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“Justice Prevails: Delhi High Court Upholds Detention in Serious Kidnapping and Ransom Case”

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Case Title: RAJU Versus THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI

Case No: BAIL APPLN. 2791/2023

Decided on: 20th May , 2024

Quorum: The Hon’ble JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

Facts of the case

The issue concerns an occurrence on April 27, 2022, when the victim was kidnapped from his bakery business by the applicant and his friends. The prosecution claims that when the victim was brought to an undisclosed place, the applicant and his associates sought a ransom of ₹50,000 over the phone. The accused tried to escape but were caught by the police after the victim was discovered to have hurt while in custody. The authorities confiscated the bamboo sticks and the automobile used in the kidnapping. On the same day as the incident, the applicant and two other accused parties were taken into custody.

Issues

1. What particular charges have been brought in this instance against the applicant?

2. How did the prosecution prove that the applicant and his cronies were involved in the kidnapping?

3. What aspects did the court take into account in deciding whether to give the petitioner bail?

Legal Provisions

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), Section 365/34, relates to kidnapping and abduction.Kidnapping for ransom is covered under Section 364A of the IPC, which carries a life sentence or death penalty. The IPC’s Section 323/34 addresses intentionally causing harm. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), Section 439, addresses the granting of bail to those who are accused. Section 161 of the CrPC pertains to the questioning of witnesses in the course of an investigation. The recording of statements made in front of a magistrate is covered by Section 164 of the CrPC.

Appellant Contentions

The applicant stated that the incident was not a case of kidnapping or a crime committed for ransom and claimed he was wrongfully accused in the case. The applicant’s acts, according to the defense attorney, were driven more by a desire for vengeance against the victim’s brother for abusing his mother than by a wish to hold the victim hostage. The defense contested the charges’ framing under Section 364A of the IPC, arguing that the victim, not the applicant, was the one who made the purported ransom demand.It was underlined that holding the applicant in detention was pointless because the charge sheet had already been submitted [T4].

Respondent Contentions

The State objected to the application receiving any relief, claiming that the applicant had committed a horrible crime. The State raised fears that the applicant could attempt to intimidate or exert influence over the victim and his family members if he was granted bail. It was emphasized that the victim had given a statement under Section 164 of the CrPC that bolstered the prosecution’s case. The State argued that the victim had not yet been seen in the case, suggesting that granting bail to the applicant may put them at danger of interference [T3].

Court Analysis and Judgement

 The court observed that the applicant had not contested the charge under Section 364A of the IPC, which carries a harsh punishment, and that the charge had been brought against the applicant [T3]. The court took into account the seriousness of the crime, ruling that it was still a serious felony [T3] even though the kidnapping was carried out as payback rather than as a ransom. Statements from the victim and public witnesses backed up specific claims of kidnapping and ransom demands, demonstrating the applicant’s involvement [T3]. Under Section 164 of the CrPC [T3], the court highlighted the victim’s endorsement of the prosecution’s case as well as the statement’s evidential importance. The tribunal5. The court emphasized that there was a solid case against the applicant because the applicant was apprehended by the police after being observed on the victim’s phone [T4]. Given that the victim had not yet undergone an examination, concerns were expressed regarding the applicant’s potential to influence the trial or threaten the victim if granted bail [T4]. The court determined that the case was unfit for release under Section 439 of the CrPC [T5] because of the seriousness of the offense, the victim’s lack of examination, and the possible hazards involved. The court denied the bail application, emphasizing that the observations included in the order applied solely to the bail application and should not have any bearing on the result of the trial [T5]. Following the examination of the principal witnesses, the applicant was allowed to resubmit the application, and the trial court was instructed to record the evidence as soon as possible [T5].

