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Necessary evidence to be produced in front of the District judge: Rajasthan HC remanded the case back as it held that the decision could not be considered contradictory to the evidence

CASE TITLE – Akha Ram & Ors. v. National Highway Authority of India

CASE NUMBER – S.B. Civil Misc. Appeals No. 1805/2023, 1806/2023, 1807/2023, 1808/2023, 1993/2023, 1994/2023, 1996/2023 & 1999/2023

DATED ON – 22.05.20244

QUORUM – Hon’ble Justice Rekha Borana

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

The present appeals have been filed against the orders passed by the District Judge, Jalore whereby the applications/objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1996’) as filed by the claimants-objectors have been rejected as being non-maintainable. A Notification dated 20.08.2018, in terms of Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1956’) was issued for acquisition of land for the purposes of construction of National Highway No.754K of Amritsar-Kandla Project under Bharat Mala Project in Jalore District. Vide the said notification, the khatedari land of the claimants was proposed to be acquired. The objections qua the said acquisition were invited vide communication dated 07.09.2018 and the objections were even filed by the claimants on 18.09.2018. However, the said objections were rejected and the final declaration in terms of Section 3D of the Act of 1956 was made on 05.08.2019. The gazette publication of the said declaration was made on 06.08.2019. the acquisition proceedings were finalised and the amount to be paid qua the acquisition was determined by the Competent Authority i.e. the Land Acquisition Officer cum Sub Divisional Officer, Jalore on 21.11.2019. The said amount was determined on basis of the DLC rates as prevalent at that point of time. An application was preferred by the claimants before the Collector on 24.06.2021. The said application was nomenclated to be under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1894’). However, an application for an amendment was preferred subsequently with the prayer for the said application to be read to be one under Section 64 of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2013’). Ultimately, the application as preferred before the Collector was decided vide order dated 25.08.2022, the Collector proceeded on to dismiss the application as preferred by the claimants while observing that the arbitration application as preferred by the claimants stands rejected. Aggrieved of the order dated 25.08.2022 as passed by the Collector vide which, the determination/Award dated 21.11.2019 was affirmed, application/objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was/were preferred by the claimants before the District Judge, Jalore. Vide Order dated 19.08.2023, the learned District Judge, Jalore proceeded on to reject the said application/objections on the premise that the same was/were not maintainable before the Court.

 

ISSUE

Whether the claimants can challenge the award passed by the Collector/Arbitrator in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 by filing objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, lays down the specifications for determination of compensation by Arbitrator.

Section 3G (6) of the National Highways Act, 1956, lays down the process by which Objections to Arbitrator’s award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be made.

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, lays down the process to challenge an arbitration award.

 

CONTENTIONS BY THE APPELLANTS

The Learned counsel for the appellants admitted that the application as preferred before the Collector was inadvertently nomenclated first, to be under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 and subsequently under Section 64 of the Act of 2013. Counsel submitted that, in fact, the said application was in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 and even the Collector decided the same treating it to be under the said provision only. He submitted that the operative portion of the order as passed by the Collector makes it clear that the Collector treated the application to be under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 and he, acting as an Arbitrator, dismissed the application treating it to be so. Therefore, in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956, once an application under the said provision is rejected, i.e. the claim of the claimants is rejected by the Arbitrator, objections in terms of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would lie as that was the only remedy available to the claimants in terms of Section 3G(6) of the Act of 1956. Counsel submitted that admittedly, the acquisition in question was an acquisition in terms of the Act of 1956 for the purposes of a National Highway and hence, the acquisition or the proceedings for compensation would be governed by the said act only. Even if the claimants preferred any application under any provision of the Act of 1894, the same could not have governed the dispute and such wrong mentioning of the provision could not have made the Act of 1894 applicable. Counsel further submitted that Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 provides that if the amount determined by the competent authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, the same shall be determined by the Arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government on an application by either of the parties. Therefore, the application as preferred by the claimants was definitely in terms of the said provision. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Order impugned deserves interference even for the reason that no such objection pertaining to jurisdiction or maintainability of the objections was raised even by the respondent Union of India.

