On consideration of the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC have not been proved against the appellant-accused by the prosecution at the standard of beyond reasonable doubt. This judgment was pronounced by the division bench comprising hon’ble Justice N. V. Raman and Justice Surya Kant at Supreme Court in the matter of Nimay Sah v. State of Jharkhand [CRL. A. No. 211/2011]. 

The facts of the case were that Asha Kumari (deceased) was married to Gora Sah (accused 1), both of them were living together. It was alleged that the deceased’s father was asked for the dowry amount of Rs. 10,000 at the time of her vidaai and she was being subjected to harassment for the same. When his daughter complained about the harassment, her father visited her matrimonial house for assuring and pacifying her in-laws about the payment of Rs. 10,000. But later, when the violence did not stop, the deceased was brought back to her parental home by her brother. After few days the husband of the deceased visited her parental home. One day he took the deceased for morning walk and he came back home alone. When he was asked about the deceased, he said she will come in sometime but she did not return. In the meantime, the husband left the place hurriedly. On searching the deceased, she was found dead with strangulation marks on her neck.

The hon’ble Additional Sessions Judge at Pakur upheld the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC along with other accused. Aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence, the accused persons appealed before the High Court. The High Court on analysis of evidence found it to be consistent and corroborative, thereby, confirmed the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court as well as the sentence vide the impugned order. Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the High Court wherein the conviction and sentence of all the accused persons has been confirmed, accused no 3, Nimay Sah (brother of deceased’s husband), has preferred this appeal.  

The division bench of the hon’ble Supreme Court held that the conviction of the appellant-accused cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi is hereby set aside and the appellant-accused is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. This court had enlarged the appellant-accused on bail and his bail bonds stand discharged. The appeal is allowed in the aforementioned terms. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

 

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There is no provision under the Rule which has been shown to the Court which enables the superior authority/revisional authority to exercise power under Rule 219.4 of the Rules even after lapse of one year from the date of an order sought to be revised under the said rules, this remarkable stand was forwarded by the Patna HC in the Civil Writ jurisdiction case of Nasibullah Khan vs. The East Central Railway, [C.W Case No.7343 of 2020], chaired by Justice Chakradhari Sharan.

The petitioner, who was posted as, assistant sub-inspector of police, was arrested by CBI under the corruption charges. A criminal case was registered u/s 7 of the prevention of corruption act, 1988. He was placed under suspension on 05.11.2014 and subsequently a departmental proceeding was initiated and inquiry report submitted on 15.01.2016.  Approximately three and half years later from the date of submission of the inquiry report, the petitioner received a charge memo & the statement of imputation of misconduct from the East Central Railway. The charge memo earlier issued to the petitioner on Patna High Court CWJC No.7343 of 2020 dt.01-12-2020 01.04.2015 and the present one, it can be easily seen that both relate to the same occurrence of the petitioner’s arrest by the CBI team on 05.11.2014. Hence the petitioner has challenged the said letter No. 963 dated 24.02.2020 issued by respondent No.4.

After examining all the submissions, arguments and evidences forwarded by the councils, the hon’ble HC observed that, “In the present case the date of the order which is sought to be revised in purported exercise of power under Rule 219.4 is dated 05.05.2016. There is no provision under the Rule which has been shown to the Court which enables the superior authority/revisional authority to exercise power under Rule 219.4 of the Rules even after lapse of one year from the date of an order sought to be revised under the said rules.” The bench further added that, the impugned order does not conform to the requirement of the mandatory Patna High Court CWJC No.7343 of 2020 dt.01-12-2020 statutory provisions under Rule 219.4 of the Rules. The impugned order is, accordingly, not sustainable and, is, therefore, set aside.

In lieu of the above made considerations and observations, the bench in this present case allowed the civil writ application.

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BBMP come to conclude after an enquiry that the petitioner who is still on probation, had in fact remained unauthorisedly absent, BBMP will be at liberty to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law and if the petitioner is able to prove that he was stopped from working, he shall be paid arrears of salary and other benefits if any, till the date of reinstatement in terms of this order, the Karnataka High Court held in Mr. Giriraj I. v. The Additional Commissioner(East) Bruhat Bengaluru and Ors.(W.P. No. 11076/2018)

The petitioner has filed a writ petition, and has sought for a direction by issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to permit the petitioner to report to duties and perform his work. The petitioner was appointed on compassionate grounds on 05.07.2014, on the death of his father, who died in harness, in the cadre of Second Division Assistant and was posted to the Office of the Health Officer of Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (the BBMP). The petitioner subsequently was transferred from the Health Department to the Revenue Department in the month of May, 2015 and subsequently to the fifth respondent BBMP Boys High School, Austin Town, Bengaluru on 06.05.2015.

The petitioner contended that, he reported to duties in terms of the order dated 06.05.2015 at the fifth respondent School but was not permitted to sign the Attendance Register or perform his duties on and from 02.12.2015. And, he was not allowed to perform the duties and allegation of the respondents – BBMP is that, he remained unauthorisedly absent. Simultaneously, the respondent argued that, though the petitioner reported to duties has remained intermittently unauthorised absent from 02.12.2015 and later did not report to duties at all.

