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Supreme Court Affirms Land Ownership Rights Bihar Land Dispute Case, Rejects State Claim

Case Title – Ram Balak Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. 2024 INSC 360

Case Number – 1627 of 2016

Dated on – 1st May, 2024

Quorum – Justice Pankaj Mithal

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the case of Ram Balak Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. 2024 INSC 360, the Appellant, Ram Balak, instituted a suit for possession and confirmation of the possession over 0.32 decimal of land in the Village of Kishanpur, Bihar. Initially, the land belonged to Rambit Kuwer, who through a lease deed in 1341 fasli settled it in favour of Makhan Singh. Until his death, Makhan Singh continued in possession of the land, subsequently his adopted son, Ram Balak Singh, inherited the said land. During the process of consolidation under the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956, the name of Ram Balak, the adopted son of Makhan Singh was recorded as the owner of the said land by the Consolidation officer. However, thereafter, the State Authorities claimed whole of the land, inclusive of the suit land, as pond land and intervened with the possession of the Appellant. The Appellant instituted a suit against the State of Bihar and another party seeking the declaration of his title over the land and the confirmation of his possession. The trial court ruled the suit in favour of the Appellant, but the decision of the court was reversed by the First Appellate Court and asserted by the High Court. The Appellant in this case, appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the Appellate Court.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

  1. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in possession of the land since it was resolved in their favour.
  2. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the Consolidation Officer had acknowledged his rights over the land and directed his name to be recorded in the records of rights, which should be final and conclusive.
  3. The Appellant, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the Appellate Courts erred in revising the decree of the Trial Court, as he had furnished sufficient evidence to establish his rights and possession over the land.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

  1. The Respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the whole of the land was pond land and could not be settled in favour of the Appellant.
  2. The Respondent, through their counsel, in the said case contented that the suit was not maintainable under Section 37 of the Consolidation Act, 1956, which bars the civil matters falling under the Jurisdiction of the Consolidation Court.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 10(B) of the Consolidation Act, 1956 prescribes the decision of matters relating to charges and transactions affecting rights or interest recorded in revised records
  2. Section 37 of the Consolidation Act, 1956 prescribes the Bar of Jurisdiction of Civil Courts
  3. Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 prescribes the procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by court
  4. Article 32 of the Constitution of India prescribes the Right to constitutional remedies for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of an aggrieved citizen
  5. Article 226 of the Constitution of India prescribes the power of the High Courts to issue certain writs
  6. Article 227 of the Constitution of India prescribes the power of Superintendence over all courts by the High Court

ISSUES

  1. The main issue of the case revolved around whether the order of the Consolidation Officer acknowledging the title of the Appellant over the land can be ignored or reversed by the Civil Court?
  2. Whether the suit instituted by the Appellant is barred under Section 37 of the Consolidation Act, 1956?

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT

The court in the case of Ram Balak Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. 2024 INSC 360, analysed the provisions of the Consolidation Act, 1956, which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the matters related to land consolidation. The court, in this present case, observed that the order of the Consolidation Officer recognizing the rights of the Appellant over the land had attained finality and could not be ignored or reversed by the Civil Court. The Court, in this present case, held that the suit instituted by the Appellant was not challenging any decision of the Consolidation Court but seeking the recognition of his rights over the land. Thus, the court concluded that the suit instituted by the Appellant was not barred under Section 37 of the Consolidation Act,1956. The court allowed the appeal of the Appellant, set aside the judgments of the Appellate Courts and restored the decree of the Trial Court in favour of the Appellant.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Sruti Sikha Maharana

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The Supreme Court scrutinized Order 22 Rule 5 of the CPC, highlighting its mandate for the court to determine the rightful legal representative upon the death of a party.

Case title: Swami Vedvyasanand Ji Maharaj (D) v. Shyam Lal Chauhan & Ors.

Case no.: Civil Appeal Nos. 5569-5570 of 2024 (@ Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.1717-1718 of 2020)

Dated on: 30th April 2024

Quorum: Justice A.S. Bopanna and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia

FACTS OF THE CASE

A recent case, outlined in the judgment, underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules, particularly concerning the substitution of legal representatives in pending cases.

The case revolves around a civil suit concerning a property dispute in Bihar. Swami Shivdharmanand was one of the defendants in the suit. After his demise, the question arose regarding the substitution of his legal representative in the ongoing second appeal before the Patna High Court.