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Judgement Analysis Written by – K.Immey Grace

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Delhi HC Limited Superintendence Role, No Fact Re-evaluation in Eviction Case

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Case Title: Hardial Singh (Deceased Through LRs) v. Vivek Gupta

Case Number: RC.REV. 339/2016

Dated On: Judgement reserved on May 14, 2024, and pronounced on May 22, 2024

Quorum: Justice Girish Kathpalia

 FACTS OF THE CASE

The case involves a petitioner named Hardial Singh, represented through his legal representatives, and a respondent named Vivek Gupta. Hardial Singh is the tenant, while Vivek Gupta is the landlord. The dispute centres around two ground floor shops located in Model Town, Delhi, referred to as the subject premises. Vivek Gupta claims ownership of these premises. The subject premises were originally owned by Gupta’s mother, Smt. Nirmala Gupta. Upon her demise, a partition suit was initiated between Vivek Gupta and his brother, Dr. Pradeep Gupta. The partition suit concluded with a settlement agreement, allocating the subject premises to Vivek Gupta’s share and a neighbouring shop to his brother.  Vivek Gupta filed an eviction petition against Hardial Singh, asserting a bona fide need for the subject premises to establish an IT consultancy firm. Hardial Singh contested the eviction petition, challenging the genuineness of Gupta’s need for the premises. Singh questioned Gupta’s ownership of adjacent premises and his residential status vis-à-vis his workplace location. The matter was brought before the Rent Controller, where both parties presented their arguments and evidence. The Rent Controller eventually dismissed Singh’s application for leave to contest, prompting Singh to challenge the decision before the High Court.

ISSUES 

  1. Whether Vivek Gupta genuinely requires the subject premises for his IT consultancy firm, as stated in the eviction petition, or if there are alternative motives behind the eviction.
  2. Clarification of the ownership status of the subject premises following the partition suit between Vivek Gupta and his brother, Dr. Pradeep Gupta, and its impact on the eviction proceedings.
  3. Determination of Hardial Singh’s rights as a tenant and his entitlement to contest the eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
  4. Assessment of whether the eviction proceedings comply with legal procedures and principles of fairness as per the Delhi Rent Control Act.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act: This provision relates to the powers of the High Court to review orders for possession of tenanted premises passed by the Rent Controller under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
  2. Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act: This section pertains to the grounds for eviction of a tenant, specifically in cases where the landlord requires the premises for his own use.
  3. Relevant Civil Procedure Code (CPC) Sections: References are made to relevant sections of the Civil Procedure Code for procedural matters.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant, represented by Senior Advocate Mr. A.P.S. Ahluwalia and his team, contests the assertion made by the respondent landlord, Vivek Gupta, regarding the necessity of the subject premises for starting an IT consultancy firm. They argue that the respondent’s claim lacks merit as alternative premises are available to him. This contention forms the crux of their defence against the eviction proceedings initiated by the landlord. In furtherance of their defence, the appellant suggests potential irregularities surrounding the partition suit and subsequent settlement, which resulted in the respondent’s claim to the subject premises. They raise doubts about the authenticity of the partition decree obtained by the respondent, implying potential manipulation or fraudulent activity in securing ownership rights to the subject premises. Another key contention put forth by the appellant is the dispute over the respondent’s claimed residency in Noida and its relevance to the eviction proceedings. They challenge the respondent’s assertion of residing in Noida, highlighting the presence of metro connectivity between Model Town and Noida. By doing so, they seek to undermine the significance of travel inconvenience as a valid reason for the respondent’s alleged need for the subject premises. The appellant further argues that the respondent has access to other suitable premises for his consultancy firm, including vacant shops nearby. By emphasising the existence of viable alternative options, they aim to discredit the respondent’s claim of exclusive reliance on the subject premises for his business endeavours.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent, represented by Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sindhwani and his team, asserts the genuine necessity of the subject premises for initiating an IT consultancy firm. They emphasise the respondent’s professional background and intentions to establish a business, underscoring the importance of the subject premises for this purpose. The respondent’s counsel argues that the requirement is bona fide and essential for the respondent’s career aspirations, providing a robust defence against the appellant’s challenge to the eviction proceedings. In response to the appellant’s contention regarding the validity of the partition decree, the respondent’s counsel reaffirms the legitimacy of the settlement reached through mediation. They counter the appellant’s insinuations of manipulation or fraud, citing the court-approved settlement agreement as evidence of the lawful transfer of ownership rights to the subject premises. This argument aims to dispel any doubts surrounding the legality of the partition decree and establish the respondent’s rightful claim to the premises. The respondent’s legal team refutes the appellant’s assertion regarding travel convenience and residency, maintaining the respondent’s need for the subject premises despite potential metro connectivity between Model Town and Noida. They argue that the respondent’s decision to establish his consultancy firm in Model Town is a deliberate choice driven by professional considerations and personal circumstances, which should be respected in the context of the eviction proceedings. Additionally, the respondent’s counsel justifies the selection of the subject premises for the consultancy firm, citing strategic and practical reasons such as proximity to existing business networks and potential client base. They argue that the premises offer distinct advantages for the proposed business venture, reinforcing the respondent’s genuine need for the subject premises and bolstering their defence against the appellant’s challenges.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The case involves a dispute between the petitioner, representing the deceased tenant’s interests, and the respondent, the landlord, regarding the eviction of the petitioner from the subject premises under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The respondent claims ownership of the premises inherited through a partition settlement, intending to utilise them for an IT consultancy firm. After considering the arguments from both sides, the court is tasked with determining the validity of the respondent’s eviction claim and the petitioner’s challenge to it.

