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A Land That Was Supposed To Be Sold At A Public Auction Is Now Under Liquidation – In The High Court Of Judicature At Bombay

The Chairman of the Society’s statement to the Court that the Society was willing to transfer up vacant ownership of 3000 square feet of land to the Bank was accepted as an undertaking. Following that, this writ petition was ordered to be considered alongside Writ Petition No.7513/2019. Two intervention applications were submitted in Writ Petition No.2975/2019 throughout the pendency of the proceedings. The Society’s Chairman has since filed Civil Application No.1453/2019, requesting that the ruling dated 29/04/2019 be modified to allow the Society to participate in the auction process, subject to vacating the premises. The Learned Judges A. S. CHANDURKAR AND PUSHPA V. GANEDIWALA, JJ, pronounced the Judgement on 21.01.2022 in JITENDRA N. JAIN V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA.

The Buldhana District Co-operative Agricultural Rural Multipurpose Development Bank Ltd. (for short, the Bank), a Society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, owns property measuring approximately 30000 square feet with construction on it located at Plot No.7/2, Chaitanyawadi, Buldhana. The Bank is in Liquidation, and the Liquidator is the District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Buldhana. According to an agreement dated October 20, 2012, the Wardhman Urban Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. Buldhana (for short, the Society) owns roughly 97.24 square meters of the land.

The agreement will be effective from August 1, 2011, to July 31, 2014. The sale of land No.7/2 was recommended in the liquidation proceedings. On September 19, 2017, the Bank, through the Liquidator, published a tender notice requesting offers from parties interested in acquiring such land, which measures about 30000 square feet and includes building. For the sale of the land mentioned above, an upset price of Rs.15,01,58,000/- was determined. Because there was no response to the last tender notice, the Liquidator published a new statement on November 6 and 7, 2017. The upset price from the original tender notification was not changed. In the absence of a response to this notice, the Liquidator published a third tender notice on December 16, 2017, proposing to sell the land as mentioned above at the same upset price.

Swastik Shops & Shop Owners Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Buldhana (the Housing Society) expressed interest in purchasing the property mentioned above and bid for Rs.5,51,11,111/-. The Housing Society’s proposal was lower than the upsetting price. The Housing Society had approached this Court in Writ Petition No.8450/2018 since no decision had been made on the abovementioned bid.

The main issue presented in these writ petitions is that, although the upset price for the sale of the property in question was specified to be Rs.15,01,58,000/-, the Housing Society’s offer for an amount of Rs.5,51,11,111/- was accepted. Because the sum provided was far less than the upset price specified, such acceptance was not permitted.

Though the tender announcement specified the upset price to be 15,01,58,000/-, it was later discovered that this upset price was decided based on the inaccurate amount provided in the ready reckoner, according to the Liquidator’s reply. As a result, the Liquidator conducted an independent appraisal of the property, which revealed that the property’s true worth was Rs.5,36,00,000/-. A Government-approved Valuer then evaluated it for Rs.5,43,58,000/-, and the Housing Society’s bid was accepted.

The intervenors’ experienced counsel contends that the applicants, as Bank employees, are interested in recovering money due and owing to them from the Bank, which is in Liquidation. The sale of the property at a lower price than its market worth would unquestionably jeopardize the rights of numerous claimants and creditors.

After reviewing the contentions of both sides, the Learned Judge of the High Court is indisputable that the Bank’s land, which measures 30000 square feet and is under Liquidation, was intended to be sold at public auction. Based on an agreement terminated on July 31, 2014, the Society owns about 97.24 square meters of land. The upset price of the property to be sold was indicated as Rs.15,01,58,000/- in tender notices dated 19/09/2017, 6-7/11/2017, and 16/12/2017. According to the records, the Housing Society was the sole bidder that responded to the tender notice with a quote of Rs.5,51,11,111/-. Given the restriction imposed by Clause 22 that no bid below the upset price may be entered, it is evident that the Housing Society’s proposal was not genuine at all. As a result, no legitimate bid quoting the upset price was received in response to the third tender notice dated 16/12/2017. As a result, the only option was to submit a piece of new tender information.

For the reasons mentioned above, the Learned Judge believes that the order dated 31/01/2019 issued by the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Maharashtra State approving the sale of the land in question according to the Housing Society’s bid, as well as the Liquidator’s subsequent communication dated 16/02/2019 accepting the Housing Society’s proposal, are liable to be set aside. The remaining balance was paid in two instalments of Rs.75,00,000 and Rs.4,68,61,111, for a total of Rs.5,51,11,111. The Liquidator holds this sum. While the earnest money must be returned to the Housing Society in line with Clause 17 of the tender contract, the remainder of Rs.5,43,61,111/- must also be repaid.

