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Sikkim HC: Mandates Fair Reassessment of GST Refund Claims, Citing Violation of Natural Justice Due to Non-Consideration of Assessee’s Response

Case Name:
W.P. (C) No. 20 of 2022 – Zydus Wellness Products Ltd. vs Union of India & Ors./
W.P. (C) No. 27 of 2022 – Alkem Laboratories Ltd. vs Union of India & Ors.

Case Number:

For Zydus Wellness Products Ltd. vs Union of India & Ors.:
W.P. (C) No. 20 of 2022

For Alkem Laboratories Ltd. vs Union of India & Ors.:
W.P. (C) No. 27 of 2022

Date of Hearing: 17th August 2023
Date of Judgment: 12th September 2023

Quorum: Single Bench: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, Judge

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioners of the case are Zydus Wellness Products Limited, represented by Umesh Parikh, Chief Financial Officer, Alkem Laboratories Limited, represented by Ajay Kumar Prasad, General Manager – Accounts, and the respondents are Union of India, various officials from the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, and Central Goods & Service Tax authorities. On February 28, 2019, Zydus Wellness-Sikkim, a partnership firm, was converted into Zydus Nutritions Limited under the Companies Act, 2013. On June 4, 2019, Zydus Nutritions Limited changed its name to Zydus Wellness Products Limited. Zydus Wellness Products Limited seeks budgetary support under the “Scheme of Budgetary Support dated 05.10.2017” for the “residual period” during which Zydus Wellness-Sikkim was entitled to exemption under Notification No. 20/2007-C dated April 25, 2007. In October 2019, Unit-V was transferred from Cachet Pharmaceuticals Private Limited to Alkem Laboratories Limited by way of a slump sale. Alkem Laboratories Limited seeks a fresh Unique Identity (UID) for Unit-V and processing of verification and claim applications under the Budgetary Support Scheme for the “residual period” for which Cachet Pharmaceuticals Private Limited was entitled to exemption under Notification No. 20/2007-C dated April 25, 2007.

ISSUES

  • Is Zydus Wellness Products Limited entitled to budgetary support for the period during which Zydus Wellness-Sikkim was entitled to exemption under a specific notification?
  • Should Alkem Laboratories Limited be granted a new Unique Identity (UID) for Unit-V, and should their claims under the Budgetary Support Scheme be processed for the period during which Cachet Pharmaceuticals was entitled to exemption under the same notification?

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Central Excise Act, 1944:

  • This Act governs the levy and collection of duties of excise on goods manufactured or produced in India. Relevant provisions within this act were likely referenced in determining the entitlement to exemptions and budgetary support.

Notification No. 71/2003-CE dated 09.09.2003:

  • This notification pertains to excise duty exemptions for units located in specific areas, including the North Eastern States, Sikkim, and Jammu & Kashmir. It outlines the conditions and extent of the exemptions granted to units in these regions.

Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime:

  • The transition from the Central Excise Act to the GST regime involved changes in tax structures and the introduction of budgetary support schemes to ensure smooth transitions for units that previously enjoyed excise duty exemptions.

Budgetary Support Scheme:

