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1 May

Delhi High Court Upholds Claim of Retired Personnel; validates Eviction Notice based on seniority.

Prime Legal

Blog #delhi, #Landlord, #seniority, #Tenant, delhi high court, eviction notice, nri

Case Name: Satpal Singh Sarna & Ors v. Satya Prakash Bansal

Case No.: RC.REV. 626/2019

Dated: April 29, 2024

Quorum: Justice Girish Kathpalia

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In their eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, the petitioners assert that they are the owners of the ground floor shops No. 3 and 4, which are part of a larger premises. They filed this petition against their tenant, the respondent, on the grounds that the subject premises were previously owned by their mother, Smt. Kulwant Kaur, who bequeathed them to them after her death, and that the petitioners became the owners of the subject premises upon the probate of that Will. Rented to the petitioners until December 2015, the respondent acknowledged them as landlords. The subject premises have been closed and unoccupied for the past five years because the respondent moved his business to another location around five years ago.

The petitioner No. 1 resides in and operates his business out of the remaining larger premises along with his wife and two married sons. The petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 with their spouses and kids live in Canada and continue to travel to India, but they struggle to find enough room to stay at the larger premises mentioned above. The petitioners are the owners of the aforementioned larger premises, which consist of five stores, two of which are used as godowns by the sons of petitioner No. 1 who operate under the names Sunny Shoe Point and Sunny Punjabi Juti.

That of the three rooms on the ground floor of the Girish Kathpalia digitally signed by Girish Kathpalia, the aforementioned larger premises are divided into two rooms occupied by one son of petitioner No. 1, one room serving as a guestroom, and two rooms and a store on the first floor occupied by the other son of petitioner No. 1. Because the larger premises are in a dilapidated state and petitioners No. 2 and 3 intend to return to India in order to marry and settle their children here, they have a legitimate need for the subject premises and do not currently have any reasonably suitable alternative accommodation available to them. As a result, they want to reconstruct the larger premises in accordance with their needs.

Once permission to contest the proceedings was granted, the respondent/tenant filed a written statement acknowledging a legal relationship of tenancy with the petitioners. However, the statement further pleaded that the requirement set up by the petitioners is not legitimate because the mother of the petitioners had previously filed an eviction petition under Section 14 of the Act, which was dismissed.

While it is unknown when and for how long the petitioners and their families, who live in Canada, want to visit India, it is possible that they have already been there. Following the property’s eviction, the petitioners want to relet the subject space at a higher rent. Petitioner No. 1 has been engaging in a range of activities with the intention of intimidating the respondent in an attempt to have the subject premises removed.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:

The petitioners’ attorney argued that there is no legal basis for the contested order. Invoking the intervention of this court, learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that the impugned decree exhibits perversity on its face.

Invoking the intervention of this court, learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that the impugned decree exhibits perversity on its face. Expert legal representation for the petitioners contended that the petitioners’ genuine want to return home at this advanced age is a prerequisite for the petition to be successful. Knowledgeable counsel for the petitioners relied on the ruling of a coordinate bench of this court in a historic case to bolster his claims.

It was argued that insufficient information had been presented to demonstrate that Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were ending their business ventures, jobs, or commercial activities in Canada or that they intended to sell their Canadian assets in order to relocate permanently to India. The experienced Rent Controller determined that there was no need to review the other provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act after concluding that the petitioners had not demonstrated that they are a bona fide requirement of the subject premises.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:

The respondent’s experienced counsel contended that this court cannot reappreciate evidence and that its authority to intervene in proceedings under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act is quite restricted. The reply contended that the petitioners had neglected to provide the Aadhar cards of the petitioners’ children on file, which would have verified their adult age. A knowledgeable attorney representing the respondent further contended that the petitioners’ requirements aren’t legitimate because they’ve been attempting to kick the respondent out in a number of ways.

The respondent’s learned counsel contended that this court cannot reappreciate evidence and that its authority to meddle in proceedings under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act is quite limited. The respondent contended that the petitioners had neglected to provide documentation of the Aadhar cards of the petitioners’ children, which would have demonstrated their adult age.

