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An accident is inexplicable, when it was said that the driver was in full senses and capable of exercising full control over the car, at the time of the accident. It was more probable that his drink, really led to it. This honorable judgement was passed by Supreme Court of India in the case of Iffco Tokio General Insurance Company Ltd vs. Pearl Beverages Ltd. [C.A. No.-001526-001526 / 2021] by The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and The Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.M. Joseph.

The appeal was filled by appellant. An accident, which took place involving a car belonging to the respondent-Company, which was insured with the appellant, had resulted in this appeal against the Order by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The car was completely damaged. The question which arises in this Appeal was, whether the NCDRC was correct in holding that the appellant was not entitled to invoke the shield of Clause (2c) of the Contract of Insurance, under which, it was not liable, if the person driving the vehicle, was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or drugs. Affidavit evidence of the Company Secretary of the respondent (PW1), the driver of the car and the person who travelled with the driver in the car, was tendered. The FIR, which was under Section 279/427 of the IPC and Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the medico-legal case sheet of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, were among the documents produced by the respondent. The Order, which have referred to under Section 279 of the IPC, was also later produced.

The court opinioned that, “Firstly, the Report indicates that smell of alcohol by a Medical Practitioner; Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that the driver had consumed alcohol and was driving the vehicle, It is also true that there is no evidence other than the smell of alcohol being detected, The requirement under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not to be conflated to what constitutes driving under the influence of alcohol under the policy of insurance in an Own Damage Claim. It would be a case where the driver would still be in control of his faculties even while having caused the accident. The driver has pleaded guilty and stands convicted under Section 279 of the IPC, which penalises rash or negligent driving.”

Th appeal was allowed by the court stating that, “the setting of the width of the road and the thinnest possible traffic, and without the slightest excuse, hitting at the footpath with massive force, not being able to maintain control, hitting the electric pole, the wall of the children park. The impact is so much that it led 181 to the overturning of the car and what is more, catching fire of the vehicle. This accident is inexplicable, if the driver is to be believed as PW2, when he deposed “I was in my full senses and capable of exercising full control over the car, at the time of the accident”. It is more probable that his drink, really led to it.”

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The concept of extradition involves the handing over of a fugitive to a foreign country, by the State where the fugitive is currently located. Extradition, in no way, means or involves releasing an accused fugitive into freedom and granting them liberty, but rather merely involves handing over the accused from the police in one state, to another, for being tried for the offences that have been committed by the accused fugitive in the requesting state. This auspicious judgment was passed by the High Court of Delhi in the matter of MILEN IVANOV DAVRANSKI V UNION OF INDIA [W.P.(C) 1541 of 2021 & CM APPL. 8482 of 2021] by Honourable Justice Prathiba M. Singh.

The Petitioner is a Bulgarian National who sought a writ of mandamus against Union of India to take steps to expedite his extradition. He is currently lodged in Central Jail, Tihar. Previously, a request was received by the Union of India from the Ministry of Justice, Government of Bulgaria, requesting for the extradition of the Petitioner and upon receiving this request the Union of India under section 5 of the Extradition Act, 1962 requesting Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, to enquire into the extradition request by determining as to whether a prima facie case for extradition is made out in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Extradition Treaty between the Union of India and the Government of Bulgaria.

An objection was raised on behalf of the Union of India under Section 31(1)(d) of the Act stating that there are three FIRs, pending against the Petitioner in the State of Goa, and the same are unconcerned with the offence concerned in extradition proceedings while the first hearing. He has been granted bail for two of three applications.

The Court observed that “The Court in extradition proceedings is, not concerned with the release of the person from jail, but rather is only concerned with the handing over of the person from one country to the another. This principle has been recognized in Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Calcutta and Others, AIR 1955 SC 367. As per the said Treaty, both the countries, which are parties to the Treaty, have agreed for mutual legal cooperation for the purposes of extradition. Both the countries have agreed to surrender the persons, other than their own nationals, who are accused or convicted of an extraditable offence, to each other. The said surrender through extradition is to take place irrespective of the place of commission of the extraditable offence. However, as per Articles 3 and 11 of the Treaty, under certain circumstances, the requested country can refuse to extradite the accused fugitive.”

