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Inclusion of Companies as Necessary Parties in Minimum Wages Act Offences: Karnataka High Court’s Ruling

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Case Name:  Padpara Patti Syed Basha Aysb v. The Labour Department Government Of Karnataka 

Case No.: Writ Petition No. 14973 Of 2023 (Gm-res) 

Dated: March 26, 2024 

Quorum: Justice S Vishwajith Shetty 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

In a criminal complaint filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mr. Padpara Patti and Mr. Sameer Sulathana were named as accused parties. The lawsuit claimed that the 1948 Minimum Wages Act’s Section 25, Rules 7, 9, and 21 had been broken. 

In accordance with Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution, the accused petitioners filed a writ case before the Karnataka High Court. They demanded that the Criminal Complaint’s whole proceedings be cancelled. 

In a writ petition filed under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C., petitioners, who are accused nos. 1 & 2 in a criminal complaint pending before the Court of JMFC-II, Shivamogga, are registered for the offence punishable under Section 25, Rules 7, 9 & 21 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Their prayer is to quash the entire proceedings in the aforementioned criminal complaint.  

A writ case was brought by the accused petitioners before the Karnataka High Court, in compliance with Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution. They requested that all procedures related to the Criminal Complaint be stopped. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER: 

The accused petitioners invoked Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution to file a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court. Their main argument was to dismiss the Criminal Complaint and all of its procedures. They contended that they were no longer in directorship roles at Attica Gold Pvt. Ltd., the involved firm. They further argued that the corporation was not listed in the complaint as an accused party.  

The applicants’ learned counsel claims in court that they are no longer directors of the business. He makes the submission that the Company is not named in the lawsuit as an accused party. The complaint cannot be maintained as a result. He, therefore, pryaed before the court to grant the request. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: 

The learned counsel for the respondents alleged that the prayer included in the petition to be rejected by the respondent-state’s learned High Court Government Pleader. Respondent No. 2, a Labour Inspector, has filed a private complaint against the petitioners in this case with the Trial Court.  

He claims to have received a complaint about the nonpayment of minimum wages from the workers of the company Attica Gold Pvt. Ltd. Despite the complainant purportedly serving the accused with a show-cause notice, the accused failed to provide the necessary documentation, address the infractions, or reply to the notice. 

It was vehemently argued that he had filed a private suit with the Trial Court because of these conditions. Following its acknowledgment of the charges reported in the complaint, the Trial Court sent summonses to Accused Nos. 1 and 2, and the case was filed under C.C. No. 104/2022 against the petitioners for the aforementioned violations.  

LEGAL PROVISIONS: 

  • Section 22(C) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948- Offences by companies: If the person breaking any law under this Act is a company, then everyone who was in charge of the company at the time of the offence and accountable to it for the way the company conducted its business will be considered guilty of the crime and will face appropriate legal action and punishment. With the caveat that if the person can demonstrate that the crime was committed without their knowledge or that they took all reasonable precautions to stop it from being done, they will not be subject to any of the penalties outlined in this Act.  

 

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The court declared that a cursory reading of the aforementioned section of the law makes it clear that, in the event that an organisation is the subject of an offence under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, both the organisation and its managers will be presumed guilty of the offence and subject to legal action and punishment.  

The court further held that the petitioners in this case are being tried in their capacities as Directors of the Attica Gold Pvt. Ltd. company, and it is alleged that they are accountable vicariously on behalf of the company. Therefore, the complaint is not maintainable if the Company is not named as accused in the complaint.  

Further, the court has noted that the only way to impose vicarious liability is through a statutory provision; in other words, a legal fiction must be established in order to achieve this goal. The petitioners in this case are requesting to be prosecuted on the 

the idea that they bear vicariously responsible for the Company’s operations. If it is the case, the Company has to be included as a party, and if the accused is accountable for the Company’s actions, legal fiction has to be made against the Company and the accused.  