  • The scheme was introduced to provide financial support to units located in specified areas that were previously eligible for excise duty exemptions, to mitigate the impact of the transition to GST. This scheme outlines eligibility criteria and the extent of support provided.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant, M/s Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd., contended that they were entitled to a refund under the Budgetary Support Scheme. This scheme, which was introduced as a replacement for area-based exemptions under the Central Excise regime, was designed to provide budgetary support to units located in specified areas. The appellant argued that they fulfilled all the necessary conditions stipulated under the scheme, and thus, their claim for a refund should be processed favourably. The appellant asserted that the authorities had failed to consider the factual and legal aspects of their case correctly. They emphasised that their claim was rejected without a proper examination of the facts and circumstances, including their compliance with the conditions of the Budgetary Support Scheme and relevant legal provisions. The appellant argued that the transition from the Central Excise regime to the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime should not affect their entitlement to benefits under the Budgetary Support Scheme. They contended that the objective of the scheme was to support industrial units in specified areas, regardless of the tax regime in force, and that their entitlement to the refund should remain intact post-GST implementation. The appellant invoked the principle of legitimate expectation, arguing that they had a reasonable expectation of receiving the refund based on the scheme’s provisions and the government’s assurances. They contended that the abrupt rejection of their claim was a violation of this principle, which protects the expectations of individuals or entities based on established practices and promises by public authorities. The appellant contended that denying their refund claim amounted to discrimination and inequality, as other similarly placed entities had been granted refunds under the same scheme. They argued that this differential treatment was arbitrary and unjust, and it violated their right to equality under the law. The appellant argued that the authorities had misinterpreted the notifications and the Budgetary Support Scheme’s provisions. They contended that a correct interpretation would support their claim for a refund and that the authorities’ narrow and restrictive interpretation was flawed and contrary to the scheme’s objectives.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent, represented by the tax authorities, argued that the appellant had not complied with all the necessary conditions stipulated under the Budgetary Support Scheme. They contended that the scheme had specific eligibility criteria and procedural requirements, which the appellant failed to meet. As a result, the appellant’s claim for a refund could not be processed favourably. The respondents contended that the transition from the Central Excise regime to the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime introduced significant changes in the tax structure and compliance requirements. They argued that the benefits under the previous regime could not be automatically extended to the new regime without re-evaluating the eligibility and compliance of the claimant under the revised rules. The respondents argued that the principle of legitimate expectation could not be invoked in this case because policy changes, especially in tax laws, are within the government’s purview. They contended that changes in policy or tax regimes could alter the benefits available to taxpayers, and the government had the right to modify or discontinue such schemes in light of new policy objectives or fiscal considerations. The respondents maintained that their interpretation of the notifications and the provisions of the Budgetary Support Scheme was correct and in accordance with the law. They argued that the scheme’s benefits were limited and conditional, and their interpretation was intended to prevent undue claims and ensure that only eligible units received support.The respondents contended that the rejection of the appellant’s claim was consistent with the broader policy objectives of the government. They argued that the Budgetary Support Scheme aimed to promote specific economic activities and industrial development in designated areas, and the appellant’s situation did not align with these objectives under the new tax regime. The respondents cited relevant precedents and case law to support their position. They argued that judicial interpretations of similar schemes and notifications had consistently upheld the government’s right to define eligibility and interpret scheme provisions. They contended that these precedents supported their rejection of the appellant’s claim for a refund. The respondents argued that granting a refund to the appellant could result in unjust enrichment. They contended that the appellant might receive a financial benefit that they were not entitled to under the revised scheme, which would be contrary to the principles of equity and fairness in tax administration.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The High Court of Sikkim analysed the two writ petitions filed by Zydus Wellness Products Limited and Alkem Laboratories Limited. Both petitions sought clarification on their eligibility for budgetary support under the Budgetary Support Scheme. The court considered several key points: Both petitioners underwent significant changes, including changes in ownership and the transition from partnership firms to private limited companies. The respondents argued that these changes disqualified the petitioners from the Budgetary Support Scheme. The court examined the definition of an “eligible unit” under the Budgetary Support Scheme. It noted that the scheme was intended to provide support to existing manufacturing units that were eligible for benefits under earlier excise duty exemption/refund schemes. The eligibility criteria were based on the unit itself, not the ownership. The court considered the opinions of the Ministry of Commerce and the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC), which stated that units undergoing changes like relocation, expansion, or change of ownership would no longer be eligible for the Budgetary Support Scheme. The court referenced relevant provisions of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act, 2017) and the Central Excise Act, 1944 to interpret the legal framework surrounding the Budgetary Support Scheme.

