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In the case of Ramu versus State of Karnataka [Criminal appeal No.- 246 of 2014], the court observed that the culprits should be sentenced with death for the offence of gang rape. The bench was headed by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Veerappa and the Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Natarajan who after discussing the seriousness of the matter persuaded that even after several laws and amendments being laid down to section 376D of the Indian penal code, women are not safe in the society.

The bench quoted the famous lines said by the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, immediately after independence that, “The day a woman can walk freely on the roads at night, that day we can say that India has achieved independence.” The judges upheld that though Indian Penal Code was enacted by Act 45 of 1860, and even after the lapse of 74 years of independence still woman in not safe in the hands of the rapist/violators of law.

The court observed that, “It is high time for the Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, Media as the Fourth Estate of Democracy and General Public to pool in their collective wisdom to curb the menace of ‘rape’, which is more dangerous than the ‘Disease of Cancer’ to the future generation of our great Country.”

“When a woman is ravished, what is inflicted is not merely physical injury, but the deep sense of some deathless shame. Between Nirbhaya’s case and present case, the only difference is that in the case of Nirbhaya, the victim died after the brutal incident on her, but in the present case. The victim has discontinued her Law Course and returned to her native Country- Nepal with all curse.”

Because of the ghastly incident committed by the accused on the victim girl, the law and order of the entire nation particularly Karnataka State is made responsible. Since the ‘reputation of the Country is at stake’, no lenience can be shown to the accused persons. Any misplaced sympathy to the accused comes in the way of upholding ‘dignity of the court, majesty of law, traditions and cultures right from our ancient time.

The court further observed that, “‘Gang rape’ is more dangerous than ‘Murder’. The demand for justice has to be made fully within legal frame work.” “We, the Judges are the societal parents. If our concern for the society of girls/ women can be summed up in one sentence that “An attack on anybody’s daughter in an attack on our daughter”.” “We hereby recommend the Legislature/Central Government to further amend the provisions of Section 376D of Indian Penal Code- Gang Rape into capital punishment in addition to the existing provisions for imprisonment of life and with fine on par with the provisions of Section 376AB and 376DB of Indian Penal Code in order to curb the menace of ‘gang rape’ in the society at large.” “We hope and trust that the increasing gender sensitivity is crucial to enhance women’s safety. The safety of women is a not a guarantee despite the stringent amended law is placed after Nirbhaya’s case.”

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In the case of Employer in relation to Management of Food Corporation of India vs. Employer in relation to Management of Food Corporation of India [W.P. (L) No. 3745 of 2009], the Ranchi high court observed ‘equal pay for equal work’ is the basic right of every individual and should be one of the fundamental right in service jurisprudence.

The aggrieved was working as a typist in the corporation and completed 240 days of his service without retrenchment being paid of any kind. Since no retrenchment was paid to him, he being terminated of service was invalid. later when the circular was issued inviting applications for filling the job, he did not apply for it and chose to raise industrial dispute claiming regularization of service and got a reference made under Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act.

The court relied on the remarks made by the counsel that there is no difference between the work of a casual Hindi Typist or the permanent Hindi Typist and the workman is performing the same, similar and identical duties to that of a regular Hindi Typist. Also that long service on the post in question is enough to prove eligibility/ qualification and as such, workman is qualified and eligible for the post of Hindi Typist as he is holding the post for more than 25 years without any complaint from any corner.

The court believed the judgement passed in the case of Bharat Bank Ltd. V. Employees reported in AIR 1950 SC 188, it has been held in para 61 as under; “61. … … In settling the disputes between the employers and the workmen, the function of the tribunal is not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. it can confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing agreement. It has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the parties. It can create new rights and obligations between them which it considers essential for keeping industrial peace.”

“Law is well settled that there has to be equality in law and nobody can be discriminated if the nature of job is same and performance are same or similar, they are entitled for pay protection and salary on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ In the case of “Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences [(SCC pp. 239 & 241, paras 5 & 7], while considering the question of application of ‘Equal pay for equal work’ it has to be borne in mind that it is open to the State to classify employees on the basis of qualifications, duties and responsibilities of the posts concerned.”

