Delhi High Court Archives - Page 15 of 15

Case title: Vaibhav v. Jawaharlal Nehru University

Case no.: W.P.(C) 12771/2023

Dated on: 24^th April 2024

Quorum: Justice C. Hari Shankar

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Vaibhav, a Scheduled Caste (SC) student, challenged Clause 12 of the Admission Policy and Procedure of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) for the B.A (Hons) course in Foreign Languages for the 2023-2024 academic session. Clause 12 segregated candidates into Code I and Code II based on whether they passed the Senior Secondary School Certificate (10+2) examination in the year of admission or the previous year. Vaibhav passed his Class XII examination in 2021 and applied for admission to the B.A. (Hons) Chinese course at JNU based on his Central University Entrance Test (CUET) scores. Despite being ranked 12th among SC category students in Code II, he was not admitted.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER

Mr. Bhagabati Prasad Padhy represented Vaibhav, arguing that Clause 12’s distinction lacked a rational nexus with its objective and violated Article 14 of the Constitution. He cited relevant case law to support his contention.

Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar (2019) 20 SCC 117: The petitioner relied on this case to argue that the classification made by Clause 12 of the Admission Prospectus of JNU, which distinguished between students based on the year they cleared their Class XII examination, violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The case emphasizes that any classification must be based on intelligible differentia and must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952 SCC Online 1): This case was cited to argue that any classification must be based on a real and substantial distinction that bears a just and reasonable relation to the objective sought to be achieved. It highlights the principle that classification should not be arbitrary but must have a rational basis.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Ms. Monika Arora, CGSC, along with Mr. Subhrodeep Saha and Ms. Radhika Kurdukar, argued for JNU. Mr. Saha submits that the division of the candidates in Code-I and Code-II is legitimate and is in fact based on an intelligible differentia, having a rational nexus with the object of the distinction. The aim of creating this distinction, he submits is to ensure a fair and transparent admission process, giving preference to recent academic qualifications to streamline the procedure and provide opportunity to students who had recently completed their Senior Secondary examinations, so as to ensure that those possessing most upto date knowledge and skills are given priority.

Mr. Saha submits that the idea is to encourage freshers, even while ensuring that older candidates, who may have passed their Class XII examination much earlier in time, are not completely blocked. In order to draw a balance between the two categories of candidates, he submits that the JNU took a policy decision to reserve 80% of the seats for admission to B.A. (Hons) Chinese courses in Foreign Languages for candidates, who had cleared their Class XII that year or in the year immediately preceding the year in which the admission was being sought and 20% for the candidates, who had cleared their Class XII examination earlier.

Mr. Saha also submits that the judgments, on which Mr. Padhy places reliance, are completely distinguishable on facts and in law.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Clause 12 of the Admission Policy and Procedure of JNU for the academic session 2023-2024. The clause establishes quotas for admission to the B.A (Hons) First Year in Foreign Languages, with 80% of the seats earmarked for candidates who passed their Senior Secondary School Certificate (10+2) exam in the year of admission or the previous year (Code I), and the remaining 20% for candidates who meet the eligibility requirements but passed their exam earlier (Code II).

Article 14 of the Constitution of India: The petitioner argues that Clause 12 violates Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination.

ISSUE –

Whether Clause 12 of JNU’s Admission Policy violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether Vaibhav’s challenge against the quota system is valid.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

Justice C. Hari Shankar analyzed the validity of Clause 12, considering the constitutional principles and academic policy. While acknowledging the prima facie appearance of arbitrariness, the judge emphasized the limited scope of judicial interference in academic matters. He noted that JNU’s decision aimed to balance the interests of freshers and older candidates.

The judge rejected Vaibhav’s challenge, asserting that the classification under Clause 12 was not arbitrary. He emphasized the importance of recent academic qualifications for collegiate courses and upheld JNU’s right to prioritize such candidates.

Regarding Vaibhav’s challenge against the quota system, the judge ruled it impermissible, citing the principle of estoppel. Vaibhav had previously sought admission under the same provision and failed.

The writ petition was dismissed, and no costs were imposed. The court upheld Clause 12 of JNU’s Admission Policy, emphasizing deference to academic policy and the principle of estoppel.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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Case title: Delhi State Legal Services Authority v. Annwesha Deb

Case no.: LPA 701/2023

Dated on: 23^rd April 2024

Quorum: Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Saurabh Banerjee

FACTS OF THE CASE

In this case, Annwesha Deb was appointed as a Legal Services Advocate (LSA) at the Juvenile Justice Board-I, Sewa Kutir, Kingsway Camp, New Delhi, with a daily pay of ₹1750, starting from May 09, 2016. During her tenure, she became pregnant and applied for maternity leave, seeking a duration of seven months. She submitted her application for maternity leave on October 06, 2017, and also formally notified the Member Secretary of the Authority about her claim for maternity benefits. Additionally, she sent an email to the Authority on October 21, 2017, regarding the same matter.

However, on October 31, 2017, the Authority responded to Annwesha Deb’s request for maternity benefits via email, rejecting her claim. The rejection was based on the assertion that there was no provision for granting maternity benefits to LSAs.

Feeling aggrieved by this decision, Annwesha Deb pursued legal action and approached the Learned Single Judge through a writ petition (W.P(C) 11016/2017) in the case titled Annwesha Deb v. Delhi State Legal Services Authority.

