#limitationact Archives

9 Apr

“Merits of Case not necessary for Granting Delay in Condonation,” Principles For Condonation Of Delay Under Limitation Act laid down by Supreme Court.

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Case title: Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)

Case no.: Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 Of 2018

Order on: 8^th April 2024

Quorum: Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Bela M. Trivedi

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the village of Gandluru, District Guntur, Andhra Pradesh, certain lands were acquired for the Telugu Ganga Project in 1989. Dissatisfied with the compensation offered, 16 claimants filed a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. During the pendency of the reference, three of the claimants passed away, but their heirs were not substituted. Eventually, the reference was dismissed along with others, upholding the collector’s award.

Several years later, some heirs and legal representatives of one of the deceased claimants, Pathapati Subba Reddy, sought to file an appeal challenging the dismissal. However, they did so after an inordinate delay of 5659 days. They cited reasons such as lack of awareness of the reference due to living away from the ancestral home.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellants, heirs of the deceased claimant No. 11, sought to explain the delay by citing lack of awareness of the reference due to living in a different household. They argued that they promptly filed the appeal upon discovering the reference.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The respondent argued against condoning the delay, highlighting the lack of due diligence by the claimants in pursuing the reference earlier. They also emphasized that most claimants had accepted the reference court’s decision, implying acquiescence to the dismissal. Few Judgements which were relied on:

Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. [1]:

it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.

Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.[2]:

where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.

Imrat Lal & Ors. vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors.[3]:

In this case also the matter was regarding determination of compensation for the acquired land and there was a delay of 1110 days in filing the appeal for enhancement of compensation. Despite findings that no sufficient cause was shown in the application for condoning the delay, this Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal as a large number of similarly situate persons have been granted relief by this Court.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. – Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

ISSUE – The key issue was whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the inordinate delay in filing the appeal.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Court analysed the principles underlying the law of limitation, emphasizing the need for finality in litigation and the mandatory nature of Section 3. It discussed the discretionary power of courts to condone delay under Section 5, contingent upon the demonstration of “sufficient cause” by the appellant.

The Court cited precedents to underscore the necessity of exercising caution in condoning delays, particularly when negligence or lack of due diligence is apparent. It emphasized that while the court may adopt a liberal approach, it should not disregard the statutory provisions or the need for substantial cause for delay.

Ultimately, the Court upheld the decision of the High Court, reasoning that the claimants had failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay. It highlighted their lack of diligence in pursuing the reference earlier and noted that most claimants had accepted the reference court’s decision. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.

The case underscores the importance of diligence and awareness in pursuing legal remedies and the stringent application of limitation laws. It reaffirms that while courts may exercise discretion in condoning delays, such discretion is not absolute and must be exercised judiciously.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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[1] (2007) 11 SCC 285

[2] (2011) 4 SCC 363

[3] (2014) 14 SCC 133

20 Aug

Section 5 Of Limitation Act Applicable To Proceedings Under Railway Claim Tribunal Act, 1987: Allahabad High Court

Prime Legal

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CASE TITLE: M/S Krishak Bharti Co-Operative Ltd.Kribhco Surat Gujarat v. Union Of India Thru G.M. Northern Eastern Railway Gorakhpur [FAFO No. – 236 of 2002]

DECIDED ON: 16.08.2023

CORAM: Hon’ble Ajay Bhanot,J

INTRODUCTION

The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been affirmed by the Allahabad High Court in relation to proceedings governed by the Railway Claim Tribunal Act, 1987 and the Railway Claim Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989.

Justice Ajay Bhanot, presiding over the bench, was overseeing an appeal stemming from a claim application submitted before the Railway Claim Tribunal. The application was dismissed due to non-prosecution. Following this, the claimant submitted a request for the restoration of the claim application. However, this request was rejected due to being beyond the permissible time limit.

FACTS

The appellant submitted a compensation claim to the Railway Claims Tribunal’s Lucknow Bench (“Railway Tribunal”) following the demise of his son. However, due to a lack of prosecution, the claim was dismissed on 09.02.2000. Subsequently, eight months later, on 04.10.2000, the appellant lodged an application for restoration. Rule 18 of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989 specifies a 30-day timeframe for submitting an application to reverse a default dismissal order. The Railway Tribunal declined the restoration application due to it being beyond the allowable time limit.