Two individuals, Swami Triyoganand and Swami Satyanand, claimed to be the rightful successors to Swami Shivdharmanand’s position. Initially, the High Court allowed both parties to be substituted as legal representatives. However, this decision was challenged, leading to a remand by the Supreme Court for the High Court to reconsider the matter.

Upon reconsideration, the High Court upheld Swami Satyanand as the legal representative, dismissing the claim of Swami Triyoganand. Dissatisfied with this decision, Swami Vedvyasanand, who claimed through Swami Triyoganand, appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s judgment emphasized the procedural nuances involved in determining legal representation. While the substitution of legal representatives is crucial for the continuity of legal proceedings, it does not confer any substantive rights. Instead, it merely allows representation of the deceased’s estate in ongoing litigation.

The Court referred to Order 22 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which mandates the court to determine the legal representative of a deceased party. Moreover, the proviso to Rule 5 empowers the appellate court to refer the matter to a subordinate court for factual inquiry, whose findings are then considered by the appellate court.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Swami Vedvyasanand Ji Maharaj, the appellant, contested the order of the High Court, which substituted Swami Satyanand as the appellant in the pending Second Appeal. The appellant, through detailed contentions, argued that the High Court’s decision to reject his substitution application and uphold Swami Satyanand’s representation was procedurally flawed.

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the legal provisions governing the substitution of parties upon the death of a litigant. Emphasizing the importance of adhering to due process, the Court highlighted the limited purpose of substitution, which is to ensure the continuity of proceedings, rather than conferring any substantive rights.

Citing the precedent set in Jaladi Suguna v. Satya Sai Central Trust, the Court reiterated that the determination of legal representation is crucial for the proper adjudication of the case. However, this determination does not grant any proprietary rights to the substituted party.

The Court noted the erroneous interpretation of Order 22 Rule 5 by the High Court and criticized its failure to consider the objections raised against the Trial Court’s report. Additionally, the Court clarified that the proviso to Rule 5 empowers the Appellate Court to consider the findings of the subordinate court while making an independent decision on substitution.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents, claiming to be successors to the deceased Swami Shivdharmanand, sought substitution in the pending appeal. Initially, the High Court allowed both parties to be substituted as legal representatives, leading to subsequent legal challenges. The Supreme Court’s intervention was sought to clarify the correct procedure for determining legal representation.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Order 22 Rule 5 of CPC reads as follows: Determination of question as to legal representative. — Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant, such question shall be determined by the Court.

Provided that where such question arises before an Appellate Court, that Court may, before determining the question, direct any subordinate Court to try the question and to return the records together with evidence, if any, recorded at such trial, its findings and reasons therefor, and the Appellate Court may take the same into consideration in determining the question.

ISSUE

  • The primary issue revolved around the correct procedure for substituting legal representatives in a pending appeal, particularly concerning conflicting claims.
  • Whether the High Court adhered to the procedural requirements stipulated under Order 22 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) while determining legal representation.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the procedural lapses in the High Court’s decision-making process. It emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory provisions and ensuring a fair opportunity for all parties to present their claims.

The Court scrutinized Order 22 Rule 5 of the CPC, highlighting its mandate for the court to determine the rightful legal representative upon the death of a party. It underscored the discretionary power of the Appellate Court to consider evidence and objections before making a conclusive decision on substitution.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. It reiterated the procedural lapses observed and emphasized the need for adherence to statutory provisions. The Court clarified that its decision pertained solely to procedural irregularities and refrained from opining on the substantive merits of the claims.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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The Supreme court criticized the notion of “blood money” and underscored that serious crimes like acid attacks should not be trivialized by monetary settlements.

Case title: Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P. & Anr.

Case no.: Criminal Appeal Nos.1957-1961 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos.3484-3488 of 2024)

Order on: 5th April 2024

Quorum: Justice Rajesh Bindal and Justice C.T. Ravikumar

FACTS OF THE CASE

In a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of India, the case of Shivani Tyagi versus the State of U.P. & Anr. (Criminal Appeal Nos.1957-1961 of 2024) has brought attention to the suspension of sentence pending appeal and release on bail, particularly in cases involving heinous crimes like acid attacks. Let’s delve into the facts, submissions, issues, court’s analysis, and the final judgment of this crucial case.

