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No Other Consent Required If The Statutory Right To Reconstruction Is Established: High Of Bombay

Title: Chandralok People Welfare Association v. State of Maharashtra

Coram : Gs Patel & Kamal Khata, Jj

Dated : 18th October 2023

Introduction:

The Petitioner is a Welfare Association. It says or claims to have as its membership, seven persons who are in its Managing Committee and fully 103 persons who are or were monthly tenants of the Chandralok building at Sudhakar Dubey Compound. The Association is registered under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950.

Facts:

The building was constructed in 1965. It outlived its life. It does not seem to have been subjected even to normal or routine repairs and certainly not to more intensive repairs as the passage of time may have required. By 2014, the building had deteriorated considerably. Then came to pass the usual process of obtaining structural audit reports of the construction. Ultimately these resulted in the second Respondent, the MCGM represented by Mr Waghmare categorizing the building in the C-1 category. This meant that it was dilapidated, dangerous, uninhabitable and required to be pulled down.

The building received notices inter alia under Section 353-B on 10th April 2019 and then a notice under Section 354 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (“MMC Act”) on 24th June 2019 is not in dispute. The building was vacated on 16th July 2019 and was demolished. Respondent claims that this demolition is in violation of orders of the City Civil Court, particularly an order dated 11th July 2019.

Since July 2019 all 103 tenants are off-site, scattered across the city, their once tightly-knit community fractured. Since then, and this is the number of the complaint, they have seen no vestige or semblance of any proposal for reconstruction or redevelopment.

Court’s Judgement and Analysis:

The court on the basis of circumstances and because of finding no answer at all to either the Petition or even to queries of this Court in the Affidavit of Respondent, made the Rule partly absolute in terms of prayer clause (b) permitting the Petitioner Association to apply to the MCGM for permission for reconstruction of the demolished building. And regarding the question of transit accommodation or transit rent, court did not find a specific provision to that effect in the MMC Act. So the petitioner were directed towards Maharashtra Rent Control Act ,1999 to find a remedy.

Furthermore it was decided that subject to any orders in Rent Act proceedings, all tenants will continue as tenants in the reconstructed building. The mere pendency of a rent proceeding will not disentitle any tenant to possession of reconstructed premises. The association must make its own arrangements for financing the reconstruction. court have only affirmed their statutory right to reconstruction and the MCGM’s obligation to permit it without requiring the prior consent of Respondents.

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Written by- Sushant Kumar Sharma

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Analysis of Movable and immovable property as per the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Analysis of Movable and immovable property as per the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Research question: What is property and different kinds as analysed in various Indian statutes?

Property means not only the physical objects but includes rights and interests existing in or derived out of the actual physical object as well. According to Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act[1], the different components of property that can be transferred include all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property, the legal incidents, the easements annexed to land or building, the rents and profits accruing after the transfer, and all things attached to the Earth; all things provided for permanent use with the house; securities, the interest or income etc. A property entails three main types of rights:

  • a right of ownership, of having the title to the property,
  • an exclusive right to possess and enjoy the property
  • an exclusive right to alienate the property in any manner that he likes.

The bundle of all the rights are called ‘interests’ in the property. Where only some rights in property are transferred, it is a transfer of an interest in the property, like lease, mortgage. Where all the interests in the property are transferred, it is called an absolute transfer of property, like sale, gift, exchange etc.[2] Property can be categorised into: moveable and immoveable.

  1. Immoveable property: Immoveable property has been defined in three Statutes. Section 2(6) of the Registration Act, 1908[3] defines immovable property to include land, the benefits that arise out of land, such as building, hereditary allowances, right to ways, lights, ferries, fisheries, or any benefits to arise out of land or things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the Earth but not standing timber, growing crop like vegetable crops or grass, more precisely the right to cut grass. Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897[4] defines Immovable property to include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Section 3 of Transfer of Property Act[5] defines “immovable property” to not include standing timber, growing crops, or grass. By taking into consideration other provisions in the Transfer of Property Act, immovable property can be said to include land, benefits arising out of land, things rooted in earth, things embedded in earth, and attached to what is embedded in the earth for its permanent beneficial enjoyment, but does not include standing timber, growing crops and grass. The procedure for transfer for immovable property requires that it be properly executed and attested in a written agreement and be registered. The limitation period is 12 years.

