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“No trial would be required as even if these documents are taken on file as evidence, by virtue of them being unregistered documents, they would not be valid and would confer no title.”, this remarkable stand was forwarded by Delhi High Court single judge bench chaired by Hon’ble Justice Mr. Prathiba M. Singh in the criminal appeal case of Vateena Begum V. Shamim Zafar & Anr., [CM APPLs. 21460-63/2020].

The present appeal challenges the impugned order dated 13th August, 2020, by which the Executing Court has rejected the objections filed by the Appellant under Order XXI Rule 97 and 101 CPC. The admitted facts in this case are:-

The original owner, in respect of the agreements of both the parties before this court, is Mr. Dilawar Hussain Malik. The Appellant has allegedly entered into certain documents in respect of the property with the original owner. None of the Appellant’s documents are registered. The sale consideration fixed is Rs. 9,00,000/-. The entire amount is purportedly received only in cash. On the other hand, the Respondents/ Decree Holders filed a suit for specific performance on the strength of an Advance Receipt-cum Agreement to Sell and Purchase, dated 21st July, 2012, with the same original owner. The consideration recorded in this agreement is Rs.6,00,000/-. Advance payment of Rs.1,00,000/- is stated to have been made out of which Rs.45,000/- is a cheque payment. There is also a receipt executed by one Mr. Mohd. Javed, who is stated to have received Rs. 2,00,000/- i.e. a part of the remaining sale consideration.

The suit for specific performance and permanent injunction was filed by the Respondents/ Decree Holders in September, 2012. A perusal of the trial court record reveals that in the suit, repeated summons were issued to the Defendant/ Original Owner of the property. Thereafter, the decree of specific performance, which was passed by the trial court, was sought to be executed by the Respondents/ Decree Holders

After examining all the submissions, arguments and evidences forwarded by the councils, the Hon’ble HC observed that, “The execution of a decree for specific performance does not merely relate to a title of a property, but as in the present case, also involves dispossessing a person who is already in physical possession of the property. At the time when the decree was passed it is not even clear as to who was in possession of the property. Hence, in such a situation, objections would have to be considered in detail by the Executing Court and may require leading of evidence to ascertain factual aspects, with respect to the suit property and the Original Owner.”

In lieu of the above made considerations and observations, the bench in this present case rejected the present application stating that, “Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside. The Executing Court would frame issues and adjudicate the objections after receiving evidence. Needless to add this Court has not examined the legality or the validity of the documents relied upon by the Appellant and the Respondents, or any other averments on merits”.

The bench further added that, “Considering that the decree in the present case was passed way back in 2002, the Executing Court shall decide the objections within a period of six months. The original documents which were handed over during the court hearing be returned to the respective counsel upon proper acknowledgment. The same be produced before the executing court. The Registry of this Court to scan the documents before the same are returned to the Ld. Counsels for the parties.”

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A compensation of Rs. 10 Lakhs was granted to an MS Surgery course aspirant for illegally denying her admission into the college and granting an admission to a candidate who ranked below her in the merit list. The College that denied her admission was directed to reserve one seat for this aspirant in the management quota in the next academic year of (2021-22). This was laid down by J. L Nageshwara Rao and Hemant Gupta in the case of National Medical Commission Vs. Mothukuru Sriyah Koumudi, [Civil Appeal No. 3940 of 2020]. 

The medico aspirant in her NEET PG 2020 scored 327 marks and was granted a provisional admission to the MS (General Surgery) course in the Kamineni Academy of Medical Science and Research Center, Hyderabad under Management Quota. The aspirant was asked by the authorities to report before the college on July 29 or 30 to submit the documents and pay the fees. The medico aspirant reached the college on those dates, but her admission was not completed. Further, the aspirant tried to meet the Chairman of the college, but she was not permitted to meet him. Later a candidate below her rank was granted admission to the college. The Medico Aspirant filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking denial of the admission granted to the other candidate.