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Reviewed by Rangasree

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POSH Act applicable even if girl student complains against teacher: Calcutta High Court

The issue whether applicability of POSH Act 2013, a statute enacted as per the guidelines in vishakha judgement,can be extended to complaints of sexual harassment by girl student against male school teacher was before consideration of a division bench of Calcutta High Court consisting of Justice Harish Tandon  and Justice Rabindranath Samanta in the matters between Pawan Kumar Niroula v. Union of India WP.CT. 86 of 2021 decided on 24.1.2022

The facts of the case are that the Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya is a government school who filed a police complaint after receiving complaints from several students that the petitioner was harassing them. Shortly after filing a complaint with the police, an internal complaints committee was set up by the school to investigate the complaints. The petitioner was informed that he was suspended through unofficial channels, although he was not informed of any disciplinary action against him. The stay order was extended several times over the course of a year, during which time the petitioner was briefed on the forming a committee that was to hold a summary trial for the petitioner.

The counsel for the petitioner challenged that both the stay order and the summary proceedings before the Central Administrative Court (CAT). The court found no flaws in the proceedings and instructed the petitioner to cooperate with the authorities. This order of the CAT was challenged before the Supreme Court in the present case. It was the petitioner’s stance that school officials should form an internal complaints committee and that summary proceedings had no legal force in terms of the provisions of the POSH Act.It was alleged that the suspension decision was illegal as it was made while the petitioner was in custody for 24 hours, and a civil servant could only be suspended if the detention period exceeded 48 hours.

The counsel for the respondent contended that because the allegations were made by the school’s female students, the POSH Act was not actually applicable to the facts of the case. This interpretation was flatly rejected by the judges, who discussed the definition of “aggrieved woman” under the law.

The Calcutta High Court held the committee in question was not an internal complaints committee as required by the POSH Act. The court ruled that such an act exceeding 90 days without justification was illegal. The summary trial committee was found to lack legal force as it did not comply with the mandatory requirements of the law. The court debated the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India. In this case, the higher court ruled that a suspension exceeding 90 days without justification was illegal. The Court therefore found the CAT decision upholding the committee’s legality unsustainable. School authorities were directed to allow the petitioner to rejoin their duties within one month and pay all retroactive fees due within two months of rejoining.

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Judgement reviewed by Bhaswati Goldar

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“Law cannot recognise different varieties of cruelty as Hindu cruelty,Muslim cruelty,Christian cruelty or secular cruelty to justify a decree for divorce”: Kerala High Court

Law cannot recognise different varieties of cruelty as Hindu cruelty,Muslim cruelty,Christian cruelty or secular cruelty to justify a decree for divorce”: Kerala High Court

The issue whether law can recognise different varieties of cruelty based on religion regardless of the fact that personal laws fall within the purview of certain definitions for cruelty was discussed by a division bench of Kerala High Court consisting of Justice A Muhamed Mustaque and Justice Sophy Thomas in the matters between Mary Margaret v Jos P Thomas MAT. APPEAL. NO.-1119 of 2015 decided on 21.1.2022.

The facts of the case are that the couple were married in 1998 pursuant to Christian rites and ceremonies, and they had two daughters before her husband filed for divorce in 2009, before filing for divorce in 2015 by the family court.

The counsel for appellants contended that the couple’s daughters testified to support the allegations of atrocities made by the husband. In addition, a psychiatrist consulted by his wife stated that he suffered from impulse control disorder but had not completed the appellant’s treatment. The allegations made by the husband were unfounded and she was ill-treated by her husband and mother. It was this mistreatment that caused the mental stress she consulted with doctors.

The counsel for appellants contended that from the very beginning of the marriage, his wife exhibited behavioral disorders, often violent and abusive. He also argued that his wife is indifferent to children and has lived in his father’s house since 2005, ignoring his children. He alleged that although his wife was taken to various psychologists and psychiatrists, he had not cooperated or completed any treatment.

The Kerala High Court dismissed the wife’s appeal and held that The law cannot recognize different types of atrocities such as Hindu , Muslim, Christian or secular to justify a divorce decree. The fact that the Hindu Marriage Law and the Private Marriage Law refer to persecution without any driver or explanation or the fact that the Divorce Law and the Annulment of the Muslim Marriage Law gives an indication of the nature of the persecution of marriage that needs to be established cannot justify this fact. It is concluded that the nature of marital cruelty, which would entitle the spouses to divorce, is different under different personal laws only because different words are used in the relevant personal law statutes. Anything that will prevent the spouse from fully blooming and enjoying married life should fall under Section 10(1)(x) of Divorce Act. Cruelty is  not defined under section 13(1)(1a) of the Hindu Marriage Law and section 27(1) of the Special Marriage Act and cruelty described in P.2(viii) of the Muslim Dissolution of Marriage Divorce Act and S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act should be inspired by this understanding of marital cruelty. The cruelty can be physical and mental. Compared to mental cruelty, physical cruelty provides more direct evidence that it is perceptible. While mental cruelty can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, physical cruelty can be inferred from the behavior of one spouse towards the other spouse that jeopardizes the physical health of the other spouse.What may be mental cruelty now, may not be mental cruelty after a while, and vice versa.

