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SUPREME COURT QUASHED THE JUDGEMENT OF HIGH COURT AND AWARDED THE EXTENSION OF TIME IN FILING THE WRITTEN STATEMENT.

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CASE NAME: ADITYA KHAITAN & ORS. VERSUS IL AND FS FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED

CASE NUMBER: CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6411-6418 OF 2023

DATED ON: OCTOBER 03, 2023

QUORUM: HON’BLE JUSTICE J.K. MAHESHWARI & JUSTICE K.V. VISWANATHAN

INTRODUCTION:

The appeals challenge the High Court’s decision to dismiss applications for taking on record their written statements in a civil suit. The court ruled that the 30-day period for filing written statements had expired on 08.03.2020. The court also ruled in Sagufa Ahmed and Others Vs. Upper Assam Plywood Products Private Limited and Others (2021) 2 SCC 317, since the orders of this that the order dated 23.03.2020, effective from 15.03.2020, would not benefit the applicants/defendants since the limitation period had expired. The court also ruled that the court’s orders under Article 142 of the Constitution of India only extended the period of limitation, not the period up to which delay can be condoned.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The plaintiff, IL and FS Financial Services Limited, filed a suit for recovery of money and consequential reliefs in C.S. No. 177 of 2019 against nine defendants. The 30-day period for filing written statements expired on 08.03.2020 and the condonable period of 90 days expired on 06.06.2020.

The appellants filed applications for the defendants on 20.01.2021, requesting an extension of the time for the defendants’ written statements. The reasons for this were the declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic, the Government of India’s advisories, the Disaster Management Act, the lockdown imposed by the Government of West Bengal, and the closure of the answering applicant’s office.

The affidavits relied on the court’s order dated 23.03.2020 and 10.07.2020, which extended the period of limitation until further orders. The plaintiffs opposed these applications, arguing that the orders would not help since the limitation period had expired before 15.03.2020. The plaintiff relied on the judgment of 18.09.2020 in Sagufa Ahmed to support its contention. The High Court accepted the plaintiff’s stand but did not take the written statements on record.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

Article-142: Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and unless as to discovery, etc.-

(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or orders so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.”

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

ORDER 5 RULE 1(1): Summons.— When a suit has been duly instituted, a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim and to file the written statement of his defence, if any, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on that defendant. Provided that no such summons shall be issued when a defendant has appeared at the presentation of plaint and admitted the plaintiff’s claim

Order 8 Rule 1:Written statement.- The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence:

Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.”

ORDER 8 RULE 10: Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by Court.—Where any party from whom a written statement is required under rule 1 or rule 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up.

COMMERCIAL COURT ACT:

Section – 16: Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in its application to commercial disputes-

(1) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule.

(2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value.

(3) Where any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), by the State Government is in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this Act shall prevail.

ISSUES RAISED:

  • Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the application for extension of time dated 20.01.2021 and in not taking the written statements on record.
  • Whether the appellants are allowed to file the written statement after the expiration the limited time period in the special circumstances or not.

CONTENTION OF APPELLANT:

Mr. Sanjoy Ghose, Senior Counsel for the appellants, used the judgment in Prakash Corporates vs. Dee Vee Projects Limited, (2022) 5 SCC 112, to argue that extraordinary measures are crucial in extraordinary circumstances. The court noted that orders of 23.03.2020, 06.05.2020, and 10.07.2020 were addressed in the same In re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation. The court distinguished Sagufa Ahmed’s case (supra) in paras 28.1, 28.2 and 33.4 of Prakash Corporates (supra), stating that the period envisaged in the order dated 23.09.2021 should be excluded from computing the period of limitation even for filing the written statement. The court ruled that the decision in Sagufa Ahmed is irrelevant to the present case, as the extended period expired on 06.06.2020.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:

Mr. Sahil Tagotra, learned Counsel for the Respondent reiterated the findings of the High Court and submitted that the applicants have forfeited their right to file the written statements and the hon’ble High Court justified in rejecting the application for extension of time dated 20.01.2021 and not taking the written statements on record.

