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20 Jun

Judicial Transparency and Bail Procedures: Lessons from the Supreme Court’s Ruling

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Case Title – Kusha Duruka vs. The State of Odisha

Case No. – Criminal Appeal No. 303 of 2024

Dated on – 19^th January, 2024

Quorum – Hon’ble Justice Vikram Nath and Hon’ble Justice Rajesh Bindal

Facts of the Case –

The appellant was arrested on 03.02.2022 for his alleged involvement in a case under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, related to the possession and transportation of 23.8 kg of Ganja. Following his arrest, his initial bail application was rejected by the Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Malkangiri, on 04.02.2022. He subsequently filed a bail application (BLAPL No. 1855 of 2022) before the High Court, assigned to Judge ‘A’, which was also denied on 06.03.2023. During this period, his co-accused, Gangesh Kumar Thakur, successfully obtained bail on 17.01.2023 from Judge ‘B’.

Following the High Court’s denial, the appellant filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court on 21.07.2023. While the SLP was pending, the appellant filed a second bail application, which was rejected by the Sessions Judge on 15.09.2023. Unaware of the SLP, the appellant filed another bail application before the High Court, which was granted on 11.10.2023 by Judge ‘B’.

On 06.12.2023, the appellant’s counsel informed the Supreme Court of the High Court’s recent bail order. The Supreme Court noted omissions in the High Court’s order regarding the appellant’s first bail application and the pending SLP. Consequently, the Supreme Court requested records and explanations from the involved parties, revealing that the High Court was not apprised of the earlier bail rejection or the SLP. This led to procedural discrepancies highlighted in the Supreme Court’s subsequent directives for handling similar future cases.

Legal Provision –

Section 439 of CrPC, 1973

Contentions of the Appellant –

The appellant contended that his prolonged detention since 03.02.2022, in connection with the alleged possession and transportation of 23.8 kg of Ganja, warranted the grant of bail. He argued that the rejection of his initial bail application by the Sessions Judge and subsequently by the High Court (BLAPL No. 1855 of 2022) was unjust, especially in light of the fact that his co-accused, Gangesh Kumar Thakur, had been granted bail on 17.01.2023 under similar circumstances. The appellant maintained that the principle of parity should be applied to his case, entitling him to bail on the same grounds. Furthermore, he asserted that his second bail application, granted by the High Court on 11.10.2023, should stand, despite the procedural lapses in disclosing the pendency of his SLP before the Supreme Court and the rejection of his earlier bail application. He emphasized that the non-disclosure was not intentional and did not warrant the cancellation of his bail. The appellant sought relief from the Supreme Court, arguing that the continuation of his detention was disproportionate and unjustified, given the circumstances and the bail granted to his co-accused.

Contentions of the Respondent –

The respondent contended that the appellant’s bail should not be granted due to the serious nature of the allegations under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, specifically Section 20(b)(ii)(C). They argued that the appellant was in conscious possession of a substantial quantity of Ganja, demonstrating a prima facie case against him. The respondent highlighted that the appellant’s initial bail application had been rightly rejected by both the Sessions Judge and the High Court, underscoring that no new circumstances justified the reconsideration of bail. Moreover, they pointed out procedural irregularities, noting that the appellant failed to disclose the pendency of his Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court when filing the second bail application before the High Court. This omission misled the High Court into granting bail on 11.10.2023 without considering the prior rejection and ongoing SLP. The respondent also emphasized that granting bail under these circumstances would undermine judicial propriety and the due process, as it would reward the appellant’s failure to disclose critical information, thus setting a detrimental precedent. Consequently, the respondent urged the Supreme Court to dismiss the appellant’s plea and uphold the legal process integrity.

Court Analysis and Judgement –

The Supreme Court’s analysis focused on procedural integrity and judicial propriety in handling bail applications. The Court noted that the appellant had failed to disclose the pendency of his Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court while filing his second bail application before the High Court. This omission resulted in the High Court granting bail without being aware of the prior rejection and the ongoing SLP. The Court found that the appellant’s conduct in not disclosing critical information misled the judicial process, undermining the integrity and consistency of judicial proceedings.