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Judgement reviewed by Bhaswati Goldar

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Preventive Detention Orders can be Passed Even When a Person is in Police/Judicial Custody or Involved in Criminal Case: High Court Of Jammu And Kashmir At Srinagar

The need of compelling reasons for passing of order of preventive detention against a person already in police or judicial custody or in relation to a criminal case, was considered by the HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT SRINAGAR, before a bench consisting of Hon’ble Justice Mr. Sanjay Dhar, in the matter of Mohammad Aslam Sheikh vs. Union Territory of J&K and Anr. [WP(Crl.) No.192/2020], on 27.01.22.

By the medium of the present petition, veracity and validity of the order of detention dated 11.11.2020, issued by District Magistrate, Budgam (“Detaining Authority”), has been assailed. In terms of the impugned order, Shri Mohammad Aslam, resident of Gudpora Yarikah Khansahib, Budgam, has been placed under preventive detention and lodged in District Jail, Amphala J&K, Jammu.

Petitioner has contended that the Detaining Authority has passed the impugned detention order mechanically without application of mind. It has been further contended that the Constitutional and Statutory procedural safeguards have not been complied with in the instant case. It has also been urged that the allegations made against the detenue in the grounds of detention are vague and that the translated version of the documents/grounds of detention has not been provided to the detenue who is a semi-literate person. Petitioner has gone to contend that he has not been informed as to before which authority he had to make a representation. Learned counsel for the petitioner highlighted various grounds while seeking quashment of impugned order but the main ground that has been argued during the course of arguments is that the detenue was already in custody in a case for offences under Sections 18, 20, 23, 38, 39 of ULA(P) Act and Sections 7, 25 Arms Act of Police Station, Khansahib, and there were no compelling reasons for the Detaining Authority to make the impugned detention order and that the Detaining Authority has not spelt out the compelling reasons for detaining the detenue under preventive laws.

The respondents, in their counter affidavit, have disputed the averments made in the petition and stated that they have followed the provisions of J&K Public Safety Act. It is contended that the detenue has been detained only after following due procedure; that the grounds of detention were read over to the detenue; that there has been proper application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority while passing the impugned order and that the detenue has been provided all the material. The learned counsel for the respondents also produced the detention records to lend support to the stand taken in the counter affidavit.

The Court, after taking into account the facts, arguments put forth, and placing reliance on several precedents, held that it is a settled position of law that preventive detention orders can be passed even when a person is in police/judicial custody or involved in criminal case but for doing so, compelling reasons are to be recorded. The Detaining Authority is bound to record the compelling reasons as to why the detenue could not be deterred from indulging in subversive activities by resorting to normal law. In the absence of these reasons, the order of detention becomes unsustainable in law. It was noted that Coming to the facts of instant case, in the grounds of detention, after referring to the allegations made in the FIR, it has been mentioned that these activities of the detenue are prejudicial to the security of State that have a potential of destabilizing the country in case the detenue is allowed to remain at large. However, the Detaining Authority has not referred to any other cogent material or furnished any other cogent ground to show that if the detenue is allowed to remain at large, he will be a potential threat to the security of the State. It appears that the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that the detenue is a potential threat to the security of the State is solely based on the allegations made in the aforesaid FIR and no other material. The detenue was already in custody in the aforesaid FIR and there were remote chances of his getting bail as he was involved in the offences to which rigor of S.43D of UAPA is attracted. Thus, there were no compelling reasons for the detaining authority to pass the impugned order of detention. The same, therefore, was held to be not sustainable in law. The impugned detention order was quashed and the petition was allowed, and the Court directed the release of the detenue provided he was not required in connection with any other case.

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Judgement reviewed by Bhargavi

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Failing to pass suitable order related to appointment on compassionate grounds, department is liable to pay petitioners’ litigation costs: Patna High Court

 The competent authority is directed to resolve the petitioners’ grievance, pass a suitable order to appoint the petitioners on compassionate grounds due to the death of their husband/father who died during their Nagar Parishad Sasaram service period and communicate the same to the petitioners failing which, the respondent-department is liable to pay the petitioners’ litigation costs is upheld by the High Court of Patna through the learned bench led by HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P. B. BAJANTHRI in the case of Neha Jaiswal Vs. The State of Bihar (Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1757 of 2021)

Brief facts of the case are that Petitioners have requested for the issuance of a writ in the nature of a mandamus instructing the various authorities to appoint the petitioners on compassionate grounds due to the death of their husband/father who died during their Nagar Parishad Sasaram service period. Petitioner’s husband, late Sheo Shankar Prasad, died on April 25, 2019, and petitioner filed a compassionate appointment application on July 18, 2019.

After protracted correspondence, the petitioners’ grievance, however, has yet to be resolved by competent authorities. As a result, the competent authority is hereby directed to resolve the petitioners’ grievance, pass a suitable order, and communicate the same to the petitioners within eight weeks of receipt of this order, failing which, the respondent-department is liable to pay the petitioners’ litigation costs, which are valued at Rs. 25,000/-.

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Judgement reviewed by – Pooja Lakshmi

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