After careful consideration of these factors, the court made the following observations: The Budgetary Support Scheme was intended to support existing manufacturing units eligible under earlier excise duty exemption/refund schemes. The eligibility of a unit was based on its status as an “eligible unit” prior to the transition to GST, irrespective of changes in ownership. While the government’s interpretation was noted, the court emphasised that the scheme’s language and intent were crucial in determining eligibility. Based on these findings, the court concluded that both petitioners remained eligible for budgetary support under the scheme, despite changes in ownership. The court directed the authorities to consider their applications accordingly. This judgement highlights the importance of interpreting government schemes in line with their objectives and statutory provisions, ensuring fair treatment for eligible entities seeking benefits.

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The lack of a Chemical Examination Report left a crucial gap in the prosecution’s evidence for rape: Rajasthan High Court acquits the accused in Rape case

Case name: State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor vs. Man Singh & Mohan Singh.

Case Number: S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 445/1991

Dated on: 09/04/2024

Qoram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case involves two appellants, Mohan Singh and Man Singh, accused of raping a woman named “K” and subsequently abetting her suicide. The prosecution argued that the accused committed these crimes in September 1989. The prosecution claims the accused raped “K” and she later set herself on fire, though the exact timeline remains unclear. “K” reportedly gave two statements before succumbing to her burn injuries. The first statement accuses the appellants of rape, while the second claims it was an accidental fire. The FIR (First Information Report) regarding the incident was filed four days after the alleged crimes took place. The victim was also reportedly not admitted to the hospital for treatment until four days after the incident. The medical examination report reportedly did not find any injuries consistent with rape on the victim’s body. The Chemical Examination Report, crucial for confirming sexual assault, was allegedly unavailable. The victim’s father reportedly waited two days after learning about the alleged rape and fire incident before filing a police report and admitting his daughter to the hospital.

ISSUES

  • How can the court reconcile the two conflicting dying declarations from the victim, and can either be used to establish the charges against the accused?
  • Do the significant delays in filing the FIR and seeking medical attention for the victim cast doubt on the prosecution’s case and the timeline of events?
  • Given the inconsistencies in the evidence, including the lack of physical evidence for rape and the conflicting statements, can the prosecution prove the charges of rape and abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  •  Section 376 – Rape: This section defines rape and outlines the punishment for the offense. Depending on the specific details of the alleged assault presented in the case (e.g., causing grievous hurt), different subsections of Section 376 might be applicable.
  •  Section 306 – Abetment to Suicide: This section deals with instigating or aiding someone in committing suicide. The court would likely analyze the specific wording related to “abetment” under Section 107 of the IPC to determine if the appellants’ actions, if proven, could be considered instigating the victim’s suicide.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellants, Mohan Singh and Man Singh, are likely to challenge the prosecution’s case on several fronts: A major point of contention would be the two vastly different dying declarations provided by the victim. The defence will argue that this glaring contradiction throws the entire accusation into question. They’ll point out the impossibility of knowing which statement, if any, is true, raising doubts about the victim’s mental state and the reliability of her accusations. The appellants will likely highlight the significant delays in both filing the FIR (First Information Report) and seeking medical attention for the victim. These delays raise suspicion about the timeline presented by the prosecution. The defence might argue that such delays could have allowed for evidence to be tampered with or even for the story to be fabricated entirely. The lack of any physical evidence to support the rape allegation will be a strong point for the defense. They will emphasize the absence of injuries consistent with rape in the medical report and the crucial missing Chemical Examination Report. This lack of evidence will bolster their argument that the rape never occurred. The defence might also cast doubt on the actions of the victim’s father. The unexplained two-day delay before reporting the incident to the police and seeking medical care could be used to suggest a potential motive or an attempt to frame the appellants. Throughout the case, the defence will likely remind the court that the burden of proof rests solely with the prosecution. They will argue that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges of rape and abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the conflicting statements, missing evidence, and unexplained delays. By presenting these contentions, the appellants aim to sow seeds of doubt in the court’s mind regarding the prosecution’s case. This doubt, they hope, will lead to their acquittal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