The petitioner, through their senior advocate Mr. A.P.S. Ahluwalia, raises several challenges to the respondent’s eviction petition. These challenges primarily focus on disputing the bona fides of the respondent’s requirement for the subject premises. The petitioner argues against the necessity of eviction, citing factors such as the existence of vacant adjacent premises, the respondent’s residency in Noida, and the alleged lack of urgency in initiating the proposed business venture. Additionally, the petitioner contests the validity of the partition settlement, implying collusion and manipulation.

In response, the respondent, represented by Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjeev Sindhwani and his team, presents a robust defence of their eviction claim. They emphasise the genuine need for the subject premises to establish an IT consultancy firm, underscoring the respondent’s professional qualifications and intentions. The respondent’s legal team refutes the petitioner’s challenges, asserting the legality of the partition settlement and the legitimacy of their requirement for the premises, despite the petitioner’s objections regarding travel convenience and alternative accommodations.

The court meticulously examines the arguments presented by both parties, taking into account the legal provisions under the Delhi Rent Control Act and relevant case law. It emphasises the need to balance the rights of landlords and tenants, particularly in cases involving eviction claims under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The court scrutinises the validity of the partition settlement, ultimately affirming its legality and recognizing the respondent’s rightful ownership of the subject premises.

After thorough deliberation, the court upholds the respondent’s eviction petition, dismissing the petitioner’s challenges and affirming the validity of the eviction order. It finds no merit in the petitioner’s contentions regarding the respondent’s requirement for the premises or the legality of the partition settlement. The court’s judgement underscores the respondent’s genuine need for the subject premises and affirms their right to eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, thereby concluding the dispute in favour of the respondent.

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 Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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Delhi HC Dismisses Petition, Validates Eviction Due to Procedural Errors and Bona Fide Requirement

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Case title : Yatti Dawar and Ors. vs. Ashok Kr. Gupta

Case No. RC.REV. 120/2022 & CM APPL.25011/2022.

Dated on: Reserved on May 17, 2024, and pronounced on May 22, 2024.

Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Girish Kathpalia.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Ashok Kr. Gupta owns shop no. 1126/2, Kucha Natwa, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, through a registered sale deed dated 23.08.2007. The shop was rented to Sh. Sunil Dawar, who passed away on 07.04.2018. His legal heirs, including petitioner no.1 (Yatti Dawar) and petitioners no.2-4, continued to occupy the premises. Ashok Kr. Gupta filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming he needed the premises for his unemployed son, Shobhit Gupta, to start a business of readymade ladies garments. He stated the premises were ideally located in a market known for wholesale and retail business of clothes and mentioned no suitable alternate accommodation. Petitioners no.2-4 filed an application under Section 25B(5) seeking leave to contest the eviction but did not provide specific grounds and lacked the required supporting affidavit. The Additional Rent Controller dismissed their application and passed an eviction order against all petitioners since petitioner no.1 did not file any application for leave to contest. Petitioners claimed petitioner no.1 had filed an application for leave to contest, which was allegedly removed from the court record, but this application was identical to the insufficient application of petitioners no.2-4. Petitioners argued the eviction petition was not bona fide, asserting Shobhit Gupta was already engaged in the steel business. The respondent argued that the petitioners’ applications were without merit and reiterated the bona fide need for the premises for Shobhit Gupta’s new business, emphasising no legal restriction on changing business types.

