The appellate authority in disciplinary proceeding acts in quasijudicial capacity and order passed has to be reasoned one and showing application of mind to the question raised by the appellant and if it is not done, the appellate order is vitiated. The authority is bound to assign reasons so as to enable the Court reviewing its decision to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the rule required to do. This was held by the Hon’ble Justice Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal in the case of Tikam Chand Thakur Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, through its Secretary, Department of Home (Police) [Writ Petition (S) No.6065 of 2010] on the 26th of July before the Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur.
The brief facts of the case are, The petitioner was subjected to departmental proceedings and ultimately, by order dated 15.1.2009 (Annexure P2) the petitioner was inflicted with penalty of removal from service, against which, he preferred appeal before the appellate authority/Deputy Inspector General of Police, Chhattisgarh Armed Force, Bhilai Area, Dist. Durg. The appellate authority by the impugned order dated 21.6.2010 (Annexure P1) dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner by brief and unreasoned order, which has been called in question by the petitioner in this writ petition. The counsel for the petitioner submits that, appeal preferred by the petitioner was required to be considered and disposed of by the appellate authority in accordance with Rule 27 (2) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 , which has not been done in this case and in one line, the petitioner’s appeal has been dismissed, which is not in consonance with Rule 27(2) of the Rules of 1966, as such, the order of the appellate authority deserves to be set-aside and the matter be remitted to the appellate authority for considering the appeal of the petitioner afresh in accordance with Rule 27(2) of the Rules of 1966. Per contra, the counsel for the respondent supports the order and deemed it just and fair.
The learned court heard the submissions of both the parties and observed that, the present appeal is governed by the regulation 262 of the police regulations. Regulation 262 of the Police Regulations is silent about the procedure to be followed while considering the appeal, but how the appeal has to be decided and whether aid and assistance can be taken from the provisions contained in the Rules 1966. In such a situation, the court relied on the judgement in the case of, Mahesh Kumar Shrikishan Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors 1985 MPLJ 516, wherein it was held that, “the applicability of the Control and Appeal Rules is not altogether excluded, where the Police Regulations are silent, the provision of Control and Appeal Rules would apply in departmental enquiries against subordinate police staff.” The court also relied on the judgement in Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others [(2006) 4 SCC 713], wherein, “Even if the appellate order is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority it may not be speaking order, but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind in compliance with the requirement of law while exercising his jurisdiction particularly when the rules required application of mind on several factors and several contentions had been raised and he was bound to assign reasons so as to enable the Court reviewing its decision to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the rule required to do.”
Applying the above mentioned rationales, the court decreed, “Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid provision and the judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that appeal preferred by the petitioner has not been considered by the appellate authority in the light of clause (a) to (c) of Rule 27(2) of the Rules of 1966 and dismissed the appeal by unreasoned and nonspeaking order on 21.6.2010, which ought to have been considered by the appellate authority in the light of clause (a) to (c) of Rule 27(2) of the Rules of 1966. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 21.6.2010 (Annexure P1) passed by appellate authority is hereby set-aside.” The writ petition was allowed.