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The Delhi HC permitted the writ petition to stand still and the court decided to quash all impugned orders made by the respondent (service tax authority) because it was found to be ultra vires to Sec. 87(b) (i) of the finance act 1994. The bench in the matter of Sanjiv Kumar Mittal vs Deputy Commissioner (TRC), CGST Commissionerate Delhi South & Ors, [W.P. (C) 5590/2020 & CM APPL.20200/2020] was headed by J. Manmohan & J. Sanjeev Narula, who opined that Single director can’t be selectively targeted to make payments in recovery of past dues on behalf of the whole company, it’s against the rule of natural justice.

The petitioner was a former director in the respondent’s (no. 6’s) company & he resigned from this post within a year of his appointment (22^nd august 2014 to 8^th July 2015). The petitioner filed the writ before the honorable Delhi HC challenging the act of the respondent (service tax authority), who initiated several orders selectively targeting only the petitioner for recovery of its tax dues from the company for which they relied upon the finance act of 1994.

The council for the petitioner argued that the directors of the company and company are two separate juristic entities, further the show cause notice was not issued to the petitioner but only to the company and that had no relation or reference to the petitioner in his personal capacity. Contradicting the above view, the council for the respondent argued that the directors of the company possess a vicarious liability for all the acts of the company and can’t take the defense of being in good faith. The court here recalled the judgment of the Bacha F. Guzdar, Bombay vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 74, stated that, “…a company and its directors are separate and distinct juristic entities and this distinction cannot be jettisoned unless there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary or till a case for lifting of the corporate veil is made out.”

The council for respondent referred to Sec. 9AA of the central excise act 1944 to argue that the impugned order is not ultra vires to Sec.87(b)(i) of the finance act 1994. Opposing the above view the petitioner’s counsel argued that Sec. 87(b) (i) of the finance act only provides for a “garnishee order” and not otherwise. The court here supporting the arguments raised by the petitioner’s council states that, “Section 87(b)(i) of the finance act provides for a garnishee order only – i.e. Provides for attachment of funds of an assessee lying with third parties. There is no provision in the finance act making an ex-director, even if having knowledge of affairs of the company, vicariously or jointly liable for the dues of the company.”

The Delhi HC while delivering the relief held that “The present writ petition is allowed without costs and the Demand notices dated 21st May, 2019 (Annexure P-5) as well as 08th November, 2019 (Annexure P-6) and attachment order dated 08th June, 2020 (Annexure P-11) are quashed.” Further the court continued stating that, “Any action taken by the respondents in pursuance to the impugned notices/order and OIO dated 08th August, 2018 against the petitioner are also set aside.”

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With the authority and power to decide comes a big responsibility to decide correctly. Unless the institutions hold such person(s) who have been conferred such authority accountable for their patently arbitrary decision, it is difficult to rein in. The remarkable judgment was given in the matter which was headed by J. Anil Kshetarpal, in the matter of Meena Yadav v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limiter and others [Civil Writ Petition No. 2829 of 2020], where it was observed that the public sector undertakings appreciate gigantic attentiveness while conveying state’s largesse’s. Notwithstanding, when the choices which were taken whenever discovered completely self-assertive and unseemly, at that point the courts are constrained to mention certain objective facts.            

The respondent corporation issued an advertisement for inviting applications for the allotment of retail outlet proposed to be set up at various locations within 1 km from Gopal Dev Chowk on Rewari Narnaul Road NH-11. The petitioner submitted an application under “DC/”B” category along with requisite fee of Rs. 10,000/-. In the same application the details of the land so offered was disclosed. In the draw of lots, the petitioner turned out to be lucky and the same was informed her with a request to remit a sum of Rs.50, 000/- as initial security and submit the required documents. The Land Evaluation committee which was set up by the respondents evaluated the land and the communication of the same was made to the petitioner. It was also informed that her land is ineligible because of a 68 meter median cut. The petitioner pointed that there was no cut present within 100 meters of the site.

The learned counsel appearing for the corporation had defended its action on the ground that on the day of visit, the gap/break/cut in the median was in existence and therefore, the Land Evaluation Committee had no choice but to recommend her disqualification.

The court observed that “Constitution’s vision of justice enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India provides that “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”. Basis structure of the Constitution provide that there shall not be any discrimination between any one including the haves and have not’s. Unless the institutions hold such person(s) who have been conferred such authority accountable for their patently arbitrary and unconscionable decisions, it is becoming difficult to rein in. In the present case, it has been found that the impugned decision taken falls in aforesaid category. The petitioner herein is pitted against wife of a politician who was a Minister in the State Government. This Court leaves it to the respondent oil company to take suitable steps”.

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The High Court of New Delhi declared that the right to change one’s name is a fundamental right and is protected under the Constitution. The single bench consisting of J. Jayant Nath held that the name of an individual is very personal, and she/he must be allowed to express it as they wish, in the case of Rayaan Chawla v. University of Delhi & Anr. [W.P.(C) 6813/2020, CM APPL. Nos. 23586/2020 & 26340/2020].

The petitioner, a 20 year old student of Hindu College (affiliated to respondent), pursuing his 3^rd year in the course of B.A.(Hons.) Philosophy was seeking for changing his name. Since his parents got divorced, having no constructive relationship with his father, the petitioner wanted to change his name from ‘Rayaan Singh’ to ‘Rayaan Chawla’, which is his mother’s maiden name. To give effect to this change, he published a declaration in two leading national dailies, effected a notice under the Gazette of India and also applied for an amendment in his Aadhar Card, declaring in all that he has changed his name. Rayaan requested the respondent for the change of name in all college records to which the respondent directed him to comply with a specific notification. Though having complied with the almost all of the conditions, a certain condition was that it was mandatory for the students seeking change of name to get their name changed in their school records first, that is, from CBSE/State Board.