The court held that, “the BBMP is at liberty to hold proceedings and arrive at a conclusion as to whether the petitioner was in fact not permitted to report to duties or he remained unauthorisedly absent by conducting an enquiry after affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner.” The petitioner shall report to duties without awaiting any further orders from the respondent, before the Public Relation Officer at the head office of the BBMP on 02.12.2020 at 10.30 a.m. But, at the same time court directed that, the BBMP shall pass the appropriate orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.

And thus, the court disposed off the writ petition.

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The doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. This judgment was pronounced by the division bench comprising hon’ble Justice Dhananjay Y. Chandrachud and Justice Indu Malhotra at Supreme Court in the matter of The State of Jharkhand and others v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd., [CA No. 3860-3862/2020]. The doctrine of legitimate expectation in public law is premised on the principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness surrounding the conduct of public authorities.  

The respondents in the present appeal challenged the judgment of hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Jharkhand and alleged that they are qualified to claim a rebate or derivation of 50% of the sum evaluated towards electricity obligation for FYs 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14. The respondent claims its qualification based on the Industrial Policy 2012 (informed by the litigant on 16 June 2012) and a statutory notification dated 8 January 2015 gave under Section 9 of the Bihar Electricity Duty Act 1948 which was adopted for the State of Jharkhand under the provision of Bihar Reorganization Act of 2000 with effect from 15 November 2000. The respondents relied upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel.  

The division bench of High Court of Judicature at Jharkhand allowed the petition instituted by the respondents under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution and held that there was no specific reason for the delay and that “but for the lethargic approach of the state authorities” the exemption should have been issued within a month of the issuance of the Industrial Policy 2012. The effect of the belated notification was to deny industrial units of the benefit of the promise held out by the State government. The Jharkhand HC observed that it was not the case of the State government that it did not intend to give the benefit to these industrial units since, as a matter of fact, it had issued a notification, though belatedly, on 8 January 2015. Since the unit of the respondent commenced commercial production on 17 August 2011, whereas the Industrial Policy is of 2012, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be extended “backwards in favor of the respondent. The court also explained the case by relying on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, doctrine of consideration and doctrine of legitimate expectations. This Court has given an expansive interpretation to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in order to remedy the injustice being done to a party who has relied on a promise.

The division bench of Supreme Court while upholding the judgment of High Court of Judicature at Jharkhand stated that the respondent would not be entitled to a rebate/deduction for FY 2011-12. In terms of Clause 35.7(b) of the Industrial Policy 2012, the entitlement ensues from the financial year following the commencement of production. The respondent commenced production on 17 August 2011. Hence, the order of the High Court would have to be confirmed for FYs 2012-13 and 2013-14. In conclusion, we are in agreement with the conclusion of the High Court that the respondent was entitled to an exemption from electricity duty, although for the reasons indicated in this judgment. Further, the relief granted would stand confined to FYs 2012-13 and 2013-14.  We shall therefore attempt to provide a cogent basis for the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which is not merely grounded on analogy with the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The need for this doctrine to have an independent existence was articulated by Justice Frankfurter of the US Supreme Court relied upon the judgment of Vitarelli v. Seton. Therefore, the appeals shall stand disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs.

 

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In cases where there are motor accidents involved and person suffers injuries due to the fault of the other person, the victim should be awarded adequate compensation considering his injuries and future grievances/loss. In case of no proof of income the guidelines and compensation fixed by the State’s Legal Authority should be granted. The Karnataka High Court held this in the case of Hussain Basha v. Panduranga & Ors., MFA. No. 102566 of 2018 (MV).

The facts of the case are the Petitioner sustained grievous injuries in a Motor Vehicle Accident in April 2016 near Ballari district due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of a tractor. As a result of the accident the Petitioner suffered serious injuries and his right was amputated up to the shoulder level. The Petitioner filed a claim for compensation of Rs. 76,50,000/- in the Tribunal. The tribunal considered the arguments and evidence and as there was no proof of income of the petitioner the tribunal considered his income to be of Rs. 7500/- per month and awarded a compensation of Rs. 16,64,500/- along with interest of 7% from date of petition till its realization. The Petitioner was aggrieved by the award and filed a Petition in the High Court seeking enhancement of compensation.

The High Court considered the contention of the Petitioner that before the accident he was a mechanic and earned an income of Rs. 15,000/- per month. The High Court also took notice of the fact that there was a disability of 90 % due to the accident. The High Court stated that the Tribunal erred in granting compensation to the Petitioner, if there is no proof of income the Tribunal should grant commission as per the amount fixed by the State’s Legal Authority. In this case the amount fixed by the Legal Authority was Rs. 8500/-. The court further relied on the case of Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar & Ors. (AIR 2020 SC 4424), in which a division bench stated that “a victim who suffers a permanent or temporary disability in an accident is entitled to compensation that covers aspects like pain, suffering and trauma, loss of income, including future earning, medical expenses and loss of expectations of life.” Considering the above stated case laws the court was of the opinion that a victim of motor accidents based on his injuries can be granted compensation for future losses. The Karnataka High Court in this case enhanced the sum that was decided by the Tribunal and awarded the Petitioner a sum of Rs. 24,11,600/- (Rs. 94,500/-, which is 90% of his annual income x 17 multiplier + 40% towards loss of future prospects + loss of pleasures of life and longevity and loss of beauty).

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