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The quality of witnesses should be the criteria under Section 134 of the Evidence Act, rather than the number of witnesses, considering how common it is for witnesses to turn hostile in a trial. This remarkable judgement was passed by the bench consisting of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Hrishikesh Roy of the Supreme Court in the matter of Jayantilal Verma v State of MP, [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 590 of 2015].

After the death of a lady in her matrimonial house, her brother alleged that the husband had murdered his sister. The couple had been married for 8 years and the brother alleged that his sister had off late been complaining of being harassed at the hands of her in laws and husband.

The post mortem reported suggested the death was caused due to asphyxiation owing to being strangled. Several witnesses turned hostile due to familial relations and the only reliable evidence remaining was the post mortem report and testimony of the doctor who conducted the post mortem and the husband himself. Earlier, the husband alleged that all members residing in the house were outside doing their work when the lady died. After going through the evidence, it was obvious that the marks on her neck and surrounding parts prove it was the case of strangulation. While giving his testimony, he added the fact that she died of a snakebite, which was also further completely negated by the post mortem report.

The trial court convicted the husband while acquitting the mother in law. The father in law passed away during the trial. On the basis of the acquittal of the mother in law, the counsel for the appellant argued that his client was not proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt and challenged the decision of the Trial Court.

The high court on the key witnesses turning hostile opined, “We are conscious that the case of the prosecution rests only on the testimony of PW-1 and the medical evidence. The statement of PW-1 was consistent and cogent except to the extent that in the earlier statement he had not mentioned the factum of the death being attributed to snakebite. However, that itself would not nullify the remaining part of his testimony. In fact, the said witness did not back out from the statement, but could not state the reason why the police did not record it in the FIR though it was mentioned”.

 Further, in light of the death taking place within the four walls of the matrimonial house, the court observed, “In our view, the most important aspect is where the death was caused and the body found. It was in the precincts of the house of the appellant herein where there were only family members staying. The High Court also found that the location of the house and the surrounding buildings was such that there was no possibility of somebody from outside coming and strangulating the deceased and that too without any commotion being caused or any valuable/jewellery missing.

We are confronted with a factual situation where the appellant  herein, as a husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by strangulation. The fact that the family members were in the home some time before is also quite obvious. No explanation has been given as to how the wife could have received the injuries. This is a strong circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the crime. explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation”.

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Safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of society, including the handicapped and mentally retarded is a constitutional duty and responsibility of the Municipal Corporation has been pronounced by the Kerala High Court in case of the Dr. P.A. Mary Anitha vs Corporation of Kochi, Ernakulam, and ors., WP(C). No.24850 OF 2018(S) in the bench comprising of Justice S.Manikumar and Justice Shaji P.Chaly.

In the present case, Public Interest Litigation was filed by the Chairperson of an NGO namely Centre for Empowerment and Enrichment (CEFEE). According to the petitioner, she volunteers and aims primarily to enable differently-abled children to come up to the limelight of society and to live in dignity in the society.  The case projected by the petitioner is that the Corporation of Kochi, as well as the Public Works Department and their Nodal Agencies, have the duty and the responsibility to ensure that the differently-abled people are able to enjoy their rights to walk freely and fearlessly within the limits of Kochi city by providing safe and hindrance free footpaths to access the roads and they have failed in fulfilling it.

It is also submitted that Section 346 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 casts duty on the first respondent Corporation to make the public streets and bridges vested in it and under the control of it to be maintained and repaired at the cost of the municipal fund and to meet the cost of all improvements to the same, which are necessary or expedient for the public safety or convenience. The Court also pointed out that under Section 207 and Section 208 and Section 346 of the Act, 1994  all public roads, streets, lanes and bridges other than National Highway, State Highway or major district road or roads classified by Government as such vest in the Municipality together with all pavements, stones and other materials and other things and duty of the Municipality to provide at the cost of the municipal fund, to such extend as the Government may, by general or special order to maintain the streets.