The respondent argued that the petitioners had failed to produce proof of the petitioners’ children’s Aadhar cards, which would have proved their adult age. The respondent’s learned counsel further contended that the requirements set forth by the petitioners are not legitimate because they have been attempting to evict the respondent through a variety of tactics.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act: Tenant eviction is covered under this clause. It gives landlords the right to file for eviction if they legitimately need the space for themselves or any members of their family. This clause was triggered by the petitioners’ contention that they required the subject premises for their own purposes.
Proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act: A review request against the Rent Controller’s ruling is permitted by this clause. Through this revision petition, the petitioners contested the way their eviction petition was dismissed.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT:

The court noted that on the directions of his client GIRISH KATHPALIA, learned counsel for the respondent addressed a particular question during the closing arguments based on the competing pleadings. He strongly asserted in a digitally signed document that was present in the courtroom that the respondent is still using the subject premises for his business. However, after the petitioners’ skilled counsel asked and the court granted their request to name a Local Commissioner to find out the facts, the respondent and his attorney made a U-turn and acknowledged that the respondent had not been using the subject premises for a number of years.

The court, after determining the appropriate level of leverage to offer a tenant is contingent upon this factor. It was typical for the tenant to keep the leased property locked because they were unable or unwilling to utilise it, hoping to intimidate the landlord into accepting an offer of money in exchange for leaving. It was necessary to stop these activities since they seriously undermine the goals of the rent control laws.

The court noted that there is no question about the fact that petitioner No. 1 and his family live in India, while the other petitioners and their families live abroad. Furthermore, there is no substantial disagreement, as demonstrated by the pleadings and documentation, about the fact that the petitioners are at least sixty years old and their children are mature adults. The petitioners’ want to go back home and live out the remainder of their lives in their country of origin cannot be viewed suspiciously in these circumstances.

The court ruled that it is common for Indians who live overseas to experience a deep yearning to pass away in their birthplace. It is impossible to reduce such a powerful emotional need to a mere whim or common want. In a case heard by the entire bench of this court, it was acknowledged that a landlord’s desire to live out his final years in his own home was a natural aspiration. This is especially true when the tenant withholds information that would contraindicate their desire.

In summary, the court found no reason to doubt the veracity of the petitioners’ stated desire to return home and settle down here after their children are married here in their birth country due to the complete lack of specific pleadings from the respondent, the complete lack of affirmative evidence, and the lack of a productive cross-examination. The petitioners’ plan to re-construct the larger premises is justified by the fact that, given the size of their families and the growing families of their grown children, the space available to them in the said premises would undoubtedly be insufficient. As a result, their requirement of the subject premises is certainly bonafide.

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Judgment reviewed by Riddhi S Bhora.

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25 Mar

Delhi Excise Policy Case: AAP Leaders involvement in Liquor Scam

Prime Legal

Articles #AAP leaders, #arrest, #BRS leader Kavitha, #CBI, #delhi, #Delhi Excise Policy, #Delhi HC, #ED, #Kejiriwal, #Money Laundering, #scam, #Sisodia

Introduction

The controversial Delhi Excise Policy 2021-22 was introduced on November 17, 2021 with an aim to revolutionize the liquor retail landscape in the capital. Its objectives were to maximize revenue for the state, combat liquor mafia and black marketing, improve the consumer experience and ensure equitable distribution of liquor vends. It marked the withdrawal of the government from the business of selling liquor and allowed only private operators to run the liquor shops. The government also made the rules flexible for licensees, such as allowing them to offer discounts and set their own prices instead of selling on MRP fixed by the government. These reforms increased the Government’s revenue by 27 percent, generating around Rs. 8900 crore.

Under the new policy, the city was divided into 32 zones inviting firms to bid on the zones. Instead of individual licences, bidding was done zone-by-zone. Each municipal ward would have 2-3 vends. Also, licenses for 849 retail vends were issued through open bidding by the Excise department as opposed to 475 liquors shops run by the four government agencies, and 389 by the private operators under the old liquor policy.

For the first time, shops were allowed to offer discounts to retail customers, which attracted crowds and reduced the number of dry days from 21 to 3. The new policy also had a provision for home delivery of liquor. It even proposed lowering the drinking age from 25 to 21. It also suggested the opening of shops till 3 am. However, these were not implemented.