ISSUES

  1. Whether Ashok Kr. Gupta’s claim that he needs the subject premises for his son Shobhit Gupta to start a new business of readymade ladies garments is genuine and constitutes a bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
  2. Whether the applications for leave to contest the eviction filed by petitioners no.2-4 were procedurally adequate, given that they did not specify any grounds for contesting the eviction and lacked the required supporting affidavit.
  3. Whether petitioner no.1’s application for leave to contest was filed and subsequently removed from the court’s record, as claimed by the petitioners, and the implications of this allegation on the eviction proceedings.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
    • Section 14(1)(e): Provides grounds for eviction of a tenant by the landlord. It allows eviction if the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, or for any purpose for which the premises were let out.
    • Section 25B(5): Special procedure for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. This section outlines the procedure for a tenant to seek leave to contest an eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e). The tenant must file an affidavit disclosing the grounds on which they seek to contest the eviction.
    • Section 25B(8): Provides the right to appeal. This section allows a tenant to appeal against an order passed by the Controller under Section 25B.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Mr. Himalaya Gupta, Counsel of the appellant submitted that the case revolves around procedural irregularities and challenges to the bona fide requirement claimed by the respondent. Firstly, the appellant contends that there was a procedural error in the filing of the application for leave to contest. They argue that the application submitted by petitioners no.2-4 lacked specific grounds for contesting the eviction and did not include the necessary supporting affidavit as required by law. However, they assert that this deficiency stemmed from the negligence of their legal representative rather than any intentional oversight on their part. Additionally, the appellant raises the issue of a missing application allegedly filed by petitioner no.1 for leave to contest. They claim that despite filing the application, it was somehow removed from the court’s record. The appellant suggests that this missing application, if considered, could potentially provide additional grounds for contesting the eviction.

Furthermore, the appellant questions the bona fide requirement asserted by the respondent for the premises in question. They argue that the respondent’s claim that the premises are needed for his son, Shobhit Gupta, to start a new business of readymade ladies garments lacks credibility. Specifically, the appellant points out that Shobhit Gupta is already engaged in the steel business, which raises doubts about the genuine need for the premises for a new business venture. Additionally, the appellant implies that the eviction petition may have been filed opportunistically following the death of the original tenant, Sh. Sunil Dawar. They suggest that the respondent’s claim of a bona fide requirement may be driven by ulterior motives rather than a genuine necessity for the premises. These contentions collectively form the basis of the appellant’s argument against the eviction proceedings initiated by the respondent and seek a reconsideration of the eviction order passed by the Additional Rent Controller.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent, represented by Mr. Nitin Ahlawat and Mr. Kshitiz Ahlawat, Advocates, presents several contentions in response to the appellant’s claims. Firstly, they assert that the applications for leave to contest the eviction filed by petitioners no.2-4 were without merit, a point even acknowledged by the appellant’s counsel. The respondent argues that these applications lacked specific grounds for contesting the eviction and did not adhere to the procedural requirements outlined by law. Therefore, they contend that no further consideration is warranted regarding the procedural adequacy of these applications.

Regarding the missing application allegedly filed by petitioner no.1 for leave to contest, the respondent dismisses the appellant’s claim, arguing that there is no substantive evidence to support this assertion. They suggest that the alleged removal of the application from the court’s record lacks credibility and appears to be a diversionary tactic by the appellant. Thus, they maintain that the missing application should not factor into the court’s decision-making process.

Moreover, the respondent defends their claim of a bona fide requirement for the premises. They emphasise that the premises are genuinely needed for their son, Shobhit Gupta, to establish a new business of readymade ladies garments. They refute the appellant’s argument regarding Shobhit Gupta’s existing engagement in the steel business, asserting that there is no legal restriction preventing individuals from diversifying their business interests. Therefore, they assert that the respondent’s claim of a bona fide requirement remains valid and should be upheld by the court.