At last, the court declared that the Writ petition may be granted. This resulted in the cancellation of the whole criminal case that was pending before the Court of JMFC-II, Shivamogga. The case stemmed from PCR No. 16/2022, which was registered for violations that were punishable under Section 25, Rules 7, 9 & 21 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.  

 

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“Karnataka High Court upholds Industrial Tribunal’s decision of reinstatement of wages for aggrieved labour” 

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Case Title: The Divisional Controller (South) v. Sri. Vasant B. Jogi 

Case No.: WRIT PETITION NO. 105424 OF 2023  

Dated: April 15, 2024 

Quorum: Justice Shivashankar Amarannavar  

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

The facts of the case include that the respondent, a driver for the petitioner corporation, was absent from work without permission from his superiors or submission of a leave request beginning on June 1, 2007.  

On the report of the depot manager dated June 22, 2007, a call notice dated September 17, 2007, was issued to the respondent directing him to report for duty. The respondent neither replied to the said notice nor reported to duty, and therefore, an Article of Charges dated April 24, 2008, was issued to him along with a statement of imputation. 

Respondent failed to submit his reply after receiving the Article of Charges; as a result, the disciplinary authority designated a Presenting Officer and an Enquiry Officer to conduct a domestic investigation into the respondent’s absence without authorization. 

By way of paper publication in the daily news paper “Vijaya Karnataka,” the enquiry notice was sent to the subject. After conducting research, the enquiry officer filed a report on their findings.  

The respondent received a show cause notice, but he declined to react. The respondent has been removed from the Corporation’s service by the disciplinary authority through its order of August 21, 2008.  

In accordance with Industrial Dispute Act of 1947, Section 33-A, the respondent filed a complaint. The Corporation, the petitioner, filed a statement of objections after showing up in response to the notification. The said complaint was partially accepted by the Industrial Tribunal after it heard the testimony of both sides. 

The respondent filed a complaint in line with the Industrial Dispute Act of 1947, Section 33-A. Following its appearance in response to the notification, the corporation, the petitioner, filed a statement of objections. The Industrial Tribunal heard testimony from both parties and partially accepted the aforementioned complaint. 

It also overturned the dismissal judgement dated August 21, 2008, which went into effect on March 28, 2014, and ordered the petitioner-Corporation to reinstate the respondent in his initial position with continuity of service with effect from March 28, 2014, on the grounds that the petitioner-Corporation has not received the necessary consent under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Dispute Act.  

In this writ case, the petitioner-Corporation has questioned the aforementioned Industrial Tribunal ruling. 

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER: 

The petitioner’s learned counsel would argue that the worker who was fired remained silent for a full six years following the order of termination. Three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, or retrenchment is the statute of limitations for bringing a claim under Section 2-A(3). 

He further argued that in accordance with Section 33-A(b), the complaint filed under Section 33-A must be decided as though it were a dispute that was referred to or pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the ID Act. As a result, he claimed, the limitation contained in Section 2-A(3) of the ID Act applies and the complaint has passed the three-year statute of limitations.  

The petitioner also argued that the Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the case was deemed non-est because it failed to comply with Section 33(2)(b) and allowed the complaint through the challenged order without considering the merits of the respondent’s conduct or the charges against it.  

Lastly, it was argued that the tribunal must consider the legitimacy of the dismissal. The complaint has only been accepted by the tribunal on the grounds that Section 33(2)(b) of the Act was not followed, without taking into account the validity of the dismissal on its own merits.  

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT: 

The counsel for the respondent argues that the tribunal must consider the validity of the dismissal and is relying on the ruling in a previous case. In an earlier case reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 643, learned counsel for the respondent would argue that the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India concluded that failing to file an application under Section 33(2)(b) seeking an obvious instance of violating Section 33(2)(b) requirements, and the dismissal order is rendered null and invalid.  

The respondent further argues that since the Hon’ble Apex Court has not addressed the case cited by the petitioner, the decision made in this case will be interpreted per-incuriam, as a prior ruling by the Constitution Bench will address the case that has not been cited. 