COURT’S ANALYSIS:

The Supreme Court has extended the deadlines for statutes of limitations in cases related to the pandemic. The court took suo motu cognizance and issued orders under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, protecting parties’ rights and ensuring their remedies and defenses were not barred. The orders of 23.03.2020 and 08.03.2021 were issued in a case involving Sagufa Ahmed (supra), which extended the limitation prescribed under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 until further orders. The court also extended the period between 15.03.2020 and the lifting of lockdown in the jurisdictional area.

The Supreme Court of India has issued directions to address the challenges faced by litigants during the COVID-19 pandemic. The order dated 08.03.2021 extended the period of limitation prescribed under general law or special laws, with effect from 15.03.2020 until further orders. The court believes that the order dated 15.03.2020 has served its purpose and should come to an end.

The court has also excluded the period from 15.03.2020 to 14.03.2021, allowing the balance period of limitation remaining as of 15.03.2020 to become available with effect from 15.03.2021. The period from 15.03.2020 to 14.03.2021 will also be excluded from computing periods prescribed under various laws. The government is also required to amend guidelines for containment zones, allowing for medical emergencies, essential goods and services, time-bound applications, and educational and job-related requirements.

The Court has directed that the period from 15.03.2020 to 14.03.2021 will be excluded from computing the period prescribed under various laws, including the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. This decision has a significant impact on the current controversy, as it excludes the period for computing outer limits within which the court or tribunal can condone delay.

The Court in Prakash Corporates (supra) also noted that the order of 08.03.2021 and subsequent orders by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges were not available for the Bench which decided Sagufa Ahmed’s case. The outer limit within which the court or tribunal can condone delay is 120 days from the date of summons.

JUDGEMENT:

As has been set out hereinabove, summons was served on 07.02.2020, but the 30 days period expired on 08.03.2020 and the outer limit of 120 days expired on 06.06.2020. The applicants filed for written statements and extension of time on 20.01.2021, and the High Court’s judgment needs to be set aside. The principle underlying the court’s orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021, and 23.09.2021, in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation would benefit the applicants-defendants.

The Appeals are allowed, and the written statements filed on 20.01.2021, are directed to be taken on record. The suit will proceed with the appeals, and the appeal stands allowed with no order as to costs.

 

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Click here to view the full judgement: ADITYA KHAITAN & ORS. VERSUS IL AND FS FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

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SUPREME COURT UPHELD AND THE JUDGEMENT OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR ELECTRICITY AND SET ASIDE THE CIVIL APPEAL.

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CASE NAME: MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED VERSUS RATNAGIRI GAS AND POWER PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.

CASE NUMBER: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1922 OF 2023

DATED ON: NOVEMBER 09, 2023
QUORUM: HONOURABLE CIJ Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JUSTICE P.B.         PARDIWALA & JUSTICE MANOJ MISHRA.

INTRODUCTION

The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) in New Delhi dismissed an appeal against an order from the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) in 2013. The first respondent, Ratnagiri Gas And Power Private Limited, filed a petition against Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., seeking resolution of issues related to non-availability of domestic gas, alternate fuel contracts, and fixed charges. CERC held the appellant liable, which was upheld by APTEL. The court granted the appellant the liberty to move the court again if necessary. The first respondent filed an execution petition, seeking payment of Rs 5287.76 crores and Rs 1826 crores, in accordance with the APTEL order.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The first respondent, RGPPL, a joint venture of NTPC Ltd., Gas Authority of India Ltd, MSEB Holding Company, ICICI, IDBI, SBI, and Canara Bank, took over the assets of Dabhol Power Company Limited after its operations were closed down. The first respondent owns a gas-based generating station in Ratnagiri, Maharashtra, with 95% allocated to the State of Maharashtra and the rest to Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli. The appellant, MSEDCL, entered into a Power Purchase Agreement with the first respondent in 2007 for 25 years. The first respondent received gas supply from RIL until September 2011, but a decline in supply was attributed to low-yielding KG-D6 gas fields. The issue was raised with the Central Government and placed before the Empowered Group of Ministers on 24 December.