However, after a series of vehement opposition and allegations of procedural irregularities the Government of Delhi withdrew the policy on August 1st, 2022 and reverted to the old excise regime.

Report of Chief Secretary

The Chief Secretary found procedural lapses and irregularities in the new policy and submitted a report on the same to the Lieutenant Governor and Chief Minister of Delhi. According to the report, Manish Sisodia, Head of the Excise Department was accused of making changes to the excise policy without the approval of the L-G, such as allowing a waiver of Rs 144.36 crore on the tendered licence fee. Further, the arbitrary and unilateral decisions taken by then Minister resulted in financial losses to the exchequer, estimated at more than Rs 580 crore.

The law governing this subject states that if any changes are made to a policy that has already been implemented, the excise department needs to place them before the cabinet, and forward it to the L-G for final approval. However, the changes made by the Deputy CM did not comply with these mandates. Therefore, the policy implemented without the approval of the cabinet and L-G was illegal, and violative of the Delhi Excise Rules, 2010 and the Transaction of Business Rules, 1993.

Timeline of Events leading to the Arrest of AAP leaders

July 8, 2022: Chief Secretary submits report to L-G office alleging procedural lapses in excise policy implementation. L-G writes to MHA recommending CBI inquiry in matter.

July 30: Sisodia says Government to revert to old excise policy

Aug 6: L-G nod to suspend ex-excise commissioner, IAS officer Arava Gopi Krishna, Dy Commissioner Anand Tiwari

Aug 17: CBI files FIR

Aug 19: CBI Raids Deputy Chief Minister Manish Sisodia and Others on Delhi LG’s Recommendation, followed by Enforcement Directorate’s money laundering probe on liquor policy.

Sept 28 : CBI arrests Vijay Nair, the Aam Aadmi Party’s Chief of Communications.

Oct 10: CBI arrests Abhishek Boinpally

Nov 14: ED arrests Boinpally and Nair

Nov 24: CBI files Cargesheet; names 7

November 26: ED files first prosecution complaint/ chargesheet. Alleges excise policy “formulated with deliberate loopholes”, which “promoted cartel formations through back door” to benefit AAP leaders

January 6, 2023: ED files second prosecution com- plaint/supplementary chargesheet claiming CM allegedly spoke to one of main accused, Sameer Mahendru, asked him to continue working with co-accused Nair who he referred to as “his boy”.

January 14: CBI visits Sisodia’s office. He calls it “raid”, CBI denies

February 19: Sisodia says CBI called him for questioning again. Seeks week’s time

February 26: Sisodia arrested

March 2023: The Enforcement Directorate detains Manish Sisodia, the former deputy chief minister of Delhi.

October: AAP Leader Sanjay Singh is arrested by the Enforcement Directorate, and the first summons is issued to Delhi CM Arvind Kejriwal in connection with the liquor policy fraud.

November 2023: On November 2, Kejriwal flies to Singrauli, Madhya Pradesh, to address a political rally instead of responding to the ED’s first summons.

December 2023: Kejriwal ignores the second summons, saying it is ‘illegal and politically motivated’. The ED sends Kejriwal a third summons to appear for questioning on January 3.

January 2024: Kejriwal misses the third summons for alleged conspiracy by the Central government. In the same month, the ED issues a fourth summons to the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) convenor, asking him to appear for questioning on January 18. Kejriwal responds to the Enforcement Directorate’s summons to him, asking the agency why notices were issued. The ED follows up by issuing its fifth summons.

February 2024: For the fifth time, Kejriwal ignores the Enforcement Directorate’s summons. An ED court filing from February said that the AAP politician was not following the summons. Kejriwal was granted a one-day reprieve from making a personal appearance by a Delhi court in February.

March 2024: In response to two allegations from the ED against Kejriwal for allegedly ignoring its summonses in the case, a sessions judge grants him bail.

Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal files a petition with the Delhi High Court challenging ED summonses. He informed the Delhi High Court that he will not appear before the Enforcement Directorate due to a “clear intent” to arrest him during the upcoming elections.

