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In the case of Kumari Anjali R. versus Karnataka Examination Authority [Writ Petition No.- 11576 of 2020(EDN- CET)], the Karnataka high court observed that because of the minor error in describing the reservation category, the candidate who was aspiring for a seat in engineering course cannot be denied a seat in the CET examination.

This very writ petition was represented by the applicant’s father under Article 226 & 227 of the constitution of India to consider the petition, allow the applicant to make a correction in the CET application form and to consider the candidate eligible for special category reservation under the category of EX CAPF. Articles 226 and 227 are the parts of the constitution which define the powers of the High Court. Article 226, empowers the high courts to issue, to any person or authority, including the government (in appropriate cases), directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari or any of them. Article 227 determines that every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction (except a court formed under a law related to armed forces).

The Karnataka Examination Authority dismissed the candidature of the applicant who is the daughter of an Ex. Border Security Force soldier because she made a mistake in the description of the reservation category. The court was of the view that since the petitioner provided sufficient material which included a certificate which proved that she is the daughter of Ex. BSF soldier who defended the frontiers of the nation for a period exceeding twenty years and has retired, therefore she was rightly entitled to enjoy the privilege of the reservation.

The court further stated that it was a minor mistake committed by the petitioner in describing the reservation category however the court was of the opinion that it was not a mistake at all as BSF is apparently a defense organization too which was statutorily constituted under the provisions of the Border Security Act of 1968; “the provisions of the Act and the Rule made thereunder make it abundantly clear that the servicemen of BSF function as the soldiers guarding the borders of the country, therefore, this aspect of the matter ought to have been adverted to by the respondent before denying a seat to the petitioner under the ‘Special Category’ regardless of the description mentioned by the candidate, who is admittedly a minor”.

The court continued to state that “too technical an approach would defeat their very purpose; in any circumstance before rejecting the applications, the officials having a word with the candidate and his/ her parents would infuse fairness in the action which is an essential element of justice; more is not necessary to specify”.

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In the case of Nizamuddin Ahmad Vs State of Bihar [Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.15447 of 2017] Patna High Court held that the principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight-  jacket formula and plea of infraction of rules of natural justice or it is not a valid proceedings cannot come to rescue of a person unless prejudice is caused to the aggrieved person.

It was the case of the petitioner that Sub-Divisional Officer, Hathua vide his letter called upon the petitioner to show cause as to why the license of the public distribution shop of the petitioner be not cancelled. The said show cause-notice was issued in the light of the letter of the Block Supply Officer, reporting therein irregularities in the matter of distribution of ration/kerosene oil, realization of more than the fixed price, indulging in black marketing of the ration for the month of May 2015 and misbehavior with the beneficiaries.

The petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation. With the show cause notice the report of the Block Supply Officer, Kateya was made available to the petitioner. In his report the Block Supply Officer had stated that in view of the letter of Sub-Divisional Officer he had gone to village Singhwania and obtained the written statement of allegationists. These beneficiaries appeared before the Block Supply Officer with their original cards and they complained that they were always scolded by the dealer Nizamuddin Ahmed. He used to say that they can go anywhere to make their complaint but they will not be provided ration. It was alleged that the dealer had not given any ration for even one month. It was further alleged that whenever consumer used to go to take kerosene oil, the dealer would give only 2 litres of kerosene oil charging Rs.25/- per litre which was more than the fixed amount. The other consumers had informed the Block Supply Officer that the dealer had sold the ration of May 2015 in black market. When the Block Supply Officer had gone to the shop of the petitioner his shop was found closed and there was no board in front of the shop.

Vide his office letter the dealer was asked to mend his ways but there was no improvement in the behaviour of the dealer and he indulged in violating the rules and misbehaving with the beneficiaries. The petitioner denied all the allegations and alleged that due to personal enmity and for some reason few persons are doing politics and acting in conspiracy with each other they want to get the license of the petitioner cancelled. As regards the complaint of the five consumers, the petitioner submitted that the allegations were false and baseless, the five consumers had got the card only one month back from some sources and they had never come to lift the ration. It had been submitted in the reply that these consumers have acted with malice and in conspiracy they have tried to indulge the petitioner in false allegation of black marketing.

The Sub-Divisional Officer, Hathuwa held that the show cause submitted by the petitioner seemed to be concocted and as regards the allegation made in the report of the Block Supply Officer, Kateya the petitioner had not made available any evidence/documents in that context. The Sub-Divisional Officer, therefore, cancelled the license of the shop of the petitioner.

The petitioner preferred an appeal and his main contention in the appeal was that the licensing authority has passed the impugned order without considering his show cause. The petitioner contended that the Panchayat representatives have certified about the genuineness of the system being followed by the petitioner in the distribution of the rations but that had not been considered. The appellate authority found that show cause of the petitioner was available in the records of the licensing authority but there was no explanation with regard to the fact that the shops were found closed. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. The revisional authority also refused to interfere. Then the present writ application had been preferred for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned order.

