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Course circumstances like recovery of clothing apparel as well as tiffin box etc., in the absence of any other material evidence on record pointing towards the guilt of the accused, cannot be termed sufficient to hold that the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt. This honorable judgement was passed by Supreme Court of India in the case of Yogesh, Anuj, Pardeep vs. State of Haryana [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1306, 1307,1308 OF 2017] by The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and The Hon’ble Ms. Justice Indira Banerjee.

These appeals aroused out of the common judgment and final order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Eight persons were tried in Sessions Case with crime registered pursuant with Police Station City, Bahadurgarh, Haryana, in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 302/364-A/376/216 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A raid was conducted at the house of accused Diwan Singh, who allegedly disclosed that his son Anuj along with three others had kidnapped the victim and as pressure of the investigation by the police was mounting, the victim was murdered and her dead-body was thrown in the fields of village Paparwat. It was not clear as to when exactly the accused were arrested but it was the case of the prosecution that pursuant to the disclosure statements made by these appellants, the place where the dead body of the victim was lying could be located, and their disclosure statements led to the recovery of certain items like clothing, tiffin box etc. belonging to the victim. The dead body of the victim was subjected to post-mortem, which was conducted by Dr. P.K. Paliwal. No semen was detected in the vaginal swabs taken from the body of the victim.

The learned council referred the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 where the law on the point of circumstantial evidence cases was made very clear.

The court opinioned that, “There are of course circumstances like recovery of clothing apparel as well as tiffin box etc. belonging to the victim. However, such recoveries by themselves, in the absence of any other material evidence on record pointing towards the guilt of the accused, cannot be termed sufficient to hold that the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Not only those circumstances are not conclusive in nature but they also do not form a cogent and consistent chain so as to exclude every other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellants.”

The court allowed the appeal stating that, “the case of the prosecution has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set-aside the orders of conviction and sentence recorded against each appellant. The appellants be set at liberty forthwith, unless their custody is required in connection with any other crime.”

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HPSEB was directed to process the candidature of all applicants, including the degree holders who participated, and depending on the relative merits, proceed to issue the final selection list of all successful candidates. This honorable judgement was passed by The Supreme Court of India in the case of Puneet Sharma & Ors. Etc v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd. Anr. Etc. [CIVIL APPEAL NO (S). 1318-1322 OF 2021] by The Hon’ble Mr. justice Ashok Bhushan and The Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat.

The appeal was filled by appellant arising out of a common judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court. Whether a degree in Electrical Engineering/Electrical and Electronics Engineering was technically a higher qualification than a diploma in that discipline and, whether degree holders were eligible for appointment to the post of Junior Engineer under the relevant recruitment rules, was the issue that falls for decision in these appeals. As was evident, this issue was not novel and has an almost endemic tendency requiring judicial attention, albeit in myriad and diverse contexts. The Himachal Pradesh Staff Selection commission, acting on the requisition sent by the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd., advertised 222 posts of Junior Engineer. Degree-holders in the concerned discipline applied for the post; after qualifying the written examination, they were called for verification of documents but the final result was not declared. They approached the High Court in writ proceedings, they would not be denied consideration. The diploma holders opposed this claim, and argued that that the qualifications possessed by degree holders was neither higher nor can be considered in teeth of the recruitment rules as also on the basis of the advertisement issued by the Himachal Pradesh Staff Selection Commission. The HPSEB adopted a neutral position; however, it highlighted that per the applicable regulations, the minimum essential qualification provided for recruitment to the post of Junior Engineer was “matriculation with Diploma in Electronics and Communication/ Computer Science from the recognized Institution duly recognized by the Central or State Government”. HPSEB further stated that the HPSSC would not traverse beyond the regulations, and was bound to make recruitments in accordance with them.

The court opinioned that, “Yet, of material significance is the fact that the higher post of Assistant Engineer has nearly 2/3rds (64%) promotional quota. Amongst these individuals, those who held degrees before appointment as a Junior Engineers are entitled for consideration in a separate and distinct sub-quota, provided they function as a Junior Engineer continuously for a prescribed period. This salient aspect cannot be overlooked; it only shows the intent of the rule makers not to exclude degree holders from consideration for the lower post of Junior Engineers”

The appeal was allowed by the court stating that, “This amendment was brought in to clear all doubts and controversies and, in that sense, the amending provisions should be deemed to have been inserted from inception. These batches of appeals by the degree holders have to succeed. The respondent HPSEB is directed to process the candidature of all applicants, including the degree holders who participated, and depending on the relative merits, proceed to issue the final selection list of all successful candidates, after holding interviews, etc.”