The Court stated, “Article 3 of the Extradition Treaty, applies only when criminal proceedings have been instituted or judgment has been passed by the Courts in India, in respect of the offence or offences qua which the extradition is requested. This provision would not be applicable in the present petition as the offence qua which the extradition of the Petitioner is sought by the Republic of Bulgaria is not the same offence for which the Petitioner is being tried in the State of Goa, in India. Additionally, under Article 11(1) of the Treaty, the decision on whether to extradite the accused fugitive or not, is to be taken by the Government of India, regardless of other criminal cases pending against the person, and regardless of whether the person is serving a sentence for an offence other than the offense for which extradition is requested. Thus, the extradition request has to be processed despite the pendency of any other criminal proceedings in India. However, under Article 11(2) of the Treaty, once the extradition is granted, the surrender can be postponed until the criminal proceedings in India are completed, or the sentence, if any, is completed, as referred to in Article 11(1).”

The Court observed, “An option for the requested state, like the Union of India in the present case, under Article 11(2) of the Treaty, would be to temporarily extradite the person to the requesting state, subject to certain conditions and a mutual agreement between the Government of India and the Republic of Bulgaria. If, however, such temporary extradition is effectuated, the Republic of Bulgaria has to ensure that the fugitive is detained in Bulgaria, during their stay in Bulgaria, and shall duly transfer back the person to India, within the mutually agreed period, which cannot exceed a period of 3 months. The above are the provisions as contemplated in the treaty between the Union of India and the Republic of Bulgaria.”

Thus, the Court dismissed the petition since, “until the Petitioner continues to be an accused in the three FIRs lodged against him in Goa, India, and the said cases are pending before the domestic fora.”

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Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come within the purview of sec. 295A of the IPC. This was decided in the case of Sudheer Rikhari v State of Goa & Ors [CRL WRIT PETN No.71 of 2020] by Justice MS Jawalkar and Justice MS Sonak in the Bombay High Court, Goa Bench.

The facts of the case date back to 17th December 2019 wherein Dastaan LIVE gave a live performance at Serendipity Arts Festival. During the course of their performance, they used the word “OM” clubbed with the words “Ullu ka pattha”. This according to the complainants amounted to insulting the religious sentiments of the people since the word “OM” is sacred for the Hindus. So, they filed an FIR against the band under sec. 295A read with sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. A petition was filed to quash the FIR on the grounds that it was a case of abuse of the criminal process warranting interference as the complaint did not disclose the commission of the said offenses as alleged.

The petitioners contended that the undue haste in registering the FIR upon a frivolous complaint suggests that it was driven by political interest with malicious intent to damage the band’s reputation and to curb free speech and creative capital. On the other hand, the respondents opposed the petition stating that the band had a malicious intention to outrage religious feelings.

The court referred to the judgment laid down in Manzar Sayeed Khan vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr [(2007) 5 SCC 1 ] wherein the SC referring to the provisions of section 153-A of IPC held that “the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and then connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning.”

After closely analyzing the facts of the present case in the background of the ratio laid in the above case, the court observed the that the action of the Respondents was contrary to judicial precedents in matters of arrest or explaining the true scope of Section 295-A of IPC. The FIR was registered hurriedly and possibly without even perusing the complaint or in any case the provisions of section 295-B of the IPC, thereby calling the allegations as vague.

 Furthermore, it said that “No arrest can be made routinely on a mere allegation of commission of an offense made against a person. It would be prudent for a police officer in the interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his interest that no arrest should be made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to the person’s complicity and even to the need to effect an arrest.” The FIR was thereby quashed by the court.

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As per Section 129 of GST Act, there is no mandate for detaining goods merely because driver took an alternate route to reach the destination, if the goods are covered by valid E-way Bill. If all the requisite documents i.e., e-way bill and invoices are available, it cannot be said that no physical transportation of goods had been taken place. However, bringing all the requisite documents on record is a necessary condition. This auspicious judgment was recently passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of M/S OM TRADING COMPANY V DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF STATE TAX & ORS. [WRIT APPEAL NO.1823/2019] by Honourable Justice S.A.Dharmadhikari and Justice Anand Pathak.

This Writ Appeal was preferred under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchch Nyayalaya Adhiniyam, 2005 and a challenge has been made to the order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby Writ Petition challenging the order passed by the learned appellate authority was dismissed.

