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It is the fundamental right of every individual to choose who they want to marry and love. This is an extension to right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. This remarkable judgement was passed by the Kalaburagi bench of the Karnataka High Court, consisting of Justice S Sunil Dutt Yadav and  Justice P Krishna Bhat in the matter of Vijay @ Vijendra v The State of Karnatak, [Criminal Appeal No. 2000141/ 2016].

The accused is alleged to have been in love with the deceased and intended to marry her. In light of the same, he went to the deceased’s house to profess his love for her and asked her to marry him to which she said she needed to consult her parents, and refused. The accused stabbed her seven to eight times with a knife he was carrying, with the deceased’s sister being present in the house. Thus, she was the key witness in this scene of crime. The deceased before dying, explained in detail the injuries caused to her and by whom which was later considered as the dying declaration.

The accused argued that the dying deceleration was a cooked up document and not reliable. He argued that there was no endorsement  certificate from the medical officer confirming the fact that the victim was in the state of mind to give her statement against the accused. Further, what supported his argument was that during the entire duration of which the victim was admitted in hospital, no statement was recorded by the medical officer, which again results in her statement being unreliable.

Lastly, the accused took the defence of grave and sudden provocation, which was blatantly rejected by the court on the following grounds. Firstly,  it was the accused who went to the victim’s house to ask her hand for marriage and secondly, he went with a weapon, which suggests that he had planned to attack her if she refuses to accept his proposal.

The Court relied on Laxman v State of Maharashtra, [(2002) 6 SCC 710]  while it opined on the dying declaration that, “it was voluntary and she was in a fit state of mind at that time , a certificate regarding fitness by a doctor is not mandatory”.

Further, in light of the defence the accused tried to take, the court observed that, “to permit the accused to take defence of grave and sudden provocation  is obnoxious and will result in negation of the fundamental rights  the deceased under article 14, 19(1)(a) ad 21 of the constitution of India”.

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The mental pain, agony, and suffering caused by the false accusations, other spouse cannot be asked to put up with the conduct of the spouse and to continue to live, was held in case of  Kirti Nagpal vs Rohit Girdhar, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 92/2020 &CM APPLs. 14842-14843/2020 by the bench comprising of Justice Sanjeev Narul and Justice Manmohan.

 In the present case, the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 24th June, 2012 at Delhi as per the Hindu rites and ceremonies. The marriage was also registered in Delhi on 31st August, 2012. The Respondent(Husband) initially preferred a petition seeking a decree of nullity of marriage under Section 12(1)(a) and (c) of the HMA, on two grounds, that the marriage could not be consummated due to Appellant’s (Wife) impotency and that his consent was obtained by concealing several material facts related to the psychological disposition of the Appellant, knowing which, he would not have consented for the marriage.

The Learned Trial Court held that the Appellant had treated the Respondent with cruelty within the meaning of the section 13(1)(ia) of HMA and thus decided in favour of the Respondent. Besides, the Court also observed that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent that it became impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress. Aggrieved with the above order, the Appellant has approached this court praying for the stay and setting aside of the impugned judgment alleging that the Learned Trial Court’s conclusion is not based on correct appreciation of the facts, the evidence, as well as the law.

This Court, answered the question, whether a false allegation of impotency amounts to cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA. The Supreme Court has elaborately discussed the concept of mental cruelty in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511. Indeed, mental cruelty is a state of mind and what might be cruelty in one case may not be so in another case, as observed by the Trial Court.

The Court in the present case observed:

“ The cruelty in the instant case is of enduring and profound nature. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that there is no allegation of cruelty in the original petition, the Trial Court was justified to conclude that it was of grave nature that caused lasting disruption in the relationship between the parties. We also note that the Appellant’s conduct of making unfounded allegations has continued right up to the appellate stage, as has been pointed out by Mr. Jauhar in his submissions. These false accusations which could not be proved are bound to cause deep hurt and anguish to the Respondent, who can reasonably apprehend that it would be perilous for him to live with the appellant. It is also abundantly clear that due to the mental pain, agony and suffering caused by the false accusations, the Respondent cannot be asked to put up with the conduct of the Appellant and to continue to live with her. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment on this ground as well”

 Thus the Court disposed of the appeal drawing the conclusion that the trial Court cannot be faulted with.

