 07.02.2008, regularised the appellant’s period of suspension as well as out of service and also fixed the pay, after deducting the payment for the punishment imposed by the Commandant Tamil Nadu Special Police VIII Battalion under Rule 17(a) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955, by the postponement of increment, for a period of three years without cumulative effect from 2001 to 2003. 

The learned Single Judge considered all of the factors before dismissing the writ petition. The learned Single Judge’s order is reasonable and appropriate. As a result, we see no reason to overturn the learned Single Judge’s decision. The Writ Appeal lacks merit and is thus likely to be rejected.

Click here to read the Judgment

Reviewed by Rangasree 

0

Deficiency in service if builder fails to obtain occupancy certificate: Supreme Court

The issue whether a builder or construction company can be held liable for not obtaining occupancy certificate was examined by Supreme Court in a division bench consisting of Justice Chandrachud and Justice Surya Kant in the matters between Samruddhi Co- Operative Housing vs. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Criminal Appeal No.- 4000 of 2019 decided on 11.1.2022.

The facts of the case are complainant rented the flat of the other party in 1993 and bought it in 1997. therefore, the members of the complaining association have to collect a higher rate of additional tax, especially property tax and water fees amounting to Rs.2,60,73,475/. At the application stage, he listened to the lawyer learned for the complainant and examined the report. A complaint was filed by the Appellant for a refund of the excess taxes and duties paid to the municipal authorities due to the Defendant’s alleged lack of service.However, the NCDRC dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was unsustainable because it was barred by limitation and not a consumer dispute. The NCDRC determined that cause of action arose when municipal officials asked the appellant to pay higher fees in the first instance and therefore, a complaint must be filed within two years of the cause of action accruing.

The appellants contended that cause of action is of a continuing nature as the members of the appellant continue to pay higher fees due to the defendant’s failure to present occupancy certificate.

The respondents contended that prior to the order of the SCDRC, the defendant offered to pay an amount of Rs. 1 crore as a one-time settlement amount for payment of additional fees or penalty incurred by the appellant for increased property tax and water fee. The appellant is not a consumer under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, as they are requesting a reinstatement. higher wages paid from the defendant to municipal officials. Furthermore, the defendant is not a service provider for water or electricity and therefore the complaint cannot be sustained.

The Apex court held in section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 provides for the statute of limitations for filing a complaint, and a complaint to a consumer forum must be made within two years of the date on which the cause of action arose. MOFA imposes certain general obligations on an organizer. These obligations include, among others, disclosure of the nature of ownership of the land, obligations on the land, fixtures, fittings and amenities, and not giving possession of an apartment unless a certificate of completion is issued by the local government.The responsibility for obtaining a certificate of occupancy from the local authority is also imposed over the appellant according to the sales contract. Receiving the Document had a direct impact on the members of the appellant in terms of paying higher taxes and water charges to the municipality, as Judge Chandrachud, speaking on behalf of the Court, did not comply with the respondent’s request. Pursuant to the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act 1963 and means an continuing wrong, and therefore the appellants have the right to claim damages resulting from this continuing wrongdoing and limit complaints. An appeal against the order of NCDRC was allowed and the complaint was held to be sustained.

Judgement reviewed by Bhaswati Goldar

Samruddhi_Co_Operative_Housing_vs_Mumbai_Mahalaxmi_Construction_on_11_January_2022

0

When the petitioners are in settled possession, they cannot be dispossessed: Andhra Pradesh HC

A person in possession cannot be dispossessed by appointing a receiver since the said person established his prima facie possession. It is impressible under the law for another person to enjoy the property by dispossessing the person who has legal possession of the property, as was held in the matters between Appinedi Pothuraju v Tahsildar by  Hon’ble Justice M. Satyanarayana Murthy in WP Nos.803 and 10612 of 2021, decided on 7 January,2022.

The two writ petitions were filed by Appinedi Pothuraju and Sayyed Jenny under Article 226 seeking relief since their property was interfered in an arbitrary way without following due process of law. Since the relief pleaded by both the petitions was same, they were taken under Common Order.

In the first case, the petitioner claimed that he is the rightful owner of the land since his father purchased the land via a Registered Sale  Deed. The respondent filed against this; however, the potion was dismissed. When  the petitioner started to maintain his land by clearing bushes, he was stopped by the staff of the respondent who tried to interfere into his land by not following due process of law. In the second case, it is claimed that the petitioner being the rightful owner of the land, started to construct the house and while he was doing so, he was interfered by the respondent without following due legal process. It is also contended that the brother of the respondent was selling the land to third parties claiming that the land is in their possession since a dispute in that regard was pending.