The Delhi High Court refused to provide Kejriwal any protection from coercive action. Consequently, Kejriwal petitioned before the Supreme Court for protection against any coercive action by the ED.

Therefore, on account of ignoring nine summonses issued by the agency for questioning, the ED arrests Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal.

Matter referred to CBI

The report of the Chief Secretary was referred to the CBI, which subsequently, led to the arrest of the then Delhi Deputy CM Manish Sisodia. 14 members belonging to AAP party were also made accused in its FIR.

Enforcement Directorate role in the case

Two cases, one by CBI and one on alleged money laundering being investigated by ED, have been registered in relation to the excise policy. The ED told the court that the alleged proceeds of crime amounted to more than Rs 292 crore, and that it was necessary to establish the modus operandi.

Manish Sisodia arrested in February 2023

AAP leader Sisodia has been under judicial custody since February 26 last year, after he was arrested by the CBI, which is also probing the “procedural lapses” in the policy execution. Sisodia is alleged to have “destroyed evidence” by changing his phone frequently, and the profit margin for wholesalers has been changed from 5 per cent to 12 per cent, among other accusations.

The case investigation began two months after Delhi LG VK Saxena assumed office in May 2022. He recommended a CBI probe into the malafide activities around the repealed policy.

BRS leader K Kavitha arrested on March 15

The Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) leader K Kavitha also approached the Supreme Court over a plea against her arrest in the same probe. However, the court refused to take up her petition and asked her to approach the trial court first. Kavitha is alleged to have “plotted” with Kejriwal and jailed former Delhi deputy CM Manish Sisodia to get “favours” in excise policy. The agency claims that she is linked to a “south group” which paid about Rs 100 crore to AAP for skewing the policy in their favour.

Kejriwal arrested on March 21^st 2023

The Chief Minister filed a challenged his arrest before the Supreme Court. But, when the Court directed to try the case first before the lower courts in the similar matter involving Kavitha, the Minister withdrew his suit and contested before the High Court. A fresh plea in HC against ED, has been filed seeking protection from any coercive action by the ED.

References

10 Nov

Doctrine Of Forum Conveniens Is To Be Invoked To Determine The Most Appropriate Forum For Adjudication Of A Dispute: High Court Of Delhi

Prime Legal

Uncategorized #CBSE, #delhi, #law, #Legal News, #Legal Report

Title: Riddhima Singh V Central Board Of Secondary Education & Ors.

Citation: LPA 729/2023

Coram: Hon’ble The Chief Justice And Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Decided On: 01.11.2023

Introduction:

The present LPA arises out of judgement dated 12.09.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No. 8383/2023 whereby the Ld. Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the Appellant herein on grounds of forum non-conveniens without expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter.

Facts:

Appellant was a student in Respondent School (the „Respondent School‟). However, on 02.04.2018, the Appellant‟s father received a message from the Respondent School that due to non-payment of fees for the academic year 2017-2018, the Appellant was debarred from attending the Respondent School. Being aggrieved, the Appellant preferred W.P.(C) 6007/2019 (the „First Writ Petition‟) before this Court seeking issuance of directions against Respondent No. 1 („CBSE‟) to permit the Appellant to appear for Class X and Class XII examinations. During the pendency of the aforenoted writ proceedings, this Court, through interlocutory orders, directed the Respondent School to readmit the Appellant and directed the school to conduct Grade VII and Grade VIII examinations for the benefit of the Appellant. Both the examinations were conducted by the Respondent School and was cleared by the Appellant. It is pertinent to note that the Grade VIII examinations were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Vide judgement dated 04.06.2021, the First Writ Petition was dismissed by the Ld. Single Judge on grounds that this Court was not the most appropriate forum to adjudicate the dispute. The Court considered that the Appellant was a resident of Uttar Pradesh and that the Respondent School was also located in Uttar Pradesh. As the grievances of the Appellant primarily pertained to the Respondent School, the Court held that the mere inclusion of CBSE as a respondent was not sufficient to enable this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Aggrieved the Appellant preferred a review petition against this judgement which was also dismissed with costs of INR 30,000 imposed on the Appellant.