It was submitted that the Block Supply Officer, Kateya is silent on the time of inspection, mode of investigation, inquiry and the Block Supply Officer did not collect any evidence regarding black marketing of the Government supplied ration. It was his submission that none of the authorities below have appreciated the submissions of the petitioner.

The State respondents have contested the writ application and it was their stand that the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner with the charges clearly mentioned in the same and the inquiry report of the Block Supply Officer was also enclosed with the show cause notice, therefore, the requirement of law and compliance with the principle of natural justice have been fulfilled.

Court held that, “The public distribution shop system caters the need of Below Poverty Line (BPL) families and vulnerable above Poverty Line (APL) families, it is meant for those who need subsidized food articles and denial of the rations/kerosene to needy beneficiaries would defeat the very object of total food security and elimination of hunger. Thus, the Court is of the view that in the given facts and circumstance if the licensing authority has cancelled the license of the petitioner no fault may be found with the same. The appellate authority has rightly appreciated the materials present on the record and upheld the order of the licensing authority.”

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In the case of Gajraj Ramabhai Hajani Thro Ramabhai Pithabhai Hajani v. State of Gujarat, (R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 12832 of 2020) the high court of Gujarat had quashed the rape case against a boy filed by the minor wife, rather the court had held the parents responsible for the concerned acts, for ruining their childhood by dragging them in such a disreputable controversy, thus the cost imposed shared equally between them.

The facts of this case initiate by filing the captioned application, the petitioner – accused, a “minor”, is seeking the invocation of powers of this Court under the provision of section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Cr.P.C.”) for quashing of the FIR being C.R. No.11202057200329 dated 19.08.2020 registered with Sikka Police Station, District: Jamnagar for the offences punishable under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sections 4 and 12 of  The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 (for short “the POCSO Act”). Interestingly, the FIR is lodged at the instance of his  “minor” wife. By the  F.I.R. dated 19.08.2020, the prosecutrix indicates that she got married to the petitioner- accused on 07.02.2015 at the age of 11 years. Her date of birth recorded in the F.I.R. is 06.01.2004. The F.I.R. also states that she was forced to maintain a physical relationship by her husband against her wishes after 2016 when she was taken to her in-law’s house. Thus, a girl of 11 years of age was married to the accused by her parents, who was a minor of 17 years of age and was in a forceful physical relationship on account their parent’s wishes and desires.  On the registration of the F.I.R., the prosecutrix was produced before the 7th Additional Judicial Magistrate, Jamnagar for the recording of her statement under section 164 of the Cr.P.C. This Court has perused her statement, in which she has specifically admitted that she was married to the accused and thereafter she was forced to maintain physical relationship with him after 2017. The investigation also revealed the established fact that the parents had solemnized the marriage of the accused and prosecutrix when they were minor on 07.02.2015. It is also informed by the learned APP that the proceedings under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 have also been initiated. She has further submitted that the present FIR may not be quashed on the ground of settlement. Reliance is placed by her on the judgement reported in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh V/s. Laxmi Narayan, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688.

The court states that “It also appears that the FIR is lodged at the behest of the parents invoking provisions of serious offences. The petitioner, a minor is embroiled in the serious offence of rape by the prosecutrix at the behest of her parents without realizing the consequences. In her tender age the prosecutrix is also made to understand the immorality and dire consequence of offence of rape.  The childhood of both the petitioner and the prosecutrix is obliterated by their parents, on two counts, first by marrying them in tender age, and secondly, by involving them in the offence of rape.  The facts are suggestive that the minors are used as weapons in order to satisfy their prejudices and egos. The prosecution is lodged taking shelter under the minority of the prosecutrix. The quashing of the F.I.R. is sought by citing the minor age and marriage of the petitioner.”

The court, in this case, had held that “This Court is of the opinion that the criminal machinery alleging such serious offences under I.P.C and POCSO cannot be allowed to be misused and the parents of such children who resort such tactics cannot be let-off easily without fastening any accountability. Sufficient time has been devoted by the investigating authority in conducting the investigation. The prosecutrix was also produced before the concerned Magistrate. A great deal of time is consumed of this Court including the registry. Hence, in order to avoid such misuse of the penal provisions, I am of the considered opinion that the time is ripe to fasten the liability for sheer wastage of time of State and the Court. Hence, I consider appropriate to impose a cost of Rs.30,000/- . It shall be deposited before the Registry of this Court. The Registry shall further transfer the amount to the Gujarat High Court Legal Service Committee.  Since the parents of both the prosecutrix and the petitioner are responsible for ruining their childhood by dragging them in such a disreputable controversy, the cost shall be shared by them equally.”

