The company cannot be convicted by the trial court and the court found that the “finding of the High Court to revisit the judgement will be unfair to the appellant/Nominated Person who has been facing trial for more than last 30 years”. This auspicious judgement was passed by the Hon’ble Justice Hemant Gupta in the matter of Hindustan Unilever Limited versus The state of Madhya Pradesh [Criminal no.- 578 of 2020].

The appeal was made to this court which challenged the order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur where the court remitted back to the trial court to revise the evidence adduced by both the parties to suit. Initially a complaint was filed by a food inspector in respect of Dalda Vanaspati Khajoor Brand Ghee manufactured by the Company, in context to the provisions of The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

The sample of Vanaspati Ghee was taken from the godown of Lipton India Limited which was found to be adulterated as the melting point was found to be 41.8 degree centigrade which is higher than the normal range i.e. as against 31-41 degree centigrade.

The court relied to the judgement passed by a three-judge Bench in the case of Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours Private Limited (2012 )5 SCC 661 which was as follows: “considered the question of conviction of the Directors in the absence of the Company in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 188112 as also in the proceedings under Information Technology Act, 2000. This Court held that Section 141 of the NI Act dealing with offences by companies contemplates that every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly”.

The court contended that “Clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 of the Act makes the person nominated to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business and the company shall be guilty of the offences under clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, there is no material distinction between Section 141 of the NI Act and Section 17 of the Act which makes the Company as well as the Nominated Person to be held guilty of the offences and/or liable to be proceeded and punished accordingly. Clauses (a) and (b) are not in the alternative but conjoint”.

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According to the Waqf Act, 1995, the number of members nominated cannot exceed the number of members elected. This rule was made in light of proper functioning of the board. The Supreme Court pronounced an order against the petition filed in the matter of  State of Tamil Nadu vs. K. FAZLUR RAHMAN, [CA NOS.3603­3605 Of 2020] which was headed by the three judge bench comprising of Justices Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah 

The Waqf Board was constituted which consisted of two Senior Muslim Advocates, and their nomination was challenged before the High Court. The State Government was of the opinion that two Senior Advocates who were nominated as members under Section 14(1)(b)(iii) proviso cannot be treated as elected members hence the number of elected members are less than nominated members. The petition was dismissed by the single judge bench of the High Court upholding the process of election. Further, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeal and held that the supersession order was not sustainable.

“It is submitted that as per second proviso to Section 99(1) the power of the State Government can be exercised only when there is a prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct or violation of the provisions of this Act. It is submitted that the grounds given for supersession in the order dated 18.09.2019 are not covered by Section 99(1) especially second proviso. It is submitted that responsibility to constitute the Board is on the State Government hence it cannot take benefit of its own wrong. It was for the State to ensure that number of elected members is not less than the nominated members. It is submitted that State was obliged to ensure compliance of Section 14(4)”. 

The state of Tamil Nadu appealed to the Supreme Court. The apex court while agreeing to the opinion of the High Court held, ‘The event of cessation of membership of an elected member is not under control of the Board. It was the duty of the State Government to constitute the Board as per the objectives enshrined in Section 14(4). The State Government has ample power to conduct election for the members as enumerated in Section 14(i)(b), (i) to (iv). The fresh election of two members in category under Section 14(1)(b)(iv) held in the year 2020 shall become non est and Syed Ali Akbar and Dr. Haja K. Majeed shall continue to occupy their office till their normal tenure of five years from 10.10.2017”.

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The Supreme Court’s recent judgment on a criminal  appeal has shed new light upon the refusal of the convict to undergo Test Identification Parade (TIP). The bench consisting of J. Dhananjay Y Chandrachud, J. Indu Malhotra and J. Indira Banerjee, in the matter of Rajesh @ Sarkari & Anr Vs. State of Haryana [Criminal Appeal No. 1648 of 2019], held that ‘refusal to undergo TIP cannot be the basis for conviction’.

In the present case, the appellants/accused, Rajesh alias Sarkari and Ajay Hooda have been convicted, along with a co-accused, Pehlad Singh alias Harpal, for an offence under section-302 read with section-34 of the Indian Penal Code, and had been sentenced to imprisonment for life by the Sessions court in a judgement dated 12^th June 2012. The accusation was for the commitment of murder of Sandeep, the son of the complainant, by firing shots at him. Aggrieved, the accused filed appeals in the HC of Punjab and Haryana, wherein the appeals were dismissed in January 2019.

In the present appeal, new facts were brought into light. It was seen that there were many inconsistencies in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses 4 and 5 (complainant and his son) who also claimed to be the eye witnesses. The court stated that “the depositions of PW4 and PW5 suffer from several material contradictions and improvements; and the non-examination of the ballistics expert in light of serious controversies in the FSL reports has cast a shadow on the prosecution’s story..”.

In the second half of the judgement, the issue of TIP was dealt with. The prosecution submitted that “an adverse inference should be drawn against the appellants for refusing to submit themselves to a TIP”. The appellants argued that the refusal to undergo TIP was borne out of the fact that the deceased and the accused knew each other prior to the occurrence of the event and were in fact co-accused in a case under trial (FIR No. 341 dated 23^rd June, 2001). Also, the fact that PW4 had seen Rajesh during the courses of hearing could not be brushed aside.