Furthermore, the respondent argues that since the Hon’ble Apex Court has not addressed the case cited by the petitioner, the decision made in this case will be interpreted per-incuriam, as a prior ruling by the Constitution Bench will address the case in question before it has not been referred to. 

The respondent further asserts that the decision in this case will be interpreted per-incuriam, which means that the Constitution Bench’s earlier decision would handle the issue in question before it has not been referred to, because the Hon’ble Apex Court has not addressed the case that the petitioner stated.  

 

LEGAL PROVISION:  

  • Section 33-A of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947: Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed during pendency of proceedings. In cases where an employer violates section 33 while the matter is pending [before a Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal, Board, or Conciliation Officer] 
  • Section 33(2)(b) of Industrial Dispute Act. While a disagreement is pending, an employer has the authority to fire or dismiss employees who are engaged in an industrial dispute for any misbehaviour unrelated to the conflict. 

 

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The court reviewed the information on file after hearing from the parties’ knowledgeable counsel. The court observed that the primary point that needed to be addressed was whether the petitioner-Corporation would have to comply with Section 33(2)(b) of the Act before issuing the order of dismissal, in which case the order would be null and void. 

The Division Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court has deliberated and made a distinction in its ruling. After taking into account and separating the ruling of the Honourable Apex Court, the court determined that the worker’s dismissal order would be invalid due to the worker’s violation of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. 

The court determined that a dispute involving a single worker qualified as an industrial dispute. Any dispute or disagreement between a worker and his employer related to, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment, or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute even in cases where no other worker or worker union is a party to the dispute. This is the case when an employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches, or otherwise terminates the services of an individual worker. 

Following 45 days from the date of his application to the appropriate Government’s conciliation officer for the conciliation of the dispute, the court made a direct application to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein.  

Upon receipt of this application, the Labour Court or Tribunal will have the authority and jurisdiction to decide the dispute as though it were one referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act. All of the provisions of this Act will apply to this adjudication in the same manner as they do to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government. 

 

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“Withholding wages for absurd reasons is violative of fundamental rights of the workers- Bombay High Court”

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Case title: Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Shri. Dattatraya Ganpat Bankhele 

Case No.: WRIT PETITION NO. 2574 OF 2017 

Dated: April 18, 2024 

Quorum: Justice Sandeep V Marne 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

The facts of the case revolve around the petition against the judgement and order dated February 12, 2016, issued by the Member, Industrial Court, Pune, had been abandoned by Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (MSRTC).  

The labour court’s judgement and order from March 25, 2014, which increased the amount of back pay from 25% to 100%, are accepted, and the respondent-employee is granted permission. As a result, the Industrial Court has ordered that 100% of back pay be paid from April 29, 1995, to the day of superannuation or reinstatement, whichever comes first.  

Since November 23, 1978, Mr. Dattatraya Ganpat, the respondent, has worked for MSRTC as a driver. He was sent to the Baramati Depot on January 17, 1991, from the Rajgurunagar Depot, but he failed to report for work there. 

The allegations of an unapproved leave of absence from work beginning on January 17, 1991, were made in a memo of chargesheet filed on April 5, 1991. On January 18, 1991, another chargesheet was released, this one accusing the respondent of invading the MSRTC land at Manchar. 

The Industrial Court, Pune, issued a judgement and order on February 12, 2016, in Revision (ULP) No.60/2014. MSRTC has since abandoned the current appeal objecting to this ruling. The Industrial Court’s decision to reject Revision Application (ULP) No. 28/2014 was not contested by MSRTC, as was previously noted. As a result, the Industrial Court’s decision to raise the backpay amount from 25% to 100% is the sole object of contention in this case. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER: 

The petitioner’s attorney argues that the Industrial Court erred in giving the Respondent 100% back pay even though it was acknowledged that the employee had been absent from work for a considerable amount of time. 