The first respondent entered into a Gas Supply Agreement/Gas Transportation Agreement with GAIL to supply Recycled Liquid Natural Gas under spot cargo. The appellant, however, refused to schedule power at the agreed rates, claiming that the first respondent failed to obtain their approval before entering into the agreement. The appellant argued that the declaration of capacity on RLNG was unilateral and arbitrary, violating Clause 5.9 of the Power Purchase Agreement. The first respondent filed a petition under Section 79 of the Electricity Act 2003 to resolve the issue of non-payment of fixed charges, the reservations of beneficiaries to enter alternate contractual arrangements for fuel, and the revision of the NAPAF.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT

Clause (4.3) Declared Capacity

“Primary Fuel for RGPPL is LNG/Natural gas and/or RLNG. Normally capacity of the station shall be declared on gas and/or RLNG for all three power blocks. However, if agreed by MSEDCL, RGPPL shall make arrangements of Liquid fuel(s) for the quantum required by MSEDCL. In such a case the capacity on liquid fuel shall also be taken into account for the purpose of Availability, Declared Capacity and PLF calculations till the time Liquid fuel(s) stock agreed/requisitioned by MSEDCL is available at site.”

Clause (5.9) Gas Supply Agreement (GSA)/ Gas Transportation Agreement (GTA)

The gas supply agreement for 1.5 MMTPA R-LNG up to September 2009 is in place, sourced through Petronet LNG Ltd and re-gasified at their Dahej terminal. Commercial implications of the GSA/GTA contract will be signed separately with MSEDCL. The total gas/LNG will be procured through short-term and long-term contracts through GAIL, under GoI’s direction. RGPPL must obtain MSEDCL’s approval on contracting terms and price before entering the contract.

ELECTICITY ACT, 2003

SECTION-79: FUNCTION OF CENTRAL COMMISSION

(1) The Central Commission shall discharge the following functions :–

The Act regulates the tariffs of generating companies owned or controlled by the Central Government, those with a composite scheme for electricity generation and sale in multiple states, and inter-state transmission of electricity. It determines tariffs for inter-state transmission, issues licenses for transmission licensees and electricity traders, adjudicates disputes involving generating companies or transmission licensees, levies fees for the Act, specifies Grid Codes and Standards, enforces quality, continuity, and reliability of service by licensees, sets trading margins in inter-state electricity trading, and discharges other functions assigned under the Act.

(2) The Central Commission shall advise the Central Government on all or any of the following matters :–

The Central Commission is responsible for formulating National Electricity Policy and tariff policy, promoting competition, efficiency, and economy in the electricity industry, promoting investment, and addressing other government-referred matters. It ensures transparency and is guided by the National Electricity Policy, National Electricity Plan, and tariff policy.

ISSUSES RAISED:

  • whether the CERC and APTEL were justified in affixing liability to pay fixed charges on the appellant.
  • Whether the dispute in the particular case primarily turns on the terms of the Power Purchase Agreement or not.

CERC ORDER DATED 30 JULY 2023 AND APTEL JUDGEMENT AND FINAL ORDER DATED 22 APRIL 2015.

The CERC allowed a petition and held the appellant liable to pay fixed capacity charges under the Power Purchase Agreement. It  ruled that the appellant’s decision not to schedule RLNG influenced variable charges, not fixed charges. Further, the appeal in APTEL was made and they directed that if the appellant wanted to not pay for RLNG, it must compensate the first respondent, as it is liable under Article 5.2 of the PPA. No prior consent was required for liability to arise. APTEL dismissed the appeal. The Civil Appeal against APTEL’s decision was initially disposed of by this Court. Since the appellant was not facing any punitive action for recovery, and the appellant was granted the liberty to approach the court when needed.  The present appeal is before the Supreme Court of India.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The appellant challenged APTEL’s judgment and final order, arguing that the CERC divided Clause 4.3 and Clause 5.9 of the PPA into two separate categories, absolving the appellant of paying for declared capacity due to RLNG. The placement of the prior approval clause in clause 5.9 suggests it applies to both clause 5.2 and clause 5.3 energy charges. The decision to adopt RLNG has commercial implications, so the prior approval requirement in clause 5.9 is invoked. The compartmentalization of clauses 4.3 and 5.9 is flawed, and the plant availability factor would be less than 70%, reducing capacity charges in accordance with CERC Regulations 2009.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The first Respondent urged that, The appellant established a generating station to meet their electricity needs. After the failure of M/s Enron International and M/s Dabhol Power Company, the station was revived and its assets transferred to RGPPL. The appellant held 13.51% shares in the first respondent. The capacity declaration and demand for charges are in accordance with Clauses 4.3 and 5.2 of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). The PPA is valid for 25 years and the appellant is bound by Clauses 6.6. and 6.7, which stipulate paying 95% of charges during a dispute.