While the case lacks an explicitly mentioned respondent, the prosecution, representing the state and the victim, would likely counter the appellant’s arguments with the following: The prosecution might acknowledge the inconsistencies in the victim’s statements but offer explanations. They could argue that the initial accusation, made under immense pain and trauma, reflects the truth of the assault. The second statement, they might propose, could be due to the victim’s deteriorating condition or fear of social stigma surrounding rape. To strengthen their case, they might attempt to find corroborating evidence, such as witness testimonies, that align with the initial accusation. The prosecution would likely address the delays in reporting and seeking medical attention. They could suggest the victim’s initial shock and trauma from the assault, coupled with potential pressure from family or societal shame associated with rape, might have delayed seeking help. Fear of retaliation from the accused could be another factor. The prosecution would argue that these delays, while concerning, don’t necessarily negate the core truth of the accusation. Despite the missing Chemical Examination Report, the prosecution might argue that the medical report, along with any available circumstantial evidence, should be considered. They might highlight witness statements or pieces of evidence like clothing that could support the rape allegation. The prosecution might downplay the significance of the victim’s father’s delay by suggesting he could have been in a state of shock or confusion due to the traumatic situation. Additionally, they might propose cultural or social norms that might have influenced the delay in seeking medical attention. The prosecution would acknowledge the burden of proof but argue that they have presented a compelling case based on: The initial accusation in the dying declaration. Any supporting circumstantial evidence gathered during the investigation. The overall plausibility of their narrative considering the facts presented. By providing these counter-arguments, the prosecution aims to convince the court that despite limitations in the evidence, the totality of the case points towards the guilt of the accused.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

 The court found the two vastly different statements from the victim, one accusing the appellants and another claiming an accident, to be highly problematic. This inconsistency raised doubts about the accuracy of the accusations and the victim’s mental state at the time the statements were made. The significant delays in reporting the alleged rape and seeking medical attention for the victim were concerning to the court. These delays cast doubt on the prosecution’s timeline and raised the possibility that evidence could have been tampered with or the story fabricated. The absence of crucial evidence, particularly the Chemical Examination Report that could confirm sexual assault, weakened the prosecution’s case. The court found the medical report alone insufficient to establish the rape charge conclusively. Based on the weak points in the prosecution’s arguments, the court ruled in favour of the appellants, Mohan Singh and Man Singh. The court likely concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the charges of rape and abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt. Here’s a possible explanation for the judgement: The conflicting dying declarations created significant doubt about the core allegation of rape. The unexplained delays raised concerns about the reliability of the prosecution’s narrative. The lack of a Chemical Examination Report left a crucial gap in the prosecution’s evidence for rape. Since the prosecution couldn’t meet the burden of proof, the court likely acquitted the appellants. However, it’s important to note that without access to the full case details, the specific reasoning for the judgement might differ slightly.

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Temple Land Acquisition Compensation Goes to Devsthan Department: Rajasthan High court.

Case Title: Partap Ram vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

Case Number: D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11499/2022

Dated on: April 20, 2024 (Pronounced on)

Quorum: Hon’ble Dr. Justice Pushpendra Singh Bhati (presiding judge), Hon’ble Mr. Justice Munnuri Laxman

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Partap Ram, is the president of a registered trust that manages a temple in Jodhpur, Rajasthan. The government decided to build a ring road and needed to acquire land, which included some land belonging to the temple. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation for the acquired temple land. However, the compensation amount wasn’t given directly to the temple trust. Instead, it was deposited in the account of the Devsthan Commissioner, a government official who oversees religious endowments in the state. The temple trust argued that they should receive the compensation money directly. They claimed they are a registered trust and have the legal right to the money. The government argued that a circular they issued requires compensation for acquired temple land to go to the Devsthan Department. The department would then use the money to buy replacement land for the temple. The government also pointed out that the temple deity is considered a perpetual minor, and the trustee acts as a caretaker, so they shouldn’t have control of the money.