In Shantabai v State of Bombay[6], the issue before the court was whether the right to enter upon a land was movable or immovable property. The court held that a right to enter upon the land of another and carry a part of the produce is an instance of profits à prendre, i.e., benefit arising out of land, and therefore a grant in immovable property. Similar stance was taken in the case of Anand Behera v State of Odisha[7], where the right and license to catch and carry away fish in specific sections of the lake over a specified future period was sold. Here, profit a prendre was held as an immovable property by the Supreme Court. In Jagdish v Mangal Pandey[8], the issue was whether the trees in a land were movable or immovable property. The court held that to determine if the trees were movable or immovable, one had to determine whether the intention was to cut the tree or to let it remain attached to the earth. Similarly in Banaras v Ghuhi Rai[9], the court said that the real test for judging whether a tree is immovable or movable property is not the nature of the tree alone, but the way in which it is intended to be dealt with. If the intention of the parties in respect of a particular transaction is that tree, is to be cut by the purchaser and removed, it will become timber (moveable property), but if the intention is that it continue to grow and to yield fruit or shade, it may not be timber.[10]

As per Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, immoveable property would include:

(a) Things Rooted in the earth.—Things which are rooted in the earth include trees and shrubs, except standing timber. Trees which are fruit-bearing and the intention is to use them for fruits they are generally considered as immovable property.

(b) Things embedded in the earth.—Things embedded in the earth means those things which rest by their own weight on earth. The test for immovability is whether or not the thing rests by its own weight on earth and whether it can or cannot change place and be removed from one place to another place without causing structural damage. This can be determined using the test of annexation.

  • Degree and Mode of Annexation: If a thing is so annexed to land that it cannot be removed from its place without great damage to the land, it should be regarded as annexed in perpetuity and should be considered as immovable property.
  • Object of Annexation: If the intention is the permanent improvement of the premises, the chattels or movables fixed or annexed become fixtures. The object of annexation can be inferred from the interest the person has in the property to which the annexation is made.
  • By whom: If the person is the owner of the land, the inference would be that attachment or annexation is meant to be permanent and immovable. Whereas if the person has temporary possession, it will be inferred that annexation is also temporary.

(c) Attached to what is so embedded.—Where a thing is attached to something embedded in the earth for its permanent beneficial enjoyment, the thing attached becomes immovable property too. Examples are doors, windows, ceiling fans etc. which are fastened to the walls or ceilings of a house for their beneficial enjoyment. Hence there are two requirements:

  • It must be a permanent attachment, i.e., intended to be used in perpetuity or till the life of the attachment.
  • Its attachment constitutes a permanent improvement and beneficial enjoyment to the thing to which it is attached.
  1. Moveable property: Section 2 (9) Registration Act, 1908[11] defines “Movable Property” to include standing timber, growing crops and grass, fruit upon and juice in trees, and property of every other description, except immovable property. Section 22 of the Indian Penal Code, 1960[12] defines the term movable property to include corporeal property which excludes land and any other things attached to the earth permanently. Section 2(7) in The Sale of Goods Act, 1930[13] defines “goods” as every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money; and includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass, and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale; In Sukry Kurdepa v. Goondakull[14], the court described immoveable as something that cannot change its place without causing injury to the quality by virtue. However, when the severance has been affected they become movable. In the matter of Raj Balamgir[15], the court had held the standing timber in the forest to be moveable property since the intention was the trees would be cut and removed within a year. In Nanhe Lal v Ram Bharosey[16], it was held that a grove consisting of shisham and neem trees will be covered under the expression ‘standing timber’ and does not constitute immovable property. Examples of moveable property include, aright of ferry, right of way, right to collect rent of an immovable property, right to collect lac from trees, standing timber, grass, growing crops etc.[17] The procedure for transfer in case of movable property is the simple delivery of possession of the property, with an intention to convey the title by the owner to the recipient. The limitation period is 3 years. In Holland v Hodgson[18], Lord Blackburn observed that an article which is affixed to the land even slightly is to be considered as part of the land unless it is shown that it was intended to continue as chattel, the onus lying on those who contend that it is a chattel.