COURT’S ANALYSIS:

TERMS OF PPA

The PPA outlines two types of tariff charges for MSEDCL: capacity charges and energy charges. The former are fixed and subject to revision by the Government of India or Maharashtra, while the latter are calculated using a formula. MSEDCL must schedule energy sending from RGPPL and obtain approval from CERC for provisional billing. The total gas requirements are procured through GAIL, with RGPPL obtaining approval before entering into a GSA/GTA.

The first respondent argues that an alternate arrangement with GAIL and capacity declarations based on RLNG was necessary due to a nationwide fuel shortage. The appellant argues that the unilateral decision to declare capacity based on RLNG violated the mandatory approval requirement under clause 5.9 of the PPA, exempting it from liability to pay fixed capacity charges.

FACTUAL CONTEXT AND THE INTENTION OF PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT

The first respondent was established due to the failure of M/s Enron International and M/s Dabhol Power Company to meet Maharashtra’s energy needs. The tariff requirements were determined to preserve the unit’s viability. The appellant’s liability for the former is actual delivery agnostic, as long as the declared capacity is made in terms of the PPA.

The appellant’s interpretation of the PPA contradicts the original purpose and intendment of the parties, as it implies that capacity charges can be avoided and made subject to the appellant’s consent. A deviation from the plain terms of the contract is warranted only when it serves business efficacy better. The appellant’s arguments would require reading in implied terms contrary to the contractual provisions, which is permissible only in a narrow set of circumstances.

JUDGEMENT:

In the present context, bearing in mind the background of the establishment of the first respondent, and the shortfall of domestic gas for reasons beyond the control of the first respondent, such a deviation from the plain terms is not merited and militates against business efficacy as it has a detrimental impact on the viability of the first respondent.

The execution proceedings pursuant to the above-mentioned execution petition before the APTEL be continued. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

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JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

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Preserving Academic Integrity: Supreme Court Vindicates University Selection Processes

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Case Title: Meher Fatima Hussain Vs. Jamia Milia Islamia & Ors.

Case No.: Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) 8333 of 2023

Dated on: April 15, 2024

Coram: J. Abhay S. Oka, J. Pankaj Mithal

Facts:

In this case, Meher Fatima Hussain and two other appellants challenged their dismissal from academic positions at Jamia Millia Islamia University. Sabiha Hussain was initially appointed as a Reader and later promoted to Professor and Director at the Sarojini Naidu Centre, following a due selection process. Despite this, the university did not regularize her position, leading to her removal and subsequent legal challenge. Meher Fatima Hussain, initially appointed as a Lecturer, faced a similar situation when her probationary post was converted to a temporary post, and she was later appointed as an Associate Professor. Suraiya Tabassum was appointed as an Assistant Professor on a tenure post. All appellants faced termination and challenged their dismissals in court, arguing that their appointments were regular and lawful. The High Court initially dismissed their petitions, leading to the current appeals in the Supreme Court.

Contentions of the Appellants:

The appellants contended that their appointments at Jamia Millia Islamia University were made following a proper and regular selection process as per the university’s statutes. They argued that their appointments were not irregular or ad-hoc, as wrongly concluded by the High Court, which had erroneously applied the law from the State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi case. Further, the appellants maintained that they met all the necessary qualifications and criteria, and were selected by duly constituted Selection Committees, and their positions were sanctioned posts. They also highlighted that the UGC had approved the regularization of such appointments if made through proper selection procedures. Therefore, the appellants argued that their termination and the university’s refusal to regularize their appointments were unjustified and unlawful.

Contention of the Respondent:

The respondents, representing Jamia Millia Islamia University, contended that the appellants’ appointments were irregular and not in compliance with the required statutory and procedural norms. They argued that the appointments were temporary or ad-hoc and subject to the continuation of specific schemes or plans, such as the UGC’s XII plan period. The university emphasized that the posts held by the appellants were not regularized due to the temporary nature of the schemes under which they were appointed. They further argued that the High Court correctly applied the principles laid down in the case of State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi and that the appellants’ appointments could not be regularized as they did not meet the necessary legal and procedural requirements.

