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In the case of Manikandan versus State of Kerala [CRL.A.No 478 of 2016], the trial court convicted four men for murdering Raveendran and Gopalakrishnan. They were said to be CPI(M) sympathizers and were murdered by the opposition party while returning from a marriage reception party. The high court reiterated that the gravity of crime by itself cannot be made a factor to uphold the conviction while acquitting 4 RSS workers in a political murder case.

The court observed that the opinion of the doctor has to be taken into consideration while relying on the lengthy statement as that of the deceased. The physical as well as mental condition of the patient has to be noted so that it would be of great help while cross examination of the medical officer takes place. In the present case since the condition of the injured and deceased was not recorded, it is quiet inevitable to believe that the deceased was neither in any condition to write any lengthy statement as presented in the court nor was his conditions recorded by the medical practitioner nor did the police got the recorded statement verified by the doctor treating him.

 “So without an expert opinion by a Doctor about the condition of the patient, it is highly unsafe for a court of law to accept such a lengthy statement as that of the deceased person. That is more so because the person who alleged to have recorded the statement itself disowned the handwriting and stated that it has been written by a constable accompanied him and he cannot name the person also.”

Relying on the case of Hari Singh and Anr. v. State of M.P. [2019 (8) SCC 677: 2019 KHC 6947], “wherein while dealing with admissibility of dying declaration it has been held that where the condition of the injured was serious and his blood pressure was not recordable, without getting the opinion of the doctor that patient was in a fit condition for making statement, his statement should not have been recorded. That was also a case in which the investigating officer recorded the statement of the victim under Section 161 Cr.P.C. After the death of the victim it was attempted to be proved as a dying declaration.”

The court quoted some parts of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act which deals with the statements of the persons who cannot be called as witnesses. “Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.”

“So dying declaration is a statement made by a person as to cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transactions which resulted in his death.”

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In the case of State of Kerala vs. Union of India [ W.P(C). No.6823 OF 2019], the bench comprising Justices Vinod Chandran and CS Dias observed that there is utterly no valid ground in the challenge against privatization which is the declared policy of the Union Government. In furtherance of the policy of the Central Government to bring in Public Private Participation, these writ petitions were filed at various intervals over a period of one year essentially pointing on the leasing out of Thiruvananthapuram International Airport as carried out by Airport Authority of India.

 The challenge by the State’s opposing the leasing out of the Airport was primarily on four aspects: (1) promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation (2) arbitrariness in awarding the tender to the Adani Group who has no prior experience in developing and managing an Airport, (3) the financial requirements in the RFP being tailor made to suit the Adani Group and (4) the AAI Act having not permitted any cross-subsidization, by way of utilization of the income generated from one Airport to augment the facilities of another.

“A wealth of decisions, spanning over a large period, were placed before us. We specifically refer to Silpi Construction Contractors v. Union of India [2019 (11) Scale 592] which referred to a number of the afore-cited decisions in paragraphs 7 to 18, which we need not reiterate.

The essence of the law laid down in the judgments referred to above is the exercise of restraint and caution; the need for overwhelming public interest to justify judicial intervention in matters of contract involving the state instrumentalities; the courts should give way to the opinion of the experts unless the decision is totally arbitrary or unreasonable; the court does not sit like a court of appeal over the appropriate authority; the court must realise that the authority floating the tender is the best judge of its requirements and, therefore, the court’s interference should be minimal.”

“Keeping in mind the caution of self-imposed restraint; while examining such matters having commercial overtones, that interference is possible on judicial review only if the exercise is found to be arbitrary, irrational, malafide or vitiated by bias or for overwhelming public interest, we proceed to consider the submissions made.”

In the present case too, the opposition made is against the tender floated by the AAI, a statutory authority to bring in private participation for the operation and management of an airport; in services not involving air traffic service and watch and ward at airports. The lease of the Airport for such purposes is permitted statutorily by Section 12A of the AAI Act, with the previous approval of the Central Government. The Private Public Participation which is a policy of the Union Government, statutorily recognised with respect to the Airports; is not questioned in the writ petitions.

“The question raised is only whether the AAI acting within the confines of Section 12A, is able to satisfy the mandate of public interest or the interest of better management, in leasing out the Airports. The State had bid under the RFP an attempt to participate in a commercial venture. There is no question arising as to the relationship between the Union Government and the State in the federal set up, as envisaged in the Constitution of India.”

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In the case of Navin Chandra Dhoundiyal v. State of Uttarakhand and Ors. (CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3493/2020), the Supreme Court had underlined the aspect while ruling that long-standing or established status quo brought about by judgments interpreting local or state laws, should not be lightly departed from.