There are three tests to ascertain whether a chattel, (movable property), after attachment has become a fixture (immovable property) or not:

  • Mode of attachment and consequences of its detachment: if a thing or machinery because of its sheer weight goes down in earth; the presumption will be that it is still movable. On the other hand, if in attaching it some external aid is required such as construction of foundation, it has become part of earth. If the attachment can be removed easily without causing sufficient damage to which it was attached, the presumption will be that it is movable, but if in trying to remove it, the attachment is destroyed or loses its value or the support is sufficiently damaged, it is immovable property.
  • Object or intention of attachment: where the object is to fix the attachment permanently or for a sufficiently long time period, the presumption will be that it has become a fixture, but if the intention was to enjoy the attachment for a specific short duration and then to remove it, the presumption will be that it is still a chattel.
  • By whom attached: if the attachment is by the owner of the land, the presumption would be that the attachment has become a fixture, but if it is attached by somebody else other than the owner, such as a tenant, a licensee or a mortgagee, the presumption would be that it is still a chattel.[19]

In Spyer v. Phillipson[20], court held that determining the mode of annexation, and what the object and purpose of annexation is imperative to decide the nature of the article in question with respect to its movability or immovability. In Leigh v Taylor[21], the House of Lords held that certain valuable tapestries affixed by a tenant to the walls of a house for the purpose of ornament and for better enjoyment of them as chattels had not become part of the house, because they were not installed for permanent use, hence they were considered movable property. In Bamdev Panigrahi v Monorama Raj[22], a person was conducting a business under the name of ‘Kumar Touring Talkies’. The issue before the court was to decide whether the two items, cinema projector and diesel oil engine, were movable or immovable. The court observed that the license to exhibit the shows was only for a period of one year, and there was no guarantee that the owner would have applied for its renewal or the authorities would have renewed it. Also, the person who fixed them to the land was not the owner of the land. These items were in fact removed from the land subsequently. Taking the intention and the person who fixed them into consideration, the court held that these were movable properties and the suit being time barred was dismissed.

In the case of Triveni Engineering & Industries Limited v. Comm. of Central Excise[23], the issue before the court was to determine whether turbo alternators which has two components – steam turbine and Generator are movable or immovable. The court found two ingredients to evaluate the nature of the turbo alternators, namely mobility and marketability. If the article exhibits characteristics of both mobility and marketability, then the article in question can be held as a movable property. Mobility can be determined by checking whether an article is permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth and whether there was intention to fasten the article to anything attached to the earth. The marketability test requires that the goods as such should be in a position to be taken to the market and sold. Here it was seen that when the turbo alternator is separated into its components, turbine, and generator, then it would not remain turbo alternator and it will not function by virtue of being not fixed to the ground. Hence the turbo alternators were held to be immovable property. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd[24], the issue before the Court was whether a petrol tank, resting on earth on its own weight without being fixed with nuts and bolts, had been erected permanently without being shifted from place to place. The court considered the Test of permanency to evaluate. The test considers two situations: if the chattel was movable to another place of use in the same position or if it was liable to be dismantled and retracted at the later place. If the chattel was movable to another place of use in the same position, then it must be a movable property but if was liable to be dismantled and retracted at the later place then it would be treated as permanently attached to the earth. In the case of Suresh Chand v Kundan[25], the issue that arose was whether the transfer of land entailed transfer of trees planted on the land. The court held that a perusal of Section 3 of the Act shows that all things attached to the earth are included in the land. There was no mention in the agreement that the saplings were not being sold along with the land. In the absence of any expressed or implied intention in the agreement, it would be taken that the land along with the saplings standing on the land were sold. The Rule of construction will be applied. The rule entails avoiding speculation as to the particular interest which was in the mind of the transferor. The presumption of transfer of all interest can be rebutted by express words or necessary implication.

In Duncan Industries Ltd v State of Uttar Pradesh[26], the issue before the court was to decide if the plant and machinery related to the fertilizer business are moveable or immovable. The High Court concluded that the machinery which formed the fertilizer plant, were permanently embedded in the earth with an intention of running the fertilizer factory and while embedding these machineries the intention of the party was not to remove them. The Supreme Court upheld this decision of the High Court and said that plant was not embedded to be dismantled or removed for the purpose of sale as machinery at any point of time. This falls in line with the test of permanency[27].