In conclusion, the respondent reaffirms the legitimacy of their eviction petition and the bona fide requirement asserted therein. They argue that the appellant’s contentions regarding procedural irregularities and the bona fide requirement lack merit and should not affect the outcome of the case.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

 After considering the arguments presented by both parties, the court proceeded with its analysis of the case. The court first addressed the procedural irregularities regarding the applications for leave to contest the eviction filed by the appellants. It noted that these applications, filed by petitioners no.2-4, lacked specific grounds for contesting the eviction and did not include the required supporting affidavit. The court acknowledged the appellant’s claim that these deficiencies were due to the negligence of their legal representative. However, it emphasised that procedural requirements must be adhered to, and the absence of grounds for contesting the eviction hindered the court’s ability to grant leave to contest.

Regarding the alleged missing application filed by petitioner no.1 for leave to contest, the court found the appellant’s claim lacking substantive evidence. It deemed the alleged removal of the application from the court’s record as not credible, stating that there was no material to support this assertion. Therefore, the court did not consider the missing application as a valid factor in its decision-making process.

Moving on to the respondent’s claim of a bona fide requirement for the premises, the court analysed the circumstances presented. It observed that the respondent genuinely required the premises for their son, Shobhit Gupta, to establish a new business of readymade ladies garments. Despite the appellant’s argument regarding Shobhit Gupta’s existing engagement in the steel business, the court noted that there was no legal impediment preventing individuals from diversifying their business interests. Thus, the court found the respondent’s claim of a bona fide requirement to be valid and upheld.

Based on its analysis of the case, the court concluded that the procedural irregularities in the appellant’s applications for leave to contest and the lack of substantive evidence regarding the missing application for leave to contest filed by petitioner no.1 did not warrant a reconsideration of the eviction order. Additionally, the court found the respondent’s claim of a bona fide requirement for the premises to be genuine and upheld it. Therefore, the court upheld the impugned order and dismissed the appellant’s petition, along with any pending applications.

The court upheld the impugned order passed by the Additional Rent Controller and dismissed the appellant’s petition, along with any pending applications. The judgement was pronounced on May 22, 2024.

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 Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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Delhi HC rules abatement upon plaintiff’s death on religious accomodation dispute

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Case title: Diocese of Delhi-CNI vs. Mr. Deepak Martin Caleb

Case No. C.R.P 46/2022

Dated on: 21st May, 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharmesh Sharma

FACTS OF THE CASE

The deceased plaintiff was appointed as a resident priest by the defendant No. 1 (referred to as petitioner) to perform religious services and duties in the Church. The petitioner allowed the deceased to reside in accommodation on the ground floor of the Church premises. Despite initially intending to retire in March 2001, the deceased’s services were extended at the request of the petitioner on an ad hoc basis until 2005.Claiming a crisis in the Church’s affairs, the deceased was given further extensions by defendant No. 3 to continue performing religious services and retain the accommodation until May 14, 2018.However, in May 2018, the petitioner informed the deceased that his services were no longer required, and a new Presbyter in-charge had been appointed. Subsequently, defendant No. 2 instructed the deceased to vacate the premises, declining his request for alternative accommodation in November 2018.In response, the deceased instituted a suit challenging the authority of the petitioner and defendant No. 2, alleging harassment and asserting his right to continue residing in the accommodation inside the Church. The deceased’s suit claimed relief against the termination of his services and challenged the authority of the defendants to manage the Church’s affairs, particularly regarding his accommodation rights. The petitioner argued that the deceased’s rights were personal and did not survive his death. They contended that the accommodation was provided as an incidental benefit for the performance of religious duties and that the right to retain it ended with the termination of services and the plaintiff’s death. The court noted that the deceased’s claim to the accommodation was not based on tenancy rights but on possessory rights. It emphasized that no hereditary rights were created, and the deceased’s successor could not continue the suit as a legal heir. Referencing legal precedents, including a case involving the appointment of priests in Hindu temples, the court concluded that the deceased’s personal rights terminated with his death and did not devolve onto his legal representatives. Additionally, the court addressed arguments made by the respondent’s counsel regarding a Supreme Court order granting temporary relief but clarified that it did not determine the survival of legal rights in the pending suit. After analyzing the arguments and legal principles, the court concluded that the deceased’s suit abated upon his death, and the previous order allowing its continuation was set aside. The court instructed that a copy of its order be sent to the trial court for information and compliance, effectively ending the proceedings related to the deceased’s suit.