That the Respondent disregarded the transfer order that was issued on January 17, 1991, and that as a result, the Respondent neglected to report for duty at Baramati Depot both during the investigation and until the chargesheet was issued. He was rightfully fired from his job due to an excessively lengthy absence, and the Industrial Court erred in giving him a 100% back pay award. 

It was further argued that the Industrial Court’s justifications for accepting the Respondent’s Revision are illogical. that since MSRTC is a non-profit organisation, it cannot be held accountable for paying back wages for the lengthy period of time between 29 April 1995 and 30 June 2008, the day the respondent reached superannuation. The attorneys appealed for the Industrial Court’s order to be overturned.  

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT: 

The petition would be opposed by the knowledgeable attorney representing the Respondent, who would stand by the Industrial Court’s decision and order in the Revision. He would argue that the Petitioner has not even provided a copy of the Order and Judgement from the Revision that was passed on February 12, 2016. He would argue that since the Revision’s rejection is not being contested, the reinstatement directive is not being contested in the current case.  

The attorney claims that since the reinstatement directive is uncontested, the award of 100% back pay following the termination order’s ruling of unlawfulness cannot be contested. The attorney will argue that MSRTC has victimised the respondent. Because in order to build the bus stand in Mansar, the Respondent’s ancestral land had to be acquired. that the disagreement between MSRTC and the respondent’s father regarding the occupation of a shed next to the bus station was the true reason for the victimisation of the respondent. 

Regarding that shed, the father of the respondent initiated a lawsuit against MSRTC and was successful in it. Due to the disagreement, the Respondent suffered from unlawful harassment. Medical certificates have been produced as a proper explanation for the respondent’s absence. The respondent’s spouse had been dealing with a kidney issue since 1985 and was receiving ongoing therapy. a procedure that she had on November 14, 1994. The Respondent’s absence has been properly justified in these circumstances.  

Besides, the absence wasn’t lengthy enough to result in the harsh consequence of being fired from the company. It would be the respondents’ prayer that the petition would be denied.  

 

COURT’S ANANLYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The court determined that the respondent was moved from Rajgurunagar Depot to Baramati Depot by an order dated January 17, 1991, and was freed on the same day in the MSRTC matter. As a result, MSRTC charged Respondent with violating the transfer order by failing to report for duty at Baramati.  

It was acknowledged that the Respondent did not report for duty until the chargesheet was issued on April 5, 1991. It seems that the Respondent neglected to report for duty for the duration of the disciplinary proceedings as well.  

The court determined that this was clear from the Respondent’s allegations in his complaint, which stated that the Enquiry Offer did not recognise the absence until September 1993. Thus, it can be seen that the respondent was consistently missing from January 17, 191, to September 1993.  

Because of this, the absence of more than two and a half years cannot be dismissed as insignificant or coincidental. Due to MSRTC’s inability to produce its Offer/Witness for cross-examination, the Labour Court has overturned the dismissal penalty and ordered reinstatement. Because of this, the Labour Court has decided to overturn the dismissal penalty due to the actions of the implicated MSRTC. 

The court observed that given the length of time that elapsed between 25 April 1995 and 30 June 2008 and the Respondent’s extended leave of absence from the workforce, it would be reasonable under the particular facts and circumstances of the case to pay 50% back wages. For the purposes of retirement benefits, however, the interim time will be considered as duty.  

The judgement and order dated 25 March 2014 by the Labour Court of Pune was modified by this court to the extent that the Petitioner shall pay the Respondent 50% of the back wages from the date of termination until the date of reinstatement or the date of superannuation, whichever is earlier. The judgement and order dated 12 February 2016 by the Industrial Court of Pune in the Revision is set aside.  

In the end, the court declared that the Writ Petition is partially accepted with the aforementioned directives. A portion of the rule is rendered absolute. 

 

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“The Bombay High Court affirmed the Labour Court’s ruling, upholding the reinstatement of an absent employee with back wages and compensation.”