Subsequent to the events of the First Writ Petition, the Appellant preferred the underlying writ petition seeking compensation from CBSE for alleged “intentional harassment, mental trauma of holding back the Petitioner in Class VII for two academic years in violation of RTE Act.” Without adjudicating on the merits of the matter, the Ld. Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of non-conveniens, noting that the Appellant has attempted to found territorial jurisdiction in Delhi merely because CBSE is headquartered in Delhi.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that the Ld. Single Judge erred in not considering that Clause 18.3.2 of the CBSE Affiliation Bye-Laws explicitly states that the legal jurisdiction for suits filed against the CBSE shall be the Union Territory of Delhi.

Court’s Analysis and Judgement:

The principle emerging from Shristi Udaipur is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In essence, the basis of the Appellant‟s claim for compensation is the loss of an academic year due a delay in examinations for Grade VIII. As the responsibility for conducting the examinations fell on the Respondent School, it is plain that the most vital part of the cause of action arose in Uttar Pradesh, where the Respondent School is located. Moreover, it must also be noted that the Appellant is a resident of Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, on a holistic examination of these circumstances, as the Appellant has failed to produce any material establishing that the grievance caused to her is directly attributable to the actions of the CBSE.

doctrine of forum conveniens is invoked to determine the most appropriate forum for adjudication of a dispute and this exercise is undertaken not only for the convenience of the parties but also in the interest of justice. Therefore, this Clause cannot be read in a matter that would permit all cases filed against the CBSE, regardless of the existence of a more appropriate forum, to be adjudicated in the Union Territory of Delhi; the existence of such a clause cannot exempt Courts from invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens especially in cases like the present where no direct actions of the CBSE have been impugned by the Appellant. So the court did not find any eason to interfere with the Impugned Judgement. Accordingly, the present LPA was dismissed.

Written by- Sushant Kumar Sharma

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9 Nov

Throwing On Another Person Any Liquid Or Substance Other Than ‘Acid’ Not An Offence U/S 326B IPC: Delhi High Court

Prime Legal

Blog #acid, #delhi, #law, #LegalPost

Title: Rashmee Kansal v. The State and Others
Citation: W.P.(CRL) 712/2022

Coram: JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL

Introduction:

In a recent ruling, the Delhi High Court provided a crucial clarification regarding interpreting Section 326-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The court emphasised that for an offence to be established under this section, it is essential that a person throws or attempts to throw ‘acid’ on another person. Importantly, the court specified that Section 326-B is exclusively tailored to address acid attacks and does not encompass incidents involving any other liquid or substance. This clarification offers a distinct understanding of the scope and application of Section 326-B, particularly in cases involving the throwing or attempted throwing of harmful substances on individuals.

Facts:

The case involves a respondent accusing her sister-in-law, the petitioner, of throwing a hot liquid at her, which allegedly landed on her right shoulder, blouse, and saree. Justice Amit Bansal, presiding over the matter, highlighted that if the liquid were indeed ‘acid,’ there would likely be external injuries and traces of the acid on the respondent’s body.

The petitioner sought the quashing of the FIR, claiming shared residency on a common property with the respondent. The petitioner argued that the FIR was a tactic to harass her, citing an ongoing property dispute between them. Additionally, it was noted that two complaints had been previously filed against the respondent by other occupants of the property.

In response, the respondent contested the existence of a property dispute and criticised the police investigation. The court considered an FSL report indicating that samples of the liquid substance collected from the property were Hydrochloric acid. However, the court noted that there was no evidence to demonstrate that the substance was thrown directly at the respondent’s body.

Court analysis and judgement:

In this case, the court provided a thorough analysis leading to the decision to quash the FIR. The central point of consideration was Section 326-B of the IPC, which specifies that an offense is established only if a person throws or attempts to throw ‘acid’ on another person and not any other liquid or substance. This legal criterion set the framework for evaluating the allegations.

The court took into account crucial medical evidence, including the discharge summary that indicated no external injury on the respondent at the time of hospital admission. Additionally, the PCR Form recorded the doctor’s statement asserting the absence of acid signs, categorizing it as a case of an old illness. These medical findings played a pivotal role in the court’s determination. Regarding the charge of criminal intimidation, the court observed a lack of substantive allegations in the FIR to substantiate the offense, providing a comprehensive legal analysis.

