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Andhra Pradesh High Court Reviews Cooperative Bank’s Decision to Raise Retirement Age from 58 to 60 Years: Clarifies Financial Implications

Andhra Pradesh High Court Reviews Cooperative Bank’s Decision to Raise Retirement Age from 58 to 60 Years: Clarifies Financial Implications  

Case Name: Sri Puvvada Venkata Mohana Murali Krishna Murthy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh 

Case No.: Writ Petition No.4861 of 2018 

Dated: May 22, 2024 

Quorum: Justice Dhiraj Singh Thakur and Justice Raghunandana Rao 

 

FACTS OF THE CASE: 

The facts of the present case centre The petitioners were all workers at the Prakasam District Cooperative Central Bank Limited. By the year 2017, they had reached superannuation age and retired at the age of 58. The petitioners’ argument is that they should have retired when they became sixty years old.  

The petitioners argued that the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) (Amendment) Act, 2014, or simply “Act No. 4 of 2014,” was passed by the state legislature in order to bolster this claim. It replaced Section 3(1) with the following sub-section. It would be appropriate to include the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984’s definition of “government employee” below. 

 The Andhra Pradesh government released G.O.Ms.No.147, which contained instructions for putting Act No. 4 of 2014 into effect. It reiterated that the Act’s provisions only applied to the categories listed in it. It was subsequently issued, outlining the plan to delay applying the increased age of superannuation to employees of Public Sector Undertakings and Institutions listed in the IX and X Schedules of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, until the issue of the partition of the institutions’ assets and liabilities between the states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana was resolved and the distribution of the employees between the two states for those public sector undertakings and institutions was finalised.  

 ISSUES: 

  • whether the petitioners, who are employees of a Cooperative Bank (a corporate body), can claim that they have been discriminated against in comparison to Government employees or employees working for entities listed under Schedule IX and X of the Reorganisation Act. 

 LEGAL PROVISIONS: 

  • Section 3(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) (Amendment) Act, 2014. The last day of the month in which a government employee turns sixty years old is when they are all required to retire from service. 

 CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS: 

The learned counsel for the appellants fiercely and strongly argued that the petitioners in this writ suit contest the Bank’s decision to not raise the superannuation age retroactively from 58 to 60 with effect from June 2, 2014, as was done in the case of institutions covered by Schedules IX and X of the Reorganisation Act by virtue of G.O.Ms. No. 138. It is claimed that the Bank’s decision to reject such a retroactive benefit was discriminatory, unlawful, arbitrary, and unfair. 

 In addition, it was argued that the Bank was unfairly distinguishing between individuals who retired after June 2, 2014, and those who continued to work as of June 30, 2017, and that raising the superannuation age just in June 2017 was an illogical move.  

Learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that since the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 (also known as the “APCS Act”) made no mention of the age of superannuation and only mentioned it in Rule 28(6) of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Rules, 1964 (also known as the “APCS Rules”), the Act No. 4 of 2014’s policy had to be adhered to.  

It was also argued that the Government should have made the choice to raise the retirement age rather than the Bank’s Board of Management, as Section 115(D) of the APCS Act did not grant them that authority.  

 CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS: 

The arguments put forward by the learned counsel for the appellants were sharply and passionately rejected by the learned counsel according to Mr. C. Sumon, the learned counsel representing the respondents, the respondents’ position was that the petitioners were not government employees as defined by subsection (2) of Section 1 of the Act, and as such, they were not entitled to the benefit of the Act.  

It was argued that employees of public enterprises and autonomous organisations were not covered by the aforementioned Act. According to the statement, the petitioners were workers in cooperative credit societies, which operated independently. The Bank had consciously decided to raise its employees’ retirement age from 58 to 60 years old as of June after carefully examining the issue of employee benefits enhancement. 

The argument went on to say that fixing the age of superannuation was a policy decision and that raising it with effect from June 2017 was not perverse. Since it was a policy decision, this Court could normally only interfere with it in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction if it was deemed to be arbitrarily or unreasonable.  

 COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT: 

The court observed that the litigation history covered in the preceding paragraphs demonstrates that the lawsuit was started at the request of workers who had worked for the institutions included in the Reorganisation Act’s IX and X Schedule for 58 years, or acquired the age of superannuation.  

