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Offences u/s 377 of the Indian Penal Code and POCSO Act are heinous/grave and the FIR for the same cannot be quashed merely on the grounds of compromise between the parties. Delhi High Court gave the judgment in the case of Sunil Raikwar vs. State & others [CRL M.C 186 of 2021] headed over by the bench of Hon’ble Justice Subramonium Prasad.

In the above-cited case, the petitioner had filed a petition for quashing FIR filed against him for the offences charged u/s 377 of IPC and u/s 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO). The respondent in the case had filed the FIR against the petitioner alleging that the petitioner sodomized his 7 years old son. In the further investigation, it was observed that there was enough material evidence to prove the charges against the petitioner under IPC and POCSO Act.

Later on, an instant petition was filed by the parties to quash the FIR against the petitioner on the ground that due to the intervention of elders of the society and friends, the parties have decided to amicably put an end to the disputes and differences. Respondents agreed to let go of the petitioner despite his wrong doings and made an affidavit stating the same.

Referring to the case of State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi & Ors. (2014) 15 SCC 29), High Court bench stated that offences u/s 377 IPC and u/s 4 of POCSO Act are non-compoundable and for quashing the criminal proceedings under said act, scanning of the entire facts must be done to find out the thrust of allegations and the crux of the settlement.

Court held that merely on the facts of compromise between the parties, FIR cannot be quashed for non-compoundable offences. HC contended that even though u/s 482 CrPC gives the power to quash the proceedings for non-compoundable offences but in the present case, such power cannot be exercised because it involves heinous offence and mental depravity which is not private in nature but affects the entire society.

HC stated that “While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases”.

The court observed that in the decision of whether FIR should be quashed in the criminal proceedings or not, that too on the grounds of compromise between the parties, it revolves around the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

While giving the judgment in the case, HC stated that the petitioner had been accused of offences under IPC and POCSO Act and the victim was a 7-year-old child, and the offence alleged on the petitioner is grave and heinous. HC contended that “The POCSO Act was enacted only because sexual offences against children were not being adequately addressed by the existing laws and the purpose of the Act was to provide protection to children from sexual assault and sexual harassment and for safeguarding the interest and well being of children. Permitting such offences to be compromised and quashing FIRs will not secure the interest of justice”.

The court said that the act done with the child shows the mental depravity of the offender which cannot be excused.

Hence, HC gave the judgment that the father of the victim has no right to quash the FIR against the offender because he himself is not the victim and the court has to safeguard and protect the interest of children against the onslaught by bad forces.

Therefore, the petition was dismissed and costs were imposed on both the parties for filing a petition under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of FIR in respect of a heinous offence against a small child on the ground that they entered into a compromise as it will cause serious prejudice to the rights of the petitioner.

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Benefit of deduction under Section 80IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 intends to be extended to a transferee or a contractor who is approved and recognised by the concerned authority and undertakes the work of development of infrastructure facility or only operates or maintains the same. The High Court bench consisting of J. Alok Aradhe  and J. Nataraj Rangaswamy decided upon who could claim deductions under the Income Tax Act in the case of PR. Commissioner of Income Tax – III v. M/S Menzies Aviation [I.T.A. No. 186 of 2016 C/W I.T.A. No. 262 2014].

The assessee is a company engaged in the busines of cargo handling at Bengaluru International Airport Limited (BIAL). The assesssee filed return of income for the Assessment Year 2009-10 declaring a total income of Rs 1,90,19,629/- after claiming deduction under Section 80IA(4)(i) of the Income Tax Act to the extent of Rs. 8,34,79,077/-. The case of the assessee was selected for scrutiny ad notice under Section 143(2) of the Act was issued seeking details regarding the eligibility of the assessee to claim deductions which were thereupon furnished. The Assessing Officer denied that deduction claimed by the assessee stating that BIAL did not fall within the meaning of expression ‘infrastructural facility’ as the assessee is a contractor and not a developer. The assesse filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax whi allowed the same upon which the revenue filed the present appeal.

Learned counsel for revenue argued that to comply with the requirement as contemplated under Section 80IA(4)(i)(b) of the Act, the assessee had to enter into an agreement with the Central Government or a State Government or a local authority or any statutory body  for developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility, but no agreement had been entered into in this case. Further that BIAL is a company whose motive is to make profit and thus, is not an authority. Learned senior counsel for the assessee, placing reliance on the findings recorded by the Commissioner of Income Tax argued that the assessee is not merely a contractor.