We can also apply the Doctrine of fixtures to determine the ownership issues of the attachment. The two maxims are:

  • quicquid plantatur solo, solo credit, which means whatever is planted in the earth, becomes part of the earth, and consequently whosoever owns that piece of earth will also own the thing planted.
  • quicquid inaedificatur solo, solo credit which means whatsoever is built into or embedded into or attached to soil becomes part of the earth and consequently, whosoever is the owner of that piece of land will also become the owner of the thing attached/built in or embedded.[28]

 

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

Written by Reema Nayak

[1] Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

[2] Poonam Pradhan Saxena, Property law (2017).

[3] Section 2(6) of Registration Act, 1908.

[4] Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

[5] Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

[6] Shantabai v State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 532.

[7] Anand Behera v State of Orissa, [1955] 2 SCR 919.

[8] Jagdish v Mangal Pandey, AIR 1986 All 182.

[9] Banaras v Ghuhi Rai, AIR 1956 All 680.

[10] Avtar Singh & Harpreet Kaur, Textbook on the Transfer of Property Act (2009).

[11] Section 2(9) of Registration Act, 1908.

[12] The Indian Penal Code, 1860 Act No. 45 Of 1860.

[13] The Sale of Goods Act, 1930.

[14] Sukry v Goondakull, (1872) 6 Mad HCR 71.

[15] Raj Balamgir, AIR 1931 All 392.

[16] Nanhe Lal v Ram Bharose, (1938) ILR All 115.

[17] Avtar Singh & Harpreet Kaur, Textbook on the Transfer of Property Act (2009).

[18] Holland v Hodgson, (1872) LR 7 CP 328.

[19] Supra note at 2.

[20] Spyer v Phillipson, (1931) 2 ChD 183.

[21] Leigh v Taylor, (1902) AC 157.

[22] Bamdev Panigrahi v Manormaraj, AIR 1974 AP 226.

[23] Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd v Comm. of Central Excise, (2000) 7 SCC 29.

[24] Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, 1991 AIR 686.

[25] Suresh Chand v. Kundan, 2000 (7) SCALE 620.

[26] Duncan Industries v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2000) 1 SCC 633.

[27] Supra note at 17.

[28] Poonam Pradhan Saxena, Property law (2017).

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Right of a Child of an Invalid Marriage in Hindu Joint Family Property: A Glimpse into the Recent Supreme Court Judgment   

INTRODUCTION 
 

In a recent landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Revanasiddappa and Anr v. Mallikarjun and Ors [1], delivered a significant ruling concerning the rights of children born out of void or voidable marriages in Hindu joint family property under the Mitakshara system of law. The three-judge bench, led by Hon’ble Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud, ruled that children born from such marriages are entitled to a share in the property of their deceased parents.  

This judgment marks a significant departure from previous interpretations of the Hindu Marriage Act [2] and the Hindu Succession Act [3] and has profound implications for the legal rights of such children. In this article, we will explore the implications of this judgment, the legal context surrounding it, and its impact on the Hindu joint family property system. 

 

BACKGROUND 
 

The genesis of this legal conundrum lies in the conflict of interpretations surrounding Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), which deals with the legitimacy of children born from void or voidable marriages. Section 16(1) and Section 16(2) of the HMA bestow legitimacy upon children born from void and voidable marriages, respectively. However, Section 16(3) of the same Act creates an exception, stating that such children shall not have rights in the property of any person other than their parents. 

 

The controversy surrounding this issue gained prominence due to differing opinions rendered by coordinate benches of the Supreme Court. The 2010 decision in Bharatha Matha and anr v. R Vijaya Renganathan & Ors [4] held that children born from void or voidable marriages were entitled to inherit only their father’s self-acquired property, excluding ancestral coparcenary property. However, in 2011, the Supreme Court, in an earlier round of the present appeal in Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun [5], deviated from this precedent and asserted that such children have a claim to both self-acquired and ancestral property. This disagreement led to the matter being referred to a larger bench. 