The court further noted that the interim orders imposed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court had retrospective effect and went into effect on June 2, 2014. In addition, the aforementioned provided that employees of the businesses included in Schedules IX and X of the Reorganisation Act would not be eligible for superannuation only on the basis of reaching the age of 58.  

The court held that since the petitioners in this case did not meet the requirements of Act No. 23 of 1984’s definition of “Government employees,” they cannot be considered government employees in any sense. If that’s the case, then corporate employees’ inability to expect the same treatment as state government employees as a matter of right is no longer res integra.  

The government’s decision regarding those entities mentioned in Schedules IX and X will not bind the district cooperative central banks, which are cooperative credit societies. These institutions are required to make their own decisions based on a variety of factors, including their financial capacity, in order to decide whether or not to extend the age of superannuation and, if so, from what date. We believe that the DCCB’s decision is a decision of a policy character. 

Finally, the court laid down that the decision to raise the retirement age from a prospective date, i.e., June 2017, was made after weighing the advantages of increasing retirement age from 58 to 60 years old as well as the financial implications of salary and other benefits that the Bank would have to pay as a result of the increase. It cannot be argued that the Bank’s decision was so irrational, perverse, or unreasonable as to be unsupportable. As a result, the court denied the current writ petitions, as we see no value in them.  

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Judgment reviewed by Riddhi S Bhora. 

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Sec 6A Of The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act Cannot Be Applied Retrospectively: Supreme Court

Case title: CBI Vs R.R Kishore

Case no.: Criminal Appeal No.377 Of 2007

Decided on: 11.09.2023

Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Kishan Koul, Hon’ble Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Hon’ble Justice Abhay S. Oka, Hon’ble Justice Vikram Nath, Hon’ble Justice J.K Maheshwari.

 

Hon’ble Justices stated that “once a law is declared to be unconstitutional, being violative of Part-III of the Constitution, then it would be held to be void ab initio, still born, unenforceable and non est in view of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and its interpretation by authoritative pronouncements. Thus, the declaration made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Subramanian Swamy will have retrospective operation. Section 6A of the DSPE Act is held to be not in force from the date of its insertion i.e. 11.09.2003.”

BRIEF FACTS:

The story begins with the CBI registering an FIR against a Radiologist for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Later they laid a trap and the radiologist is said to have accepted a bribe. A charge sheet was filed and before the Special Judge and the Radiologist filed a discharge petition. The main contention in that petition was that the trap which was a part of the enquiry/investigation had been laid without the previous approval of the Central Government as provided under Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Though the Special Judge rejected this discharge plea, the High Court of Delhi allowed his revision petition and held that the CBI acted in contravention of Section 6A DSPE Act. Against this judgment, the CBI approached the Apex Court.

During the pendency of this appeal, the constitution bench judgment Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation was delivered, which held that  Section 6A(1) of the DSPE Act was held to be invalid.

So when the appeal came up before the bench again, the CBI contended that Section 6A(1) has been declared to be unconstitutional,  the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside and the prosecution should be allowed to continue with the proceedings from the stage of rejection of discharge application. In other words, the CBI contended that the Constitution bench judgment striking down Section 6A would have retrospective effect. On the other hand, the accused contended that this judgment could not have any retrospective operation. The court has placed this case before the constitutional bench to decide the matter at hand.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT:

Taking into account the nuance of Article 13(2), the court ruled that the State is prohibited from making any law that takes away or limits the rights conferred by Part-III, and that any law made in violation of this clause is void to the extent of the violation. Article 13(2) prohibits the making of any law, so it would apply to laws enacted after the Constitution’s inception, such as the case at hand. In this case, it has been determined that Section 6A of the DSPE Act violates Article 14 of Part III of the Constitution, rendering it void.

The court additionally clarified how the word “void” must be construed. It noted that “void” has been interpreted in a number of judgements of this Court from 1951 to the present, and has been given various names such as ‘non est’, ‘void ab initio’, ‘still born’, and ‘unenforceable’.

The court stated that once a statute is deemed unconstitutional for violating Part III of the Constitution, it is void ab initio, still born, unenforceable, and non-existent under Article 13(2) of the Constitution.

Hence, the appeal of CBI is allowed and set aside the order of high court.

 

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Written by – Surya Venkata Sujith

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