Shivani Tyagi, the appellant-victim, was subjected to a brutal acid attack resulting in severe injuries, including deep burns on her face, chest, and hands. The attack left her permanently disfigured, highlighting the grave consequences of such a heinous crime. The perpetrators, five in number, were convicted under Sections 307/149 and 326A/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

On behalf of Shivani Tyagi, the victim of the heinous acid attack, submissions were made regarding the severity of the crime and the need for judicial prudence in dealing with such cases. The appellant’s counsel argued that the impugned orders reflected a lack of consideration for the gravity of the offense and failed to adequately assess the relevant factors for the suspension of sentence and grant of bail. It was emphasized that the permanent disfigurement caused by the acid attack warranted careful examination and serious consideration of all parameters.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents, representing the convicted individuals, made submissions regarding the offer of compensation and the delay in the appeal process. They argued that the offer of compensation, along with the period of incarceration and the likely delay in the appeal proceedings, justified the suspension of the sentence and grant of bail. However, the appellant contested that such factors alone could not override the seriousness of the offense and the need for proper judicial scrutiny.

Key Considerations by the Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court referred to previous judgments to underscore the importance of recording reasons for the suspension of sentence and grant of bail under Section 389 of the Cr.PC. It highlighted that in cases involving serious offenses, such as acid attacks, a careful assessment of relevant factors is imperative. Factors such as the nature and severity of the offense, the manner of its commission, and the gravity of the charges should be objectively evaluated.

Ruling and Implications:

After a meticulous examination of the impugned orders and the arguments presented by both parties, the Supreme Court concluded that the orders lacked proper consideration of the relevant factors. It emphasized that the seriousness of the offense, especially in cases of acid attacks resulting in permanent disfigurement, necessitates diligent scrutiny.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

The Court deliberated on Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), which deals with the suspension of sentence pending appeal and release on bail.

It emphasized the need for the appellate court to objectively assess the case and record reasons for granting suspension of sentence and bail. The Court cited previous judgments to highlight the importance of considering factors such as the nature of the offense, severity of punishment, and likelihood of tampering with evidence or threats to the victim.

ISSUE

  • Whether the court properly applied the principles under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) in suspending the convicts’ sentence.
  • Whether the court adequately considered the gravity of the offense and other relevant factors before granting bail to the convicts.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed previous decisions and legal provisions related to the suspension of sentence and bail pending appeal. It emphasized that each case must be examined on its merits, especially in serious offenses like acid attacks. The court underscored the importance of considering factors such as the nature of the offense, severity of punishment, and potential threat to the victim or witnesses.

The court, after a thorough examination of the facts and legal principles, held that the impugned order lacked proper application of mind and failed to consider the gravity of the offense adequately. Therefore, it set aside the order suspending the convicts’ sentence and canceling their bail. The appellants were directed to surrender before the trial court for committal to judicial custody within four days, failing which the convicts would be rearrested.

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Shivani Tyagi case sets a significant precedent in cases involving acid attacks and other serious offenses. It underscores the need for courts to carefully consider all relevant factors before suspending a sentence or granting bail, ensuring justice for victims and maintaining social security. This ruling reaffirms the commitment of the judiciary to uphold the rights of victims and deter perpetrators of heinous crimes.

Despite an offer of compensation by the convicts, the victim refused to accept it, leading to a correction application. The court emphasized the severity of acid attacks, stating that no amount of compensation can truly address the trauma caused. It cited previous cases highlighting the psychological and physical impact of acid attacks and the need for stringent measures to prevent such crimes. The court also discussed the principles governing the cancellation of bail, emphasizing that bail should not be granted solely based on the accused’s ability to pay compensation. The court criticized the notion of “blood money” and underscored that serious crimes like acid attacks should not be trivialized by monetary settlements.