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Any default bail granted after the usual expiration of 180 days by a High Court under section Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C, by error can be cancelled by it later under section 439. This remarkable judgement was passed by the bench consisting of Justice Ashok Bhushan, Justice R. Subhash Reddy and Justice M.R Shah of the Supreme Court in the matter of Venkatesan Balasubramaniyan v The Intelligence Officer, D.R.I. Bangalore, [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 590 of 2015].

Around 45kgs of Methaqualone was found in a car, which is a psychotropic drug under the NDPS Act, 1985 for which the appellants were arrested under section 22, 28 and 29 of the said Act. The appellants alleged that before the Special Judge, Hyderabad when the case was taken, neither any charge sheet was filed before the Special Court Hyderabad nor any information was given to the Special Court that any charge sheet has been filed in Omerga Court, Maharashtra. Further, no complaint under Section 36A(d) of NDPS Act having been filed on the date which period, 180 days had lapsed, the learned Special Court had granted default bail on 12.07.2018 to all the appellants.

Two offences were committed, one at Hyderabad being at the instance of D.R.I., Hyderabad namely and the other under the NDPS Act by the D.R.I., Bangalore, Zonal Unit. Thus, a combined complaint taking care of both the offences was filed before the Special Court, Omerga, Maharashtra. There is ample material in the complaint that the transportation of narcotic substance started from Omerga, Maharashtra and was being allegedly to be taken to Chennai and intercepted at Hyderabad. The appellants are to be charged only for the offence of possession and the transport. The appellants have no role to play with reference to the manufacture of contraband in the factory at Omerga.

The counsel for the appellant submitted that instead of filing an application for cancellation of the bail before the Special Court under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C., the respondent approached before the High Court under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. When the bail order was passed by the Special Court, D.R.I., Bangalore ought to have informed the Special Court seeking the cancellation of the bail by giving explanation as to why the fact of filing combined complaint was not informed to the Special Court.The appellants by way of their collective petitions prayed for default bail since the duration of 180 days has expired under section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. Further, the additional sessions judge demanded for the custody of the accused from Maharashtra to Bangalore. The sessions court of Hyderabad passed on the custody Directorate of Revenue Intelligence(DRI), Bangalore.

The apex court held, “The High Court in the impugned judgment noted that charge sheet having been filed on 06.07.2018, i.e., well within the stipulated period of 180 days, the accused could not have been granted the benefit under Section 167 Cr.P.C. Letter of the same date 12.07.2018 was received by Special Court, Hyderabad from Special Court, Omerga praying for custody of the appellants, which custody was also granted by the Special Court, Hyderabad on the next day, i.e., 13.07.2018. All these facts were brought before the High Court in application filed under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. and the High Court has rightly cancelled the bail order dated 12.07.2018. We do not find any error in the order of the High Court cancelling the bail. We have noted above that regular bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. was filed before the Omerga Court by the appellants, which was withdrawn on 25.09.2018, we are of the view that it is open for the appellants to file regular bail application before Omerga Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. afresh, which may be considered on merits without being influenced by any observations made by the order passed by the High Court in the impugned judgment or observations made by us. We further observe that bail application to be filed by the appellants under Section 439 Cr.P.C. be considered and decided expeditiously”.

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Reasonable opportunity should be given to an individual to defend herself/himself in order to uphold the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court bench consisting of J. Abdul Nazeer and J. B. R. Gavai, ruled against the Food Corporation of India, discussing about its authority in matters of blacklisting in the case of UMC Technologies Private Ltd. v. Food Corporation of India and Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 3687 of 2020].  

The Food Corporation of India, herein the respondent, issued a Bid document inviting bids for the appointment of a recruitment agency to conduct the process of recruitment for hiring watchmen for the Corporation’s office. The appellant on submitting its bid, was declared as the successful bidder and was appointed for a period of 2 years for undertaking the tendered work of conducting the recruitment of watchmen for the Corporation. On the day of the written exam conducted by the appellant for eligible aspirants, a Special Task Force of Bhopal Polices arrested persons who were in possession of certain handwritten documents which prima facie  appeared to be the question papers to the examination. A charge sheet was filed by the police upon which the Corporation issued a show cause notice informing the appellant about the said arrest and alleging that the appellant had breached several clauses of the Bid document which rested the responsibility of confidentiality upon the appellant. The notice also stated that the appellant had acted in a negligent manner and gave the appellant 15 days to furnish an explanation, the default of which would call for an appropriate ex-parte decision by the Corporation.

