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The delay may not be fatal to the criminal proceedings. However, it always depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.  However, at the same time, a long delay like 29 years as in the present case can certainly be a valid consideration for grant of anticipatory bail. The judgment was delivered by three judge bench comprising hon’ble Justice Ashok Bhushan, Justice R. Subhash Reddy and Justice M.R. Shah at Supreme Court in the matter of Sumedh Singh Saini v. State of Punjab and another [CRL. A. NO. 827/2020].  

The appellant in the present appeal has alleged that Balwant Singh (brother of the informant) was illegally abducted from his residence which was at Mohali by those people who were working under the appellant. He was harshly and cruelly tormented while in guardianship, by and at the command of the appealing party. It is additionally asserted that a bogus and created FIR No. 112 of 1991 may have been enrolled at the occasion of the litigant to recommend that the casualty was brought to the police station Qadian from where the casualty was asserted to have gotten away.

The appellant filed anticipatory bail application before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mohali. By order dated 10.07.2020, the learned Additional Sessions Judge granted protection by way of three days’ advance notice in case of addition of offence under Section 302 IPC. three   co-­accused   in   FIR   No.   77   dated   06.05.2020 wanted to become approver and they submitted the applications before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mohali for grant of pardon and declaring them as approver under Section 306 Cr. P.C. However, all three applications came to be dismissed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mohali, vide order dated 07.8.2020. the appellant applied for anticipatory bail for the offence under Section 302 IPC before the learned Additional Session Judge, Mohali by way of bail application. The learned Additional Sessions Judge vide order dated 01.9.2020 dismissed the said application. That thereafter the appellant approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh with an application for grant of anticipatory bail being CRM-M No. 26304 of 2020. By the impugned judgment and order, the High court has dismissed the said anticipatory bail application. Hence, the appellant has preferred the present appeal.  

The hon’ble Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, as well as, the learned Additional Sessions Court dismissing the anticipatory bail applications of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC FIR No. 77 dated 06.5.2020, registered at P.S. City Mataur, District S.A.S. Nagar, Mohali are hereby quashed the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC in connection with and set aside. It is ordered that in case of arrest of the appellant Sumedh Singh Saini in connection with FIR No. 77 dated 06.5.2020, registered at P.S. City Mataur, District S.A.S. Nagar, Mohali for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, he shall be released on bail on furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- and two sureties of the like amount and to surrender the passport and to cooperate with the investigation (however without prejudice to his rights and contentions in the pending proceedings to quash the impugned FIR). The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

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There is no assertion that any of the appellants have qualified both parts of A.M.I.E. Examination which is treated to be equivalent to the Engineering Degree. The appellants being only Diploma holders were promoted under Regulation 7(a)(ii) read with Regulation 10.4 of the Regulations. They had the opportunity to compete for direct recruitment after 12 years of service, which they never availed or remained unsuccessful. The appellants would have been entitled to claim parity with Kripal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg only if they were qualified and promoted against the posts reserved for those employees by direct recruitment. Consequently, the appellants cannot claim time bound promotion after completion of 9/16 years at par with Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg (junior to the appellants in the category of Assistant Engineer (Civil)) the Supreme Court held in Inderjit Singh Sodhi and others v. The Chairman, Punjab State Electricity Board and Another (SLP(C) No. 23877 OF 2014).

The appellants have claimed time bound promotional scale while working as Assistant Engineers. They were promoted to the said post from the post of Junior Engineer. The services of the appellants are governed by the Punjab State Electricity Board Service of Engineers (Civil) Regulations, 1965. However, The post of Assistant Engineer as per Regulation 7 is required to be filled up (1) by direct recruitment in terms of Regulation 9; (2) by promotion in terms of Regulation 10 or (3) by transfer of an officer already in services of a Government or another Government or Undertaking of the Government. The qualification required for direct recruitment under Regulation 9 is BE in Civil Engineering from a recognised institution or university. The Regulations further permit serving Section Officers who possess three- or four-years diploma in Civil Engineering and minimum 12 years qualifying service to apply for the post by way of direct recruitment. Regulation 10, provides for the promotion of the candidates with not less than 10 years’ experience subject to the condition that their number do not exceed 30 per cent of the total number of the cadre posts of the Assistant Engineers.