 

INVALID MARRIAGES IN HINDU LAW 

 

Before delving into the implications of the recent Supreme Court judgment, it is crucial to comprehend the concept of invalid marriages in Hindu law. In Hindu law, marriage is considered a sacred union, and its validity is a crucial factor in determining the legal rights and status of the parties involved. Hindu marriages can be broadly classified into two categories: valid and invalid. 

 

Valid marriages conform to the essential conditions prescribed under Section 5 of the HMA, and other relevant legal provisions, including the consent of both parties, the absence of prohibited relationships, and compliance with necessary rituals and ceremonies. In such marriages, the offspring are generally entitled to inherit ancestral property. 

 

Invalid i.e., void or voidable marriages, under Section 11 and Section 12 of the HMA respectively, are those unions that do not meet the essential legal conditions for a valid Hindu marriage. Void marriages can occur due to various reasons, including bigamy, child marriage, prohibited degrees of relationship, marriages in violation of the sapinda relationship, non-compliance with essential rituals, or other violations of the Hindu Marriage Act. Voidable marriages, on the other hand, are marriages that can be annulled at the request of one of the parties involved due to certain legal defects or fraud. 

 

Historically, children born out of void or voidable marriages were considered illegitimate and were often denied any claim to the ancestral property of their parents’ joint Hindu family. This discriminatory practice has long been a contentious issue, prompting the Supreme Court to reevaluate the legal rights of such children. 

 

THE RECENT SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT IN REVANASIDDAPPA VS. MALLIKARJUN 

 

The case of Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun [6] revolves around the rights of a child born out of an invalid marriage within a Hindu joint family setup. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether such a child can claim a share in the ancestral property of the Hindu joint family, even if the marriage of their parents is deemed invalid. 

 

The court recognized that the child should not be made to suffer due to the invalidity of their parents’ marriage. Denying them a share in the ancestral property would be detrimental to their welfare. The Supreme Court emphasized the legitimacy conferred upon children of void or invalid marriages by statutory provisions. The court cited Section 16(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, which states that in the case of a voidable marriage that is subsequently annulled, a child begotten before the annulment is deemed to be legitimate. This provision extends the same rights and legitimacy under Section 16(1) to children born from marriages declared void as if they were born from valid marriages. 

 
However, it is essential to note that the Supreme Court clarified that these rights are limited to the properties of the child’s parents. In cases of invalid marriages, the man and woman do not have the status of husband and wife under Hindu law. Consequently, the child’s rights are restricted to the inheritance of their parents’ property, and they do not possess the right to claim other coparcenary shares. 

 

CONCLUSION 

 

The Supreme Court, in its wisdom, took a progressive stance and provided much-needed clarity on this contentious issue. The ruling underscores the principle that every child, regardless of the circumstances of their birth, has an inherent right to their parental property within the framework of Hindu law. The judgment has far-reaching implications and reflects a departure from the traditional interpretation of Hindu law. This decision emphasizes the principle of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in the Indian Constitution.  

 

The landmark judgment promotes social justice and seeks to rectify historical injustices that may have been perpetuated by traditional interpretations of Hindu law. It ensures that children born in complex family situations are not disadvantaged. It underscores the importance of protecting the rights of vulnerable individuals, particularly children, and ensuring their access to ancestral property. The Supreme Court judgment of 2023 is a step in the right direction, heralding a more inclusive and equitable interpretation of Hindu law in contemporary India. It underscores the principle that law cannot remain static and must adapt to contemporary understandings of family and kinship. While it brings much-needed clarity to the legal landscape, it also raises the need for continued legal education and awareness to ensure that these rights are effectively asserted and protected in practice. 

 

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.” 

 

Written by – Ananya Chaudhary 

 

[1] 2023INSC783

[2] Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

[3] Hindu Succession Act, 1956

[4] (2010) 11 SCC 483

[5] (2011) 11 SCC 1

[6] 2023INSC783

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Delhi High Court Clarifies Scope of Seizure under Section 67 of CGST Act

Title:  Deepak Khandelwal Proprietor v. Commissioner of CGST and Anr.