The facts, in this case, initiates with the common question which arises for decision is as to the correct interpretation of a condition in the respondent-University’s statutes regarding the date of superannuation of its teachers. All the appellants, in this case, are working as Professors in various disciplines, in the respondent Kumaun University (hereafter “the University”). By the order dated 21.12.2019  they all were aggrieved. It sets out their respective dates of retirement (which were the last dates in the months they attained the age of superannuation, i.e. 65 years). The appellants thus, relied on Statute No. 16.24 of the University, applicable to them. They contended that they were entitled to continue beyond the last date of the month in which each of them attained the age of superannuation, till the “30th of June following” in terms of that provision.

 The appellants were aggrieved by the office order dated 21.12.2019 and approached the Uttarakhand High Court in writ proceedings. They had stated that they were entitled to continue in service, on extension up to the end of June, 2021. They had relied on a previous judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court – Dr. Indu Singh v State of Uttarakhand (2017 SCC Online 1527).  In that judgment, the Division Bench had, on an interpretation of the relevant provisions (which were worded identically to Statute No. 16.24 as in this case) held that those who retire after 30th June are “entitled to continue till the end of the academic year”. The Division Bench placed emphasis and importance on the legislative intent “to cater to the supreme need to not adversely affect the academic activities of the institution and to safeguard the interest of the students.” The impugned judgment rejected the appellants’ writ petition, thus they upheld that Indu Singh could not be considered as a binding authority. It was also held that Statute No. 16.24 applies to the teachers of the university.

The judges, in this case, had held that “ This court is of the opinion that on a plain interpretation of Statute No. 16.24, including the proviso in question, it is clearly apparent that firstly each teacher attains the age of superannuation on completing 65 years {Statute No. 16.24 (1)}. Secondly, no teacher who attains the age of superannuation has a right or entitlement to reemployment; in fact, the opening expression “No teacher” appears to rule out reemployment of superannuated teachers {Statute No. 16.24 (2)}. Thirdly, and importantly the proviso {to Statute 16.24 (2)} carves out an exception to the main provision, inasmuch as it provides that a teacher whose “date of superannuation does not fall on June 30, shall continue in service till the end of the academic session, that is June 30, following and will be treated as on re-employment from the date immediately following his superannuation till June, 30, following.”

“ This court no doubt held that a teacher could not continue as principal; yet, it decisively ruled that “There is no doubt that the said decision would enable respondent No. 1 to continue as a teacher, which is his substantive appointment, up to 30th June, following the day when he attained the age of 60 years.” In this court’s opinion, such a categorical expression about a pari materia norm was decisive enough for the court to have found itself compelled to follow. Yet, the impugned judgment- with respect, characterized the expression in S.K. Rath11 as obiter. The Division Bench, in this court’s view, erred on this score.”

“The issue appears to have lingered and different benches of the Allahabad High Court, in view of the differences in phraseology of rules and statutes of various institutions, seem to have expressed divergent views in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Ultimately, this led to a reference which was answered by a Full Bench, authored by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud12 by the judgment reported as State Of U.P. v Ramesh Chandra Tiwari ((2015 (6) ADJ 579).”

“ The above analysis would show that the view of the Uttarakhand High Court, as also the Allahabad High Court (now settled by the full bench decision) consistently have been that teachers superannuating are to be treated as re-employed or allowed to continue, in the larger interest of the pupils, has prevailed. If the view that found acceptance with the impugned judgment were to prevail, there would be avoidable disruption in teaching; the likely delay in filling vacancies caused mid-session cannot but be to the detriment of the students. That apart, this court is also of the opinion that if the state or the university wished to depart from the prevailing understanding, appropriate measures could have been taken, putting all the concerned parties to notice, through amendments. In the absence of any such move, the departure from the prevailing understanding through a discordant judgment, as the impugned judgment is, injects uncertainty. Long ago, this court had underlined this aspect while ruling that long standing or established status quo brought about by judgments interpreting local or state laws, should not be lightly departed from, even by this Court, in Raj Narain Pandey v Sant Prasad Tewari & Ors (1973 (2) SCR 835)in the following words:

“In the matter of the interpretation of a local statute, the view taken by the High Court over a number of years should normally be adhered to and not disturbed. A different view would not only introduce an element of uncertainty and confusion, it would also have the effect of unsettling transactions which might have been entered into on the faith of those decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis can be aptly invoked in such a situation. As observed by Lord Evershed M.R. in the case of Brownsea Haven Properties v. Poole Corpn.(1958 [Ch] 574), there is well-established authority for the view that a decision of long standing on the basis of which many persons will in the course of time have arranged their affairs should not lightly be disturbed by a superior court not strictly bound itself by the decision.”

“This court is consequently of the opinion that the impugned judgment is in error. The very object and intent of the proviso to Statute No.16.24 is to avoid the disruption caused by discontinuity of service of a teaching staff employee or official mid-session. Therefore, the view in Indu Singh15, dealing with an identical statute, was correctly interpreted; the other decisions which dealt with Statute No.16.24 [Professor Sri Krishna Khandelwal and Binod Kumar Singh (supra)] too were correctly decided.”