The legal representation included Mr. Sunil K. Mittal, Mr. Anshul Mittal, Mr. Harshit Vashisht, and Mr. Sarthak Sharma, Advocates for the petitioner, and Mr. Yasir Rauf Ansari, ASC (Crl.) with Mr. Alok Sharma and Mr. Rohan Kumar, Advocates for the respondents. The court, based on its analysis, quashed the FIR, highlighting that the substance thrown was not confirmed to be ‘acid’ and suggested that the allegation stemmed from an ongoing property dispute between the parties. This judgment analysis underscores the court’s meticulous consideration of legal criteria, medical evidence, and the context surrounding the allegations.

Written By: Gauri Joshi

8 Nov

Appellate Court Upholds Appellant’s Business Rights in Arbitration Dispute: High Court of Delhi

Prime Legal

Blog #delhi, #judgement, #law, #LegalPost

Title: HAD FLAVOURS PVT LTD. Vs. DADDY’S HOSPITALITY PVT LTD.

Citation: ARB. A. (COMM.) 29/2023 & IA Nos.12437/2023, 12439/2023

Coram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

Decided on: 06-11-23

Introduction:

The appellant is appealing against an order passed by the Ld. Sole Arbitrator, disposing of an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “A&C Act”). The Ld. Sole Arbitrator was appointed by the court vide order dated 10.02.2023, at the parties’ joint request. While appointing the Ld. Sole Arbitrator, the court directed that the said petition under Section 9 of the A&C Act would be placed before the Ld—sole Arbitrator as an application under Section 17 of the A&C Act.

Facts:

The case involves a Business Transfer Agreement (BTA) dated 29.01.2022 between two parties. The BTA specifies the transfer of a “transferred undertaking” along with certain rights and assets, including the brand “34 Chowringhee Lane.” The purchase consideration for this transfer was detailed, with a lump sum amount to be paid, and the appellant alleged that the respondent violated the BTA by continuing to operate a competing brand.

Disputes between the parties led to legal notices and the purported termination of the BTA by the respondent. The matter was taken to arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and the Sole Arbitrator issued an order addressing various prayers made in the petition under Section 9 of the Act.

The impugned order by the Sole Arbitrator restricted the appellant from creating new franchises or entering into business agreements with third parties for the use of the name/brand “34 Chowringhee Lane.” This restriction aggrieves the appellant.

Court analysis and judgement:

In the judgment the court considered the contentions of both parties and reviewed the impugned order issued by the Sole Arbitrator under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The key points in the judgment are as follows: The Sole Arbitrator had found that after the receipt of the consideration amount, the conduct of the business was recognized as the right of the claimant (appellant), with the respondent’s directors assisting in the business for remuneration. The impugned order also made a prima facie finding that the respondent could not claim a right to interfere with the conduct of the business. The court noted that putting restrictions on the appellant’s right to create new franchises or enter into business agreements with third parties was unwarranted in light of the findings in the impugned order, which recognized the appellant’s right to conduct the business. The appellant contended that such directions were unwarranted, especially considering that the respondent had not filed an independent Section 17 application seeking injunctive orders against the appellant.

The court emphasized that a blanket embargo on creating new franchises or business agreements might harm the business’s value due to market stagnation or share depletion. Such a direction was deemed inappropriate when dealing with the appellant’s Section 17 application in the absence of a similar application from the respondent. The court, therefore, set aside the portion of the impugned order that restricted the appellant from creating new franchises or entering into new business agreements with third parties during the proceedings. However, the court directed that any such actions should be done with the prior approval of the Sole Arbitrator and subject to the terms and rationale being presented to the Sole Arbitrator to safeguard the rights of the respondent. The judgment disposed of the present appeal with these directions, and any pending applications were also disposed of. In summary, the court found that the restrictions placed on the appellant by the impugned order were unwarranted and lifted them. Instead, it required that any such actions be taken with the approval of the Sole Arbitrator and subject to the protection of the respondent’s rights.

Written By: Gauri Joshi

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