Decision of the Single Judge:

The Single Judge framed the issue of whether Annwesha Deb, working on a contractual basis, could be extended maternity benefits like permanent/regular employees.
The Single Judge examined relevant provisions of the Act and cited Supreme Court and High Court judgments to support his decision.
The Single Judge held that Annwesha Deb’s case fell within the definition of “Wages” under the Act and that maternity benefits should be extended to all employees, irrespective of the nature of their employment.
He directed DSLSA to release all medical, monetary, and other benefits accrued to Annwesha Deb due to her pregnancy within three months from the date of the order.

This appeal has been preferred by the DSLSA against the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The respondent/ petitioner is only an empanelled Advocate and is not its employee who is covered under the Act of 1961. The Advocates empanelled with them are paid honorarium as per the Fee Schedule of the DSLSA for which they are required to submit a report by the end of each month on the duties they have performed. Such reports are supported by attendance certificates based on which the payment is made depending upon the number of hours put in by the Advocates.

The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, the Regulations of the National Legal Services Authority as well as the DSLSA Rules, regulate the empanelment of the Advocates with the Authority. The empanelled Advocates are not employees of the DSLSA, neither contractual nor even ad-hoc. The empanelled Advocates only render their services, as and when called upon or required by the appellant for which they are paid the honorarium.

The relationship between the Authority and the empanelled lawyers is of a client-lawyer (relationship) and as such, the Authority is not bound to provide benefits to the lawyers engaged by them in a professional capacity, which the regular employees may be entitled to. Hence, there is no entitlement that arises in favour of the respondent under Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961.

The respondent was only tasked to provide legal services to the children who are produced before the Juvenile Justice Boards for which she was paid honorarium for the number of days on which she discharged her duties with the Authority. It was also submitted that the empanelment is merely a process by which Advocates are selected to provide legal aid on behalf of DSLSA to the needy children but they do not become obligated to receive benefits which the regular employees are entitled to in law.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

As per Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, she has the right to maternity benefits and while denying such benefits, the Authority has violated her legal rights. It was also contended that the Section 3(o) of the said Act includes women employed for wages in any establishment and as per Section 3(n), wages include all remuneration paid to a woman in terms of contract of employment etc.

She had worked till the 7th month of her pregnancy as a LSA and it was upon Doctor’s advice for bed rest on finding of her deteriorating health, she had to stop working till the time of her delivery and hence, she is entitled to the time she took off for her delivery and post-delivery child care.

Despite contractually employed in the Juvenile Justice Board with the Authority for a tenure of 3 years, she was not paid maternity benefits, whereas the permanent employees of the Authority are being provided the same. It is in violation of Articles 14, 15(3), 16, 19(1) (g) and 42 of the Constitution of India.

The maternity benefits granted to women are substantial for their personal health as well as for the wellbeing of her children and denial of the same would amount to economic and social injustice. The decision of the Authority denying the maternity benefits is arbitrary, as there is no valid or material reason given by the Authority.

She relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224, to contend that a woman cannot be compelled to undertake hard labour at the time of advanced stage of her pregnancy and that she would be entitled to maternity leave for certain period prior to and after her delivery. It was also submitted that there is no provision in the Act of 1961 which suggest that women employees working on contractual/casual basis are not entitled to the maternity benefits during the course of their contract/tenure.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Maternity Benefit Act, 1961: Legislation granting maternity benefits to eligible employees.
Article 21 of the Constitution of India: Recognizes the right to bear a child as a fundamental right.
Section 12 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Outlines criteria for eligibility for legal services, including entitlement for those filing or defending a case under specified conditions.
Section 13 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Deals with entitlement to legal services if a prima facie case exists.
Section 29 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: Empowers the Central Authority to make regulations.
National Legal Services Authority (free and competent legal services) Regulations, 2010: Regulations framed under Section 29 of the Act, providing free legal aid to eligible individuals.
Section 2(e) of the Regulations of 2010: Defines “Legal Services Institutions” to include various legal bodies.
Section 2(1)(eb) of the Regulations of 2010: Defines “Panel Lawyer” as a legal practitioner empanelled under regulation 8.
Regulation 8 of the Regulations of 2010: Deals with the empanelment process for legal practitioners.
Bar Council of India Rules: Likely referred to regarding legal professional conduct, though not explicitly stated.

ISSUE –

Whether the claim of maternity benefits under the Act of 1961, being a statutory right, is available to the respondent, which has been granted in her favor by the learned Single Judge?

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Delhi High Court, after hearing arguments from both parties and reviewing the case records, affirmed that the right to bear a child is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, the court deliberated on whether the respondent, who had been granted maternity benefits by the learned Single Judge, was entitled to such benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961.

The court analyzed provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act of 1987, regulations made under it, the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961, and the Bar Council of India Rules. It noted that the Legal Services Authorities Act aimed to provide free legal services to disadvantaged sections of society and organize Lok Adalats for justice on equal opportunity grounds.

Section 12 of the Act outlined criteria for legal services eligibility, including entitlement for those filing or defending a case falling under specified conditions. Section 13 elaborated on the entitlement to legal services if a prima facie case existed. Section 29 empowered the Central Authority to make regulations, leading to the publication of the National Legal Services Authority (free and competent legal services) Regulations of 2010, which provided free legal aid to eligible individuals.

The court also considered the definitions of “Legal Services Institutions” and “Panel Lawyer” under the Regulations of 2010, emphasizing the process of empanelment for legal practitioners.

The court disagreed with the interpretation by the learned Single Judge regarding the application of the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961 to the respondent. It stated that extending maternity benefits to professionals engaged by entities like the appellant would set a problematic precedent. The court clarified the distinction between advocates engaged professionally and employees appointed according to recruitment rules.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment. It dismissed related applications as they had become redundant in light of its findings. No costs were awarded.

Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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