Two sets of circulars were issued by the Punjab State Electricity Board for grant of time bound promotional scales w.e.f. 1.1.1986. The Second Circular was issued to grant time bound promotional scale to directly recruited Assistant Engineers. However, the promoted employees were said to be entitled to time bound promotional scale as per the First Circular itself. The said Second Circular was issued to equally apply to the Civil and Electrical Branch of the Board.

A Writ Petition No. 19306 of 2003, Krishan Kumar Vij v. State of Punjab was filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court claiming time bound promotional scale. The writ petitioners were employed with Bhakra Beas Management Board. The said Board had adopted the Circular issued by Punjab State Electricity Board on 26.6.1992. The writ petition was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 6.12.2004. The order of the High Court was however later set aside by this Court in a judgment reported as Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij & Anr (2010) 8 SCC 701.

Counsel for the respondents argued that time bound promotional scale would be applicable to the promotee officer such as the appellants only in terms of the First Circular which contemplates that an employee shall be entitled to promotional scale on completion of 9 years of regular service on a post and subsequent second time bound promotional scale after completion of 16 years of service. If in case an employee gets normal promotion to the next higher post before completion of 9 years’ service, he would not be entitled to first time bound promotional scale. He would however be eligible to get second promotional scale after completion of 16 years’ service, counted from the date of direct recruitment, provided that he does not earn second normal promotion before the completion of above said 16 years’ service.

The court was of the view that “We find that the appellants were promoted within 9 or 16 years from their initial appointment, therefore, they are not entitled to time bound promotional scale. Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg were appointed by direct recruitment as Assistant Engineer (Civil), whereas the appellants have been promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil). Hence, the Second Circular would not be applicable to them. The promotee employees are entitled to time bound promotion scale in terms of the First Circular only. Hence, the appellants are not entitled to claim any parity with Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg.”

Conclusively, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgement and the appeals were dismissed.

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Recently, the Allahabad High Court stated that the right to stay in live-in relationship is covered under Article 21 – Right to life and personal liberty. The court stated that a couple in a relationship have the liberty to live together and no person has the right to interfered in their peaceful living. In case of any disturbance the Police authorities should be approached for immediate protection. This was laid down by the High court in the case of Kumar Devi & Anr. V. State of U.P. & Ors., WRIT – C No. – 11108 of 2020.

The facts of the case are that two adults i.e. the Petitioners were living together in a live-in relationship for 6 months. But the respondents i.e. the parents of the Petitioner No. 1 are unhappy with this relationship and at many occasions have tried to solemnize the marriage of the Petitioner No. 1 with older persons against her consent. The Respondents were not happy with the relationship of Petitioner No. 1 and from time to time they use to harass them and pressurize to marry older persons. The Petitioner tried seeking help from the local police station to get protection against such harassment but there was no action taken by the police and so the Petitioner has file a writ petition in the court to issue the writ of mandamus.

The court in this case relied upon a number of Supreme Court judgments in which it has been stated that even if live-in relationship is considered as immoral in the society it is not illegal and does not amount to an offence. If a heterosexual couple has consented to stay in a live-in relationship it does not constitute as a crime and is perfectly legal. This was stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Lata Singh v. State of U.P. The Court also stated that it has been laid down in a series of judgments that if two adults i.e. a male and female decide to stay together their personal liberty cannot be interfered by anyone not even by their parents. Hence the division bench of Allahabad High Court was The Court thus stated, “We are of the view that the petitioners are at liberty to live together and no person shall be permitted to interfere in their peaceful living. As the right to life is a fundamental right ensured under   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   of   India   in   which   it   is provided that no person shall be deprived of his right to life and personal liberty.” The court also stated that if there is any further interference or hinderance caused in their relationship by anyone they can approach the court of Superintendent of Police.

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A division bench of the Karnataka High Court recently noted “No Court is bound by such a decision taken to withdraw from the prosecution.” The matter was heard while issuing notice to the respondents in PUCL v. State of Karnataka (W.P. 13781/2020).

 A Cabinet order was passed by the Karnataka government on the 31^st of August 2020 which directed that 61 pending cases against elected representatives of the Government be dropped. Parties to these suits include ministers of the State Government such as BC Patil, CT Ravi, Anand Singh and JC Madhuswamy. The People’s Union for Civil Liberties in Karnataka filed a motion challenging the validity of this order. The petitioners contended that such an order was against the rule of law.