The High Court, upon perusal of Section 80IA (4)(i)(b) of the Act stated that “the assessee must be engaged in the business of developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining any infrastructure facility which fulfils the following conditions, namely (a) it is owned by a Company, (b) it has entered into an agreement with Central government or a State Government or a local authority or any statutory body for developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility”. For the first part of the requirement, relying on M/S Flamingo Dutyfree Shops Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [W.P. No. 14215 of 2006], the HC held that BIAL was infact a statutory body under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. For the second part, the court held that cargo handling services were located within the airport and were critical infrastructure facilities and were hence, deemed to be a part of the airport. The court added “every contractor may not be a developer but every developer developing infrastructure facility on behalf of the Government is a contractor” and held that the assessee was eligible to claim deductions and ruled against the revenue.

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In cases when an appointment to the post of a Professor or Lecturer is made in a university and the university has stipulated a certain amount of time as per the act to challenge such appointment, the court cannot entertain a writ challenging such appointment after an unreasonable amount of time has already passed. This was held in the case of Pooran Chand v. Chancellor and Ors. [Civil Appeal Nos 268-269 of 2021] in the Supreme Court of India by Hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhushan.

An advertisement inviting applications for the post of Professors, Associate Professors, Asst. Professors and Lecturers was issued by King George Medical University in the year 2005. The appellant made an application for appointment on the post of Assistant Professor whereas respondent made an application for appointment on the post of Lecturer. Both the appellant and respondent were considered by the same Selection Committee and recommendations of the Selection Committee were approved by Executive Council after which they were appointed. However, the respondent is this case was promoted for the post of Asst. Professor over the appellant on the basis of seniority.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that High Court committed error in entertaining the challenge to the appointment of appellant as the respondent cannot be permitted to challenge the appointment of appellant after a period of more than four years, which was filed in the year 2009. For this It placed reliance on judgment of this Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. R.K. Zalpuri and Ors., (2015) 15 SCC 602 where writ petition was filed challenging the dismissal order after six year.

The counsel appearing for the respondent submitted the appellant, who did not fulfill the eligibility for the post of Assistant Professor, his appointment on the post of Assistant Professor was void and is nullity and the decision of the High Court holding that respondent as not eligible is correct, which needs no interference by this Court.

The court observed that Section 53 of the University Act provides that if any question arises whether any person has been duly elected or appointed, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor, and the decision of the Chancellor thereon shall be final. For this it has also placed reliance on judgment of this Court in Nagendra Chandra and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. (2008) 1 SCC 798 which had a similar set of facts. The Section also contains proviso to the effect that no reference in this Section shall be made more than three months after the date when question could have been raised for the first time. There is an object and purpose for  entertaining any question regarding appointment of member of any authority or body whether any person has been duly appointed within a period of three months. It is in the interest of the University that all doubts regarding appointment of teachers are raised within that time.

It stated that “the appointment of appellant as Assistant Professor, which is approved earlier, was not challenged or questioned by respondent was in accordance with provisions of the Act, 2002. Although, in the writ petition filed at the high court by respondent, he has made a prayer for quashing the appointment order of the appellant as Assistant Professor but we are of the view that the appointment of appellant as Assistant Professor having not been challenged before the Chancellor, he could not have been permitted to challenge the appointment of appellant. Appointment dated 08.08.2005 could not be allowed to be challenged after four years in the writ petition.”

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NGOs shouldn’t use the terms “Central”, “State”, and “National” with their names so as to avoid the confusion that it’s a statutory body run by either Central or State Government. Kerala High Court gave the judgment stating the above-cited reasons in the case of State Environment Protection Council vs. State of Kerala [WP(C).No.2366 of 2015(S)] headed by the bench of Hon’ble Chief Justice S. Manikumar and Justice Shaji P. Chaly.

In the above-cited case, the State Environment Protection Council (Petitioner) of Kannur had filed a writ petition of certiorari to quash the building permit for constructing additional six floors in the building. Writ of Mandamus was also filed against the respondent for illegal construction on the building.

According to the facts, Respondent had given the permit to KP Mohammad Ashraf, MD (Global Village, Kannur) in violation of Rules 34(2) and 31(2) of the Kerala Municipal Building Rules, 1999. As a result, an inquiry had been conducted to revoke the building permit and partial occupancy certificate (which was already given).

In this matter, instead of taking necessary actions, excuses were made by the respondents. In addition to the facts, the petitioner also contended that the illegal construction of 6 storey building on the side of the National Highway would cause a severe threat to the life of the people.

