The Supreme Court sentenced the convict to 25 years of rigorous life imprisonment while allowing his appeal to commute death sentence, as ordered previously by the High Court and Trial Court. The bench consisting of J. Uday Umesh Lalit, J. Indu Malhotra and J. Krishna Murari, observed that the standards to grant death sentences are much higher than as seen in the present case of Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal Nos. 763-764 of 2016].

According the FIR lodged by the father of the victim who was a girl of two and half years old, Shatrughna Baban Meshram, the accused and the victim’s uncle, after taking her away from the house of the complainant, was found lying in a construction site, next to the victim who was without her pants, her face being bitten and her private parts swollen. When taken to the hospital, the doctor examined and declared her dead. The appellant was charged with rape of a minor and murder under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Sections 376(1)(2)(f)(m), 376A, 302 of the IPC respectively.  

The Trial Court awarded death sentence and rigorous imprisonment for life to the accused, of which the former was subject to confirmation by the High Court. The HC affirmed the orders of the Trial Court saying that this falls under the rarest of rare cases, and relied on Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1980 2 SCC 684] and Machhi Singh and others v. State of Punjab [(1983) 3 SCC 470], while stating that “The appalling cruelty shown by him to the minor girl child is extremely shocking and it gets accentuated, when his age is taken into consideration. It was not committed under any mental stress or emotional disturbance and it is difficult to comprehend that he would not commit such acts and would be reformed or rehabilitated. As the circumstances would graphically depict, he would remain a menace to society, for a defenceless child has become his prey. In our considered opinion, there are no mitigating circumstances”.

In the present appeal, although SC found the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, the court stated that “there was no requisite intent as would bring the case under any of the first three clauses of Section 300 IPC, the offence in the present case does not deserve death penalty”. The SC classified the matter broadly under two heads –

“(A) Whether the circumstantial evidence in the present case is of unimpeachable character in establishing the guilt of the Appellant or leads to an exceptional case.  (B) Whether the evidence on record is so strong and convincing that the option of a sentence lesser than a death penalty is foreclosed.”

The SC held that “The circumstances are clear, consistent and conclusive in nature and are of unimpeachable character in establishing the guilt of the Appellant”, however, the court did not find that the option of a sentence lesser than death penalty was completely foreclosed. Further the court added “ It is true that the sexual assault was very severe and the conduct of the Appellant could be termed as perverse and barbaric. However, a definite pointer in favour of the Appellant is the fact that he did not consciously cause any injury with the intent to extinguish the life of the victim”.

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The Supreme Court, in the matter of an employment dispute, observed that although employers have the authority to prescribe qualifications for a particular post, such qualifications should be given due consideration and should not be arbitrary. The bench consisting J. Ashok Bhushan, J. R Subhash Reddy and J. R Shah, in the matter of Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank & Anr. v. Anit Kumar Das [Civil Appeal No. 3602 of 2020], held that lower educational qualification can be a criteria for employment of a candidate, given that there is a rationale behind it.  

The appellant Bank had invited applications for the post of Peon by publishing an advertisement in the local newspaper. The advertisement clearly mentioned the eligibility criteria for the candidate to have passed 12^th class or its equivalent and basic reading/writing knowledge of English. It also specifically provided that the candidate should not be a graduate. The respondent, upon submitting the applications got selected for the employment, after which it came to the knowledge of the appellant that the respondent was in fact a graduate, and thus, his candidature was cancelled. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court arguing that higher education cannot be a basis for denying employment, relying on Mohd. Usmain Gani v. District and Sessions Judge, Nagpur [Civil Appeal No. 1010 of 2000]. The HC allowed the petition and directed the Bank to allow the respondent to discharge his duties as a Peon.

The present appeal arises out of this judgement, wherein the counsel for the appellant argued that firstly, the respondent never challenged the eligibility criteria, and further, he deliberately and willfully suppressed the material fact of having been a graduate. Further, that the criteria is decided keeping in mind the nature of the job, and that of the Peon does not require an employee with higher qualification than as prescribed. Hence, the Bank should not be ordered to appoint the respondent as a Peon.

The SC placed reliance on Yogesh Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi [(2003) 3 SCC 548], wherein it was stated that “recruitment to public service should be held strictly in accordance with the terms of advertisement and the recruitment rules, if any. Deviation from the rules allows entry to ineligible persons and deprives many others who could have competed for the post”. The SC hence, held that the respondent was ineligible for the employment and the HC had erred in finding otherwise. The court further stated that “Qualifications are prescribed keeping in view the need and interest of an Institution or an Industry or an establishment as the case may be. The Courts are not fit instruments to assess expediency or advisability or utility of such prescription of qualifications. However, at the same time, the employer cannot act arbitrarily or fancifully in prescribing qualifications for posts”.

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The Supreme Court shed light upon the meaning of ‘land’ and ‘distress’ under the West Bengal Restoration of Alienated Land Act, 1973. The appeal was partly allowed by the bench comprising of J. Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. Aniruddha Bose and J. Krishna Murari in the case of Smt. Renuka Dey & Ors. v. Naresh Chandra Gope (D) THR. LRS. & Anr.  [Civil Appeal No. 6264 of 2013].  

The appellants, original owners of the land, conveyed their land to the respondents by a deed executed on 26^th April, 1968 for a specific consideration amount. The particular land included parts of pond(tank) and a garden. In the deed itself, the reasons for such a transfer were specified as repayment of loan, meeting educational costs and purchase of another property. The appellants urged that along with this deed, there was a simultaneous deed executed for the reconveyance of the said property between the same parties. The transferors applied for restoration of the property in 1974, which stood rejected by the Special Officer as well as the High Court of Calcutta (under constitutional writ jurisdiction). Civil writ petition was filed by the appellants before the HC who remanded the matter to a Special Officer who sustained the application of restoration. The purchasers invoked writ jurisdiction on the ground that the land at question was a homestead non-agricultural land and there was no sign of distress, hence the Act was not applicable relying on the case of Prosad Kumar Dhara v. Kamala Kanta Dikshit [AIR 1982 Cal 532].