In response to the decisions made by the Railway Tribunal, the appellant initiated an appeal in the High Court.

CASE ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The court drew upon precedents from the Gujarat High Court, specifically the cases of Shyam Santaram Sali (Marathi) v. Union of India and Dharmesh Madhubhai Parmar v. Union of India. In these cases, it was established that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings governed by the Railway Claim Tribunal Act, 1987, in conjunction with the Railway Claim Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989.

The court acknowledged that the case had been transferred from Gorakhpur to Lucknow, and due to an administrative oversight, this transfer was not communicated to the appellant. Consequently, his absence on the day of the case’s dismissal was beyond his control.

The court noted that the application for condonation of delay demonstrated a valid and sincere reason for the delay, with no intention to cause it. The court further recognized the appellant’s consistent diligence in pursuing his claim. The court emphasized that when substantive rights are at stake, the primary focus should be on ensuring justice rather than barring claimants on technical grounds.

The court held that given the presence of a valid reason for the delay, the Railway Tribunal should have granted condonation for the delay.

As a result, the court nullified the decision to reject the application for delay condonation and reinstated the case for a comprehensive review on its merits.

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Written by- Mansi Malpani

2 Jun

Until the appellant gives the sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it cannot be condoned: Gujarat High Court

Prime Legal

Blog #delay, #Gujarathighcourt, #limitationact

State Of Gujarat vs Lajbarkhan Sherdalkhan Pathan on 12 April, 2023

Bench: Honourable Justice Sandeep N. Bhatt

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18903 of 2021

Facts

The respondent possessed a plot of land and his name was shown in the revenue record as a farmer. In the year 1989, the present petitioner – Government Authority came to the plaintiff’s place and issued notice for vacating the said land within seven days, without following any procedure, and removed some part of the hut. Therefore, the plaintiff filed a suit before the competent Civil Court for declaration and permanent injunction, along with an application for injunction. However, the Government Authority had chosen not to appear and contest the said suit. The trial Court therefore, allowed the suit ex-parte and granted permanent injunction and directed the Government Authority not to take possession of the land in question from the plaintiff, without following due process of law. There was no challenge by the State Authority against the same before any higher forum till date and hence the judgement attained finality

The respondent then filed another suit before the competent Civil Court to declare him the owner of the land in view of adverse possession as he was in its possession for the past 61 years as well as for permanent injunction. However, no appearance was made by the Government authority and therefore, the trial Court directed to hear the suit ex-parte. Ultimately, the trial Court passed the judgment in favour of the respondent and decreed the suit

After a delay of 3230 days, the State Authority then finally filed an application for condonation of delay and preferred an appeal against the judgment passed by the trial Court.

However, the Government Authority / Government Pleader failed to appear and therefore, the rights of the State were closed at each stage of the proceeding, after giving ample opportunity and thus the appellate Court rejected the application made by the Government authority for condonation of the delay. It is this order impugned, which is challenged by the State Authority before the present Court in the petition after about 9 years.

The counsel for the Government authority submitted that there was a revenue distribution of territorial jurisdiction of Ahmedabad which bifurcated it into 4 zones due to which an urgent requirement of establishment of authorities for all 4 zones had arisen. The bifurcation of the zones consumed some time and only then did the authorities have a chance for the demarcation of the revenue jurisdiction. Hence, in the process of establishment of the offices, the records, documents and all the other connected things were either shifted or were in process of being shifted which took considerable time.

He contended that the appellate Court below had not rightly appreciated the facts and circumstances of the case and the reasons given by the Government authority in the application for condonation of delay and that the delay should be considered liberally

Judgement

The Court after going through the case held that despite sufficient opportunities having been given, theState Authorities had not appeared before the trial Court which compelled it to hear the matter exparte. Even after the verdict, the Government authority failed to challenge it and thus it attained finality which shows the marked incompetence of the authority to act in a timely manner.

The Court held that all these facts signify that there are wilful latches and negligence on the part of the state authority and for these reasons, the present petition is devoid of merits and therefore, the Court dismissed it accordingly.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY AMIT ARAVIND

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