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While considering the grant of bail under Section 43D (5) in The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the entire material on record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not. This auspicious judgment was passed by the Supreme Court of India in the matter of SUDESH KEDIA V UNION OF INDIA [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 314-315 of 2021] by Honourable Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Honourable Justice S. Ravindra Bhat.

The Appellant is accused of committing offenses under Sections 120B, 414, 384, 386, and 387 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 read with Sections 17, 18, and 21 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 along with Sections 25 (1B) (a), 26 and 35 of the Arms Act and Section 17 (1) (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. The application filed for grant of bail was dismissed by the Special Judge NIA at Ranchi and the High Court too dismissed his criminal appeal and upheld the order of the Special Judge. Thus, he filed this appeal.

The facts of the case are in the FIR it was alleged that one Vinod Kumar and others were operatives of a terrorist gang and they were extorting levy from coal traders, transporters, and contractors. In exercise of powers conferred under Section 6 (5) and Section 8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the Central Government directed NIA to take up investigation in view of the gravity of the offenses involving the seizure of arms and ammunitions and huge amounts of cash. The members of TPC, according to the charge-sheet, had been extorting money from businessmen in Amrapali and Magadh coal mining areas and had also been obstructing the smooth supply of transport of coal.

During the investigation, The National Investigation Agency submitted a supplementary charge sheet in which the modus operandi of collecting levy from contractors, traders, transporters, etc. was given. Another supplementary charge-sheet was filed in which it was mentioned that the accused was engaged in transporting coal on behalf of GVK Power and Godavari Commodities and had paid levy from his current account. Thus, he colluded with the members of the terrorist gang (TPC) and was a party to a criminal conspiracy to raise funds for a terrorist gang. Thus, the HC rejected the bail application since Prima facie they were satisfied that it is a case of terror funding.

The Supreme Court observed that “Section 43-D (5) mandates that a person shall not be released on bail if the court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made are prima facie true. Apart from the other offenses, the Appellant is accused of committing offenses under Section 17, 18, and 21 of the UA (P) Act. The Appellant is accused of providing funds to a terrorist organization. According to the prosecution, he has entered into a conspiracy with the other members of the organization to strengthen and promote the activities of the organization. Further, an amount of Rs. 9,95,000/- was seized from the Appellant’s house, making him liable for punishable under Section 21 of the Act.”

The Court relied on National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali to consider the parameters for exercise of the power under Section 43 (5) D and opined that, “Appellant is entitled to bail and that the Special Court and High Court erred in not granting bail to the Appellant” since, “The material on record shows that the Appellant paid levy/extortion amount to the terrorist organization and Payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding. Appellant paid money to the members of the TPC for the smooth running of his business. Prima facie, it cannot be said that the Appellant conspired with the other members of the TPC and raised funds to promote the organization.”

The judgment of the High Court was set aside and the Appellant was directed to be released on bail subject to the satisfaction of the Special Court since the court mentioned that they were “not satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out against the Appellant relating to the offences alleged against him.”

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Once a suit for specific performance has been filed, any delay as a result of the Court process cannot be put against the plaintiff in decreeing specific performance. However, it is within the discretion of the Court based on the facts of each case, as to whether some additional amount ought or ought not to be paid once a decree of specific performance is passed. This auspicious judgment was recently passed by the Supreme Court of India in the matter of A.R. MADANA GOPAL V M/S RAMNATH PUBLICATIONS PVT. LTD. AND ANR. [Civil Appeal Nos.3523-3526 of 2010] by Honourable Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice S. Ravindra Bhat.

These Appeals are filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court by which a decree for specific performance passed by the learned Single Judge was reversed. Appellant filed four suits for specific performance of the agreements of sale dated 20.03.1991 and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) dated 24.01.1994 and also prayed for a direction to deliver vacant possession of the schedule property at the dispense of the respondent and a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from alienating or encumbering the suit property and a decree of mandatory injunction to deposit the title deeds with the Court.

It was alleged that the Respondent entered into separate agreements and the sale was to be concluded within a period of four months. The Respondents would produce the encumbrance certificate much before the execution and registration of the sale deeds and obtain the income tax. To comply with these terms the Respondent applied to the Income Tax authorities for permission to alienate the property and an order for compulsory acquisition of property was passed.