ISSUES

  • Does the temple trust, as a registered legal entity managing the land, have the direct right to receive the compensation awarded for its acquisition by the government?
  • Does the government’s circular mandating the deposit of compensation for acquired temple land with the Devsthan Department have legal standing and supersede the trust’s rights?
  • Considering the concept of the temple deity as a “perpetual minor” and the trustee’s role as a caretaker, does it restrict the trust’s full control over the compensation money received for the acquired land?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (Act of 1959):

  • This Act likely defines the legal framework for managing public trusts in the state of Rajasthan, including temples.
  • Specifically, the judgement mentions Section 37 of this Act, which designates the Devsthan Commissioner as the “Treasurer of Charitable Endowments” for the state.
  • This suggests the Act might grant the Commissioner some authority over the financial aspects of public trusts, potentially including compensation received for acquired land.

Government Circular (dated June 11, 2020):

  • This circular, though not directly quoted in the judgement, is mentioned as a key argument by the government.
  • The circular likely mandates that compensation awarded for acquired temple land should be deposited with the Devsthan Department.
  • The court’s decision seems to acknowledge the validity of this circular, suggesting it might have legal weight within the context of land acquisition procedures.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant, Partap Ram representing the temple trust, argued their case based on two main contentions that is they emphasised their status as a registered trust managing the temple according to Rajasthan law. This registration, they argued, grants them the legal authority to handle the temple’s affairs, including finances. As the legal custodians of the temple land, they claimed the full right to receive the compensation awarded for its acquisition by the government. The trust argued that the compensation amount awarded for their land should be directly deposited into their account. They contested the government’s decision to withhold the money and deposit it with the Devasthan Commissioner. By receiving the compensation directly, the trust likely aimed to have more control over how the funds would be used.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondents, representing the State of Rajasthan and potentially other relevant government departments, countered the appellant’s claims with two key contentions that the government’s primary defence rested on a circular issued by the Revenue Department (possibly dated June 11, 2020). This circular, according to the respondents, mandated that compensation awarded for acquired temple land should be deposited with the Devsthan Department. By citing this regulation, the government argued that they followed the proper procedure and the Devsthan Commissioner was the rightful custodian of the compensation amount. The respondents introduced the concept of the temple deity as a “perpetual minor.” This legal concept suggests the temple itself cannot hold property or manage finances. In this context, the government argued that the temple trustee acts as a caretaker with limited financial control. By highlighting this limitation, the respondents likely aimed to justify withholding the compensation directly from the trust and placing it under the Devsthan Commissioner’s control, who they presented as a more responsible financial steward. Additionally, the government might have argued that the Devsthan Commissioner, acting under the aforementioned circular, would utilise the compensation to acquire alternative land for the temple, ultimately benefiting the temple itself.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

In analysing the case, the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur primarily focused on two aspects: the government’s circular and the legal standing of the temple trust. The court acknowledged the existence of the government circular mandating the deposit of compensation for acquired temple land with the Devsthan Department. The court likely viewed this circular as a valid regulation within the framework of land acquisition procedures. By upholding the circular’s authority, the court recognized the Devsthan Commissioner’s role as outlined in the Rajasthan Public Trust Act (specifically Section 37). This section presumably designates the Commissioner as the “Treasurer of Charitable Endowments” for the state, potentially granting them control over financial aspects of public trusts, including compensation received for acquired land. While the court didn’t explicitly comment on the specific details of the temple trust’s registration, it didn’t challenge their legal existence or their role in managing the temple. However, the court’s acceptance of the government’s argument regarding the temple deity as a “perpetual minor” with the trustee acting as a caretaker likely influenced the final decision. This concept suggests the trust might have limitations on full financial control, including the compensation money. Based on the analysis, the High Court dismissed the petition filed by Partap Ram on behalf of the temple trust. This decision implies the court sided with the government’s arguments. The court likely viewed the Devsthan Commissioner’s actions as lawful and aligned with the government circular and the Rajasthan Public Trust Act. Essentially, the court ruled that the Devsthan Department, not the temple trust directly, would hold the compensation amount. The court’s reasoning focused on ensuring the proper utilisation of the compensation money for the benefit of the temple. By placing the money with the Devsthan Commissioner, the court might have considered them a more qualified entity to manage the funds and potentially use them to acquire alternative land for the temple, ultimately fulfilling the purpose of the compensation. The temple trust did not receive the compensation amount directly. The Devsthan Department will hold the money and use it, as per the government’s argument, to purchase replacement land for the temple.