In the fight against such atrocities, justice must not only be served but also seen to be served, and the Shivani Tyagi case marks a crucial step towards achieving that goal.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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Bail Refused to Defendant Charged Under UAPA for Supporting ISIS Ideology and Organizing Illegal Weapons: Delhi High Court

Case title: Jamsheed Zahoor Paul v. State of NCT of Delhi

Case no: CRL.A. 51/2024

Dated on: 24th April, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Jain

Facts of the case:

Special Cell (New Delhi Range), Lodhi Colony received information that two persons i.e. Parvaiz Rashid Lone and Jamsheed Zahoor Paul (appellant herein) were radicalized youths of Jammu & Kashmir, having allegiance to banned terrorist organization ISIS/SI/DAESH. As per intelligence inputs, they had procured arms and ammunition from UP for their cadres for executing some terrorist act in Jammu & Kashmir and would come at Netaji Subhash Park, near Lal Quila (Red Fort), Delhi on 07.09.2018 to proceed to Kashmir. Both the aforesaid named suspects were found moving towards Lal Qila. Search of the appellant yielded recovery of one pistol, containing five live cartridges in its magazine. From the possession of Parvaiz Rashid Lone (A-1) also, one pistol was recovered. These were seized. The police tracked them. They were found to be juvenile in conflict with law (JCL) and, therefore, separate report was prepared against them, which was filed before concerned Juvenile Justice Board (JJB). During investigation, both the accused divulged that they were propagating ideology of terrorist outfit ISIS in India and were in touch with another ISIS militant, namely, Abdullah Basith. Though, initially, FIR had been registered for commission of offence under Section 25 Arms Act, after detailed investigation and on the basis of the incriminating material collected during investigation, penal provisions of Section 18 & 20 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) were added. Both the accused were accordingly charge-sheeted for commission of offences under Section 25 Arms Act and for Sections 18 & 20 of UAPA. Main charge-sheet was submitted on 28.02.2019. Appellant had earlier also moved one application seeking bail which was dismissed and it was withdrawn on 06.06.2019. He moved another bail application which, too, was dismissed on 01.05.2020, feeling aggrieved, he preferred Criminal Appeal 345/2021 which was, however, not pressed and resultantly, the same was dismissed by this court on 31.01.2022 charges were framed on 25.04.2022. It was thereafter only that the appellant moved another bail application which also did not find favour and was dismissed by the learned trial court. When Appellant was interrogated, he revealed names of various cadres of ISIS (J&KModule) with whom he was in touch through social media, Black Berry Messenger (BBM) and Facebook etc. Some of such cadres of ISIS had already been shot dead in encounter. The mobile phones, recovered from both the accused, were sent to CERT-In for retrieval of data and its forensic analysis. Such analysis indicated that they both were not only involved in procuring sophisticated weapons for banned terrorist organization but also shared information about the movement of Army to other terrorists in Kashmir. Role, involvement and complicity of the appellant also stood exposed whose profile picture on BBM contained four terrorists, two of whom carrying AK-47 Rifles.

Contentions of the appellant:

According, to the learned counsel for appellant, allegations on record, even if those are taken on their face value, do not show commission of any offence under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA and at best, without admitting anything, it can be said to be a case of recovery of arms. It is contended that though the charges have been ascertained by the learned Trial Court and these have not been assailed so far, it is still legally permissible for the appellant to seek bail and to demonstrate that the bar provided under Section 43D (5) of UAPA does not stand attracted. There is no material to show that appellant had indulged into any unlawful or terrorist act, much less attribution of any overt act on his part. The entire case of prosecution is dependent upon the disclosure statements of the accused persons and these statements have no evidentiary value, being inadmissible in law. There is nothing to indicate that any message or BBM chat retrieved from the electronic device of the appellant had any potential to indicate that he was in contact with any terrorist. Appellant could not be branded as “terrorist‟ or a “person involved in terrorist act” merely on the basis of the recovery of a pistol and, therefore, invocation of draconian provision of UAPA is totally mis-founded and unwarranted. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant was a member of ISIS or their purported fronts. There is nothing to suggest that he was radicalized and was associated or was otherwise furthering the activities of ISIS. Merely because there was some BBM Chat retrieved from the electronic devise of his co-accused, appellant could not have been held to be a co-conspirator. Mere framing of charge does not create any embargo against grant of bail as the consideration for framing the charge is different from the one required for grant of bail. At the stage of consideration of bail, Court is merely required to undertake surface-level analysis of probative value of the evidence in order to satisfy test of “prima facie true” and if such analysis is carried out, it would clearly go on to show that there is no admissible evidence on record indicating commission of offences under Section 18 & 20 of UAPA. Appellant has undergone incarceration for more than five and half years and the trial is not likely to conclude any time soon and, therefore, his fundamental right as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been seriously jeopardized, entitling him to be released on bail on that count alone.