ISSUES

  1.  Whether the deceased plaintiff’s legal rights continue beyond his death and can be pursued by his legal representatives.
  2. Examining the validity of the defendants’ actions in terminating the deceased’s services and demanding his eviction from the accommodation.
  3. Determining whether the deceased’s rights were personal and extinguished upon his death or if they could be inherited or transferred to his legal representatives.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Order 22, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC): This rule deals with the abatement of a suit in case of the death of a plaintiff or defendant and specifies the circumstances under which the suit may or may not abate.
  2. Principle of “actio personalis moritur cum persona”: This Latin maxim means “a personal action dies with the person.” It applies to certain actions ex delicto, such as defamation or personal injury, where the right to sue extinguishes upon the death of the person.
  3. Legal Precedents: Referring to past judgments like Puran Singh v. State of Punjab and Girja Nandini v. Bijendra Narain, which establishes when the right to sue survives the death of a party and when it does not.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant, representing the deceased plaintiff, contends that the deceased was initially appointed as a resident priest by the petitioner/defendant No.1. It is acknowledged that the petitioner allowed the deceased to reside in the accommodation on the church premises. Despite the acknowledgment of retirement, the deceased’s services were extended multiple times, indicating an ongoing engagement with the church. The appellant argues that the deceased, in his capacity as a resident priest, faced harassment from the defendants, particularly from petitioner/defendant No.1 and defendant No.2. The deceased challenged the authority of these defendants not only for the non-extension of his tenure but also for alleged harassment. The contention revolves around the termination of his services, which the deceased perceived as unlawful and unjustified. Another key contention is regarding the nature of the legal rights asserted by the deceased. The appellant argues that the rights claimed by the deceased, including the right to continue residing in the accommodation provided by the church, were personal in nature and not heritable. This implies that these rights did not transfer to the appellant upon the deceased’s death.The appellant further contends that the respondent, as the son of the deceased, does not inherit any rights to become a religious priest of the church or challenge the authority of the defendants. The appellant emphasises that the accommodation provided to the deceased was for the sole purpose of facilitating his religious duties and did not confer any hereditary rights upon his heirs. Additionally, the appellant distinguishes between possessory rights and hereditary rights. While acknowledging that the respondent seeks to protect possessory rights in the premises, the appellant asserts that no hereditary rights were created in favour of the respondent. Therefore, the appellant suggests that any claim to the premises should be pursued separately from the deceased’s lawsuit. These contentions collectively form the appellant’s argument against the respondent’s claim and serve as the basis for challenging the lower court’s decision.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent contends that the deceased plaintiff challenged the authority of the petitioner/defendant No.1 and defendant No.2. This challenge is not solely based on the termination of his services but also involves allegations of harassment at the instance of defendants No.1 and 2. The respondent argues that such actions justify his right to maintain the suit and seek relief from the court. The respondent asserts that the deceased plaintiff was appointed as a religious priest in the Church in his individual and personal capacity by petitioner/defendant No.1. Moreover, he was allotted and allowed to retain accommodation in the suit premises inside the church premises solely to facilitate him in discharging religious duties. Therefore, the respondent argues that the plaintiff’s legal rights were personal to him and not heritable, which justifies his right to continue the suit.The respondent further contends that even if an extension was granted to the deceased plaintiff, the legal right, if any, available to him was a personal right of action that died with his death and was not transferable or heritable. Therefore, the respondent argues that the relief claimed by the deceased plaintiff challenging the authority of the petitioner/defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 essentially died with him and cannot be pursued further by his successor or legal heir.  The respondent emphasises that no hereditary rights are created in favour of the respondent to continue with the suit filed by the deceased plaintiff as his successor or legal heir. The respondent refers to an analogy regarding the right of a pujari to provide services in Hindu temples to support this argument, suggesting that continuity of service does not confer an independent right upon successors. These contentions form the basis of the respondent’s argument in the case, asserting the legitimacy of maintaining the suit despite the death of the original plaintiff.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court’s analysis and judgement in the case revolve around interpreting the legal rights and obligations concerning the deceased plaintiff’s tenure as a religious priest in the Church and his right to retain accommodation on the church premises. 

The court begins by examining whether the legal right to sue survives the death of the plaintiff, as per legal provisions outlined in Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). It acknowledges the principle that a personal action dies with the death of the person, citing the maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona.” However, it notes exceptions where the right to sue survives despite the death of the party, particularly in cases where the relief sought would not be rendered nugatory by the party’s death.