Decided on:  17th August, 2023

+  W.P.(C) 6739/2021

CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU & HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

Introduction

The Delhi High Court, in a recent case, delved into the interpretation of Section 67 of the CGST Act, 2017, pertaining to the seizure of documents, books, and items during search operations. The court highlighted the legislative intent behind the provision and clarified the extent to which seizure can be carried out.

Facts

The petitioner, engaged in trading non-ferrous metals, faced a search operation at his residence under Section 67(2) of the CGST Act, resulting in the seizure of items, currency, and subsequent arrest. The petitioner sought the release of the seized assets, including two silver bars and mobile phones.

Analysis

The court analyzed the provisions of Section 67 of the CGST Act to discern its legislative intent. It noted that the power to seize items, books, or documents under Section 67(2) is solely for the purpose of examination, inquiry, or proceedings under the Act. The court emphasized that the intent is to uncover tax evasion and ensure taxable supplies are taxed. It clarified that the provision does not empower the seizure of currency or valuable assets solely based on unaccounted wealth.

Held

The court ruled that under Section 67(3) of the Act, items seized under Section 67(2) and not relied upon for issuing notices under the Act or its rules must be returned within thirty days of notice issuance. The court emphasized that the seizure provisions are not meant for recovering unaccounted wealth or tax evasion. Therefore, it directed the respondents to release the seized currency and valuable assets from the petitioner’s possession.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s interpretation of Section 67 clarifies the boundaries of seizure powers under the CGST Act, emphasizing that the provision is not intended for seizing unaccounted wealth or assets. The court’s analysis reaffirms the legislative purpose and ensures that the scope of seizure remains aligned with its original intent.

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Written by- Ankit Kaushik

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SEBI’s Direction Under Section 11B(1) of the 1992 Act Cannot Prevent Bank From Auctioning Defaulter’s Property In Line With Bank’s Rights Under SARFAESI: Delhi High Court

Title:  ICICI Bank v. Deputy General Manager and Ors.

Decided on:  21st July, 2023

+  W.P.(C) 3796/2022

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

The Delhi High Court has clarified the scope of SEBI’s powers under Section 11B of the SEBI Act, 1992, stating that SEBI can issue directions to any person or class of persons, including banks, under this section, irrespective of whether they are registered with SEBI under Section 12. However, the court emphasized that SEBI’s powers should be exercised in a manner that does not conflict with or curtail the effect of other laws. The court ruled that SEBI’s direction under Section 11B(1) cannot restrain a bank from auctioning a defaulter’s property according to the bank’s rights under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

Facts

The case revolved around the petitioner bank and the third and fourth respondents who had borrowed a home loan from the bank and mortgaged a property. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) initiated an investigation against a company in which the third and fourth respondents were directors. SEBI ordered that the respondents not dispose of or alienate any assets without prior permission. Meanwhile, the bank noted the respondents’ default in loan repayment, classified their account as a Non-Performing Asset, and issued a demand notice under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The bank also sought to auction the mortgaged property.

Senior Advocate Sanjiv Sen represented the petitioner, while Senior Advocate Arunabh Choudhury appeared for the respondent.

Analysis

The court analyzed the interplay between SEBI’s powers under the SEBI Act and the rights of banks under the SARFAESI Act. It noted that SEBI’s powers must be exercised carefully to avoid conflicting with other laws. The court pointed out that SEBI’s directions cannot change the material terms of the direction and should not be applicable to those to whom it is not intended.

The court emphasized that the SARFAESI Act prioritizes the debts of secured creditors over other dues. It highlighted the insertion of Section 26E in the SARFAESI Act to protect banks from interference by the state machinery in realizing their dues.

Held

The Delhi High Court held that the SEBI Act’s powers are legitimate and legal as long as they do not breach the mandate of other laws. In this case, the SARFAESI Act’s provisions took precedence over SEBI’s directions. The court concluded that the bank’s actions to realize its secured asset were not connected to the securities market and were governed by the SARFAESI Act. The SEBI Act’s directions were applicable to a broader set of assets and situations.

Thus, the court held that the bank’s rights under the SARFAESI Act should not be curtailed by SEBI’s directions, and the bank could proceed with the auction of the mortgaged property in accordance with the SARFAESI Act.

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

Written by- Ankit Kaushik

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