Court’s Analysis & Judgement:

The Court judiciously analysed the facts of the case and considered the contentions of both the appellants and the respondents. It examined the procedural aspects of the appointments, including the selection processes followed by the university and the nature of the posts held by the appellants. After thorough deliberation, the Court concluded that the appointments of the appellants were made through proper selection processes and were not irregular. It noted that the appellants had been serving in their respective positions for a significant period and had met the necessary qualifications. Additionally, the Court considered the correspondence from the University Grants Commission (UGC), indicating that the appointments could be regularized if made through a regular selection process. Based on these findings, the Court held that the High Court had erred in dismissing the appeals and upheld the appellants’ contentions. Therefore, it set aside the impugned judgments and granted relief to the appellants, reinstating their positions.

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Judgement Reviewed By- Shramana Sengupta

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Supreme Court on Electricity Tariffs: No Additional Reliability Charge for Continuous Process Industries

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Case title: Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. VS M/s JSW Steel Ltd. & Anr.

Case no: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8413 OF 2009

Order on: 17 May, 2024

Qoram: HONOURABLE JUSTICE ABHAY S. OKA WITH HONOURABLE  JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN

Fact of the case:

The appellant is Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., a company responsible for distributing and supplying electricity across Maharashtra. The 1st respondent is M/s JSW Steel Ltd., a large steel industry and significant consumer of electricity supplied by the appellant. In a tariff order dated 20th October 2006, the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission imposed additional supply charges for uninterrupted power supply to bulk consumers, including the 1st respondent. This order was later discontinued by another tariff order on 20th June 2008, which also directed the appellant to refund the additional supply charges collected during 2006-07 and 2007-08. The appellant filed a petition with the Commission under the Electricity Act, 2003, seeking approval to recover reliability charges for implementing Zero Load Shedding (ZLS) in the Pen Circle area. A public hearing was conducted, and the Commission approved the petition on 15th June 2009, imposing the reliability charge from 16th June 2009 to 31st March 2010 on all consumers in the area, including the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent appealed against the Commission’s order to the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, which set aside the Commission’s order. The appellant then brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issues framed by court:

  • Whether the 1st respondent was liable to pay the reliability charge.

Legal provisions:

  • Section 62(3) of Electricity Act, 2003: Deals with the determination of tariffs by the Commission and the conditions under which different tariffs can be imposed for different consumer classes.
  • Section 111 of Electricity Act, 2003: Which provides the right to appeal against the orders of the Commission to the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity.

 Contentions of Appellant:

The appellant argued that the imposition of a reliability charge was legal and within the powers of the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission under the Electricity Act, 2003. They pointed out that similar charges were already being levied in other areas like Pune, Baramati, Vashi, and Thane. They claimed that the 1st respondent did not participate in the public hearing about the reliability charge, implying that they had given their consent to pay the charge. The appellant argued that if the respondent had any objections, they should have raised them during the hearing. The appellant stated that the 1st respondent benefited from uninterrupted power supply due to ZLS and thus was rightly liable to pay the reliability charge. They emphasized that this charge was for a limited period and that the 1st respondent, being a major consumer, should have participated in the public hearing. The appellant noted that the 1st respondent consumed about 45% of the electricity in the Pen Circle area and should, therefore, be subjected to the same reliability charge as other HT industrial consumers in similar areas.

Contentions of Respondents:

The 1st respondent argued that they were already paying a higher tariff because they were classified as a continuous process industry. They contended that this higher tariff was meant to cover the cost of uninterrupted power supply, making the additional reliability charge unnecessary and unjustified. The respondent rebutted the claim that they did not raise objections, pointing out that the Vidharba Industries Association, of which they were a member, had filed an affidavit raising objections during the public hearing. The 1st respondent asserted their right to appeal the Commission’s order under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003, arguing that being directly affected by the charge gave them the locus standi (the right to bring the case) regardless of their participation in the public hearing.