It was submitted by petitioners that in both the cases, the petitioners are in possession and enjoyment of the property, either of respondents cannot disposes them without following due process of law. Even if there is a proceeding under Section 146 (1) and 145 of Cr. P. C , it does not mean that portioners lose their protection of possession under the law. However, the respondents submitted that the appeal is pending before the court and no order shall be issued to restrain the respondents from interfering the property.

The court after hearing the pleadings from both the sides, stated that the dispute is between the two private individuals and the respondents taking advantage of that is impermissible under the law. Applying the precedent set out by the apex court in the case of Rame Gowda (dead) by L.Rs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by L.Rs., the court stated that , when the petitioners are in settled possession and enjoyment of the property, they cannot be dispossessed, without following due process of law in view of the law. The court declared the actions of the respondent of interring into the portioners property without following the due process of law as arbitrary.

Click here to view the judgement

Reviewed by Namisha Choudhary.

0

Section of 482 Cr.P.C. could be invoked where allegations made and evidence collected in support do not disclose commission of an offence: High Court of Delhi

The exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice could be invoked to bring an end to the criminal prosecution in cases where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. These were stated by High Court of Delhi, consisting Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri in the case of T. Harish Kumar vs. State of NCT Delhi [CRL.M.C. 3467/2019] on 12.01.2022.

The facts of the case are that petitioner, alongwith his wife was the joint owner of flat property. The petitioner and his wife had rented out the flat to Leela Ambience Delhi Convention Hotel acting through its Authorized Signatory Ms. Parul Jain, for a period of 36 months initially. The flat was rented out for Residential purpose, i.e. for accommodation of lady staff members of the Hotel exclusively, and for no other purpose. Subsequent to execution of the aforesaid Rent Deed, the Hotel had provided a list of 8 persons to the petitioner who were their employees and were to occupy the flat. Alongwith the list, duly filled tenant verification forms of those persons were also handed over and police verification was done. Thereafter, a complaint was filed on behalf of the residents occupying other floors of the property that the occupants of the flat used to come late in the night and were a source of disturbance and security concerns. On becoming aware of the concerns, the petitioner immediately sent a notice to the Hotel seeking to terminate the tenancy and asking that peaceful possession of the flat be handed over back to him and his wife. In pursuance of the aforesaid notice, the vacant possession of the flat was handed over by the Hotel to the petitioner. In between however, on 16.07.2018, the present FIR came to be registered on the complaint of Head Constable Kapil Kumar alleging that during spot inspection, two ladies namely Bhadri Maya Gurang and Rinchen Lhamo were found to be tenants of the flat, in respect of whom no police verification had been carried out.

The Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the flat was rented out to the Hotel for the purpose of accommodation of its lady staff. He further submits that in pursuance of the rent agreement, a list of 8 persons, along with their tenant verification forms was forwarded by the Hotel to the petitioner. The documents were duly submitted to the concerned Police Station for verification. He also submitted that as per the information disclosed by the occupants of the flat, only the 8 persons named in the letter were residing in the flat. On becoming aware of the issues faced by the other residents of the property/building, the petitioner immediately terminated the tenancy and sought vacant possession of the flat which was delivered on 10.08.2018. He further submitted that the petitioner had also given copies of the Rent Deed, the tenant verification forms as well as the notice dated 09.07.2018 to the concerned SHO. Lastly, it was submitted that neither were the aforesaid two ladies tenants of the petitioner, nor did Constable Sanjeev Kumar and/or Head Constable Kapil Kumar meet him on 16.07.2018 at 7:30 p.m. as alleged.

The Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, opposed the petition. He submitted that the petitioner had rented out the flat without getting requisite police verification done, and thus, had violated the order No.7308-7407/R-ACP/Vivek Vihar Delhi dated 11.12.2017.

