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Court cannot be inclined to quash the FIR in which offense under Section 376 IPC has been leveled against the petitioner, for the reasons that an offense under Section 376 IPC is one against the society and High Courts ought not to use the inherent powers under Section 482. This was held in PAWAN GAUR v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) [CRL.M.C. 981/2021] in the High Court of Delhi by single bench consisting of JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD.

Facts of the case are that FIR was filed for offenses under Sections 376 and 354 IPC against the petitioner. Both parties have entered into amicable settlement. The current petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the FIR .

The Court relied on the judgement of Apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab to discuss the jurisdiction of the court to quash processing under S.482, which deals with the power of court to secure justice and prevent the abuse of court process, the Apex court in the case had observed as under, “In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offenses of mental depravity or offenses like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute.”

The court also referred to the Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr,  wherein it was held that, “Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offenses of mental depravity or offenses like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offenses are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offenses alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offenses committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.”

Considering the precedent and the facts of the case High Court stated that, the judgements of the Supreme Court are binding on the High court under Article 141 of the Constitution. The court further stated that as offenses under S.376 of IPC are against the society, they cannot be quashed by the inherent powers, even in cases where the prosecutrix and the alleged offender have entered into a compromise.

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The High Court has only to see whether the learned ARC has committed any jurisdictional error and has passed order on the basis of material available before it. Court sitting in revisional jurisdiction cannot act as a Court of Appeal. This was held in ASHOK MITTAL v. SUDESH MEHTA [RC.REV.  320/2015] in the High Court of Delhi by single bench consisting of JUSTICE jasmeet SINGH.

Facts of the case are that the respondent had filed an eviction petition that the  tenanted premises were required by the respondent for use and occupation for  running a commercial establishment.The present petition has been filed under Section 25-B (8) of the DRC Act, 1958 challenging of Eviction order passed by learned ARC.

The  Court referred to the order passed by the learned ARC who had after analyzing all the grounds had held that respondent had a better title than the Petitioner with respect to the premises and had relied on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court titled Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. Leela Wati & Ors under which it was observed that an eviction petition against one of the joint tenant is sufficient against all the joint tenants and all joint tenants are bound by the order of the Rent Controller as the joint tenancy is one tenancy and is not a tenancy split into different LRs.

The counsel for petitioner  had  cited the judgment titled Visalakshamma v. Balaji Agencies, to highlight that the jurisdictional error committed by the learned ARC can be interfered with in revision petition.

The Court relied on the judgement of Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd, where in it was held that,“The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court is supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. The satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of the case must be confined to the limited sphere that the order of the Rent Controller is “according to the law”. In other words, the High Court shall scrutinize the records to ascertain whether any illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing the order under Section 25-B. It is not permissible for the High Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such a finding on the materials available.”

Considering the precedent and the facts of the case High Court held that, the learned ARC had considered each of the defenses raised by the Petitioner in detail and had committed no jurisdictional error, thus there is no power with the court for  interference. The order of eviction was on the basis of material available before the ARC, who came to the conclusion that no triable issue had been raised by the petitioner and consequently the eviction order was passed.

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In exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directing, to handover custody to the State of Uttar Pradesh, within a period of two weeks. The honorable judgement was passed by Supreme Court of India in the case of State of U.P. v. Jail Superintendent (Ropar)&Ors [WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.409 OF 2020] by The Hon’ble R. Subhash Reddy.

This Writ Petition is filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, read with Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) by the State of Uttar Pradesh, seeking Writ of Mandamus, seeking appropriate directions, directing the respondent-State of Punjab and the Learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Mohali, 1W.P.(Crl.) No.409 of 2020, etc. State of Punjab, to transfer the criminal proceedings to the Court of Special Judge, Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh and with a further direction to the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 to handover the custody of the accused / 3rd Respondent from Roopnagar Jail, District Ropar, Punjab to District Jail Banda, Uttar Pradesh. It is the case of the petitioner-State that in view of the conspiracy, hatched by the accused / 3rd Respondent, is registered against the 3rd Respondent for the offences punishable under Sections 386 & 506 of the IPC on the file of Police Station Mathaur, District Mohali, State of Punjab.

It was stated that the said case was registered in view of the complaint of Mr. Umang Jindal, C.E.O., Homeland Hights, Mohali, Punjab, where it was alleged that there was a call from Mobile No.6390407709, demanding ransom of Rs.10 crores. As per the information, the accused / 3rd Respondent had called him on 07.01.2019, as such, the case was registered and he was taken into custody in connection with the said case in connection with the said case, he wasn’t arrested. While referring to his political background, it was stated that he has come from a respectable family and in view of political rivalry, there had been several attempts on his life on multiple occasions.

The Writ Petition is allowed in part stating that, “This petition, filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India / Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,The relief, sought for transfer of the case, in terms of of Para-26(A) of this petition is not granted, inasmuch as the case in Crime No.05 of 2019, on the file of Police Station Mathaur, District Mohali, Punjab, is at the stage of investigation, as such, Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be pressed into service. In exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we issue directions, directing the Respondent Nos.1 & 2, to handover custody of the 3rd Respondent to the State of Uttar Pradesh, within a period of two weeks from today, so as to lodge him in District Jail, Banda in the State of Uttar Pradesh.