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Delhi HC upholds student rights to readmission for attendance issues

Case Title: Tripurari Kumar Jha v. Faculty of Law, University of Delhi & Anr.

Case Number: LPA 703/2023

 Dated On: Reserved on 03.05.2024, Pronounced on 31.05.2024 

Quorum: Hon’ble Mr Justice Rajiv Shakdher, Hon’ble Mr Justice Amit Bansal

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, a student in the LLB program at Delhi University, was detained due to insufficient attendance during the first term of the academic year. The University asserted that there was no provision for readmission if a student was detained for attendance issues in the first term. Delhi University maintained that the amendments made to Ordinance V, specifically Appendix II, in 2007, prohibited the readmission of students who failed to meet the attendance criteria in the first term. This stance was supported by a resolution passed by the University’s Academic Council on December 12, 2007. On July 12, 2012, an amendment to Ordinance IV introduced Article 5(b), which allowed for the readmission of students detained due to a shortage of attendance. This amendment came after the changes to Ordinance V and was argued to supersede it. The appellant argued that the readmission provision in Ordinance IV should prevail over the earlier amendments to Ordinance V. The appellant asserted that under Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV, the University had the power to readmit students, and this provision should apply to all disciplines, including professional courses like LLB. The University cited previous judgments to support its position that provisions in the Prospectus or Information Bulletin are binding on students. However, these cases dealt with different contexts and did not specifically address readmission due to attendance shortfalls. The Bar Council of India indicated that students could be readmitted if they failed to meet attendance requirements for genuine reasons. The BCI suggested that such students could be accommodated in the subsequent academic year within the sanctioned seats. The court analysed the hierarchical structure and powers conferred by the DU Act, highlighting that the Court is the supreme authority with the power to review acts of the Executive Council (EC) and the Academic Council (AC). The court found that the provision for readmission in Ordinance IV, added later, should prevail over the earlier amendments to Ordinance V. The court concluded that the University’s contention was flawed and that it indeed had the power to readmit students under Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV. The court emphasised the need for the University to exercise compassion and consideration for students facing genuine difficulties, aligning with the BCI’s perspective on maintaining educational standards while accommodating genuine cases.

ISSUES

  • Whether the amendments to Ordinance V in 2007 restricting readmission were superseded by the later insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV in 2012.
  • Whether the powers of university bodies like the EC, AC, and Court in matters of readmission were clearly defined under the Delhi University Act.
  • Whether the university’s policies on readmission were in line with BCI recommendations, especially in accommodating students facing genuine difficulties.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  • Delhi University Act: The primary legislation governing the establishment, structure, and functioning of the University of Delhi.
  • Statutes: Rules and regulations derived from the Delhi University Act, providing detailed provisions on various aspects of the university’s administration and operations.
  • Ordinances: Specific regulations within the university’s framework, derived from the Delhi University Act and statutes, detailing procedures and criteria for matters such as admission, promotion, examination, and readmission.
  • Bar Council of India (BCI) Guidelines: External standards and recommendations provided by the Bar Council of India, particularly relevant in matters concerning legal education, curriculum, and student welfare within the university’s law programs.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant argued that the power of readmission for students detained due to attendance issues is vested in the University under Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV. The amendments made to Ordinance V in 2007, which seemingly restricted readmission, were superseded by the subsequent insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV in 2012. The University’s contention that the provision for readmission in Ordinance IV was inapplicable to professional courses, such as LLB, is flawed. The University’s failure to exercise the power conferred upon it by Article 5(b) of Ordinance IV resulted in the erroneous denial of readmission to the appellant. These contentions formed the basis of the appellant’s argument challenging the University’s decision regarding student readmission.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent argued that the provision for readmission in Ordinance IV did not apply to professional courses like LLB. They contended that the amendments made to Ordinance V in 2007, which restricted readmission, were still applicable and had not been superseded by the insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV. The University maintained that the appellant’s admission was cancelled due to a shortfall in attendance, and they did not have the authority to grant readmission under the prevailing ordinances. Additionally, the University asserted that accommodating readmissions for students like the appellant would adversely affect available seats for fresh admissions, creating logistical challenges. These contentions formed the core of the respondent’s defence against the appellant’s claims regarding readmission.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court examined the provisions of Ordinance IV and Ordinance V to determine the university’s authority regarding readmission for students detained due to attendance issues. It concluded that the insertion of Article 5(b) in Ordinance IV in 2012 superseded the amendments made to Ordinance V in 2007, thereby conferring the power of readmission to the university.