“For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and orders of the High Court are set aside. The appellants are entitled, consequently, to continue till the end of the following June on re-employment. If any of them has been superannuated, he or she shall be issued with orders of reinstatement, with full salary for the period they were out of employment, and allowed to continue till the following June, on re-employment basis. The appeals are allowed without any order as to cost.”

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In the case of Mahendra Yadav Vs State of Bihar & Ors. [Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.6901 of 2020] Patna High Court held that pricing and procurement of food-grains for public distribution system, as also fixing Minimum Support Price is a policy decision which cannot be interfered with by the Court, unless of course, such policy is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or violative of Article 14/21 of the Constitution of India.

Petitioner, had filed the instant petition in public interest, desiring that the State fixes a Minimum Support Price for procuring the agricultural crop, i.e. maize, which is lying in abundance in the State of Bihar. The petitioner prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus or any writ/ order/ direction to direct the Respondents to henceforth immediately & expeditiously procure the ready & harvested crop of maize grains from the farmers of State and accordingly, pay such beneficiaries at the Minimum Support Prices (MSP) fixed by the Government of India.

The issue before the court was that whether the Court can issue a mandamus directing the State to pay a Minimum Support Price (MSP) for an agricultural crop.

The respondents submitted that procurement of particular crop is a policy matter and since the Go-downs of the Food Corporation of India are likely to be filled up with other category of food-grains to be procured, any decision for fixing the Minimum Support Price would be contrary to the public interest and against the policy.

Court referred the case of Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223 where the apex court held that, “The true position, therefore, is that any act of the repository of power, whether legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, is open to challenge if it is in conflict with the Constitution or the governing Act or the general principles of the law of the land or it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair-minded authority could ever have made it.”

Court further relied on the case of Rayalaseema Paper Mills Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., (2003) 1 SCC 341 where it was held, “Where the legislature has prescribed the factors which should be taken into consideration and which should guide the determination of price, the courts would examine whether the considerations for fixing the price mentioned in the statute or the statutory order have been kept in mind while fixing the price and whether these factors have guided the determination. The courts would not go beyond that point.”

The High Court observed that, “The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bihar SEB v. Pulak Enterprises, (2009) 5 SCC 641 held that in the absence of any provision in that regard the principles of natural justice would not be applicable and the scope of judicial review would also be limited to plea of discrimination i.e. violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As a general proposition, the law on the point is settled.”

Court held that, “Nothing is brought to our notice indicating the policy or the action of the respondents to be violative of Article 14/21 of the Constitution of India. Only for the reason that this year in the State of Bihar, the crop of maize is in excess than the previous year, cannot be a reason for this Court to issue a mandamus directing the State to procure the food-grains i.e. maize under the Minimum Support Price, so fixed with respect to other items of food-grains.”

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In the case of Raja Jha Vs State of Bihar & Ors. [Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.22497 of 2018] Patna High Court held that court exercising jurisdiction of judicial review, cannot examine, the sufficiency of the reasons for satisfaction of the competent authority especially when it is supported by material on the record.

The petitioner filed an application, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of certiorari quashing order contained in Memo No.3751 passed by Secretary of Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board whereby the petitioner was put under suspension and the departmental proceeding was initiated, framing the charges in Proforma- ‘Ka’.

In a writ petition a Bench of this Court had directed C.B.I. investigation in the matter of appointment of 73 Gramin Dak Sevak during the period 2008-13 in Muzaffarpur Postal Division on the basis of fake and forged Madhyama marksheet. Eight R.C. cases were registered. During investigation of the aforesaid R.C.case, it revealed that officials of one of the schools namely Krishnadev Niranjan Dr. Jai Narayan Sharma Sanskrit High School, Patahi,

Muzaffarpur in a conspiracy, accepted forms of Madhyama examination for the period 2005-09 from the students and their fee was also collected in unauthorized manner. The S.P., C.B.I. vide his letter addressed to the Chairman of Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board reported that during investigation, sufficient material came on the record to initiate departmental proceeding for major punishment against three persons including the petitioner who were Assistants in Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board as they had allowed backdoor entry of students.

The impugned order has been challenged on the ground that Bihar Government Servant (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 was not applicable in the case of employees of the Sanskrit Shiksha Board nor there is any other Rule governing the service condition regulating the area. Therefore, the impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction. The impugned order had further been challenged on the ground that the action has been taken on the recommendation of the C.B.I. Hence, the impugned order suffered from non-application of its own mind by the competent authority. The petitioner admitted that the Board used to adopt State Government’s Rule relating to payment of gratuity, leave encashment and benefit of A.C.P. schemes, for its own employees.

Court held that, “The impugned order reveals that Bihar Government Servant (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 and Amendment Rules 2007 were applicable and under those Rules action has been taken. The petitioner has admitted that some beneficial provisions of the State Govt. for its employees have been given to the employees of the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board also. Hence, they cannot claim immunity from the Disciplinary Proceeding Rule. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission that no Disciplinary Rule was applicable in the matter of employees of the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board. The Court held that Lokayukta has no jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue Mandamus.”

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