The Court emphasized the importance of transparent and accurate disclosures in bail applications to avoid conflicting orders and ensure proper judicial review. It also reviewed the affidavit and reports from the Odisha Government and the High Court, which confirmed that the High Court was not informed about the pending SLP or the previous bail application dismissal. The Supreme Court underscored the necessity of listing subsequent bail applications before the same judge who decided the earlier applications, as per the Standing Order No. 2 of 2023 from the Orissa High Court.

While recognizing the procedural lapses and the appellant’s misleading actions, the Supreme Court chose not to cancel the granted bail but imposed a token cost of ₹10,000 on the appellant, payable to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre attached to the Orissa High Court within eight weeks. The Court dismissed the appeal as infructuous, directing the High Courts to correct procedural systems to prevent such issues in the future. A copy of the judgment was ordered to be sent to all High Courts for appropriate action, and the original record was returned to the High Court.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Anurag Das

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19 Jun

Even if there is 0.001% negligence, it should be dealt with thoroughly: SC raps NTA, Centre over NEET Exam irregularities

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Amid worries over the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) for admission to medical institutions, the Supreme Court today slammed the National Testing Agency (NTA), which administers the statewide exam for medical college applicants.

“If there’s even 0.001% negligence on anyone’s part, it should be thoroughly dealt with,” the Supreme Court stated. The Supreme Court, in hearing a batch of petitions over alleged anomalies in the exam, stated that it expected “timely action” from the NTA and that the organisation must guarantee that all applicants are treated equitably.

“As the agency in charge of the exam, you must be fair. If there is an error, say yes, it is a mistake, and here is the course of action we will pursue. At the very least, that gives you confidence in your performance,” said a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and SVN Bhatti to the NTA. The Supreme Court emphasised the importance of students’ preparation for one of the country’s most difficult admission tests, stating that if someone who has cheated the system becomes a doctor, they are even more detrimental to society. It emphasised that children must study hard in order to pass NEET. “The next hearing in the case will be held on July 8.”

Last week, the NTA informed the Supreme Court that the grace marks awarded to 1,563 applicants in the NEET-UG test will be revoked, and the participants will be given the option of retaking the exam on June 23. The findings of the re-test will be announced by June 30, the Supreme Court was told.

If any of these applicants elected not to take the re-test, their previous score would be returned, minus the additional marks.
The results for the medical entrance test, which was taken by 24 lakh candidates on May 5, were released on June 4. Allegations of a test paper leak quickly emerged. As many as 67 students received flawless scores of 720/720.

Several students were offered grace marks, reportedly to compensate for lost time at the exam centre. Many student associations have complained of claimed NEET irregularities, including the release of incorrect question papers, ripped Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) sheets, and delays in sheet delivery.

Written By: Abhishek Singh

17 Jun

“Supreme Court Upholds Rajasthan’s Stamp Duty on Out-of-State Insurance Stamps”

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Case Title – Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.

Case No. – Civil Appeal No. 3391 of 2021

Dated on – 30^th April, 2024

Quorum – Hon’ble Justice Pamidighatam Sri Narasimha and Hon’ble Justice Aravind Kumar

Facts of the Case –

The appellant, a life insurance company, was subjected to demands by the State of Rajasthan for stamp duty on insurance policies issued within the state, pursuant to the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952. The company, facing a lack of availability of India Insurance Stamps in Rajasthan, purchased these stamps from Maharashtra based on a letter from the Treasury Officer, Jaipur, which indicated that the central government’s insurance stamps were not available through the state. The state authorities-initiated proceedings for recovery of stamp duty, asserting that the stamps should have been procured within Rajasthan. The appellant contended that their actions were consistent with the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as interpreted in the VVS Rama Sharma case, where it was held that purchasing stamps from outside the state did not constitute an offense. However, the High Court ruled against the appellant, leading to the current appeal before the Supreme Court, which involved questions of legislative competence, the applicability of the relevant state law, and the procedural propriety of the state’s demands for stamp duty.

Issues –

Whether the 1952 Act or the 1998 Act applies to the facts of the present case?
Whether the state government has the legislative competence to impose and collect stamp duty on policies of insurance as per Entry 91 of List I read with Entry 44 of List III?
Whether the 1952 Act requires the purchase of insurance stamps from and payment of stamp duty to the Rajasthan government for insurance policies issued within the state?
Whether, in the facts of the present case, the appellant is liable to pay stamp duty?

