#Rajasthanhighcourt Archives

20 Jun

NEET-UG 2024: Supreme Court Halts High Court Proceedings on Paper Leak Allegations; While Stating that Counselling will not stop.

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An interesting development has come up in the cases dealing in the alleged NEET-UG 2024 paper leak, where the Supreme Court on Thursday (20^th July), issued a notice to Stay the proceedings in three other High Courts, namely the Rajasthan, Calcutta, and Bombay High Courts. The ruling was issued in response to a notice on a transfer petition filed by the National Testing Agency (NTA) by a vacation bench consisting of Justices Vikram Nath and SVN Bhatti. The NTA is requesting that the Supreme Court hear these cases after they were originally heard in the High Court.

“There may be some individual cases where petitions have been filed asking for the answer sheets, issue of higher marks and lesser marks, let those matters be thrashed out by the High Court.” – Justice Vikram Nath stated while issuing the stay order.

The Supreme Court in addition, tagged certain other writ petitions that claimed irregularities in NEET-UG 2024’s conduct with related matters that were posted on July 8. The Court verbally stated that it is known that the admission procedure will be contingent upon the outcome of the petitions, while reiterating that it was not going to halt the counseling process.

The following matters are the ones for which the Court issued notices:

NTA vs. Keshav Pareek and others (T.P.(C) No. 1602/2024) – Rajasthan High Court.
NTA vs. Shreya Banerjee and others (T.P.(C) No. 1597/2024) – Calcutta High Court.
NTA vs. Tanmoy Chattopadhyay and others (T.P.(C) No. 1596/2024) – Calcutta High Court.
NTA vs. Nikita (Minor) and others (T.P.(C) No. 1600/2024) – Bombay High Court.

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Written by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

4 Jun

Rajasthan HC directs State Government to look into the absence of State Counsel representation in legal proceedings

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CASE TITLE – Rekha Kumari v. State Of Rajasthan.

CASE NUMBER – S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3015/2019

DATED ON – 15.03.2024

QUORUM – Hon’ble Justice Ganesh Ram Meena

FACTS OF THE CASE

Mr. Rahul Gupta, Adv. and Mr. Shubhendu Pilania, Adv., on behalf of Mr. Basant Singh Chhaba, AAG, representing all respondents, request three weeks to file a reply. On January 22, 2020, this Court instructed the petitioner’s attorney to provide a copy of the petition to Mr. C.L. Saini, AAG’s office and to file the case after indicating Mr. Saini’s name in the cause-list. Mr. C.L. Saini, AAG, represented the respondents on February 3, 2020, and requested two weeks to provide a response. On September 15, 2023, Mr. C.L. Saini, AAG, representing the respondents, requested an extension of time to submit their reply, and this request was granted. Once more, now, more than four years later, the respondent State’s attorneys ask for extra time to file a response. The issues concern the petitioners’ claim to be appointed to the Grade III (Special Education) Teacher post. The unemployed people who have come before this court as petitioners are doing so in order to pursue justice. Although they were served four years ago, the respondent-State, which is regarded as a welfare state, is pleading for more time to submit a response.

ISSUE

Whether the State can be given time to file a reply.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan noticed that the respondent authority’s sluggish attitude demonstrates that they are not operating as a welfare state, and this type of behaviour might have disastrous effects on the entire legal system, which is why poor unemployed litigants are turning to the courts in the first place. The court has also evidently noticed that the respondent-State is not being adequately represented by the Officer or its solicitors for the past two months. It has been brought to the attention of the Rajasthani government, the chief secretary, and the principal secretary of the law and legal affairs department several times, but as of yet, no adequate plan has been established for the state’s representation. The absence of State counsel is the reason for the adjournment of several cases. A few days ago, this Court also learned of a lawsuit that the State had brought, in which no one had represented the State on two or three occasions. In the aforementioned case, this Court believes that the Governor of Rajasthan, His Excellency, should be informed of the issue so that the State Government can investigate and the State’s interests can be protected throughout the legal process and any rulings rendered by the Court. The court ordered that a copy of this order must be sent by the Registrar (Judicial) to the Chief Secretary of the State of Rajasthan, His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan, and the Principal Secretary of the Law and Legal Affairs Department of the Government of Rajasthan. For the sake of fairness, the Hon’ble High Court gave the respondents two weeks as a last chance to file a reply, subject to the respondent state paying each petitioner’s costs of Rs. 10,000 in the event that the reply is not submitted by the next listing date.