 Court analysis & Judgement:

The Supreme Court agreed with the respondent that the higher tariff already compensated for the uninterrupted power supply. This higher rate was set specifically for continuous process industries like the 1st respondent and made the additional reliability charge redundant. The court found no statutory basis in the Electricity Act, 2003, or any rules or regulations that supported the imposition of the reliability charge. The appellant failed to demonstrate how the charge was justified under the existing legal framework. The court acknowledged that the Vidharba Industries Association, which represented the 1st respondent, had indeed raised objections during the public hearing. This participation was sufficient to preserve the 1st respondent’s right to challenge the reliability charge. The court upheld the respondent’s right to appeal under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003. It clarified that non-participation in a public hearing did not negate their right to appeal if they were directly affected by the Commission’s order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., agreeing with the findings of the Appellate Tribunal. The court ruled that the 1st respondent should not be subjected to the reliability charge since they were already paying a higher tariff for uninterrupted power supply. The imposition of the reliability charge was deemed unjustified and unsupported by any statutory provision.

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The Patna High Court sentenced on Equivalence of B.Sc. and B.Sc. (Hons.) Degrees in Recruitment Criteria

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Case Title: Mini Agarwal v. Bihar Public Service Commission and others.

Case No.:   15933/ 2023

Dated on: 29th May 2024

Coram: Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE ANJANI KUMAR SHARAN

FACTS OF THE CASE

the petitioner has applied for the post of Assistant Professor in Govt. Engineering Colleges, against the vacancy advertised by the Bihar Public Service Commission, vide advertisement no. 63/2020. After scrutiny, the petitioner was found eligible and was allowed to appear in written (objective) competitive examination and accordingly, the concerned Authority issued Admit Card of the petitioner bearing Roll No. 630278. she appeared in the written examination and was successful, proceeding to the interview stage. which was scheduled to be conducted on 12.04.2023. This petitioner has appeared before the Interview Board on the scheduled date and time along with relevant documents. After the interview, the petitioner discovered she had been awarded “0” marks for her graduation percentage because she held a B.Sc. (Physics) degree rather than a B.Sc. (Hons.) degree. The BPSC cited the requirement of a B.Sc. (Hons.) degree for awarding marks in this category. Subsequently, she sought some information from Department of Science and Technology & B.P.S.C. under RTI and filed representation before the Secretary, Bihar Public Service Commission and requested to review the relevant documentation and policies to ensure a fair assessment of her qualifications and consider her B.Sc.(Physics) degree as valid. Her requests were not addressed, leading her to file the present writ petition.

ISSUES

  • Whether the petitioner’s B.Sc. (Physics) degree should be considered equivalent to a B.Sc. (Hons.) degree for the purpose of awarding marks in the recruitment process for Assistant Professor as per UGC notification F5-1/2013 (CPP-II) and the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020:

  • Table-1: Specifies the qualifications required for the post of Assistant Professor in Engineering and Technology, and in Humanities and Science.
  • Table-2: Provides the weightage scheme for direct appointments to the post of Assistant Professor, specifying that candidates with a B.Sc. (Hons.) or B.A. (Hons.) degree are eligible for a 5% weightage for graduation marks.

 UGC Notification F5-1/2013 (CPP-II) dated July 5, 2014:

  • This notification deals about the specified degree and talks about degree like B.Sc./B.Sc. (Hons.). It means the degrees are treating in same fashion. As such, there should be treated to be one of the specified under graduate degree for direct recruitment for the post of Assistant Professor in Bihar Engineering College

 UGC Notification F.1-2/2017(EC/PS) dated July 18, 2018:

  • Specifies the minimum qualifications for the appointment of teachers and academic staff in universities and colleges. The petitioner referenced this notification to argue that it does not differentiate between B.Sc. and B.Sc. (Hons.) for shortlisting candidates.