The appellant denied any negligence on its part and furnished several factual justifications  along with a forensic analysis which proved many dissimilarities between the documents seized and the actual examination papers. The Corporation concluded that the shortcomings on the part of appellant stood established beyond reasonable doubt and proceeded to terminate the contract and blacklisted the appellant from participating in any future tenders of the corporation  for a period of 5 years. The appellant’s security deposit was forfeited and it was asked to execute the unexpired portion of the contract at its own cost and risk. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court, where the petition was dismissed.

The Supreme Court observed that the appellants were only challenging the blacklisting for 5 years and not the termination of the contract. Relying on Nasir Ahmad v. Assistant Custodian General, Evacuee Property, Lucknow and Anr. [(1980) 3 SCC 1], the SC held that “ the first principle of civilised jurisprudence that a person against whom any action is sought to be taken or whose right or interests are being affected should be given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The basic principle of natural justice is that before adjudication starts, the authority concerned should give to the affected party a notice of the case against him so that he can defend himself. Such notice should be adequate and the grounds necessitating action and the penalty/action proposed should be mentioned specifically and unambiguously. An order travelling beyond the bounds of notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction to that extent”.

The SC held that the blacklisting order passed by the Corporation was contrary to the principles of natural justice and that the mere existence of a clause in the Bid document, which mentions blacklisting as a bar against eligibility cannot satisfy the mandatory requirement of a clear mention of the proposed action in the show cause notice. Hence, the appeal was allowed and the HC order was set aside.

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A creditor or a group of creditors can be considered as a party to an application seeking transfer of case from the High Court to the National Company Law Tribunal regarding the winding up of a company. The Supreme Court bench consisting of Hon’ble Chief Justice S.A. Bobde, Hon’ble Justice A.S. Bopanna and Hon’ble Justice V. Ramasubramanian, delivered an excellent judgement regarding requirements of transferability of a case in the matter of M/S Kaledonia Jute and Fibres Pvt. Ltd. v. M/S Axis Nirman and Industries & Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 3735 of 2020].  

The respondents filed a petition before the High Court under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956, pleading for the winding up of the first respondent company as it was unable to pay debts. The court ordered the admission of the petition and directed for the publication of the advertisement of the petition in accordance with Rule 24 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. Pursuant to the publication, the court directed the winding up of the company and appointed an official liquidator directing him to take over the assets and books of accounts of the Company. The respondent filed an application for recalling the order but the liquidator opposed the application on the grounds that the respondent owed money close to Rs. 27 crores to various creditors. In the light of this, the court kept the order of winding up in abeyance but directed the liquidator to continue to keep in custody the assets of the company.

The appellant, who claimed to be a creditor of the respondent moved an application before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, that the respondent had failed to pay a sum of Rs. 32 lakhs to the appellant despite repeated demands. The appellant moved an application seeking transfer of this case from the High Court to the NCLT which was rejected by the HC on the grounds that the requirement for winding up order had already been passed. It was against this order of the HC that the financial creditor came up with a civil appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court in its decision, reiterated the provisions relating to the transfer of case regarding winding up of company and stated that “the transferability of a winding up proceeding, both under Rule 5 as well as under Rule 6, is directly linked to the service of the  winding up petition on the respondent under Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. If the winding up petition has already been served on the respondent in terms of Rule 26 of the 1959 Rules, the proceedings are not liable to be transferred. But if service of the winding up petition on the respondent in terms of Rule 26 had not been completed, such winding up proceedings, whether they are under Clause (c) of Section 433 or under Clause (a) and (f) of Section 433, shall peremptorily be transferred to the NCLT”. After this, the court dealt with who will be considered as a “party”. Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1959 states that “an order for winding up shall operate in favour of all the creditors and all of the contributors for the company as if it had been on the joint petition of a creditor and of a contributory”. Thus the court stated that winding up proceedings are actually proceedings in rem and the entire body of creditors will be a party to the same. Hence, herein the court held that the appellant was infact a party and that the transfer was not restricted by the stage of proceeding as it was covered by the 5th proviso to Section 434(1)(c) of the act.

Relying on Forest India Ltd. c. Edelweiss Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd. [(2019 2 SCR 477], the court found that parallel proceedings in the HC and NCLT  would demolish the entire object of the IBC, hence, the petitioner should be entitled to seek transfer of the pending winding up proceedings against the respondent. Therefore, the appeal was allowed and the case was transferred to the NCLT.

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