Contention of the respondent:

There are serious allegations against the appellant and the learned Trial Court has already come to a definite conclusion that there is a prima facie case against him for offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. According to the respondents, there are following clearcut allegations and if all these allegations are read conjunctively, it would clearly reveal his complicity qua offences under Section 18 & 20 UAPA. One loaded pistol was recovered from his possession and he disclosed that he had purchased the same from four juveniles. Such fact was found to be correct as the police was able to reach those juveniles and they were apprehended and admitted that weapons in question had been sold by them to the accused persons, in lieu of money. Appellant was found in possession of two electronic devices and when the data was retrieved, it was found that he was found using Black Berry Messenger for communicating with his associates. His BBM ID was deciphered and the profile picture of Black Berry Messenger depicted four terrorists holding AK47 rifles and pistols in their hands. Appellant and his co-accused had procured illicit arms and had come to Delhi together and were to leave for Kashmir together in furtherance of their conspiracy. BBM chats retrieved from the electronic devices from his co-accused clearly suggested that there was incriminating communication of precarious nature between him and Adil Thokar. Appellant had, on the directions of Omar @ Umar Iban Nazir, met one Abdullah Basith. Such Abdullah Basith was later arrested by NIA and the fact of there being a meeting between them was confirmed and substantiated by NIA. Motive of such meeting was to procure weapons for terrorist activity and the record of Shaka Guest House confirmed his such visit. appellant with his co-accused not only conspired to commit terrorist act but also procured weapons and in pursuit of their abominable objective for perpetuating terror, they both, on the direction of Adil Thokar and Umar Iban Nazir, arranged weapons through JCLs and came to Delhi via flight and even sent the images of recovered pistol to their handlers through BBM. The BBM chats from the electronic device of his coaccused clearly indicated that he was even discussing about the movement of Army in Kashmir which clearly exposes their nefarious design.

Legal Provisions:

Section 18 & 20 of UAPA- Punishment for Organizing Terrorist Camps-Anyone who engages in conspiracies, preparations, or attempts to organize a terrorist camp or provides encouragement, advice, or instigation for such activities shall be subject to imprisonment. The term of imprisonment shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Additionally, a fine may also be imposed. Punishment for Being a Member of a Terrorist Gang or Organization If an individual knowingly becomes a member of a terrorist gang, organization, or supports such entities, they shall be liable for punishment. The imprisonment term shall not be less than five years, but it may extend to life imprisonment. Furthermore, they may also be fined. Section 43D(5) of UAPA- makes it virtually hard to grant a bail.Section 10 of Evidence Act- pertains to the admissibility of evidence in cases involving conspiracy.

Issue:

  1. Whether in view of the fact that charges have already been framed and such charges have not been challenged by the appellant, whether bail plea can be considered and whether the court can go on to opine that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true?
  2. What should be the level of scrutiny for believing the same? Whether the appellant has been able to show that there is no prima facie case against him? Whether despite such statutory bar being in place and when prima facie is found to be made out, bail can still be granted in order to safeguard his fundamental rights.