The court clarified the authority of various university bodies, including the Executive Council (EC), the Academic Council (AC), and the Court, in matters related to readmission. It emphasised that the university had the power to grant readmission, particularly in cases where genuine reasons, such as illness, warranted leniency.

The court highlighted the importance of aligning university policies with the guidelines and recommendations of the Bar Council of India (BCI). It emphasised the need for compassion and understanding towards students facing genuine difficulties, as advised by the BCI.

In conclusion, the court ruled in favour of the appellant, allowing the appeal and directing the university to re-admit the appellant with suitable adjustments. The judgement underscored the university’s responsibility to consider genuine reasons for readmission and ensure alignment with BCI guidelines to maintain high standards in education.

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Environment conversation, Urban Development with a direction of Municipal Authorities: Delhi High court

Case Title: Ravinder Tyagi vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another

Case Number: W.P.(C) 4708/2024 & C.M.No.19283/2024

Dated On: 02nd April, 2024

Qoram: Hon’ble Acting Chief Justice and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case involves a public interest litigation (PIL) filed by Ravinder Tyagi against the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and another respondent, with Mr. Nikhil Palli representing the MCD. The petitioner, appearing in person, has raised several issues related to the alleged removal of trees and illegal encroachments in the Gandhi Maidan Parking area and H.C. Sen Road in Delhi. Ravinder Tyagi asserts that 23 Peepal trees, which existed between the entry and exit gates of Gandhi Maidan Car Parking towards the eastern side, were illegally cut or removed by the respondents. He further claims that respondent no. 2 has encroached upon the side pavement, merging it with the space occupied by Omaxe Mall. Additionally, the petitioner contends that iron grills and barricades were installed on the side pavement, resulting in the area being used for staff parking, thereby causing inconvenience to the public. The petitioner references an earlier court order dated 30th August 2018, where the then Deputy Commissioner of Delhi Municipal Corporation assured that 65 trees around the proposed Multi-Level Car Parking at Gandhi Maidan would not be cut for redevelopment purposes. Despite this assurance, the petitioner alleges that the respondents violated this undertaking by removing the trees and making unauthorized constructions. Upon reviewing the petition, the court noted that the petitioner had not provided any prior notice to the respondents before filing the writ petition. Furthermore, the petitioner did not obtain any sanction plan under the Right to Information (RTI) Act from the MCD. The photographs submitted by the petitioner did not provide clear evidence that the 23 Peepal trees were cut for the construction project, contrary to the MCD’s previous undertaking. The court acknowledged the importance of the issues raised and disposed of the writ petition with a directive. The Deputy Commissioner of City Sadar Paharganj Zone, MCD, was instructed to treat the writ petition as a representation and to issue a reasoned order within four weeks, after providing the petitioner an opportunity for a hearing. The court also allowed the petitioner the liberty to pursue appropriate legal proceedings if he is dissatisfied with the Deputy Commissioner’s decision.