 

CONTENTIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS

The Learned counsel appearing for the NHAI submitted on merits that the award in question is totally in conformity with law and does not deserve any interference. However, counsel was not in a position to refute the submission as made by learned counsel for the appellants that the application/objections as preferred by the claimants was/were very much maintainable before the District Judge in terms of Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

 

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan noted that it is an admitted position on record that acquisition of the land in question was for the purposes of National Highways in terms of the Act of 1956. Meaning thereby, the provisions of Section 3G of the Act of 1956 would govern the procedure for determination of compensation. They held that the provision under the Act of 1996, which provides for a challenge to an award passed by the Arbitrator, is definitely Section 34. Therefore, the application as moved before the District Judge in the present case, raising a challenge to the award as passed by the Collector/Arbitrator in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956, was definitely in terms of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The fact that the application as preferred before learned Collector was infact in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 was also evident to them from the fact that no prayer for reference of the same in terms of Section 64 of the Act of 2013 was made in the same. The High Court stated that had the application been intended to be made under Section 64 of the Act of 2013, a prayer for reference of the same definitely would have been made, which was clearly not made. They stated that the provisions of the Act of 2013, relating to the determination of the compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule were only made applicable to all cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act. Meaning thereby, all aspects contained under Sections 26 to 28 of the Act of 2013, for determination of compensation, were made applicable to the National Highways Act, 1956 also. The effect of the Act of 2015 was that the beneficiary provisions of Sections 26 to 28 of the Act of 2013 were made applicable to all the land acquisition proceedings. But then, only the said provisions of the Act of 2013 were made applicable to the Act of 1956 and nothing more than that. Meaning thereby, Section 64 of the Act of 2013 as relied upon by the learned District Judge was not applicable in the present matter. And so far as the finding of learned Judge regarding there being no notification in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 appointing an Arbitrator is concerned, the High Court held that the finding cannot be said to be contrary to the material as no such notification was placed on record before the learned District Judge. And since it had been placed before the High Court, due to which the orders impugned were quashed and set aside, and held that the matter is remanded back to the learned District Judge, Jalore for decision afresh on the application/objections as preferred by the claimants treating them to be under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

 

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Judgement Reviewed by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

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Delhi HC rejects the appeal of NHAI regarding Pochanpalli Expressways

Case Title : National Highways Authority Of India vs GMR Hyderabad Vijayawada Expressways Ltd. 

 Case no :(i) + FAO(OS) (COMM) 108/2020 & CM APPL. 21850/2020

                 (ii) + FAO(OS) (COMM) 109/2020 & CM APPL. 21853/2020 

                 (iii) + FAO(OS) (COMM) 110/2020 & CM APPL. 21856/2020

 Order no : 7th May, 2024

 Quorum : Hon’ble Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Hon’ble Justice Neena Bansal Krishna 

 FACTS OF THE CASE

In December 2007 the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) issued a tender for design, construction, development, finance, operation and maintenance of 4/6 laning of Hyderabad Vijayawada Section from KM 40.000 to KM 221.500 on NH-9 in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Tender was in two stages: technical and financial bid stage.

19 bidders submitted their bids, after examining those GMR Infrastructure Ltd./Punj Lloyd Ltd. (JV) were found technically eligible. Later on the Central Government intervened and re-examined the bids and declared GMR Infrastructure as ineligible. The parties took the matter to the Supreme Court and later on it was decided by the court that 8 bidders were allowed to contest in the second stage of bidding i.e, financial bidding. Eventually GMR Infrastructure was awarded the project. 

According to NHAI the respondents GMR Infrastructure would pay a premium of 32.60% according to the concession agreement starting from Commercial Operation Date (COD). The respondents reached the COD and started the operation but later on stopped paying the premium. NHAI demanded outstanding premium and claimed that the respondents violated the interim order. The respondents claimed adverse financial consequences due to the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh and change in laws. NHAI claimed that the respondent’s claims showed lack of grievance.

Later the matter was taken up to the Arbitral Tribunal where the Appellant claimed saying the respondent was delaying the proceedings on purpose and the matter was taken up in the Supreme Court. Dissatisfied with the result both the parties took up the contention again in the Arbitral Tribunal and the contention of allowing NHAI to decide the claims in accordance with the majority Award was challenged by the appellant.

ISSUE

whether the learned Single Judge, in proceedings under Section34 of the Act, exceeded his jurisdiction by upholding the minority Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, which resulted in the appellant being denied the opportunity to take a fresh decision, and instead appointed a sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the claim of the respondent and whether the learned Single Judge was justified in doing so.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 : Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with subsection (2) and sub-section (3). (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice.
  2. Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 : parties can approach the Court under section 9 of the Act to seek interim reliefs before, or during the arbitral proceedings, or at any time after the passing of the award but before it is enforced.

CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT

The learned counsel for the Appellants contended that the learned Judge and the Tribunal failed to consider Clause 41.1 of the Agreement which only covers cases of increased costs due to change in law and not all kinds of revenue losses due to reduced traffic. The appellant further contends that subordinate legislation was not intended to be included in the definition of Change in Law unless expressly mentioned. Next the Appellant’s Learned Counsel submitted that the respondents action regarding the payment of the premium breaches the contractual terms and the successive section 17 were filed to prevent the appellant from recovering the premium.

The appellant challenges the integrity of the Halcrow project and discrepancies in traffic projections which were ignored by the Tribunal.NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA The Learned Counsel of the appellant finally submitted that the Learned Single Judge Bench erred in substituting the majority award with the minority award without proper authority. 

 CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT

The Learned counsel for the Respondents stated that the challenges arose due to bifurcation of the two states and changes in the traffic patterns. The respondents disputed the claims of the appellants regarding clause 41.3 of the agreement regarding the financial model was binding as per contractual obligations.

The Learned Counsel for respondents rejected allegations regarding the  traffic studies and opposed the appellants claims about clause 41.3. The counsel finally submitted that the conclusions reached by the Tribunal and the Single Judge were based on the thorough examination of legal provisions, evidence and arguments thus the appeal must be dismissed. 

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT

The Arbitral Tribunal in both the majority and the minority awards agreed that the change in ‘sand mining’ policy constituted a ‘change in law’ under the agreement. As there were disagreements the Single Judge appointed an arbitrator to resolve the issue but the appellant disagreed with the appointment and stated that the courts cannot modify arbitral awards but can set them aside and the decision was based on the principle of severability. 

The whole issue revolves around ‘change in law’ as per the agreement and its clauses. The court disagreed with the way of the appellant challenging the issue by section 34 of Arbitration Act. The court upheld the decision of the tribunal and rejected the request for the appellant to introduce new contentions. The court found no basis to discredit the Halcrow report and the financial model. The court upheld the decision of appointing an arbitrator to assess respondents’ claim and rejected the appellant appeals against the Award and the  Single Judge.

 

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JUDGMENT REVIEWED BY – Nagashree N M

 

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The Decision of Allahabad High Court ‘Smacks of arbitrariness and perversity’: Supreme Court quashed the hasty order of HC

Case title – Suneeta Devi VS Avinash and others

Case no. – Civil Appeal No(s). OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 20422 of 2019)

Decision on – March 11, 2024

Quoram – Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Sandeep Mehta

Facts of the case

A primary school situated in a village was found to be falling on the proposed alignment of the National Highway and the same was demolished by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) for the construction of the highway. The villagers requested the NHAI to construct new primary school in the village which was accepted by it. The Land Management Committee issued a proposal identifying and providing a plot of land in the village for the construction of the new school and forwarded the same for approval to the State authorities.

The proposal was accepted by the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) and NHAI started construction of the school. In order to challenge the same, two persons (respondents) filed a writ petition before the High Court portraying it to be a Public Interest Litigation (PIL). The PIL was dismissed by the Division Bench.

The respondents subsequently preferred pleas against the legality of the resolution/proposal. The High Court held the proposals to be illegal. The Respondents before the High Court, aggrieved by its decision, appealed before the Apex Court. A stay was granted by the Supreme Court on the operation of the impugned order.

Submissions of the parties

The respondents filed counter affidavit in the matter, but however, no one appeared to contest the matter when it was called upon for hearing.

The Learned counsel representing the appellant submitted that the school in question has already been constructed and is operational on the disputed plot of a government land. Furthermore, the appellant being the impleaded respondent in the writ petition was never heard by the High Court as the writ petition was allowed without issuing any formal notice.

Court’s Analysis and Judgement

The bench observed that the writ petition filed claiming title on the disputed plot of land was taken up in hot haste by the High Court and was allowed without issuing formal notice to all the respondents. Even the State authorities were not given proper opportunity of filing a counter. Further, the standing counsel was instructed to appear without any formal notice being issued and was given a single day’s opportunity to present the factual report.

The Court opined that the writ petition deserved rejection with exemplary costs because the factum of filing of previous two writ petitions was concealed by the respondents. It further noted that the petition was manifestly tainted on account of concealment of material facts. The Court, therefore, held that the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, perversity, and was passed in sheer violation of principles of natural justice.

Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the appeal and quashed the order of the High Court.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Keerthi K

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