The Court held that there is a constitutional obligation along with the statutory obligation and held as:

 “ We are of the considered opinion that the cause put forth by the petitioner are genuine and bona fide in nature so as to protect the interests of the differently-abled persons, and we have no hesitation to hold that differently-abled people like any other citizens are entitled to enjoy the fruits of life and liberty guaranteed under article 21 of the constitution of India. That apart, the State also has a duty as per the directive principles of state policy under Part 1V of the Constitution.  Further, after the introduction of Part 1XA to the Constitution of India, Under Section 243W dealing with Municipalities, the Municipalities are liable to discharge such functions entrusted with them thereunder.”

Thus, Supreme Court held that we have no hesitation to hold that the Corporation of Kochi, as well as the Public Works Department, are duty-bound under the law to make necessary arrangements in the footpaths and the road so as to enable differently-abled persons to access the roads and the footpaths to their convenience.

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A public servant or official can be investigated against even without prior approval from the state government, unless the official can prove the investigation is being carried out with prejudice. The consent mentioned under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 is merely directory and not mandatory. This remarkable judgement was passed by the bench consisting of Justice A M Khanwilkar and  Justice B R Gavai of the Supreme Court in the matter of M/S Fertico Marketing And Investment Pvt. Ltd. And Ors. Etc. V Central Bureau Of Investigation And Another Etc., [CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 760- 764 of 2020].

It was alleged that a few private individuals as well as public officials were involved in the selling of coal in the black market that lead to a loss to the tune of Rs.36.28 crore to the Central Government. The private individuals were named in the FIR by the CBI whereas, a chargesheet was filed against the public officials for misusing their authority and passing false status reports. The Single Judge hearing this case was faced with the question of whether the investigation carried out by the CBI was beyond its jurisdiction in light of Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as “DSPE Act”).

The court opined that the investigation suffered from lacking inherent jurisdiction and held, “since in the present case, investigation conducted by the CBI was without the previous permission/consent of the Government of UP as such, was in breach of the mandatory provisions of Section 6 of the DSPE Act”. Further, it also laid down the principle that if any public servant, under the control of the State Government was named in the FIR, consent of the State Government would be required for investigation. But, if the official is not named in the FIR and is required to be contacted for further investigation in the matter, permission from the state government is not required.

The appeal before the Supreme Court arose as the High court held “that the question of consent can be raised only by the public servants who have been named in the FIR and not by the private individuals, who had come before the Court”. Thus, dismissing the appeals.

The counsel for appellant argued on two grounds. Firstly, that provisions of the PC Act can be levied only against public servants. Secondly, meeting of minds is a pre requisite for section 120 of the IPC. Thus, when read together, “the offence cannot stand unless there is a meeting of minds between public servant and the private individuals and as such, an FIR could not be registered. As such, for registration of FIR against the private individuals for the offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act and other offences under the IPC, committed in the course of the same transaction or arising out of the same facts, the Members of DSPE have all the powers and jurisdiction. As such, we find absolutely no merits in the appeals filed by the private individuals”.

 The Supreme Court relied on the judgement passed in the case of H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi, ([1955] 1 SCR 1150) and State of Karnataka v. Kuppuswamy Gownder and Others, [(1987) 2 SCC 74] while it observed that, “In the present case, there are no pleadings by the public servants with regard to the prejudice caused to them on account of non-obtaining of prior consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act qua them specifically in addition to the general consent in force, nor with regard to miscarriage of justice”.

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The custom followed in one family can be different from the one followed in another, and the onus of proving which custom is applicable in the case lies on the party who is asserting that such a custom should be applied. The single judge bench consisting of J. Meenakshi Madan Rai, decided upon the matters of applicable customary law in a land dispute in the case of Nil Kumar Dahal and Another v. Indira Dahal and Others [Civil Appellate Jurisdiction RFA No. 10 of 2017].