The High Court allowed the Writ Petition and directed the Medical College to create or sanction one seat for the Petitioner and further directed the College to grant her admission to the PG medical course. The National Medical College approached the Supreme Court on the grounds that creating another seat for the medico aspirant would be contrary to the law that has been laid down by the Supreme Court itself. 

The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the High Court and laid down that the college was at fault in not granting admission to the medico aspirant. The Court further stated that, “The manner in which Respondent No.2-College acted in depriving admission to Respondent No.1 and giving admission to Respondent No.5 s deplorable. The managements of the medical colleges are not expected to indulge in such illegalities in making admissions to medical courses.” The court with respect to admission stated that adding one seat beyond the sanctioned capacity by the National Medical Commission cannot be permitted. Hence the Supreme Court stated that the medical aspirant should be granted a compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs for a loss of academic year for no faults of her and a seat in management quota for the academic year 2021-22.

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It goes without saying that Homeopathic medical practitioners have to follow the advisory dated 06.03.2020 issued by AYUSH Ministry, this remarkable stand was forwarded by Supreme Court three judge bench chaired by Hon’ble Justice Mr. Ashok Bhushan, Mr. R. Subhash Reddy & Mr. M.R. Shah in the Civil appeal case of Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission School of Homeo Pharmacy V. The Secretary, Ministry of Ayush & Ors. [C.A. No. 4049 of 2020],.

This appeal has been filed by the appellant Dr. AKB Sadbhavana Mission School of Homeo Pharmacy aggrieved by the part of Division Bench judgment of Kerala High Court dated 21.08.2020 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.9459 of 2020. The appellant, who was not party in the writ petition feeling aggrieved by certain directions issued by the High Court have come up in this appeal.

The writ petition was filed by respondent No.4, an Advocate praying for writ of Mandamus or for any other writ or order directing the Secretary, Department of AYUSH, Government Secretariat, Trivandrum to ensure that the Homeopathic practitioners are immediately allowed to perform in accordance with the Exhibit-P1 notification (Guidelines dated 06.03.2020 issued by Secretary, Department of AYUSH (Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha, Sowa-Rigpa and Homeopathy) (AYUSH, New Delhi).

“The only prayer made in the writ petition are to the following effect:- (i) To issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other Writ or Order directing the third respondent to ensure that the Homeopathic practitioners are immediately allowed to perform in accordance with the Exhibit P-1 notification. (ii) To grant such other reliefs as this Honourable Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

The Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the writ petition by judgment dated 21.08.2020. The High Court in its judgment has extracted advisory dated 06.03.2020 of the Government of India, Ministry of AYUSH, the Government Order dated 08.04.2020 and 21.04.2020 issued by Government of Kerala and after noticing the aforesaid, the High Court disposed of the writ petition.

The appellant, who was not party to the writ petition, has filed this appeal before the Hon’ble SC stating that, “the Hon’ble High Court had not issued any notice either to Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India or to Homoeopathy doctors or its organization before passing the impugned order.”

After examining all the submissions, arguments and evidences forwarded by the councils, the Hon’ble HC observed that, “The guidelines, however, specifically provides that “the prescription has to be given only by institutionally qualified practitioners”. The High Court in its impugned judgment has not fully comprehended the guidelines dated 06.03.2020 and taking a restricted view of the guidelines and have made observations for taking appropriate actions against the Homeopathic medical practitioners, which cannot be approved.”

The bench further added that, “The High Court, however, is right in its observation that no medical practitioner can claim that it can cure COVID-19. There is no such claim in other therapy including allopathy. The High Court is right in observing that no claim for cure can be made in Homeopathy. The Homeopathy is contemplated to be used in preventing and mitigating COVID-19 as is reflected by the advisory and guidelines issued by the Ministry of AYUSH as noticed above.”