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Case Title: Bhushan Industries v. Lohasingh Ramavadh Yadav 

Case No.: WRIT PETITION NO. 1025 OF 2024 

Date: March 20, 2024 

Quorum: Justice Sandeep V. Marne 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE:  

With this petition, the employer-petitioner contests the contested award that the First Labour Court of Mumbai’s Presiding Officer issued on October 4, 2022. The petitioner company is a partnership that manufactures hairpins. At the position of Painter, Respondent began working for Petitioner in April 1999.  

According to the respondent’s case, on April 8, 2013, he asked Mr. Nileshwar Bhushan, a partner in the petitioner firm, for a loan of Rs. 2,000 so that he could pay for Dr. the spouse turned down the loan request. that starting on April 9, 2013, the petitioner’s partner prevented him from joining the services and that he was not given his wage for the months of March and April. This is how his services were terminated on April 9, 2013, as stated by the respondent.  

In the respondent’s case, on April 8, 2013, he requested a loan of Rs. 2,000 from Mr. Nileshwar Bhushan, a partner in the petitioner firm, in order to pay for Dr. that the petitioner’s partner stopped him from accessing the services on April 9, 2013, and that he didn’t receive his pay for the months of March and April. According to what the respondent said, this is how his services were ended on April 9, 2013. 

On April 13, 2013, the Respondent wrote the Petitioner to ask for permission to return to work. But on April 13, 2013, the Petitioner’s partner replied to the Respondent, accusing the latter of failing to report for duty. After exchanging letters, the Respondent filed a Statement of Justification on 18 July and complained to the Deputy Labour Commissioner.  

In the end, the matter came before the Labour Court due to a referral on the petitioner’s termination made by the relevant government. The Labour Court has responded to the reference in the affirmative, ordering the petitioner to bring the respondent back into work with continuity and full back pay as of April 9, 2013. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER: 

The Labour Court erred in ordering Respondent’s reinstatement without taking into account the fact that Respondent had no interest in cooperating with the Petitioner, according to the learned counsel representing the Petitioner.  

The respondent was made multiple offers to join the tasks, but the respondent declined. that the petitioner had no reason to kill the respondent because he had stopped providing services. He often missed more than 90 days of work each year, so in any event, he was never able to accrue 240 days of service. 

Furthermore, it was argued that since the Petitioner establishment has been closed since March 20, 2020, the issue of the Respondent’s reinstatement is resolved. that the argument of establishment closure was wrongly dismissed by the Labour Court. that the petitioner’s elderly partners are unable to manage the company.  

Mr. Shukla would also want to add that the evidence in the record, which shows the Respondent acknowledged being an employee and performing painterly duties, runs counter to the order for back wages to be paid. that from September 2013 until December 2018, he unreasonably neglected to put himself forward for employment.  

The petitioner would like to draw my attention to the Complaint (ULP) No. 10 of 2021, which is a challenge to the closure order filed by additional Petitioner-establishment employees. He would contend that the petitioner paid in a total of Rs. 5,91,000 towards the final settlement for the remaining employees, which included amounts paid for ex-gratia, notice pay, closure compensation, and bonuses.  

That the complaint has been dropped, and all other employees have accepted the money that was given to them. hem. Thus, it is hardly in doubt that the respondent will not be reinstated or receive any financial compensation. He would offer his prayers for the petition to be dismissed. 

 

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT: 

The learned counsel for the Respondent would argue against the Petition and in favour of the Labour Court’s Award. She would argue that there is a delay and laches in the petition. that the Petition was only submitted in order to enforce the Award following the issuance of the recovery certificate. If not, the Petitioner did not contest the Award for around a year. She would argue that the petition should be denied due to its delay.  

Additionally, the counsel for respondent would like to state that Petitioner was denied permission to resume his duty despite Respondent’s numerous attempts to join him. She would go over the incidents that the Labour Court had documented in Paragraph 3 of the Order with me. In order to prove that the petitioner purposefully continued to correspond falsely with the respondent and did not genuinely allow him to resume his duties, she would also rely on the compilation of documents to indicate the varied correspondence that the parties exchanged.  