The appeal arises from a Suit of Declaration, Recovery of Possession, Injunction and other Consequential Reliefs against the respondents. The appellants or the plaintiffs in the previous suit were blood brothers and sons of Devi Prasad Dahal whereas the respondents were the step mother and the daughter of the step brother of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed that since they are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, the jiwni land, kept aside by their late father from ancestral properties, should be given to them. The plaintiffs stated that their father had laid dual conditions  for the jiwni land to be passed on to the son “who would look after and perform death rites”. The plaintiffs claimed that these conditions had been satisfied and thus they should be given full possession of the property. The respondents on the other hand stated that the plaintiffs had left the house several years back, willingly, and had failed to take care of the father or perform his death rites. Further that she and her son had been in physical possession of the property for years, had taken care of the father and performed his birth rites. So, according to the Law of the Land, the respondents had rights over the disputed property.

The Trial Court ruled that the plaintiffs had in fact not taken care of the father as per the evidence and ruled the judgement against them. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs approached the High Court, contending that Trial Court had illegally ordered the mutation of the land in favour of the defendant. The HC held that the trial court had failed to appreciate the “uncontroverted evidence of their witnesses”. Placing reliance on the ratio of Karedla Parthasaradhi v.Gangula Ramanamma (Dead) Through Legal Representatives and Others [AIR 2015 SC 891], it was contended that the wife is the Class I heir of her husband and entitled to his properties on his death. Further, relying on Daya Ram v. Sohel Singh [(1908) P.R. No. 110 1906, F.B.], the court held that they “were aware of the myriad of castes and customs of the country and that custom in one family may not necessarily be the custom of another family and thereby the lack of uniformity in customs. In other words, it is accepted in our country that every family may have their own customs but it is for the person asserting it to establish that such a custom exists by sufficient proof”.

Eventually, allowing the appeal partially, the HC decided that “In the absence of any statutory provision dealing with Succession in the State and as the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has not been extended and enforced in the State but considering that the Courts in Sikkim have applied the provisions of the Laws of the country where the Laws in Sikkim are inadequate or do not cover a specific area, it stands to reason that the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, can be invoked and applied for the purposes of determining matters relating to Succession in Sikkim, involving parties to whom the personal Law is applicable, till specific Laws occupy the field”.

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The bench comprising of Justice L.Nageswara Rao, Justice Hemant Gupta, Justice Ajay Rastogi has reiterated that when the second appeal is listed for hearing on admission and if the High Court is satisfied that no substantial question of law is involved, it shall dismiss the second appeal without even formulating the substantial question of law in the case of Kirpa Ram (deceased) vs. Surendra Deo Gaur [Civil Appeal no. 8971 of 2010] relying on the case of Ashok Rangnath Magar v. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar , (2015) 16 SCC 763.

In the present case, the respondents have filed a suit for declaration challenging the vesting of the said land in Gaon Sabha in a suit filed on 20.7.1959. The said suit was decreed on 7.10.1960 holding that the plaintiffs are owners and Bhumidars of land comprising in Khasra No. 238. Later, the respondents have filed a suit for a permanent injunction on 31.7.1971 claiming that land is owned and possessed by them. But the plaintiff has stated that the said disputed land belongs to him and not others and also stated that the land in dispute does not bear Khasra No. 238 and that it is not situated in the revenue estate of Village Basai Darapur. Instead, the land in dispute bears Khasra No. 79 and is situated in the revenue estate of Village Shakarpur.

In view of this dispute, trial court held that the land belongs to the respondents. Then, the first appeal was filed by the Plaintiff. The High Court followed the judgment of the trial Court. The second Appeal has been filed and The High Court vide judgment dated 25.8.2008 dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellants herein. Aggrieved by the findings of the High Court, Plaintiff is in appeal before this Court and argued that the High Court has dismissed the appeal without framing any substantial question of law which is mandatory in terms of Section 100 of the Code.

It was observed by the Supreme Court as,  

“The formulation of a substantial question of law or reformulation of the same in terms of the proviso arises only if there are some questions of law and not in the absence of any substantial question of law. The High Court is not obliged to frame the substantial question of law, in case, it finds no error in the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court.”.

Thus, the matter was disposed of as the Court did not find any error in the judgment and order of the High Court dismissing the Second Appeal without even formulating the substantial question of law.

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