As the workman already superannuated from his service on attaining his age of 60 years during the pendency of the writ petition, the bench said that he is entitled to all the benefits. “This Court is in full agreement with the Award passed by the learned Tribunal. I do not find any infirmity or any illegality in the impugned Award.” 

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In the case of Branch Manager, Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company Ltd and Others v. Dalbir Kaur, (Civil Appeal No. 3397 of 2020),  the Supreme Court had held that a proposer who seeks to obtain a policy of life insurance is duty-bound to disclose all material facts bearing upon the issue as to whether the insurer would consider it appropriate to assume the risk which is proposed.

The facts of this case initiate from the judgment of the order dated from dated 20 March 2020 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.

On 5 August 2014, the appellants Kulwant Singh had submitted a proposal for obtaining a policy of insurance. The proposal form indicated the name of the mother of the proposer, who is the respondent to these proceedings as the nominee. The proposal form contained questions pertaining to the health and medical history of the proposer and required a specific disclosure on whether any ailment, hospitalization, or treatment had been undergone by the proposer Column 22 required a declaration of good health. However, the proposer answered the queries in the negative, indicating that he had not undergone any medical treatment or hospitalization and was not suffering from any ailment or disease. The declaration under Item 22(c) of the proposal form was in regard to whether any diseases or disorders of the respiratory system such as but not  limited to blood in sputum, tuberculosis, asthma, infected respiratory disease or any respiratory system disease including frequent nose bleeding, fever and dyspnoea were involved. This query was also responded to in the negative. Thus based on the information given by them policy insurance was issued by the appellants on 12 August 2014. Thus under the policy, the life of the proposer was insured for a sum of Rs. 8.50 lakhs payable on maturity with the death benefit of Rs. 17 lakhs.   On 12 September 2014, Kulwant Singh died within a period of one month and seven days from the issuance of the policy, following which a claim was lodged on the insurer.

 The respondent instituted a consumer complaint before the District Consumer  Disputes Redressal Forum. The District Forum allowed the complaint and directed the appellants to pay the full death claim together with interest. The first appeal was rejected by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as “SCDRC”) and the revision before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as “NCDRC”) has also been dismissed. The NCDRC has relied on the decision of this Court in Sulbha Prakash  Motegaonkar & Ors vs Life Insurance Corporation of India (Civil Appeal No 8245/2015 decided on 5.10.2015). Thus consequently, while affirming the judgment of the SCDRC, the NCDRC imposed costs of Rs. 2 lakhs on the appellants, of which, an amount of Rs. 1 lakh was to be paid to the complainant and Rs. 1 lakh was to be deposited with the Consumer Legal Aid Account of the District Forum.

The judges in this case had held that “The decision of this Court in Sulbha Prakash Motegaonkar vs Life Insurance  Corporation of lndia, which has been relied upon by the NCDRC, is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the assured suffered a myocardial infarction and succumbed to it.  The claim was repudiated by the insurance company on the ground that there was a suppression of a pre-existing lumbar spondilitis. It was in this background that this Court held that the alleged concealment was of such a nature that would not dis-entitle the deceased from getting his life insured. In other words, the pre-existing ailment was clearly unrelated to the cause of death. This Court had also observed in its decision that the ailment concealed by the deceased was not a life-threatening disease. This decision must,  therefore, be distinguished from the factual position as it has emerged before this Court.”