Hence, the writ petition was filed wherein the petitioner argued that he should be allowed to change his name without him being expected to change is names in the previous records since the task was impossible. The respondent, relying on Tarachand Soni v. University of Delhi [W.P.(C) 1694/2019], argued that since the petitioner’s parents got divorced in 2015, he had enough time to change his name previously, also, that not adhering to this particular condition would violate the continuity and uniformity required in the educational credentials of a student. 

The HC, relying on Rohitash Institute of Elementary Education v. National Council for Teacher Education, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7532, said that the stand of the respondent is erroneous since the petitioner is being asked to do an impossible task and the maxim “Lex non cogit ad impossibiia” was stated.

The court further stated that “to have a name and to express the same in the manner he wishes, is a part of the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (1) (a) as well as right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be denied that the right to change a name is a protected right and the petitioner would normally be not denied the said right on technical issues”. Further, relying on Abhishek Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2459, the court held that “ the issuance of revised certificates with changed name as sought by the petitioner therein would create a discrepancy and reflect a status which did not exist at the time of issuance of the certificates thereof (i.e. school leaving certificates)”, and hence, the demand of the respondent is a misplaced one.

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The government has officially declared COVID 19 as a disaster under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and this has put the steps taken against the virus by the government under heavy scrutiny. A concerned citizen approached the Supreme Court by the way of a writ petition contending the steps taken against the spread of the COVID 19 are violative of the Right to Health under Article 21 of the constitution in the matter of Gurusimran Singh Narula V Union Of India & Anr, [Writ Petition (C) NO.560 OF 2020].

The petitioner argued that the spraying or fumigation of any kind of chemical disinfectants on human beings which was being done rampantly in various public places was not protecting against the virus and on the other hand was counterproductive and dangerous to human health without the approval of the relevant ministry is violative of Article 21. The Ultra Violet(UV) rays are being used on human body and various edible items like fruits and vegetables to protect from the virus which is again futile and dangerous. The petition was filed making the Ministry of Health the respondents.

The respondent contended that under Section 10 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, the National Executive Committee is empowered to give directions regarding measures to be taken by the concerned ministry and departments of the Government, State Governments and State Authorities in response to the threatening situation or disaster. To this, the respondent argued that it was the duty of the Ministry of Health to implement guidelines issues against use of such dangerous practices to protect the health of its citizens instead of leaving scope for practices like these.

The Supreme Court in its single bench consisting of Justice Ashok Bhushan held, “States are taking all measures to contain the pandemic and all mitigating steps but the facts which have been brought on record in this writ petition indicate that in the present case, something more was required to be done by respondent No.1 apart from issuing advisory that use of disinfectant on human body is not recommended. When public authorities/ organizations were using disinfectants both chemical/organic on the human body and there are various studies to the effect that it may be harmful to the health and the body. Some more actions were required to remove the cloud of uncertainty and to regulate the use even if it was to either prevent such use or regulate the use so that health of citizens is amply protected.

The respondent No.1 may consider and issue necessary directions in exercise of powers vested in it under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, regarding ban/Regulation on the usage of disinfection tunnels involving spraying or fumigation of chemical/organic disinfectants and UV rays for the human beings”.

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The Supreme Court sentenced the convict to 25 years of rigorous life imprisonment while allowing his appeal to commute death sentence, as ordered previously by the High Court and Trial Court. The bench consisting of J. Uday Umesh Lalit, J. Indu Malhotra and J. Krishna Murari, observed that the standards to grant death sentences are much higher than as seen in the present case of Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal Nos. 763-764 of 2016].

According the FIR lodged by the father of the victim who was a girl of two and half years old, Shatrughna Baban Meshram, the accused and the victim’s uncle, after taking her away from the house of the complainant, was found lying in a construction site, next to the victim who was without her pants, her face being bitten and her private parts swollen. When taken to the hospital, the doctor examined and declared her dead. The appellant was charged with rape of a minor and murder under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 376(1)(2)(f)(m), 376A, 302 of the IPC respectively.  

The Trial Court awarded death sentence and rigorous imprisonment for life to the accused, of which the former was subject to confirmation by the High Court. The HC affirmed the orders of the Trial Court saying that this falls under the rarest of rare cases, and relied on Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1980 2 SCC 684] and Machhi Singh and others v. State of Punjab [(1983) 3 SCC 470], while stating that “The appalling cruelty shown by him to the minor girl child is extremely shocking and it gets accentuated, when his age is taken into consideration. It was not committed under any mental stress or emotional disturbance and it is difficult to comprehend that he would not commit such acts and would be reformed or rehabilitated. As the circumstances would graphically depict, he would remain a menace to society, for a defenceless child has become his prey. In our considered opinion, there are no mitigating circumstances”.

In the present appeal, although SC found the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, the court stated that “there was no requisite intent as would bring the case under any of the first three clauses of Section 300 IPC, the offence in the present case does not deserve death penalty”. The SC classified the matter broadly under two heads –

“(A) Whether the circumstantial evidence in the present case is of unimpeachable character in establishing the guilt of the Appellant or leads to an exceptional case.  (B) Whether the evidence on record is so strong and convincing that the option of a sentence lesser than a death penalty is foreclosed.”

The SC held that “The circumstances are clear, consistent and conclusive in nature and are of unimpeachable character in establishing the guilt of the Appellant”, however, the court did not find that the option of a sentence lesser than death penalty was completely foreclosed. Further the court added “ It is true that the sexual assault was very severe and the conduct of the Appellant could be termed as perverse and barbaric. However, a definite pointer in favour of the Appellant is the fact that he did not consciously cause any injury with the intent to extinguish the life of the victim”.

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