Legal Provisions –

Article 254 of The Constitution of India, 1950
Article 265 of The Constitution of India, 1950
Section 3 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899
Section 74 & 75 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899

Contentions of the Appellant –

The appellants contended that the imposition of stamp duty by the State of Rajasthan on insurance policies issued within the state, under the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952, was unjustified as they had to purchase India Insurance Stamps from Maharashtra due to their unavailability in Rajasthan, as confirmed by the Treasury Officer’s letter dated October 7, 1991. They argued that the High Court erred in overlooking this evidence and in failing to recognize the applicability of Section 3A(4) of the 1952 Act, which excluded instruments under Entry 91, List I from cash payment of stamp duty in the absence of adhesive or impressed stamps. The appellants further relied on the precedent set by VVS Rama Sharma, asserting that purchasing insurance stamps from outside the state did not violate any legal provisions and should not attract penalty or demand for additional stamp duty. They maintained that the stamp duty regime was improperly applied and that their actions were consistent with the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, making the state’s demands invalid and their recovery proceedings unlawful.

Contentions of the Respondent –

The respondents contended that the appellants were legally obligated to pay stamp duty on insurance policies issued within the State of Rajasthan, as mandated by the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952. They argued that the state legislature had the authority to impose and collect stamp duty under Entry 44 of List III, as prescribed by the Parliament under Entry 91 of List I. The respondents maintained that the purchase of insurance stamps from outside the state amounted to evasion of stamp duty and resulted in the instruments being considered not duly stamped. They asserted that the appellants had the option to pay stamp duty in cash under Section 3A of the 1952 Act if the stamps were unavailable, but they failed to do so. Additionally, they differentiated the case from VVS Rama Sharma, emphasizing that the latter involved interpretation of rules under a central act without an applicable state law having Presidential assent, unlike the present case where the 1952 Act had received such assent and therefore prevailed over the central Act within Rajasthan. The respondents thus argued for the validity of the state’s demands for stamp duty and the initiation of recovery proceedings against the appellants.

Court Analysis and Judgement –

The Hon’ble Supreme Court analyzed the case by examining the applicability of the Rajasthan Stamp Law (Adaptation) Act, 1952 and the Rajasthan Stamp Rules, 1955, which mandate the imposition of stamp duty on insurance policies executed within the state. The Court held that the 1952 Act, a state law enacted under Entry 44 of List III and having received Presidential assent, prevailed over the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 within Rajasthan. Differentiating the case from VVS Rama Sharma, the Court noted that the latter involved the interpretation of central rules without an equivalent state law with Presidential assent. The Court further held that, despite the unavailability of insurance stamps within Rajasthan, Section 3A(4) of the 1952 Act, which excludes instruments under Entry 91, List I from its application, meant that the appellants could not have paid the stamp duty in cash as suggested by the High Court. Consequently, the Court upheld the legislative competence and jurisdiction of the state to levy and collect stamp duty on insurance policies but directed the state not to demand and collect the stamp duty as per the specified orders. Thus, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirmed the High Court’s judgment, and directed the parties to bear their own costs.

Judgement Reviewed by – Anurag Das

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11 Jun

Justice Served to 9-Year-Old: Sikkim High Court Dismisses Phurba Lepcha’s Appeal

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Case Title: Phurba Lepcha vs. State of Sikkim

Case No.: Crl.A. No.24 of 2023

Dated on: 5th June, 2024

Coram: The Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, Judge & The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, Judge

Facts:

In this case, Phurba Lepcha was accused of sexually assaulting a 9-year-old boy who used to play at his house. The victim’s father reported to the police that his son came home crying, saying that Phurba had lured him into his house with sweets, then assaulted him. After an investigation, Phurba was convicted under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Phurba appealed the decision, arguing he was falsely accused, but the court upheld the conviction, finding the evidence against him credible.

Issues:

Whether the Appellant committed the offence is the question that calls for determination in the instant matter.

Legal Provisions:

Section 363 of IPC: Punishment for kidnapping.
Section 4 of the POCSO Act: Deals with penetrative sexual assault, which is considered a more serious offense than sexual assault.
Section 6 of the POCSO Act: Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
Section 377 of IPC: Unnatural Offenses.
Section 342 of IPC: Deals with the punishment for wrongful confinement.