Judgement Reviewed by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

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4 Jun

Necessary evidence to be produced in front of the District judge: Rajasthan HC remanded the case back as it held that the decision could not be considered contradictory to the evidence

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CASE TITLE – Akha Ram & Ors. v. National Highway Authority of India

CASE NUMBER – S.B. Civil Misc. Appeals No. 1805/2023, 1806/2023, 1807/2023, 1808/2023, 1993/2023, 1994/2023, 1996/2023 & 1999/2023

DATED ON – 22.05.20244

QUORUM – Hon’ble Justice Rekha Borana

FACTS OF THE CASE

The present appeals have been filed against the orders passed by the District Judge, Jalore whereby the applications/objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1996’) as filed by the claimants-objectors have been rejected as being non-maintainable. A Notification dated 20.08.2018, in terms of Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1956’) was issued for acquisition of land for the purposes of construction of National Highway No.754K of Amritsar-Kandla Project under Bharat Mala Project in Jalore District. Vide the said notification, the khatedari land of the claimants was proposed to be acquired. The objections qua the said acquisition were invited vide communication dated 07.09.2018 and the objections were even filed by the claimants on 18.09.2018. However, the said objections were rejected and the final declaration in terms of Section 3D of the Act of 1956 was made on 05.08.2019. The gazette publication of the said declaration was made on 06.08.2019. the acquisition proceedings were finalised and the amount to be paid qua the acquisition was determined by the Competent Authority i.e. the Land Acquisition Officer cum Sub Divisional Officer, Jalore on 21.11.2019. The said amount was determined on basis of the DLC rates as prevalent at that point of time. An application was preferred by the claimants before the Collector on 24.06.2021. The said application was nomenclated to be under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1894’). However, an application for an amendment was preferred subsequently with the prayer for the said application to be read to be one under Section 64 of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2013’). Ultimately, the application as preferred before the Collector was decided vide order dated 25.08.2022, the Collector proceeded on to dismiss the application as preferred by the claimants while observing that the arbitration application as preferred by the claimants stands rejected. Aggrieved of the order dated 25.08.2022 as passed by the Collector vide which, the determination/Award dated 21.11.2019 was affirmed, application/objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was/were preferred by the claimants before the District Judge, Jalore. Vide Order dated 19.08.2023, the learned District Judge, Jalore proceeded on to reject the said application/objections on the premise that the same was/were not maintainable before the Court.

ISSUE

Whether the claimants can challenge the award passed by the Collector/Arbitrator in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 by filing objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, lays down the specifications for determination of compensation by Arbitrator.

Section 3G (6) of the National Highways Act, 1956, lays down the process by which Objections to Arbitrator’s award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be made.

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, lays down the process to challenge an arbitration award.

CONTENTIONS BY THE APPELLANTS

The Learned counsel for the appellants admitted that the application as preferred before the Collector was inadvertently nomenclated first, to be under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 and subsequently under Section 64 of the Act of 2013. Counsel submitted that, in fact, the said application was in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 and even the Collector decided the same treating it to be under the said provision only. He submitted that the operative portion of the order as passed by the Collector makes it clear that the Collector treated the application to be under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 and he, acting as an Arbitrator, dismissed the application treating it to be so. Therefore, in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956, once an application under the said provision is rejected, i.e. the claim of the claimants is rejected by the Arbitrator, objections in terms of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would lie as that was the only remedy available to the claimants in terms of Section 3G(6) of the Act of 1956. Counsel submitted that admittedly, the acquisition in question was an acquisition in terms of the Act of 1956 for the purposes of a National Highway and hence, the acquisition or the proceedings for compensation would be governed by the said act only. Even if the claimants preferred any application under any provision of the Act of 1894, the same could not have governed the dispute and such wrong mentioning of the provision could not have made the Act of 1894 applicable. Counsel further submitted that Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 provides that if the amount determined by the competent authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, the same shall be determined by the Arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government on an application by either of the parties. Therefore, the application as preferred by the claimants was definitely in terms of the said provision. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Order impugned deserves interference even for the reason that no such objection pertaining to jurisdiction or maintainability of the objections was raised even by the respondent Union of India.