As an effect, an affidavit was filed by the town planner of Kannur stating that building construction had violated the rules of Kerala Municipal Building Rules, 1999 including:

• Open space having a width of 5m was not available [(Violation of Rule 117(1)].
• Only 138 numbers of parking spaces are provided even though 188 numbers are required as per Rule 34 (2).
• No space is provided for loading and unloading as provided under Rule 34(6).

In response to the above affidavit, an application had been made by KP Mohammad Ashraf (Respondent) for regularizing the construction of the building, for which the learned counsel of the petitioner had argued that since the rules were violated, further construction of the building should not commence.

The learned counsel of the respondents had argued that whether such private NGO based in Kannur has the right to file such writ petition challenging the construction of the building.

Arguments were held regarding the name of the petitioner where, it was named as State Environment Protection Council, therefore, giving an impression that it’s been run by the Government or it’s a statutory body. On the contrary, it’s just a private NGO. Court held that, while registering, no private body should give an impression that it’s a statutory body. HC stated that “NGOs or associations or societies, should not give any impression, to the public at large that, it is a statutory body, under any enactment, State / Central, as the case may be. Needless to say that NGOs or associations, or societies, registered under the Kerala Societies Registration Act, 1860, as far as possible, should avoid, using the name ‘Central’ or ‘State’ or ‘National”.

HC stated that regarding the alleged construction of the building and violations, the public shouldn’t be misled by the institution in the exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

HC directed that the NGOs shouldn’t use the word “Central”, “State”, and “National” with their names under the provisions of the Kerala Societies Registration Act, 1860 because it might mislead the public at large resulting in confusions and unauthorized use of the powers.

And therefore, as a result, HC dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner for illegal construction of the building.

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Magistrate court cannot take cognizance of a charge sheet filed by an officer of the Central Crime Branch (CCB) unless the State government declares the CCB as a police station. The Karnataka High Court presided over J. B.A. Patil laid down this ratio in the case of Dr. M.G. Gopal & Ors. Vs. State by Central Police, [Criminal Revision Petition No. 34/2018].

KIMS is one of among several other educational institutions run by Rajya Vakkaligara Sangha. The Complainant alleged that one Gopal misused his power and secured admission for six medical students in the academic year 2014-15. He further stated that for the admission Gopal procured Rs. 30 lakhs. The Complainant stated that in order to secure an admission for his son in the first year MBBS course an amount of Rs. 17 lakhs was paid by him. Later instead of granting admission to the son of the complainant, the authorities admitted the niece of another accused. A case was registered against the Dean and two others for offences of breach of trust and cheating. The Magistrate Court directed to register a case against the Petitioners for offences under Section 406, 477, 420, 120 B and 114 read with Section 34 of the India Penal Code. Aggrieved by the Order the Dean and others filed a criminal revision before the High Court.

The Petitioner submitted that final report by CCB which had not been declared as a police station as contemplated under Section 2(s) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Further it was contended that as there is no report filed by the investigating officer in-charge of the police station, therefore, cognizance taken by the Magistrate is not sustainable in law.

The Court in this case relied on Section 173(2) of CrPC and stated that, “Section 173(2) of the Code contemplates submission of report of investigation. From plain reading of the said provision it is evident that it is the officer in-charge of a police station who is authorized to forward and submit the report in the prescribed form to the jurisdictional Magistrate to take cognizance. The words used in Section 173(2) are “shall forward” which themselves give the meaning that it is the officer in-charge of the police station to file the final report.”

The Court further stated that, “…it is the police officers superior in rank to an officer-in-charge of the police station who have been conferred with such power as that of the officer in-charge of the police station. But in the case on hand, CCB police are not the officers superior in rank to an officer in-charge of the police station in the local jurisdiction. In that light, the contention which has been taken up by the learned SPP-I is not acceptable.”

Lastly the Court concluded that Magistrate failed to keep in view the provision of Section 190(1) & 173(2) of CrPC regarding whether the CCB is having any authority to file the report or not. The Court was of the opinion that, “Though the learned Magistrate has observed that he has perused the statement of the witnesses and material on record, but as discussed above, while taking cognizance if he has not kept in view the provisions of Sections 190(1) and 173(2) of the Code whether the CCB is having any authority to file the report or not, that itself shows that he has not applied his mind properly to the proposition of law and factual matrix of the case on hand. I am of the considered opinion that the order passed by the trial Court is not in accordance with law.”

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