“The medical records which have been obtained during the course of the investigation clearly indicate that the deceased was suffering from a serious pre existing medical condition which was not disclosed to the insurer. In fact, the deceased was hospitalized to undergo treatment for such condition in proximity to the date of his death, which was also not disclosed in spite of the specific queries relating to any ailment, hospitalization or treatment undergone by the proposer in Column 22 of the policy proposal form. We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment of the NCDRC in the present case does not lay down the correct principle of law and would have to be set aside. We order accordingly. “

Thus the court had finally held that “However, Mr. Amol Chitale, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has informed the Court that during the pendency of the proceedings, the entire claim was paid over to the respondent, save and except for the amount of costs. Having regard to the age of the respondent,  who is seventy years old and the death of the assured on whom she was likely to be dependent, we are of the view that it would be appropriate for this Court to utilize its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, by directing that no recoveries of the amount which has been paid shall be made from the respondent. However, while doing so, we expressly hold that the impugned judgment of the NCDRC does not lay down the correct position in law and shall accordingly stand set aside. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. “

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In the case of Mr. Arvind Kejriwal & Anr. v. State NCT OF Delhi, (CRL.M.C. 1867/2020), Delhi HC has set aside an order of the trial court, in which the court did not give permission to Delhi cm Kejriwal and Minister Manish Sisodia to have access to some extremely crucial documents without following the procedure under CrPC in the chief secretary assault case. The matter was heard by a single judge bench of Justice Suresh Kumar Kait.

An application under 207 of CrPC was filed regarding supply of certain documents including a copy of the statement of the witness (VK Jain). The trail court set the application aside and said that as claimed by the prosecution about the copy of the statement of the witness cannot be provided and it was not recorded under 161 CrPC on the alleged date in the application.

 A revision application was filed before the trial court but even that was disposed “it was a record of oral examination by the IO and was noted in the case diary, it could not constitute a statement under Section 161”.  It could be used by the court however, as an aid during the trial.

Senior Adv. N. Hariharan, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the impugned order stated that VK Jain was examined and the statement is being withheld to help the case of the prosecution.

It was submitted that“…they are trying to conceal/withheld the crucial part of evidence which is against the principle of ‘Criminal Jurisprudence’ and in violation of the basic principle of natural justice, free and fair trial. A plain reading of Section 207 CrPC makes it amply clear that under this provision the accused is entitled to have right to take the complete copy of the chargesheet and other documents in regarding of the case from the prosecution”.

Furthermore, it was also contended that a joint reading of section 173(5), first proviso of 207 and 173(6), leaves no scope of doubt about the fact that it is the duty of the police officer to forward all the statements mentioned under section 173(5) to the magistrate. The discretion of withholding the evidence with the magistrate.

Senior Adv. Sidharth Luthra, who appeared on behalf of the respondent no.2/complainant, submitted that on 21^st February, VK Jain was called for examination but no statement was recorded. Further he contended that it was a typographical error and the fact that was referred by the petitioner was for 22^nd sept.

He further argued that “under Section 173(5) and (6) and Section 207, what is to be supplied to an accused are the specified documents and no more. It is what the Prosecution proposes to rely upon what can be supplied and the accused cannot seek supply of a document which they have produced and which the Prosecution does not choose to rely upon”.

“It was also submitted by Luthra that records of the Case Diary could not be sought due to the bar imposed by Section 172(3). Multiple cases such as State of NCT of Delhi v. Ravi Kant Sharma (2007) and Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2005) relied upon to buttress this submission. It was further argued that it was not obligatory on part of the police officer to record any statement made to him and he may do so if he feels it necessary.”

Luthra concluded his arguments by citing the 41^st Law Commission Report, where they justified the wide discretion which was granted to the police officer to record only those statements, which may aid the prosecution.

The court observed that VK Jain was called on 21^st February, and was examined by 21.02.2018 and was examined by the IO which was later on recorded in the case diary. It was recorded in the case diary that the witness was examined in depth and a report was prepared thereafter.

Justice Kait then refers to Section 161 of the Code and the case of Ashutosh Verma v. CBI (2014) to observe that even at the stage of scrutiny of documents unde Section 207, the Court shall supply all the documents to the accused, even if the same is not relied upon by the Prosecution.