CONTENTIONS BY THE RESPONDENTS

The Learned counsel appearing for the NHAI submitted on merits that the award in question is totally in conformity with law and does not deserve any interference. However, counsel was not in a position to refute the submission as made by learned counsel for the appellants that the application/objections as preferred by the claimants was/were very much maintainable before the District Judge in terms of Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan noted that it is an admitted position on record that acquisition of the land in question was for the purposes of National Highways in terms of the Act of 1956. Meaning thereby, the provisions of Section 3G of the Act of 1956 would govern the procedure for determination of compensation. They held that the provision under the Act of 1996, which provides for a challenge to an award passed by the Arbitrator, is definitely Section 34. Therefore, the application as moved before the District Judge in the present case, raising a challenge to the award as passed by the Collector/Arbitrator in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956, was definitely in terms of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The fact that the application as preferred before learned Collector was infact in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 was also evident to them from the fact that no prayer for reference of the same in terms of Section 64 of the Act of 2013 was made in the same. The High Court stated that had the application been intended to be made under Section 64 of the Act of 2013, a prayer for reference of the same definitely would have been made, which was clearly not made. They stated that the provisions of the Act of 2013, relating to the determination of the compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule were only made applicable to all cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act. Meaning thereby, all aspects contained under Sections 26 to 28 of the Act of 2013, for determination of compensation, were made applicable to the National Highways Act, 1956 also. The effect of the Act of 2015 was that the beneficiary provisions of Sections 26 to 28 of the Act of 2013 were made applicable to all the land acquisition proceedings. But then, only the said provisions of the Act of 2013 were made applicable to the Act of 1956 and nothing more than that. Meaning thereby, Section 64 of the Act of 2013 as relied upon by the learned District Judge was not applicable in the present matter. And so far as the finding of learned Judge regarding there being no notification in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 appointing an Arbitrator is concerned, the High Court held that the finding cannot be said to be contrary to the material as no such notification was placed on record before the learned District Judge. And since it had been placed before the High Court, due to which the orders impugned were quashed and set aside, and held that the matter is remanded back to the learned District Judge, Jalore for decision afresh on the application/objections as preferred by the claimants treating them to be under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.

Judgement Reviewed by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

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4 Jun

Rajasthan High Court Verdict in 1991 Criminal Case: Conviction Changed from Attempt to Rape to Assault

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Case title: Suwalal VS. The State Of Rajasthan

Case no : S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 272/1991

Order on: 13/05/2024

Qoram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND

Fact of the case:

The complainant (PW-3) lodged a report at the Police Station, Todaraisingh, District Tonk, alleging that his six-year-old granddaughter, referred to as “D,” was drinking water at a Pyau (Water Booth) near Dharamshala when the accused, Suwalal, forcefully took her into the Dharamshala around 8:00 PM with the intent to commit rape. Villagers intervened upon hearing the girl’s cries. Based on this report, Crime Report No.40/1991 was registered for the offence under Section 376/511 IPC. Following the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the appellant for the aforementioned offence, and charges were framed by the Trial Court, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented 7 witnesses and 5 documents. The appellant’s statements were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. On 03.07.1991, the Sessions Judge, Tonk, convicted Suwalal under Section 376/511 IPC and sentenced him to 3 years and 6 months of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.100, with an additional 3 months of simple imprisonment in default of payment.

Issues Framed by the Court

Whether the appellant, Suwalal, committed the offence of attempt to rape under Section 376/511 IPC as per the allegations.
Whether the facts and evidence support the conviction under Section 376/511 IPC or if a different section of the IPC is more appropriate.

Legal provisions:

Section 376/511 IPC: Deals with the attempt to commit rape. Section 376 covers the punishment for rape, and Section 511 deals with the punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with life imprisonment or other punishments.

Section 354 IPC: Apply to to assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.

Contentions of Appellant:

The appellant’s counsel argued that the allegations made by the prosecutrix did not constitute an attempt to rape under Section 376/511 IPC. The main accusation was that the appellant undressed himself and the prosecutrix, which does not fulfill the legal criteria for an attempt to rape. The counsel highlighted that there was no medical evidence connecting the appellant to an attempt to rape the prosecutrix. The counsel contended that the Trial Court erred in its judgment by convicting the appellant under Section 376/511 IPC without sufficient evidence of an attempt to rape.