ISSUES

  • Whether the respondents illegally removed 23 Peepal trees
  • Whether the respondents engaged in unauthorized encroachment and construction.
  • Whether the installation of iron grills and barricades by the respondents caused public inconvenience.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  • Environmental Protection Act, 1986: This Act provides a framework for the protection and improvement of the environment and for matters connected therewith.
  • Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980: This Act aims to conserve forests and regulate diversion of forest lands for non-forest purposes, which may include tree removal.
  • Public Interest Litigation (PIL): PIL allows citizens to seek judicial intervention in matters of public interest, including environmental issues.
  • Municipal Laws and Regulations: Local municipal laws and regulations may govern land use, construction, and environmental protection within their jurisdictions.
  • Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act): The RTI Act empowers citizens to request information from public authorities, which may be relevant for obtaining documents such as sanction plans for construction projects.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The petitioner contends that 23 Peepal trees between the entry and exit gates of Gandhi Maidan Car Parking were unlawfully removed by the respondents, contrary to an assurance by the Delhi Municipal Corporation. The removal of these trees is alleged to be in violation of prior commitments regarding redevelopment plans for the parking area. The petitioner asserts that respondent no. 2 has engaged in unauthorized encroachment by merging the side pavement with the space occupied by Omaxe Mall. Additionally, unauthorized constructions have allegedly been raised in areas previously occupied by Bapu Market and where the 23 Peepal trees stood. The petitioner claims that respondent no. 2 installed iron grills on the side pavements and placed barricades around the area, causing public inconvenience and restricting access. These installations are purportedly used for parking staff vehicles, leading to inconvenience for the general public.

CONTENTIOS OF TE RESPONDENT

The respondent may deny the allegations of illegally removing 23 Peepal trees and argue that any tree removal was conducted lawfully and in accordance with relevant regulations. They might contend that the removal was necessary for legitimate reasons, such as redevelopment or maintenance purposes. Regarding the alleged unauthorized encroachment and construction, the respondent may argue that any constructions made were duly authorized and compliant with applicable laws and regulations. They might present evidence to support the legality of the constructions and dispute the petitioner’s claims of encroachment. The respondent could justify the installation of iron grills and barricades on the side pavements as necessary measures for public safety or traffic management. They might argue that these installations were implemented in accordance with relevant regulations and were essential for the efficient operation of the area. The respondent may raise procedural defenses, such as the petitioner’s failure to provide prior notice or obtain necessary approvals before filing the petition. They might argue that proper procedures were not followed in initiating the legal action and request the court to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court observes that the petitioner has alleged the illegal removal of 23 Peepal trees, unauthorized encroachment, and construction by the respondent, as well as the installation of iron grills and barricades causing public inconvenience. However, upon reviewing the evidence presented, the court finds it unable to conclusively determine at this stage whether the allegations are valid. The court notes the absence of prior notice to the respondents before filing the petition and the petitioner’s failure to obtain necessary approvals under the Right to Information (RTI) Act.

Despite the uncertainties regarding the allegations, the court acknowledges the importance of the issues raised by the petitioner. Given the significance of the matter, the court decides to dispose of the petition with a directive to the Deputy Commissioner, City Sadar Paharganj Zone, MCD.

The court instructs the Deputy Commissioner to treat the writ petition as a representation and decide on it through a reasoned order within four weeks. The Deputy Commissioner is directed to provide the petitioner with an opportunity for a hearing before making a decision. In the event that the petitioner is dissatisfied with the Deputy Commissioner’s decision, the petitioner is granted liberty to pursue appropriate legal proceedings in accordance with the law.

This judgment demonstrates the court’s commitment to addressing issues of public interest while ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to legal requirements. The court’s directive allows for the resolution of the matter through administrative channels, providing the petitioner with an opportunity to present their case and seek redressal in a structured manner.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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