In lieu of the above made considerations and observations, the bench in this present case rejected the present application stating that, “We, thus, observe that directions issued by the High Court in paragraph 14 of the judgment need to be It goes without saying that Homeopathic medical practitioners have to follow the advisory dated 06.03.2020 issued by AYUSH Ministry as well as guidelines for Homeopathic medical practitioners for COVID-19 issued by Government of India, Ministry of AYUSH, as noted above. The Civil Appeal is disposed of accordingly. The interlocutory applications filed seeking permission for impleadment is rejected.”

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No merits in the case to prove that the cab aggregators i.e. Ola and Uber were carrying out any anti-competitive acts. Further, the NCLAT finding that the Petitioner does not have locus standi to file an appeal was dismissed. The ratio was laid down by J. RF Nariman, Krishna Murari and KM Joseph in the case of Samir Agarwal Vs. Competition Commission of India & Ors., [Civil Appeal No. 3100 of 2020].

The Petitioner in this case approached the CCI alleging that the cab aggregators were carry out anti-competitive practices based on the algorithmic pricing software used by them. The Petitioner alleged that this practice was against Section 3 of the Competition Act as it did not permit the individual cab drivers to compete among themselves. The CCI carried out an investigation in this case and held that the pricing is based upon the personal data and information available like demand, day, traffic, time of the day, and the drivers had no agreement or meeting of mind to fix the price. Secondly, the allegation against the minimum resale maintenance was dismissed on the grounds that there was no ‘resale’ in the app-based cab services. NCLAT dismissed the appeal on similar grounds stated by the CCI. It further held that the Petitioner had no locus standi to make the appeal and approach the CCI.

The Supreme Court upheld the order of the CCI and NCLAT on the grounds that there was no merits in the case that could prove anti-competitive practices but rejected the NCLAT’s finding that the Petitioner had no locus standi in this case. The Supreme Court stated that the definition of ‘person’ in the Competition Act is very wide and it is difficult to agree with the finding on the NCLAT. It further stated that,

“13. A reading of the provisions of the Act and the 2009 Regulations would show that “any person” may provide information to the CCI, which may then act upon it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In this regard, the definition of “person” in section 2(l) of the Act, set out hereinabove, is an inclusive one and is extremely wide, including individuals of all kinds and every artificial juridical person. This may be contrasted with the definition of “consumer” in section 2(f) of the Act, which makes it clear that only persons who buy goods for consideration, or hire or avail of services for a consideration, are recognised as consumers.

14. A look at section 19(1) of the Act would show that the Act originally provided for the “receipt of a complaint” from any person, consumer or their association, or trade association. This expression was then substituted with the expression “receipt of any information in such manner and” by the 2007 Amendment. This substitution is not without significance. Whereas, a complaint could be filed only from a person who was aggrieved by a particular action, information maybe received from any person, obviously whether such person is or is not personally affected. This is for the reason that the proceedings under the Act are proceedings in rem which affect the public interest. That the CCI may inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions of the Act on its own motion, is also laid down in section 19(1) of the Act. Further, even while exercising suo motu powers, the CCI may receive information from any person and not merely from a person who is aggrieved by the conduct that is alleged to have occurred. This also follows from a reading of section 35 of the Act, in which the earlier expression “complainant or defendant” has been substituted by the expression, “person or an enterprise,” setting out that the informant may appear either in person, or through one or more agents, before the CCI to present the information that he has gathered.”

The Supreme Court with respect to the power vested with the CCI and the provision in the act which enable it to act in rem, in public interest, it stated that, “ Further, it is not without significance that the expressions used in sections 53B and 53T of the Act are “any person”, thereby signifying that all persons who bring to the CCI information of practices that are contrary to the provisions of the Act, could be said to be aggrieved by an adverse order of the CCI in case it refuses to act upon the information supplied. By way of contrast, section 53N(3) speaks of making payment to an applicant as compensation for the loss or damage caused to the applicant as a result of any contravention of the provisions of Chapter II of the Act, having been committed by an enterprise. By this sub-section, clearly, therefore, “any person” who makes an application for compensation, under sub-section (1) of section 53N of the Act, would refer only to persons who have suffered loss or damage, thereby, qualifying the expression “any person” as being a person who has suffered loss or damage. Thus, the preliminary objections against the Informant/Appellant filing Information before the CCI and filing an appeal before the NCLAT are rejected.”