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For determination of seniority which is a different concept and determination of seniority is governed by seniority rules enforced at the time of appointment of the personnel under 1972 Rules. This honorable judgement was passed by Supreme Court of India in the case of Jagmohan Singh Dhillon Etc. v. Satwant Singh & Ors[CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4616-4618/2010] by The Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan.

The appeal was filled by appellant as The High Court vide the impugned judgment had allowed the LPA filed by the State of Punjab and set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge and dismissed the writ petitions. The appellants are ex-servicemen, who after being released from the Army were appointed to Punjab Civil Service. Rules were framed namely Demobilized Indian Armed Forces Personnel Rules, 1972, under which Rules Twenty percent of the vacancies in the Punjab Civil Service were to be filled in by direct recruitment from amongst Released Indian Armed Forces Personnel, who joined military service or were commissioned on or after the first day of November, 1962. The vacancies existed under Rules, 1972 for direct recruitment were from 1979 to 1981. Another set of Rules were framed namely Punjab Recruitment of Ex-servicemen Rules, 1982 which were gazetted on 12.02.1982. Fifteen percent of the vacancies to be filled by direct appointment were reserved for being filled in the recruitment by ex-servicemen. The examination was held in the year 1985 and the appellants were appointed vide order dated 18.03.1986 to Punjab Civil Service. The seniority list was issued in the year 1994 in which seniority of the appellant was fixed at S.No.25 without granting him any benefit of earlier services in the Army. The appellant submitted representation against wrong fixation of his seniority.

The learned council referred the case of State of Punjab and other versus Dr. Balbir Bharadwaj, LPA No.168 of 2004, decided on 29.01.2007 has rightly been distinguished by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment.

The court opinioned that, “The Division Bench has rightly taken the view that saving clause under Rule 9(3) does not extend any benefit to the appellant since there is nothing to show that any right of weightage for army services for seniority has already accrued before he joined services. Saving clause in Rule 9(3) cannot be availed by the appellant. We fully endorse the above view of the Division Bench taken in the impugned order.”

The appeal was dismissed stating that, “the appellant was not entitled to claim benefit of military service for purpose of seniority for appointment to Punjab Civil Service(Executive Branch) since the benefit of Rule 4(1) of 1972 Rules was not continued in 1982 Rules. His seniority was to be governed by statutory rules applicable after the enforcement of 1982 Rules.”

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The liberty to pursue their rights and remedies in pursuance of the arbitration clause contained in the Concession Agreements on all PART (F) 67 matters falling within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. This honorable judgement was passed by Supreme Court of Indis in the case of Rapid MetroRail Gurgaon Limited Etc v. Haryana Mass Rapid Transport Corporation Ltd &Ors. [Civil Appeals Nos. 925-926 of 2021] by Dr Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud.

The appellants filed Special Leave Petitions challenging orders dated 12 October 2020 and 16 December 2020 passed by the High Court. The order of this Court dated 5 February 2021 issuing notice. On 22 February 2021, two financial institutions, Andhra Bank and Canara Bank, were permitted to file their responses. The Special Leave Petitions were listed thereafter, and have been taken up for final disposal. On 12 October 2020, the Division Bench of the High Court noted the affidavit that had been filed by the Advisor (Planning) HMRTC and took the affidavit on record, while also noting the submission of RMGL and RMGSL that the matter “does not brook any delay”. The hearing was then adjourned to 16 October 2020 to facilitate filing of replies. The proceedings then came up before the High Court on 16 December 2020, when on the request of the counsel for the petitioners before the High Court (HMRTC and the State of Haryana), the hearing was deferred to 8 April 2021.

The above expression indicates that the term debt due comprises of three components: (i) The principal amount of the debt provided by the senior lenders under the financing agreement; (ii) All accrued interest, financing fees and charges payable under the financing agreement; and (iii) Any subordinated debt which is included in the financial package.

The court disposed of the proceeding stating that, “HSVP shall within a period of three months from the date of the present judgment deposit into the Escrow Account 80 per cent of the debt due as determined in the reports of the auditors dated 23 June 2020, in the case of RMGL and RMGSL respectively; RMGL and RMGSL on the one hand, and HSVP on the other, are at liberty to pursue their rights and remedies in pursuance of the arbitration clause contained in the Concession Agreements on all PART F 67 matters falling within the ambit of the arbitration agreement, including the validity of the notices of termination, any past or future inter se claims and liabilities as envisaged in the order of the High Court dated 20 September 2019, in regard to the determination of the debt due, any of the parties would be at liberty to raise a dispute in the course of arbitral proceedings; Upon compliance with the directions contained in above, RMGL and RMGSL shall execute and handover to HSVP all documents which are required for effectuating the transfer of operations, maintenance and assets to HSVP or their nominees with a view to fulfill the obligation of the concessionaires in Article 25 of the Concession Agreement dated 9 December 2009.”

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