Court analysis and Judgement:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2024 SCC On-Line SC 109, the impact of Section 43D (5) of UAPA was delineated and it was observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence – bail is the rule and jail is the exception – does not find any place in UAPA. It further observed that exercise of general power to grant bail under UAPA is severely restrictive in scope. It went on to hold that in view of said statutory bar contained under Section 43D (5) of UAPA, if the
offences fall under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of UAPA and there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, bail must be rejected as a rule. Gurwinder Singh (supra) also discussed National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali: 2019 SCC On-Line SC 461 which lays down elaborate guidelines about the approach that the Courts must partake in, while considering bail application under UAPA. In context of the meaning attributable to “prima facie true‟, it observed that material collected by the investigating agency, on the face of it, must show the complicity of the accused in relation to the offence and must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence. It also observed that at the stage of giving reasons for grant or rejection of bail, the elaborate examination or dissection of evidence was not required and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. Thus, once charges are framed, it can be easily assumed that there is a very strong suspicion against the accused. Therefore, in such a situation, the task of any such accused becomes much more onerous and challenging as it is never going to be easy for anyone to satisfy that the same set of material, which compelled the court to frame charges on the basis of strong prima facie case, would persuade it to hold to the contrary, by declaring that such accusation was not prima facie true. Be that as it may, there can never be any restriction or embargo on moving application seeking bail. Such unfettered right remains available as long as the proceedings are alive. Moreover, in view of specific observations made in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) as elaborated in Gurwinder Singh (supra), Court can always consider such bail application, even after framing of charges, the rider being the onus on accused would be much more rigorous in such a situation. The first two facets stand answered accordingly. As per allegations appearing on record and facts and circumstances placed before the court, the appellant was continuously in touch with his co-accused, travelling with him and arranging weapons. He was in touch with militants as well and met one of them in Delhi. Conspiracy, as the cliché goes, is hatched in secrecy and very rarely, there would be any visible evidence suggesting clear-cut conspiracy. On most of the occasions, conspiracy has to be inferred by connecting dots from bunch of circumstances. Moreover, Section 10 of Evidence Act cannot be kept aside which visualizes such type of situation and makes the actions and the statements of coconspirator to be relevant as against the others. Such action or statement can even be used for proving the existence of conspiracy. Thus, at this stage, appellant does not seem to be in any position to wriggle out of the statutory bar contained in proviso of Section 43D (5) of UAPA as there are clear-cut allegations which go on to indicate that accusation against him is prima facie true. This observation is based on broad probabilities and surface analysis of material collected by respondent. Each case has to be evaluated in the backdrop of its factual background. Moreover, in view of our forgoing discussion and material on record, the appellant seems part of conspiracy and when a full-fledged trial is already underway, we would refrain from embarking upon a mini-trial to dissect each circumstance, threadbare. The appellant was in touch with cadres of ISIS which is sufficient to give insight of his culpable mind. In Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2023) 8 SCC 745, it has been observed that mere membership of banned organization is also sufficient to incriminate, without there being any overt act. Moreover, the factum of connection and association with any banned outfit has to be inferred from the attendant circumstances and the activities of the person concerned. There will never be a tangible piece of evidence or any kind of documentary proof in this regard, particularly once any such organization is banned. Learned counsel for the appellant has prayed that accused has already undergone incarceration for more than 5 ½ years and trial is not likely to conclude in near future. It is argued that he was just 19 years of age when he was arrested and at that time, he was at an important threshold of his educational and professional career. It is argued that though case is already at the stage of trial and the prosecution has examined nine out of cited twenty-seven witnesses, there is no likelihood of case getting disposed of in near future and, therefore, on the strength of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, it is prayed that despite the aforesaid statutory bar, Constitution Court can always grant bail so that the right of speedy trial and that of life and liberty do not stand defeated.
Thus, as per K.A. Najeeb (supra), despite the above statutory restriction contained in UAPA, the Constitutional Courts can consider grant of bail on the ground of violation of Part-III of the Constitution. However, in the case in hand, the maximum sentence provided under Section 18 & 20 UAPA is imprisonment for life and there is nothing which may indicate that prosecution is acting in a manner which is detrimental to his fundamental rights as provided under Part-III of the Constitution of India. Trial Court Record does not suggest any deliberate attempt on the part of prosecution to slow down the trial and, therefore, at this juncture, merely because of the above incarceration period, the accused does not become entitled to bail. The learned trial court has already observed that it, being already conscious about such fundamental right of the accused, was taking up the matter diligently by giving shortest possible dates. Therefore, there is no further requirement of passing any further direction in this regard. 

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Judgement reviewed by- Parvathy P.V

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Delhi High Court’s Jurisdiction Limited to Cases of Perversity in Industrial Tribunal Decisions

Case title: Director General, Delhi Doordharshan Kendra v. Mohd. Shahbaz Khan, Tej Pal Manohar Paswan, Danvir Hans Raj.

Case no: LPA 242/2024, LPA 243/2024, LPA 244/2024, LPA 245/2024, LPA 246/2024,

Dated on: 22nd March, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Rekha Palli and Hon’ble DR. Justice Sudhir Kumar Jain.