This order of the Income Tax authority was challenged in a writ petition in Madras High Court and the authorities were directed to reconsider the matter afresh. Another order directing the purchase of the property was passed and an interim order of injunction was given by the HC.

The parties were directed to not change the nature of the property and henceforth Appellants and Respondents entered into four separate MOUs and these were in addition and not in substitution. It was agreed that the Respondents shall continue to keep the original title deeds until completion of the sale by registration of the sale deeds. Certain amounts were paid by the Appellants and the balance of the sale price shall be paid to the Respondents at the time of registration of the sale deeds immediately after the disposal of the Writ Petitions in their favour.

The Writ Petitions filed against the compulsory acquisition by the Income Tax authorities were disposed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowing the Writ Petitions was challenged by the Income Tax department by way of filing an appeal. When the Appellants made a demand for execution of sale deeds, the Respondents informed them that it can be done only after disposal of the Writ Appeal. Indian Bank filed a suit for recovery of its dues from the Respondents as the Respondents were not executing the sale deeds in spite of repeated requests, the Appellants filed separate suits for specific performance.

It was observed that “The Appellants were always ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. The Appellants asserted that the interpretation of the MOU is contrary to the well-settled law of this Court. The Division Bench of the High Court placed undue emphasis on the word “immediately” to conclude that the Appellants failed to pay the balance consideration immediately after the disposal of the Writ Petition.”

It was also added, “The High Court lost sight of the words “at the time of registration of sale” in clause 3 of MOUs. A plain reading of clause 3 in the MOU’s would show that the Appellants were required to pay the balance sale consideration at the time of the registration of the sale deeds immediately when the Writ Petition is disposed of upholding the sale agreement. The High Court further found fault with the Appellants in waiting for 2 years and 3 months after the disposal of the Writ Petition for filing the suits. The finding of the Division Bench of the High Court that the Appellants were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract by not paying the balance consideration immediately after disposal of the Writ Petition is erroneous.”

Thus, the court said that “Escalation of prices cannot be the sole ground to deny specific performance”. Thus, the judgment of the High Court was set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge are restored.

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The non-explanation of the linkage of a person with other names as shown along with his grandparents’ names in the voters list of 1970 “does not affect the credibility or genuineness to show his linkage with his grandparents. The High Court of Gauhati in the case of Haidar Ali vs Union of India & ors [WP(C)/1818/2019] by Honourable Justice N. Kotiswar Singh & Justice Manish Choudhury.

The facts of the case are a Foreigners Tribunal in Assam had declared a man named Haidar Ali as a foreigner although he had established the link with the names of his father and grandfather entered in the voters lists of 1965 and 1970. The Tribunal at Barpeta observed that since Haider Ali had failed to establish his linkage with other projected relatives in the voters list. Therefore, the Tribunal held that he had failed to show the linkage properly.

The Court observed “What was crucial and required of the petitioner was to prove before the Tribunal was that Harmuz Ali was his father and that his father, Harmuz Ali was the son of Nadu Miya, who were admittedly Indians. The fact that Harmuz Ali was the son of Nadu Miya has been already duly proved by theaforesaid voters lists of 1970 and 1965, genuineness of which was not questioned by the State”. Thus, non-explanation of relationship of the petitioner with other persons mentioned in the voters list of 1970 cannot be aground for disbelieving the correctness of the entry of the names of the grandparents in the voters list, when the correctness of the entry of the names of the petitioner’s father and grandfather was not questioned“

Further, the court opined that “All the evidence are corroborative in nature and failure to disclose all the relevant facts does not ipso facto lead to the inference that his evidence is unreliable. The more evidence one adduces, the better for him. But there is no law nor dictum that if the precede does not disclose the names of all the other relatives, other than what matters and does not produce all the relevant evidence other than what matters, his evidence cannot be believed.”

While allowing the petition the Court observed that “the standard of proof in a proceeding under the Tribunal is a preponderance of probability and not proof beyond all reasonable doubt and if the petitioner has been able to prove that the names of his father and grandfather were shown in 1966 and 1971 thereby showing his linkage with them on the strength of voters lists after 1971, the Tribunal cannot reject the claim of the petitioner, merely because some documentary evidence was not produced.”

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