The Government order dated 31.08.2020 mentioned that permission was granted for withdrawal of 61 cases under S.321 of the CrPC. S.321 deals with withdrawal from prosecution by the Public Prosecutor, which results in dismissal of the charges or acquittal of the accused. The bench found that action under S.321 could only be taken with the Court’s permission.

They looked into the Supreme Court’s verdict in S.K. Shukla & Ors. v. State of UP, where it was held that “Before an application is made under Section 321, the Public Prosecutor has to apply his mind to the facts of the case independently without being subject to any outside influence. The Government may suggest to the Public Prosecutor that a particular case may not be proceeded with, but nobody can compel him to do so.

“If the Government gives instructions to a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of a case, the latter after applying his mind to the facts of the case may either agree with instructions and file a petition stating grounds of withdrawal or disagree therewith having found a good case for prosecution and refuse to file the withdrawal petition.The courts are also free to assess whether the prima face case is made or not. The court, if satisfied, can also reject the prayer.”

The bench held that Courts were duty-bound in assessing whether a prima facie case exists, irrespective of any order to the contrary. However, they stated that they could not stay the order before the respondents had a chance to reply. Notice was taken on behalf of the State by the Additional Advocate General.

They also issued instructions to the State Government to forward copies of the court order to the Public Prosecutors who had been instructed to withdraw from prosecution in those 61 cases. The Prosecutors were to bring it to the notice of the Karnataka High Court when an application was made under S.321 CrPC.

Refusing withdrawal of prosecution from these cases would be a bold move towards a brighter future. The judiciary is supposed to be independent of the legislature and executive, but in recent times, the lines have begun to blur. In the present situation, Karnataka’s own Law minister is a defendant in one of the cases that are to be withdrawn! The judiciary is seen as a pillar of democracy, and to win the trust of its citizens, the Court must take a proactive stance by putting justice first.

 

 

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“Presence of malicious conduct of the parties if found, becomes sufficient for the court to not grant any relief to the concerned parties”, this remarkable stand was forwarded by Odisha HC in the writ appeal case of Abhinash Kumar Lohani v. Jitendra Kumar Sahoo & Others, [WRIT APPEAL NO.586 of 2020], chaired by Justice Sanju Panda & Justice S. K. Panigrahi. the bench in this present case allowed the instant writ appeal, thereby disposing off the case.

The respondent no.1 is a gold merchant who possess the ownership of many properties including a huge mall named as “B.S. Mall”. He was a tenant under joint family firm of the Appellant-M/s Kumar Multiplex Pvt. Ltd. and Dillip Kumar Ram. The period of tenancy was up to 31.12.2012 and it was never extended even though Clause-4 of the Deed of Agreement expressly provided for extension of the lease period by renewal of the agreement. In a family partition the aforesaid property fell in the share of the present appellant. Since the tenancy period of the respondent No.1 was over in 2012, the appellant-landlord approached the respondent No.1 to enter into a fresh rent agreement or to hand over the vacant possession to him. But, the respondent No.1 took evasive plea and refused to vacate the possession. As a result of which, the present Appellant was compelled to file a suit for eviction and the same is pending before the 4 learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Keonjhar registered as C.S.No.81 of 2020.

The present Writ Appeal seeks to challenge the Order dated 23.09.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.23804 of 2020 directing the electricity authority to provide temporary electricity supply in favor of the Writ Petitioner/present Respondent No.1 which amounts to granting the main relief sought for in the writ petition by the Respondent No.1.

After examining all the submissions, arguments and evidences forwarded by the councils, the hon’ble HC observed that, In fact, the conduct of the Respondent No.1 in seeking the intervention of this Court with unclean hands is sufficient for non-suiting to get any relief which is succinctly echoed in plethora of judgments like Dalip Singh v. State (2010) 2 SCC 114 & Oswal Fats and Oils Ltd. v. Commr. (Admn) (2010) 4 SCC 728. Therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable and sans proper reasoning.

The bench further added that, the decision dated 23.09.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No.23804 of 2020 is set aside, responded was asked to vacate the premises after restoring all his dues within 30 days from the date of the delivery of the judgment.

In lieu of the above made considerations and observations, the bench in this present case allowed the instant writ appeal, thereby disposing off the case.

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