Contentions of Respondents:

The respondent ( Public Prosecutor ) argued that the prosecutrix’s statements clearly indicated that the appellant undressed both himself and the prosecutrix, which were specific actions pointing towards an attempt to rape. The counsel noted that the appellant did not cross-examine the prosecutrix (PW-2) to challenge her testimony, thereby suggesting that her statements should be considered credible and sufficient to establish an attempt to rape. The Public Prosecutor maintained that the evidence on record and the testimony of the prosecutrix justified the conviction under Section 376/511 IPC.

Court analysis& Judgement:

In this case, The court examined the FIR and statements of witnesses, particularly focusing on the prosecutrix (PW-2) and her grandfather (PW-3). The prosecutrix’s account that the appellant undressed her and himself was scrutinized. However, it was found that these actions did not constitute an attempt to rape as defined under Section 376/511 IPC. The court clarified that for an act to be considered an attempt to rape under Section 376/511 IPC, it must go beyond mere preparation and constitute a direct attempt to commit rape. The court determined that the actions of the appellant, forcefully taking the prosecutrix into the Dharamshala and undressing, amounted to assault with intent to outrage modesty under Section 354 IPC. The court emphasized that the appellant’s actions had the intention or knowledge that the modesty of the prosecutrix was likely to be outraged, fitting the criteria for Section 354 IPC. The court considered the appellant’s age at the time of the incident (below 25 years). The duration the appellant had already spent in jail was noted (approximately 2½ months). The court acknowledged the long duration since the incident (over 33 years), which had likely caused mental, physical, and economic strain on the appellant. Given the significant lapse of time, the court found it inappropriate to send the appellant back to jail.

Therefore, the court decided that the appellant’s conviction was altered from Section 376/511 IPC (attempt to rape) to Section 354 IPC (assault or criminal force with intent to outrage modesty). The findings of the learned Sessions Judge, Tonk, were modified accordingly. In accordance with Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the appellant was directed to furnish a personal bond of Rs.50,000/- and one surety of a similar amount within three months. This bond would ensure the appellant’s appearance before the Supreme Court if an appeal was filed against this judgment. The bonds would remain effective for six months. The trial court’s record was ordered to be sent back immediately.

Judgement Reviewed By- Antara Ghosh

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4 Jun

Rajasthan High Court Granted probation to convicted appellants in an attempted murder case

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Case title: Unknow VS State of Rajasthan

Case no.: S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 483/1993

Dated on: February 19^th 2024

Quorum: Hon’ble. MR Justice GANESH RAM MEENA

FACTS OF THE CASE

The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused-appellants against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 26.11.1993 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Prevention of Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes, Prevention of Atrocities, Jaipur (for short ‘the trial Court’) in Sessions Case No.88/1990. Five years Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo 2 months imprisonment. Five years Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo 2 months imprisonment. Fine of Rs.100/- each and in default of payment of fine each of the accused appellant has to undergo 15 days imprisonment. On filing of appeal, the sentence awarded to the accused appellants was suspended vide order dated 13.12.1993 and they were released on bail.

ISSUES

Whether the reformation of the accused-appellants and their peaceful conduct post-bail support the argument that they do not pose a risk to public safety and thus should be granted probation?
Whether the objections raised by the learned Public Prosecutor, opposing leniency and probation due to the nature and manner of the offense, should preclude the granting of probation to the accused-appellants?
Whether the prolonged duration of the trial and the resultant mental agony and harassment faced by the accused-appellants since 1993 warrant leniency in sentencing?
Whether the conviction and sentence of the accused-appellants by the trial court under Sections 307 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) were valid and justified?
Whether the accused-appellants are entitled to the benefit of probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, considering their age, lack of criminal antecedents, and behaviour post-conviction?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Indian Penal Code (IPC)

Section 307 IPC: This section pertains to the offense of attempt to murder. It deals with the intention or knowledge of committing murder, and the actions taken in furtherance of that intention. The maximum punishment under this section is imprisonment for up to 10 years, and if the act causes hurt, the punishment can extend to life imprisonment, along with a fine.