Respondent’s attorney would argue that since the termination of the respondent was based on wrongdoing, an investigation was required. She would argue that, even in the absence of such circumstances, desertion of service is a factual matter that can only be established by investigation. 

It was also argued that termination without holding an investigation was not permissible, even in the event that it turned out that the respondent had not served the full 240 days of service. She would argue that the Labour Court’s rulings are not perverse. that the respondent’s closure defence is untrue because there isn’t a closure notice in this particular situation. Without causing harm, she would argue that, even in the event that closure is determined, the Labour Court’s relief can still be enhanced by ordering the payment of back wages up until the day of closure in addition to closure compensation and a gratuity. She would offer prayers for the petition to be dismissed. 

 

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The court determined that the Respondent’s refusal to report for duty is difficult to uphold. Actually, it seems from the petitioner’s varied correspondence with the respondent that the main intention behind them was to create the impression that the petitioner was prepared to extend an employment offer to the respondent. 

As to the court’s ruling, the petitioner had no intention of joining the respondent’s tasks. The Labour Court concluded that the Respondent never declined to accept tasks when they were truly offered after taking into account all of the correspondence that is on file as well as the testimony provided by the parties. I see no justification for meddling with the aforementioned finding of facts that the Labour Court has documented.  

The Respondent’s claim of job desertion has been accepted by the Petitioner. This Court has held over and again that the question of abandonment of service is one of fact, which requires investigation to be established.  

The court decided that at the very least, the Respondent should have received a show-cause notice if the Petitioner was actually correct in believing that he had abandoned the service. Petitioner did not accuse Respondent until after he brought up the topic of termination.  

The court held that since the parties were in communication with one another, the petitioner had the opportunity to undertake a domestic investigation by charging the respondent with evading their obligations. This is not a situation where Petitioner was unaware of Respondent’s whereabouts. Therefore, given the specific facts and circumstances of this case, it was possible to undertake a domestic inquiry. The court is of the opinion that, given the facts and circumstances of this case, the plea of abandoning of employment cannot be accepted.  

The court observed that the matter at hand concerns the type of relief that can be awarded to the Respondent after it was determined that the termination of the Respondent, which took effect on April 9, 2013, was deemed invalid and that the establishment will close on March 20, 2020. It is hardly in doubt that Respondent will be reinstated because the establishment has closed.  

The amount that the petitioner would be entitled to in terms of gratuity, one month’s notice pays, and retrenchment compensation has been recorded by Mr. Shukla, without affecting the petitioner’s rights. The retrenchment compensation for the period from April 1999 to the closing date of March 20, 2020, will be Rs. 1,03,950, according to that announcement.  

The petitioner’s attorney has gone over some of the responses made by the respondent during his cross-examination, in which he acknowledged that he occasionally worked as a painter and that he travelled back to his home country for work.  

The respondent’s attorney didn’t take long to clarify that working occasionally as a painter did not equate to gainful employment. Despite the fact that the petitioner was unable to demonstrate that Respondent was employed in a continuous, profitable manner, it seems that he did receive compensation for his painting abilities.  

 

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Delhi High court rejected the Review petition filed by Statesman Limited seeks to review the judgement passed by the high court.

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Title: The StatesMan Limited vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.

Decision: 04.07.23

+ REVIEW PET. 516/2019 and CM APPL. 53531/2019, CM APPL. 12275/2022 in W.P.(C) 9497/2015

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

Introduction

The Delhi High court rejected the Review petition filed by Statesman Limited seeks to review the judgement passed by the high court dated 18.11.19 on the grounds that it does not address the issue of jurisdiction of the Authority under the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, (“the Working Journalists Act”) to pass the order dated 21 July 2015 forming subject matter of challenge in WP (C) 9497/2015.