Contentions of the Appellant:

Phurba Lepcha, herein, the appellant, contended that he was falsely accused of sexually assaulting the 9-year-old boy. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, denying any wrongdoing. Phurba maintained his innocence and suggested potential ulterior motives behind the accusation, aiming to cast doubt on the credibility of the victim’s father and other witnesses. Despite his appeals, the court upheld the conviction, deeming the evidence against him credible and sufficient under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.

Contentions of the Respondent:

The respondent, representing the prosecution or the victim’s family, contended that Phurba Lepcha’s conviction was justified based on the evidence presented during the trial. They asserted that the victim’s testimony, supported by the father’s report to the police, provided credible and compelling evidence of appellant’s guilt. Additionally, they highlighted certain corroborating evidence, such as physical evidence or witness statements, that further supported the victim’s account. The respondent likely emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect children from sexual exploitation, urging the court to uphold Phurba’s conviction and the accompanying sentence of twenty years in prison under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.

Court’s Analysis & Judgement:

Upon the critical analysis made by the hon’ble court, adjudging the arguments presented by both the parties, it was of the opinion that, the argument suggesting that the incident couldn’t have occurred due to the closeness of the road to the Appellant’s house lacks merit. There’s no proof indicating pedestrians on the footpath, and the offense happened indoors. No inquiry was made into whether any sounds from inside the house could be heard outside. Therefore, this argument doesn’t support the Appellant’s case. After a thorough examination of the evidence, the hon’ble court firmly believed that the Prosecution has convincingly proven its case, leaving no room for doubt. Hence, the court concur with the Trial Court’s findings. Consequently, the previous judgment and sentencing order are upheld and so the appeal is dismissed.

Judgement Reviewed By- Shramana Sengupta

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10 Jun

The Thodu Tangle: The Karnataka High Court Validates Villagers’ Concerns on Bridge Construction.

Samad A.A. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.

Writ Appeal No.: 636 OF 2024

Court: High Court of Karnataka.

Coram: Hon’ble J. B.M. Shyam Prasad, J. T.G. Shivashankare Gowda.

The High Court of Karnataka delivered a judgment on May 2, 2024, on a writ appeal filed against an interim order dated 18.03. 2024. The interim order directed the Deputy Commissioner of Madikeri to remove a concrete road constructed on a thodu within four weeks.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellants are the residents of Mugatageri village in Kodagu District. A concrete road has been put up on the thodu (a small stream or water channel) in their locality, which might have resulted in the stagnation of water. The initial petition was filed by Sri K.K. Deepak against various state officials and local authorities responsible for the construction and maintenance of the road. After this, there were directions to remove the concrete road, but actions were yet to be taken due to the election.

LEGAL ISSUES

Whether the appellant’s rights would be affected by the implementation of the interim order directing the removal of the concrete land?
Whether the appellants should have been impleaded as parties in the writ petition before passing the interim order?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, under which the appeal was filed.
Rule 27 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, states that a certiorari writ petition must include certified or authenticated copies of the order to be quashed and, if applicable, copies of orders from all involved authorities.
Additionally, the case involves principles under environmental protection laws concerning water bodies.

CONTENTIONS BY THE APPELLANTS

The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the implementation of the interim order directing the removal of the concrete road would affect their rights as they were not made parties to the original writ petition. Thus, their rights and interests were only considered after passing the interim order. The petitioners argued that the construction of concrete roads over thodu may have led to significant water stagnation, affecting the local land properties. They also contended that despite the direction of the Tahsildar, the Panchayat Development Officer, to remove the concrete road, no action was taken.

CONTENTIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS

The learned Additional Government Advocate, representing the respondents, submitted that the interim order could not be implemented due to the elections during the time of order. However, he did not oppose the appellant’s contention that they should have been included and heard before passing the interim order to address their concerns appropriately.

ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court recognized the environmental issues resulting from the construction of the road over the thodu. It observed that the grievances of the appellants regarding the interim order and their concerns were valid as they were not given an opportunity to present their case in the original writ proceedings. The Court acknowledged the delay due to elections and deemed it necessary to provide the appellants an opportunity to file the applications.

CONCLUSION

The case above is an example of the importance given to the principles of natural justice by the courts. The courts allowed the appellants to be heard before the implementation of an order that might affect their rights. This case highlights the necessity of ensuring that all parties are heard in judicial proceedings. It also underscores the importance of maintaining natural environments and addressing the impact of infrastructure projects on the environment.

Judgement reviewed by Maria Therese Syriac.

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