“In order to see that the relationship between the families does not further deteriorate and the life of both the petitioner and the prosecutrix is maintained smoothly and effortlessly, the impugned FIR and the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed and set aside in view of the settlement arrived at between the concerned parties. This Court is conscious of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh V/s. Laxmi Narayan (supra). The law enunciated by the Apex Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Hence, the submissions advanced by the learned APP are rejected. The petition stands allowed. RULE is made absolute accordingly”

“I may part with the observations of (His Lordship K.S.P.Radhkrishnan, J in the case of Aarushi Dhasmana V Union of India, 2013 (9) SCC 475) – “Law of this land has always recognised the rights of parents with their wards/minors and first and foremost consideration of the Court is “welfare of the children”, which overrides the views or opinions of the parents.”

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In the case of Ramu versus State of Karnataka [Criminal appeal No.- 246 of 2014], the court observed that the culprits should be sentenced with death for the offence of gang rape. The bench was headed by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Veerappa and the Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Natarajan who after discussing the seriousness of the matter persuaded that even after several laws and amendments being laid down to section 376D of the Indian penal code, women are not safe in the society.

The bench quoted the famous lines said by the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, immediately after independence that, “The day a woman can walk freely on the roads at night, that day we can say that India has achieved independence.” The judges upheld that though Indian Penal Code was enacted by Act 45 of 1860, and even after the lapse of 74 years of independence still woman in not safe in the hands of the rapist/violators of law.

The court observed that, “It is high time for the Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, Media as the Fourth Estate of Democracy and General Public to pool in their collective wisdom to curb the menace of ‘rape’, which is more dangerous than the ‘Disease of Cancer’ to the future generation of our great Country.”

“When a woman is ravished, what is inflicted is not merely physical injury, but the deep sense of some deathless shame. Between Nirbhaya’s case and present case, the only difference is that in the case of Nirbhaya, the victim died after the brutal incident on her, but in the present case. The victim has discontinued her Law Course and returned to her native Country- Nepal with all curse.”

Because of the ghastly incident committed by the accused on the victim girl, the law and order of the entire nation particularly Karnataka State is made responsible. Since the ‘reputation of the Country is at stake’, no lenience can be shown to the accused persons. Any misplaced sympathy to the accused comes in the way of upholding ‘dignity of the court, majesty of law, traditions and cultures right from our ancient time.

The court further observed that, “‘Gang rape’ is more dangerous than ‘Murder’. The demand for justice has to be made fully within legal frame work.” “We, the Judges are the societal parents. If our concern for the society of girls/ women can be summed up in one sentence that “An attack on anybody’s daughter in an attack on our daughter”.” “We hereby recommend the Legislature/Central Government to further amend the provisions of Section 376D of Indian Penal Code- Gang Rape into capital punishment in addition to the existing provisions for imprisonment of life and with fine on par with the provisions of Section 376AB and 376DB of Indian Penal Code in order to curb the menace of ‘gang rape’ in the society at large.” “We hope and trust that the increasing gender sensitivity is crucial to enhance women’s safety. The safety of women is a not a guarantee despite the stringent amended law is placed after Nirbhaya’s case.”

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In the case of Employer in relation to Management of Food Corporation of India vs. Employer in relation to Management of Food Corporation of India [W.P. (L) No. 3745 of 2009], the Ranchi high court observed ‘equal pay for equal work’ is the basic right of every individual and should be one of the fundamental right in service jurisprudence.

The aggrieved was working as a typist in the corporation and completed 240 days of his service without retrenchment being paid of any kind. Since no retrenchment was paid to him, he being terminated of service was invalid. later when the circular was issued inviting applications for filling the job, he did not apply for it and chose to raise industrial dispute claiming regularization of service and got a reference made under Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act.

The court relied on the remarks made by the counsel that there is no difference between the work of a casual Hindi Typist or the permanent Hindi Typist and the workman is performing the same, similar and identical duties to that of a regular Hindi Typist. Also that long service on the post in question is enough to prove eligibility/ qualification and as such, workman is qualified and eligible for the post of Hindi Typist as he is holding the post for more than 25 years without any complaint from any corner.

The court believed the judgement passed in the case of Bharat Bank Ltd. V. Employees reported in AIR 1950 SC 188, it has been held in para 61 as under; “61. … … In settling the disputes between the employers and the workmen, the function of the tribunal is not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law. it can confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing agreement. It has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of the parties. It can create new rights and obligations between them which it considers essential for keeping industrial peace.”

“Law is well settled that there has to be equality in law and nobody can be discriminated if the nature of job is same and performance are same or similar, they are entitled for pay protection and salary on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ In the case of “Mewa Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences [(SCC pp. 239 & 241, paras 5 & 7], while considering the question of application of ‘Equal pay for equal work’ it has to be borne in mind that it is open to the State to classify employees on the basis of qualifications, duties and responsibilities of the posts concerned.”

As the workman already superannuated from his service on attaining his age of 60 years during the pendency of the writ petition, the bench said that he is entitled to all the benefits. “This Court is in full agreement with the Award passed by the learned Tribunal. I do not find any infirmity or any illegality in the impugned Award.” 

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