Facts of the case

The application made under Section 17(1) of the Working Journalists Act by a few members of the Statesman Mazdoor Union is resolved by the order dated July 21, 2015. The stated applicants requested payment of arrears in accordance with the Majithia Wage Board’s recommendations. The petitioner-Statesman disputed their obligation to pay the applicants in accordance with the Wage Board’s recommendations on the grounds that they had incurred significant cash losses three years prior to the implementation of those recommendations, exempting them from the requirement to pay arrears. The Court has carefully considered the applicants’ case and rejected the petitioner’s argument that it was not the petitioner’s responsibility to pay the applicants as recommended by the wage board.

The petitioner conceded to the Authority’s authority and objected to its need to compensate the applicants-workers on a merits-based basis. After losing before the Authority, the petitioner used the current writ petition to appeal to this Court.

Analysis and Decision of the court

The Delhi High Court held that Even in the current writ suit, there is not even the slightest hint of a challenge to the Authority’s authority to hear the workmen’s claims and issue the ruling of July 21, 2015. Instead, extensive and numerous submissions have been made in an effort to prove that the petitioner was, in fact, experiencing significant losses three years prior to the Wage Board’s recommendations and was not, therefore, required to pay the applicants-workmen in accordance with those recommendations. The petitioner submitted a response to the writ petition after the respondents submitted a counter affidavit. There isn’t even a claim that the Authority lacked the authority to decide the applications of the journalists in the response. Instead, the response outlines how the petitioner believes the Authority should have resolved the aforementioned arguments.

The order dated July 21, 2015 lists the errors under the heading “Grounds for Setting Aside Impugned Order” in paragraph 11 of that document. In the aforementioned paragraph, the petitioner first explains why, in its opinion, it had actually experienced losses for three years; second, it explains why the petitioner’s net current assets could not be taken into account when determining whether the losses suffered by the petitioner were heavy; and third, it makes reference to Supreme Court decisions that, in the petitioner’s opinion, established the guidelines for identifying “heavy losses.”

Therefore, the written submissions do not only fail to raise any objections to the Authority’s competence or jurisdiction. decision on the petitions submitted by the applicant-journalists, but they also go so far as to assert that the Authority should have handled the cases differently than how it did. Therefore, there is a favourable claim regarding the Authority’s ability and authority to rule on the journalists’ application.

The petitioner also had approached the hon’ble SC with an SLP (C) 36133/2015 The Supreme Court did not interfere with the direction, of the learned Division Bench, to decide the writ petition expeditiously, and merely modified the order of pre-deposit by reducing it to ₹ 30 lakhs. This indicates that the argument of want of jurisdiction of the Authority to adjudicate on the claims of the respondent-workmen was not canvassed either before the Division Bench or even before the Supreme Court.

Even after reserving the judgement in 2018, the petitioner failed to file any written submission when given opportunity for the same. As a result, there was no challenge made to the Authority’s competence or jurisdiction to decide on the claims of the respondent-workmen in the writ petition’s only written submission.

Thus, neither the writ petition nor the response nor the written representations submitted by the petitioner contested the Authority’s competence or authority to decide on the claims of the respondent-journalists. In contrast, the petitioner made specific allegations in the written submissions it submitted to this court about how it believed the Authority should have handled the situation, even going so far as to request a remand to make sure the Authority handled the situation again properly. These allegations cannot be reconciled with the claim that the Authority lacked the authority to determine the respondents’ petitions; in fact, they are diametrically opposed to one another. It was in these circumstances that, in the judgment under review, this Court did not return any findings regarding the competence of the Authority to pass the order dated 21 July 2015.

In light of the above, this Court conducted a merits review of the case and determined that the defence of three years of continuous loss as a justification for not adhering to the Majithia Wage Board’s Award was inadmissible.

Ultimately, the Delhi High Court dismissed the petition and miscellaneous applications were disposed of accordingly.

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Written By – Shreyanshu Gupta

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