The High Court of Delhi held that it was the responsibility of the Hotel to provide to the petitioner a list of the occupants along with their duly filled tenant verification forms. Further, in the FIR and the statement of Constable Sanjeev Kumar recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., there is not a whisper as to whether any verification was conducted with respect to those 8 tenant verification forms. The FIR is also silent as to on what basis the complainant/Head Constable Kapil Kumar came to the conclusion that the two ladies namely Bhadri Maya Gurang and Rinchen Lhamo were tenants at the flat whose tenant verification was not done in terms of the order dated 11.12.2017. Mere presence of the aforesaid ladies in the flat, even if proved, by no stretch of imagination can form the basis to establish that they were tenants. While summarizing the principles of law governing the exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, it was held that such power could be invoked to bring an end to the criminal prosecution in cases where “the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused”. Consequently, the petition was allowed and the FIR and all other consequential proceedings were quashed.

Judgment reviewed by Shristi Suman. Read Judgment

0

Order XXI Rule 41(2) of CPC can only be invoked by an application filed on behalf of the decree holder: High Court of Delhi

Power under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the CPC can only be invoked by an application only in respect of the judgment debtor. The affidavit of assets can only be directed to be filed upon an application on behalf of the decree holder under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the CPC. Such a direction cannot be passed suo motu by the Executing Court. These were stated by High Court of Delhi, consisting Justice Amit Bansal in the case of G.S Sandhu & Anr. vs. Geeta Aggarwal [CM(M) 1399/2019] on 14.01.2022.

The facts of the case are that the respondent instituted a suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908  for recovery of Rs.13,56,625 against the judgment debtor company. The said suit was decreed in favour of the respondent on 06th July, 2012 for a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- along with interest. On 20th January, 2014, auction sale was conducted in respect of the movable property of the judgment debtor company, which resulted in Rs.5,00,000/- being recovered by the decree holder. On 05th August, 2014, the decree holder moved an application under Order XXI Rule 37 of the CPC seeking detention of the petitioners, being the directors of the judgment debtor company. The said application was contested by the petitioners by filing a reply, stating that the judgment debtor company had become defunct after attachment of its movable assets and there were no further assets in the judgment debtor company. Vide the impugned order, the Executing Court directed the petitioners to file affidavits of assets in pursuance of the judgment of this Court in Bhandari Engineers and Builders Pvt. Ltd.

The Counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners were neither parties in the suit filed by the respondent, nor were any averments made against the petitioners in the plaint and even in the application filed by the decree holder under Order XXI Rule 37 of the CPC, no specific allegations have been made against the petitioner. It was further stated that the petitioners, being directors of the judgment debtor company were not parties to the suit which was decreed in favour of the respondent. The decree was passed only against the judgment debtor company and not the petitioners but the petitioners were also made parties to the execution petition filed on behalf of the decree holder; and under Order XXI of the CPC the directors of the judgment debtor company cannot be asked to file their list of assets.

The Counsel for the respondent contended that only the petitioner no.1 has complied with the order passed by this Court to comply with the direction of the Executing Court however, the petitioner no.2 has failed to comply with the same. Further, it was contended that the petitioner no.1 has falsely stated in his affidavit that judgment Debtor Company does not own any immovable property. Reliance in this regard was placed from the balance sheet of the judgment debtor company and also it was falsely stated in the affidavit of the petitioner no.1 that all movable assets of the judgment debtor company were disposed of through auction and proceeds given to the decree holder. While admitting that the petitioners were not parties in the suit or in the execution proceedings, the counsel for the decree holder contended that specific allegations were made in respect of the petitioners in the application filed on behalf of the decree holder under Order XXI Rule 37 and that the petitioners were guilty of making false statement and fraud.

The High Court of Delhi held that Order XXI Rule 37 does not provide for a judgment debtor or its directors to file their list of assets. A prayer was not made in the aforesaid applications filed on behalf of the decree holder for the petitioners or the judgment debtor company to disclose their list of assets. Therefore, there was no occasion for the Executing Court to pass the impugned order directing the petitioners to file their list of assets under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 37 of the CPC. Further, the power under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the CPC can only be invoked upon an application filed on behalf of the decree holder and in the present case, admittedly, no application has been filed by the decree holder under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the CPC. Even in respect of the judgment debtor, the affidavit of assets can only be directed to be filed upon an application having been filed on behalf of the decree holder under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the CPC. Such a direction cannot be passed suo motu by the Executing Court. Therefore, it was observed by the Court that the Executing Court committed an error in issuing direction to the petitioners to file affidavits. In view of the above, the directions contained in the impugned order dated 13th August, 2019 directing the petitioners to file an affidavit disclosing their personal assets could not be sustained and were set aside.

Judgment reviewed by Shristi Suman. Read Judgment

1 1,036 1,037 1,038 1,039 1,040 1,678