“Further observed that the accused can ask for the documents that withheld his defence and would be prevented from properly defending himself, until all the evidence collected during the course of investigation is given to the accused. Also observed that if there is a situation that arises wherein an accused seeks documents which support his case and do not support the case of prosecution and IO ignores these documents and forward only those documents which favours the prosecution, in such a scenario, it would be the duty of IO to make such documents available to the accused”.

The court was in consonance with Hariharan’s arguments which state that it is the duty of the police officer to forward to all the statements to the magistrate. “It cannot be disputed that the duty of the investigating agency is to do free and fair investigation by bringing to the notice of the Court all the evidences collected during the investigation without pick and choose the one which does not support them.”

The judgement concluded with an observation on the issue of source of document and states that if the evidence is relevant, it is admissible irrespective of how it is obtained. Finding merits in the present plea, the Court set aside the impugned order of the Trial Court.

Court held that “Consequently, the Trial Court is directed to consider the statement dated 21.02.2018 of VK Jain, which is part of ‘Case Diary’ and placed on record by the accused, at the time of passing the order on Charge.”

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In the case of Ajit Kumar v. The State of Bihar, (Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 888 of 2018), the Patna High Court releases the accused who was sentenced to death by the Trial court for the commission of crimes like murder and rape, on the ground that the Trial Court’s approach which had adopted was “casual and perfunctory in nature, unmindful of the consequences of the decision which when implemented becomes irrevocable and irreversible”.

The facts of the case start on a very grievous note. The accused Ajit Kumar and Vishal Kumar enticed and kidnapped the prosecutrix (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’), who was a minor girl, from the guardianship of her parents residing in Village Pipra (Bihar) and took her first to Patna (Bihar) and then to Vadodara (Gujarat) where she was subjected to gang rape and burnt to death. The accused Ajit Kumar stood convicted for committing an offence punishable under Sections 363, 366A, 120B, 302, 376(D) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6(g) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “POCSO Act, 2012). Thus seeing the nature of an offence under Section 302 I.P.C., the accused was sentenced to be hanged by the neck till his death. The Trial Court stated that no separate sentence about the other crimes stands passed. Thus the accused moved the High Court of Patna in appeal.

The judges in the case held that the principles over which Judicial decision had been developed over the years. These principles are “rarest of the rare cases, Judicial discretion on sentencing must be accompanied by application of judicial mind, and governed by rule of law, the judgment must be supported by special reasons,  Balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Weightage to every relevant circumstance relating to the crime and the criminal, Residual doubt becomes a mitigating circumstance, more so, for cases based on circumstantial evidence, Judicial approach must be cautious, circumspect and careful. Court must exercise prudence, and each court from Sessions court to the Supreme Court – must peruse and analyze facts of the case at hand and reach independent conclusion, Sessions court, in particular, must rigorously apply the rarest of rare case principle, Principle of retribution,   Doctrine of rehabilitation, and The court must not be an oracle of the public opinion and recognize limits to judicial power.”

The court finally held that “What is the basis of his conclusion of the case being the rarest of rare cases is not discussed. What are the special reasons for grant of capital punishment; whether there were any mitigating circumstances; what was the mental state, motive, or the brutality of the crime were never thought of much less considered by the learned trial judge. The approach adopted is casual and perfunctory in nature, unmindful of the consequences of the decision which when implemented becomes irrevocable and irreversible.”

“We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the Trial Judge, either on the sentence of awarding death penalty or applying the principles of sentencing. The sentence for each one of the offences was required to be pronounced which, perhaps Trial Judge forgot to do so.”

“The Death Reference is answered accordingly. For all the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal filed by accused Ajit Kumar and set aside the judgment of conviction dated 25th June 2018 and order of sentence dated 30^th June 2018 passed in Manjhagarh P.S. Case No.67 of 2017 (C.I.S. no.177 of 2017) by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Gopalganj (Bihar).”

“The accused Ajit Kumar is in jail. He be released forthwith unless required in any other case. Registrar (List) shall ensure the communication of the judgment to all concerned, also by an electronic mode. Equally, learned counsel for the State is directed to do so.”

Thus the accused was released.

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