The learned counsel for the appellants argued before that SC that “the deed that what was sold was a pond, which can mean tank, as also highland trees as part of fishery”. He justified restoration on the grounds that the deed was coupled with the agreement of reconveyance and that distress is to be given a “liberal construction” as held in Chitta Ranjan Ghish v. State of West Bengal [(1976) s CLJ 180].

The SC, taking all the previous orders, facts and cases into consideration, stated that “Under Section 4(1)(a) of the Act, three situations have been contemplated as alternative conditions to enable a land holder to seek restoration of land already conveyed by him. These are “in distress” or “in need of money for the maintenance of himself and his family” or “for meeting the cost of his cultivation”.

“These are interconnected situations and the vendors’ reasons for transfer, spelt out in the conveyance deed itself, in our view, comes within the broad terms expressed in the statute”. Hence, it was considered that the appellants were in fact distressed out of which the deed was executed. However, the SC held that the nature of the land was still a disputed topic. The SC directed the matter to a Tribunal stating that if the land was covered by the said Statute then the restoration would be executed, and if not, the appellants had no such right or claim.

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The Supreme Court observed that mere literal construction of a statute without examining the context and the scheme will not serve the purpose of the statute. The bench consisting of J. Nageswara Rao, J. Hemant Gupta and J. Ajay Rastogi observed in C. Bright v. the District Collector & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3441 of 2020] that the 30 days’ time period, extendable to an aggregate of 60 days upon reasons recorded in writing, prescribed in Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) was a directory provision.

Before the matter was appealed to the SC, the Kerala HC held that “the secured creditor is adversely affected if the provision is construed as mandatory and not directory in as much as it would delay the process of taking physical possession of assets instead of expediting such process by entailing the filing of another application for such purpose”, and hence, it was to be considered as a directory and not a mandatory provision.

The learned counsel for the appellant, relying on Union of India & Ors. v. A.K. Pandey [(2009) 10 SCC 552], Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 1] and Dipak Babaria & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors [(2014) 3 SCC 502] argued that “the proviso mandating the District Magistrate to record reasons, if the order is not passed within 30 days, in order to avail an extended period of a total 60 days, shows that the provision is mandatory. If the District Magistrate is not able to take decision within 60 days, the secured creditor has to find its remedy elsewhere and not in terms of Section 14 of the Act. It is contended that the proviso mandates the District Magistrate to pass an order within 30 days as the word “shall” is used in first part of the proviso. Thus, the time limit provided is unambiguous and by corollary the provision is mandatory”.

The SC held that the question of time limit fixed for a public officer to perform his duty being directory or mandatory had been examined by many Courts earlier, and placing reliance of various cases, stated that until and unless the neglect of a public officer towards the performance of her/his duty causes serious inconvenience or injustice to the general public, the courts should not adjudge the provision as mandatory.

The SC placed reliance on Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1968 SC 224], where the court held that the time limit of 30 days for publication of awards was directory since the non-publication within the prescribed time limit did not entail any penalty. Further, in P. T. Rajan v. T. P. M. Sahir & Ors [(2003) 8 SCC 498], the court, examining the non-publication of final electoral rolls before the time of acceptance of nomination of papers, stated that “It is a well settled principle of law that where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the same would be directory and not mandatory”. Hence, the SC upheld the order of the HC and dismissed the appeal, and furthered the interpretation of such statutory provisions.

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The Supreme Court held that the Patna High Court and Jharkhand High Court had erred in dismissing a writ petition on the basis of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The late petitioner’s wife appealed to the SC aggrieved with the decisions of the HC as they contended that both petitions had different causes of action. The earlier Writ Petition, in the present matter of  Shanti Devi Alias Shanti Mishra V Union Of India & Ors. [Civil Appeal NO. 3630 of 2020], was filed on different cause of action where the substantial prayer was for refund of the amount illegally deducted whereas the second one was on entirely different cause of action.

The appellant’s husband, a retired employee of the Coal India Ltd. had to run from pillar to post after two high courts rejected his petition with respect to his pension on the basis of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The case went on for long enough so much so that he died during the pendency of the suit and his wife was substituted as writ petitioner.  The petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court of Patna as well as the High Court of Jharkhand and both the courts dismissed his petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as the petitioner was employed at West Bengal but resided in Jharkhand after retirement, where he was receiving pension.

The Learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court held that “petitioner served in the State of West Bengal under the authorities and organizations which are located either in States of West Bengal or Jharkhand, hence, High Court of Patna had no territorial jurisdiction”.

The SC held that, “Form the facts of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Patna High Court. The deceased petitioner was continuously receiving pension for the last 8 years in his saving bank account in State Bank of India, Darbhanga. The stoppage of pension of late B.N. Mishra affected him at his native place, he being deprived of the benefit of pension which he was receiving from his employer. The employer requires a retiring employee to indicate the place where he shall receive pension after his retirement. Late Shri B.N. Mishra had opted for receiving his pension in State Bank of India, Darbhabga, State of Bihar, which was his native place, from where he was drawing his pension regularly for the last 8 years, stoppage of pension gave a cause of action, which arose at the place where the petitioner was continuously receiving the pension. We, thus, are of the view that the view of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench holding the writ petition not maintainable on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction was completely erroneous and has caused immense hardship to the petitioner.

Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014 was fully maintainable at Patna High Court and learned Single Judge and Division Bench committed error in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The writ petition stands revived before the Patna High Court”.

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