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This Judgment was delivered by the single bench comprising Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. Mohammad Rafiq & Hon’ble Justice K.R. Mohapatra of Odisha High Court in the matter of Bakul Kumar Mishra V. UOI & others, [W.P.(C) NO. 10668 OF 2003].

This writ petition has been filed calling in question the legality and propriety of the order dated 16.04.2002 (Annexure-6) passed by the Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. 1525 of 2001 and the order dated 18.07.2003 (Annexure-7) passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No. 276 of 1993 filed by the present petitioner.

The case of the petitioner has a chequered career. The petitioner was an ex-army personnel for twelve years. After taking retirement from the defense service, the petitioner pursuant to an advertisement dated 21.02.1972 applied for the post of Assistant Commandant in Class-II Cadre of the Odisha Military Police. On being successful in the interview, he got selected and joined as Assistant Commandant on 16.11.1972. Before joining in the Odisha Military Police Service, the petitioner had rendered five years eleven months and two days of approved commissioned service out of his twelve years career in defense service. Thus, he made a representation to the Secretary, Government of Odisha, Home Department, Bhubaneswar-opp. party no. 2 to fix seniority taking into consideration his past service in the Army and to antedate his date of joining in the Odisha Military Police. He also requested the opp. party no. 2 to re-fix his scale of pay accordingly. The State Government vide its letter dated 18.01.1978 granted the benefit of military service from 3 30.08.1964 to 31.07.1970 to the petitioner. Accordingly, a revised gradation list was published and circulated, wherein the petitioner was placed at Sl. No. 9, whereas the name of one Shri Gopabandhu Biswal was placed at Sl. No. 10 in the cadre of Assistant Commandant. When the matter stood thus, said Gopabandhu Biswal moved this Court in OJC No. 2414 of 1982 challenging the action of the State Government in not considering his case for promotion as Deputy Superintendent of Police in the I.P.S. Cadre. After creation of the Central Administrative Tribunal pursuant to the enactment of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, the writ petition was transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack (for short „the Tribunal‟) and the same was registered as T.A. No. 1 of 1989. Vide order dated 24.12.1991, said T.A. was disposed of directing the State Government to consider the case of Shri Gopabandhu Biswal for promotion in the cadre of I.P.S. in respect of the vacancies available from 1977 till January, 1980. The judgment passed by learned Tribunal in T.A. No.1 of 1989 was challenged by the State of Odisha and others before the Hon‟ble Apex Court in SLP(C) No. 7479 of 1992, which was dismissed on 03.08.1992.

After examining all the submissions, arguments and evidences forwarded by the councils, the Hon’ble HC observed that, “There cannot be any quarrel over the fact that Special Leave Petition filed by the State Government assailing the 22 judgments and order passed in T.A. No.1 of 1989 filed by Gopabandhu Biswal was dismissed in lemini. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has to follow the said judgment and order, more particularly when the Hon‟ble Apex Court while remitting O.A. No. 276 of 1993 and other similar Original Applications to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication has categorically opined that if the Tribunal comes to a conclusion that its earlier judgment requires reconsideration, the Tribunal can refer the question to a larger Bench.”

The bench further added that, “There is no dispute about the correctness of the ratio of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner but learned counsel for the petitioner failed to substantiate the applicability thereof to the instant case.”

In lieu of the above made considerations and observations, the bench in this present case held that, “In that view of the matter, this writ petition fails and is dismissed. Resultantly, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Tribunal under Annexures-6 and 7 are confirmed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.”

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