The brief facts leading to filing of the writ petition were that the appellant was a dealer registered under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and was engaged in selling and purchasing Clarified Butter (Ghee), Butter and other milk products under the name of M/s Om Trading Company Gwalior.

On 05.10.2018, a show cause notice was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of State Tax Gwalior, in which it was stated that the business is carried only on papers and the e-way bills are downloaded but the concerned vehicles are not transporting any goods in actuality. The cause of action arose when a report to the Joint Commissioner, Gwalior transpired that the appellant had carried out business transactions with one M/s Macro International, Agra, and had purchased 8100 kgs and 1000 tin of clarified butter.

Later a show cause notice was issued since bills were without supply of goods and in violation of law. The notice was issued under Rule 21 (b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules 2017 and appellant failed to prove his e-way transaction details so his registration was cancelled. Thus, he preferred an appeal under Section 107, and Appellate Authority affirmed the order passed by the Commissioner of State Tax. Later he filed a writ petition whereby the orders passed by the Commissioner of State Tax as well as Appellate Authority have been affirmed. Being aggrieved, the present Writ Appeal has been filed.

The HC stated that “Ongoing through the order passed by the appellate authority it appears that the detailed inquiry was conducted before passing the impugned order, in which certain discrepancies were found with regard to the business of the appellant. It was found that the appellant had failed to prove away bill transaction details, therefore, the registration was canceled. A proper opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant. No cogent documentary evidence is available on record to justify the stand taken by the appellant. The learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion and dismissed the writ petition.”

Court also observed that “The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant are of no assistance to the appellant inasmuch as the facts of those cases and the present case are altogether different. In the present case, in the detailed inquiry, it was found that no material was physically transferred from Agra to Gwalior.”

Thus, the court held that “no fault can be found in the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge as well as learned appellate authority” and hence dismissed the writ appeal.

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When a seniority list has been created that is in contravention of the established principles laid down by law, such a list cannot be used for the purpose of promoting a candidate by the official authorities.  This was decided in the case of Yash Rattan & Ors vs. Union Of Indian And Ors [W.P.(C) 3576/2021] by the Hon’ble Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw and Hon’ble. Justice Amit Bansal in the High court of Delhi.

The present writ petition impugns the order passed by Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) wherein the applicants before the CAT were allowed and the seniority list, which was the subject matter of challenge before the CAT, was set aside. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners, who were the respondents before the CAT. The petitioner of this case were inspectors in the Delhi Commissionerate recruited in the year 2011 and at their request, they were transferred to the Delhi Zone in 2014. On account of the increase in number of vacancies, the private respondents took a transfer to Delhi Commissionerate from their parent cadre and were placed at the bottom of the seniority list. This seniority list was prepared in terms of the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. N.R. Parmar and Ors. (2012) 13 SCC 340. This seniority list itself is the subject matter of the writ petition.

The counsel on behalf of the petitioners has strenuously argued that the impugned order of the CAT is erroneous as it fails to consider that, while preparing seniority list, the recruitment year of the candidates is relevant and not the year in which they join the cadre. The seniority list impugned before CAT was prepared strictly in terms of OM dated 4th March, 2014 which was based on N.R. Parmar judgment. Relevant provisions of the OM dated 4th March, 2014 relied on behalf of the petitioners are set out below: “d) Recruitment Year would be the year of initiating the recruitment process against a vacancy year;

The learned counsel for the private respondents submits that the petitioners have wrongly stated that the private respondents are transferees. It was contended that the N.R. Parmar judgment was not applicable because the said judgment dealt with seniority between direct recruits and promotees, whereas the controversy in the present case relates to seniority between two different categories of direct recruits, inasmuch as the private respondents are also direct recruits.

The court observed that in service jurisprudence, seniority cannot be claimed from the date when the incumbent is yet to be borne in the cadre and therefore, norms on assessment of inter se seniority, suggested in N.R. Parmar) case were disapproved. It was also stated by the court “Persons aspiring to be appointed to a vacant post do not have any vested right. Only upon completion of the selection process, a candidate becomes a selected candidate and therefore, the finding in above case that the selected candidate cannot be blamed for administrative delay, was not correct.”

The petition was dismissed after upholding the judgement of the tribunal

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