 The court proceeds to analyse the nature of the deceased plaintiff’s rights and tenure as a religious priest in the Church. It observes that the plaintiff’s appointment and accommodation were facilitated by the petitioner/defendant No.1 to enable him to discharge religious duties. The court underscores that the plaintiff’s rights were personal and not heritable, emphasising that the accommodation was provided as an incidental benefit to his role as a priest.

Examining the contentions raised in the suit, the court considers the plaintiff’s challenge to the authority of the petitioner/defendant No.1 and defendant No.2, as well as allegations of harassment. It concludes that the relief sought by the plaintiff challenging his termination and authority essentially died with him, as it was a personal right of action.

Addressing the respondent’s contention that he, as the legal heir of the deceased plaintiff, should be allowed to continue the suit, the court rejects this argument. It emphasizes that no hereditary rights are created in favor of the respondent to pursue the suit, as the deceased plaintiff’s rights were personal and not transferable or heritable.

The court draws parallels with legal precedents related to the appointment of priests in Hindu temples to support its analysis. It highlights that continuity of service does not confer an independent right upon successors, further reinforcing its stance on the non-heritability of the plaintiff’s rights.

 Based on its analysis, the court concludes that the impugned order allowing the respondent’s application under Order 22 Rule 3 of the CPC suffers from patent illegality and constitutes an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. Consequently, the court sets aside the order and declares that the suit filed by the deceased plaintiff abates, meaning it comes to an end and shall not be further proceeded with in the Trial Court.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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Jurisdictional Limits of Magistrates in Restoring Dismissed Complaints: Vakamulla Chandrashekhar & Ors. V. ROC”

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Case Title: VAKAMULLA CHANDRASHEKHAR & ORS. Versus REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES -THROGH ITS DEPUTY REGISTRAR NCT OF DELHI AND HARYANA

Case No: CRL.M.C. 2372/2022 & CRL.M.A. 10023/2022

Decided on: 15th May , 2024

Quorum: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

Facts of the case

Under Sections 447/448 of the Companies Act, 2013, the respondent lodged a complaint, claiming that the accused firm had misappropriated IPO proceeds to several entities rather than using them for the intended uses specified in the prospectus. The Special Judge first rejected the complaint because the respondent did not show up. Following this, the Special Judge granted the complaint’s restoration, acknowledged the offenses, and sent summonses to the petitioners.

Issues

1. Did the Special Judge have the authority to reinstate the dismissed complaint?

 2. Was it lawful for the order to call the petitioners for violations of the Companies Act?

 3. Whether the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure’s provisions were appropriately construed and utilized in this instance?

Legal Provisions

The Companies Act of 2013’s Sections 447 and 448 deal with offenses including the diversion of IPO profits. The High Court’s inherent authority to halt proceedings is outlined in Section 482 of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 362 of the 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure grants a judge the authority to rectify mathematical or clerical errors.

 Appellant Contentions

The Code of Criminal Procedure contains no clause allowing a magistrate to review or recall an order, hence the Special Judge lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the dismissed complaint. The complaint was dismissed, rendering the Special Judge functus officio, which prevented the restoration or summons from being issued. The Supreme Court was relied upon ruling in Maj. Gen. A.S. Gauraya v. S.N. Thakur, which highlighted that, in accordance with Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., only the High Court possesses inherent authority.

Respondent Contentions

Since the judgment of dismissal lacked merit, the Special Judge’s reinstatement of the complaint was appropriate. The respondent said that the Special Judge was empowered to recall the dismissing judgment since Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. permits corrections of errors in orders.

 Court Analysis and Judgement

The High Court ruled that because the Cr.P.C. does not allow magistrates to review or recall their orders, the Special Judge lacked power to reinstate the rejected case. The decree directing the petitioners to be summoned was set aside, highlighting the restrictions on the Special Judge’s authority following the complaint’s rejection. The respondent may pursue appropriate legal remedies to get the complaint restored in compliance with the law, the Court further stated. This case emphasizes how crucial it is to comprehend the extent of judicial authority and how laws should be correctly applied in criminal cases.

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Judgement Analysis Written by – K.Immey Grace

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