After the submissions, the court relied on various cases such as Matru v. State of U.P. [(1971)2 SCC 75 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 391], Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain [(1973) 2 SCC 406 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 828] and Visveswaran v. State [(2003) 6 SCC 73] to clarify the need and purpose of TIP. Taking all the facts into consideration, the SC acquitted the accused after 12 years of imprisonment and stated that “the identification in the course of a TIP is intended to lend assurance to the identity of the accused. The finding of guilt cannot be based purely on the refusal of the accused to undergo an identification parade. In the present case, we have already indicated the presence of the alleged eyewitnesses PW4 and PW5 at the scene of the occurrence is seriously in doubt. The ballistics evidence connecting the empty cartridges and the bullets recovered from the body of the deceased with an alleged weapon of offence is contradictory and suffers from serious infirmities. Hence, in this backdrop, a refusal to undergo a TIP assumes secondary importance, if at all, and cannot survive independently in the absence of it being a substantive piece of evidence.”

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The Supreme court made directions regarding how cases of maintenance in matrimonial disputes should be adjudged. This extraordinary judgement was concerned with the maintenance rights of a wife and her son. The judgement was passed by the Hon’ble J. Indu Malhotra and J. R Subhash Reddy in the matter concerning Rajnesh versus Neha & Another [Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2020].

The respondent left her matrimonial home in January 2013, shortly after the birth of her son. She filed a petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C. asking for interim maintenance for herself and her minor son. The Family Court awarded so, upon which the husband, Rajnesh, filed an appeal to the Bombay HC, which confirmed the order of the Family Court. The present case was an SLP filed by the husband/appellant to question the validity of the previous orders. The Court granted the leave and ordered the husband to file his Income Tax Returns and further make payments to his wife as interim maintenance, the failure of which would result in Contempt of Court for willful disobedience of the Orders passed.

After declaring the decision, the court found it necessary “to frame guidelines to ensure that there is uniformity and consistency in deciding the same” (such cases). The final directions of the court were as follows :

1. Issue of Overlapping Jurisdiction: To avoid the passing of conflicting orders in different proceedings, the court gave the following directions –

• “where successive claims for maintenance are made by a party under different statutes, the Court would consider an adjustment or setoff, of the amount awarded in the previous proceeding/s, while determining whether any further amount is to be awarded in the subsequent proceeding;
• it is made mandatory for the applicant to disclose the previous proceeding and the orders passed therein, in the subsequent proceeding;
• if the order passed in the previous proceeding/s requires any modification or variation, it would be required to be done in the same proceeding.”

2. Payment of Interim Maintenance: The court held that in all maintenance proceedings, including pending proceedings before the concerned courts, both the parties should file the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities as stated in the judgement.

3. Date from which maintenance is to be awarded: Maintenance is to be awarded from the date of filing of the application for maintenance.

4. Enforcement/Execution of orders of maintenance: The order or decree of maintenance may be enforced under section 28A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956; section 20(6) of the D.V. Act; and section 128 of Cr.P.C. as may be applicable. This order can be enforced as a money decree too.

5. Criteria for determining quantum of maintenance: The court stated that “The objective of granting interim / permanent alimony is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage, and not as a punishment to the other spouse.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated it’s stance on the fact that if a pleading has not been made by the party, no amount of evidence produced later in a civil suit will help. The bench consisting of Justices Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah held the above mentioned in the matter of Biraji @ Brijraji vs. Surya Pratap [C.A.Nos.4883-4884 of 2017].

The plaintiff questioned the deed of adoption that his father. The plaintiff contended that the adoption was not carried out as per required formalities. He even went on to allege that the father was not present during that ceremony and pleaded the court to summon his father’s leave application of the Rajput Regiment Centre Fatehgarh.

The Trial Court as well as the High Court opined that firstly, no such pleading was made by the Plaintiff and secondly, the application was filed by the plaintiff at a much later stage. The plaintiff thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

 The court held that  “In the adoption deed itself, the ceremony which had taken place on 14.11.2001 was mentioned, hence it was within the knowledge of the appellants plaintiffs even on the date of filing of the suit. In the absence of any pleading in the suit filed by the appellants, at belated stage, after evidence is closed, the appellants have filed the application to summon the record relating to leave/service of Ramesh Chander Singh on 14.11.2001 from the Rajput Regiment Centre Fatehgarh.”

There was an order from the High Court stating that “for expeditious disposal of the suit and the application which was filed belatedly is rightly dismissed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Revisional Court and High Court. It is also pertinent to mention, subsequent to dismissal of the application in Application No. 97-C, for summoning the leave/service record of defendant No.2, from his place of working that is Rajput Regiment Centre Fatehgarh, by the Trial Court on the ground that there was no such pleading in the suit, the appellants herein have filed application for amendment of the plaint in an Application No. 103-A, which was dismissed by the Trial Court and said order was confirmed by the District Judge, Gazipur in Civil Revision No. 58 of 2013 by order dated 03.05.2013. The said order has become final”.

Also “Though the first application for summoning the record in Application was dismissed by the Trial Court, the appellants have filed similar application again for the very same relief, which is also rightly rejected by the Trial Court.”

The court stated that “It is clear from the conduct of the appellants, that in spite of directions from the High Court, for expeditious disposal of the suit, appellants plaintiffs were trying to protract the litigation”.

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