Facts of the case:

Appeals filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent LPA 242/2024 & other connected appeals to assail five similar orders dated 12.12.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in a batch of Writ Petitions. Vide the impugned order dated 12.12.2023, the learned Single Judge has rejected the Appellant’s challenge to the award dated 15.10.2007 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal (Tribunal), wherein the learned tribunal after holding that the termination of the respondents’ service by the Appellant was illegal, has directed the Appellant to reinstate them with 25% back wage.

Contentions of the appellant:

The learned Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge have failed to appreciate that the respondents were never employed with the Appellant but had in fact, been engaged by one M/S Navnidh Carriers who was engaged by the appellant on 31.07.1998, to provide manpower services as and when required. The learned Tribunal has not examined as to whether the Respondents had completed 240 days of continuous service in the year immediately preceding their termination, which aspect the learned Single Judge also over looked. Instead of placing the onus to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship on the respondents, the learned Single Judge has wrongly shifted the said onus on the Appellant.

Contentions of the respondent:

The learned Tribunal has, as a matter of fact, found that the respondents had been working with the Appellant/Organization much prior to 31.07.1998, i.e; the date when the appellant had, with malafide intention, engaged M/S Navnidh Carriers for providing manpower services and therefore, it was evident that the respondents had initially been engaged by the appellant itself. The experience certificate dated 13.07.1999 issued by the appellant to one of the respondents wherein it has been categorically stated that he had been working with the appellant as a casual labourer since July 1997 and was an honest and hardworking worker. The appellant admittedly does not have any licence to engage workmen through a contractor as is mandated under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (the CLRA Act), it is evident that the respondents were to be treated as employees of the appellant itself. He, therefore, prays that the appeals be dismissed.

Legal provisions:

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (the CLRA Act)- regulated the employment of contract labor in certain establishments and provides for its abolition in certain circumstances. Article 226 of the Constitution- gives the High court the power to issue orders, directions and writs to any person or the authority including the Govt for the enforcement of Fundamental rights.

Issue:

Whether Respondents were engaged by the Appellant and were illegally terminated? When can Writ Court interfere with the factual findings of fact of Labour/Industrial Tribunal?

Courts judgement and analysis:

The learned Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge, after taking into account the gate passes as also experience letter dated 13.07.1999 issued by the appellant to one of the respondents have come to a conclusion that the respondents were employed with the appellant/ organisation and had been illegally terminated. Both the learned Single Judge as also the learned Tribunal found upon appreciation of evidence that the purported contract by the appellant in favor of M/s Navnidh Carriers was sham and an attempt to conceal the engagement of the respondents with the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to give any explanation whatsoever for the issuance of the said experience certificate if the respondent namely Mohd. Shahbaz Khan was not their employee. The Appellant did not have any license, as mandated under the CLRA Act, 1970, to engage workmen through a contractor, hence it is evident that they were directly engaged by the appellant. In the light of these categoric factual findings by the learned Tribunal, which cannot, in any manner, said to be perverse or contrary to the evidence lead before the learned Tribunal, we are of the view that it was neither open for the learned Single Judge to interfere with these findings in exercise of its writ jurisdiction nor is it open for this Court to examine these questions of fact. In Dinesh Kumar v. Central Public Works Department, 2023 SCC On-Line Del 6518, wherein the co-ordinate Bench after examining various decisions of the Apex Court held that writ Court can interfere with the factual findings of fact recorded in the industrial award only if the same are perverse or are entirely unsupported by evidence. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters is quite limited. In Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Limited v. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193, the Apex Court, held that the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals as the case be is the final court of facts, unless the same is perverse or not based on legal evidence, which is when the High Courts can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Devi Dutt, (2006) 13 SCC 32, has held that the writ Court can interfere with the factual findings of fact only if in case the Award is perverse; the Labour Court has applied wrong legal principles; the Labour Court has posed wrong questions; the Labour Court has not taken into consideration all the relevant facts; or the Labour Court has arrived at findings based upon irrelevant facts or on extraneous considerations. In the present case, the Labour Court has arrived at a conclusion based upon the evidence adduced by the parties and the learned Single Judge has affirmed the findings of fact again after minutely scanning the entire evidence, and therefore, the question of interference by this Court does not arise. In the light of the aforesaid, we find absolutely no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge to hold that the respondents were engaged by the appellant and were illegally terminated. The appeals being meritless are, along with all pending applications, dismissed.

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Judgement reviewed by- Parvathy P.V.

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