 Advertisement No. 63/2020 by BPSC:

  • Specifies the eligibility criteria and weightage scheme for the recruitment of Assistant Professors in Government Engineering Colleges, including the requirement for a B.Sc. (Hons.) degree to receive marks for the graduation percentage.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER

The petitioner contended that her B.Sc. (Physics) should be considered equivalent to a B.Sc. Hons.  degree based on the UGC notification F5-1/2013 (CPP-II) dated July 5, 2014, which does not differentiate between B.Sc. and B.Sc. (Hons.) degrees, treats them in the same manner. Also, UGC notification F.1-2/2017(EC/PS) dated July 18, 2018, which specifies the minimum qualifications for teaching positions and does not distinguish between B.Sc. and B.Sc. (Hons.) degrees. She argues that the BPSC’s action is contrary to these UGC regulations.  As per the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020, and the UGC guidelines, her B.Sc. degree should make her eligible for the 5% weightage in graduation marks, which was denied to her by the BPSC. The petitioner points out that in previous BPSC advertisements, such as advertisement no. 19/2020 for the post of Lecturer in Government Polytechnic Colleges, marks were awarded for B.Sc. degrees irrespective of whether they were Hons. or not. She argues that the current practice of denying marks for her B.Sc. degree is inconsistent and unreasonable. The petitioner claims that despite filing representations and requests for reconsideration to the Secretary of the BPSC and the Department of Science and Technology, her qualifications were not fairly assessed, and no action was taken in her favour. She argues that the recruitment process should be fair and not disadvantage her based on a technical distinction between B.Sc. and B.Sc. (Hons.) degrees, especially when UGC guidelines and previous BPSC practices did not make such a distinction, and thus, her B.Sc. degree should be considered valid for awarding the 5% graduation weightage as per the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents argue that the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020, explicitly require a B.Sc. (Hons.) or B.A. (Hons.) degree for awarding the 5% weightage in graduation marks. Since the petitioner holds a B.Sc. degree without honors, she does not qualify for these marks. They maintain that the advertisement no. 63/2020 for the recruitment of Assistant Professors was issued in compliance with the requisition sent by the Department of Science and Technology and follows the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020. Therefore, the recruitment process, including the qualification criteria, is legally valid and binding. The respondents emphasize that Table-2 of the Appendix-1 of the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020, prescribes that the weightage for graduation marks is specifically for candidates with B.Sc. (Hons.) or B.A. (Hons.) degrees. Hence, the petitioner’s B.Sc. (Physics) degree does not meet this requirement. While the respondents acknowledge the mark distribution scheme adopted for appointment of lecturers allowed marks for B.Sc. degrees irrespective of honors, the assert that the recruitment criteria for the post of Assistant Professor are different and more stringent, which justifies the distinction made in the current advertisement. BPSC has the authority and discretion to interpret and implement the rules as laid out in the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020. The decision to award “0” marks for the petitioner’s B.Sc. degree is in accordance with these rules and as far as the issue of reconsideration is concerned, the representations of the petitioners were duly reviewed but found to be without merit based on the explicit requirements of the advertisement and the rules. Therefore, no changes were made in her favour. One point unites all of the respondents’ arguments: the hiring process was carried out in a lawful and equitable manner, abiding by the established weighting schemes and criteria. The petitioner’s writ application is without merit because her qualifications did not match the required standards.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court upheld the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020, which clearly differentiate between B.Sc. and B.Sc. (Hons.) degrees for awarding weightage marks in the recruitment process. The court emphasized that the rules explicitly prescribe a maximum 5% weightage for graduation marks only to candidates with B.Sc. (Hons.) or B.A. (Hons.) degrees. The Coury stated that the BPSC’s advertisement no. 63/2020 was in consonance with the requisition sent by the Department of Science and Technology and complied with the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020. The educational qualifications and weightage scheme provided in the advertisement were found to be lawful and appropriately applied. The court gave importance to the precedent requirements laid down in the Bihar Engineering Education Service Rules, 2020 to be binding for the recruitment process and rejected the petitioner’s argument that her B.Sc. degree should be treated as equivalent to a B.Sc. (Hons.) degree based on UGC notifications and noted that even though there were some inconsistency in the previous advertisements,  The current recruitment criteria for Assistant Professor are distinct and justified by the need for more stringent qualifications. The court concluded that the recruitment process was conducted fairly and legally, adhering strictly to the rules and guidelines. The BPSC’s decision to award “0” marks for the petitioner’s graduation percentage was found to be in accordance with the advertised criteria. Based on the above rationale the court dismissed the writ application, stating that the petitioner’s B.Sc. degree does not qualify for the weightage marks as per the prescribed rules, and thus, there is no merit in her claims.

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Judgement Reviewed by – PRATYASA MISHRA

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