Section 323 IPC: This section addresses the punishment for voluntarily causing hurt. The punishment can be imprisonment for up to one year, or a fine up to one thousand rupees, or both.

Section 34 IPC: This section pertains to acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act as if it were done by him alone.

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

Section 4: This section allows the court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct instead of sentencing them to imprisonment. The court can use this provision for offenders who have committed offenses not punishable with death or life imprisonment, and if the court deems it appropriate after considering the offender’s age, character, and the circumstances of the case.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Mr. V.R. Bajwa, Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Amar Kumar and Ms. Savita Nathawat, appearing for the accused appellants instead of arguing the appeal on its merits with regard to challenge to the conviction and sentence, confines his arguments for grant of benefit of probation to the appellants under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1958’). Counsel further submits that except the present case, no case has been registered against the accused-appellants. Counsel further submits that the accused appellants are living peacefully in the society without there being any criminal antecedents to their discredit. Senior Counsel further submits that the accused-appellants have faced trial for about three years and against the impugned judgment, they preferred the appeal in the year, 1993. Thus, from the last 33 years, the accused-appellants are facing mental agony and harassment because of pendency of criminal case registered against them. Counsel further submits that the maximum sentence under Section 307 of IPC is 07 years but in the present case, the accused appellant No.1 Nawal Kishore has been convicted for offence under Section 307 of IPC and accused appellant No.2-Rajesh has been convicted for the offence under section 34 read with section 307 IPC and they been sentenced to undergo five years Rigorous Imprisonment and for the offence under section 323 read with section 34 IPC a fine of Rs.100/- has been imposed upon each of them. Senior Counsel further submits that the accused appellant No.1 is 59 years of age and the accused appellant No.2 is 56 years of age. Thus, taking into consideration the aforesaid facts, the accused-appellants may be given the benefit of probation under the provisions of the Act of 1958.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State opposed the prayer made by the counsel appearing for the appellants and submits that looking to the allegations and the manner in which the incident took place, the appellants are not entitled for any kind of leniency in awarding sentence as well as the benefit of probation under Section 4 of the Act of 1958. Considered the submissions made by the Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants as well as the learned Public Prosecutor. Learned trial Court while considering the issue of granting leniency to the accused appellants, has rejected their prayer in regard to the leniency. Section 4 of the Act of 1958 nowhere says that the benefit of probation cannot be allowed to an accused who is above 21 years of age. The Act of 1958 deals with the powers of the Court to release certain offenders for good conduct.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act explains the rationale for the enactment and its amendments: to give the benefit of release of offenders on probation of good conduct instead of sentencing them to imprisonment. Thus, increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of offenders as useful and self-reliant members of society without subjecting them to the deleterious effects of jail life is what is sought to be subserved. The main object of sentencing a convicted person is to bring in him certain character reformation and to keep him away from the society so as to see that the impact of his criminal character does not put any adverse impact on any other person. In the present case, after conviction of the accused appellants, their sentence was suspended and they were release on bail vide order dated 13.12.1993. Since after their release on bail, they are living in the society peacefully without there being any criminal antecedents to their discredit. There is no bar under law to extend the benefit of probation to convict of above 21 years age. After taking into due consideration the legislative intent of the Act and the decision as referred in above paragraphs, this Court deems it appropriate to extend the benefit of probation to the appellants under Section 4 of the Act of 1958. the present appeal is partly allowed. While maintaining the conviction of the present appellant No.1- Nawal Kishore for the offence under Section 307 of IPC and of accused appellant No.2-Rajesh for the offence under section 34 read with section 307 IPC and of both the accused appellants under section 323 read with section 34 IPC, as recorded by the learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment, this Court interferes only with the sentence part of the said judgment and directs that the appellants shall be released on probation under Section 4 of the Act of 1958 upon their furnishing a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 50,000/- each and two sureties in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court with a further undertaking that they shall maintain peace and good behaviour for a period of two years and shall not repeat the offence. The appellants are allowed two months’ time to furnish the bail bonds, sureties and undertaking as ordered above. The appellants are on bail. They need not to surrender. Their bail bonds stand cancelled accordingly. The Registry is directed to send back record of the case to the trial court forthwith.

Judgement Reviewed by – HARIRAGHAVA JP

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