#punjabhighcourt Archives - Page 3 of 4

18 Jul

Counsel argues that POCSO Act accusations cannot be based solely on the contents of FIR – Dismissed by Haryana High Court

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TITLE: Surjeet Khanna v State of Haryana

Decided On-:14.07.2023

CRM-M-4079-2023

CORAM: Hon’ble Justice Mr. harnaresh Singh gill

INTRODUCTION- The petitioner requests the dismissal of an initial police report (FIR) filed under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 6, 18, and 21 of the later-added Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act of 2022 (the “POCSO Act”) in the district of Faridabad.

FACTS OF THE CASE-

The one who is filing the petition is the principal of the Delhi Public School in Greater Faridabad’s Sector 81. The unfortunate incident that resulted in the suicide of a young student in Class X-B due to the alleged harassment, bullying, and torture by his classmates/students of the School prompted the filing of the aforementioned FIR. When informed of the aforementioned harassment, bullying, or mental torture, the petitioner, who was in charge of the school in its entirety, did not respond as required by the POCSO Act. The complainant is an unfortunate mother whose world was turned upside down by her son’s premature death. This Court regrets that this unfortunate act occurred and sympathizes with the parents of the child.

COURT ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The senior attorney representing the petitioner would fervently argue that there is no instigation on the petitioner’s part; that a simple reading of the FIR’s contents and the very role played by the petitioner in resolving the situation by involving the parents of all the children (involved in the alleged incident), including the mother of the deceased child (complainant), would even strengthen the petitioner’s firmware that no ingredients of Section 107 were present.

On the contrary , the knowledgeable State Counsel contends that in accordance with the POCSO Act, the Petitioner, who was the Principal of the School at the Time, who, by virtue of her inaction, caused the death of a young person, cannot be heard pleading her false accusation.

Both counsels have relied their submissions on previous rulings of various Hon’ble courts. The court after having a holistic view of the arguments made by both parties came to view of stating i.e.

“The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner’s argument that the petitioner cannot be tried under Section 21 of the POCSO Act in the absence of the children who were allegedly involved in the incident of harassment and bullying cannot be accepted for the simple reason that this Court cannot discuss the reasons why the aforementioned students left the School or their potential expulsion from the School in the current proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Nothing else has been emphasised. Given the foregoing, the present petition is hereby dismissed because it lacks merit.”

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Written by- Steffi Desousa

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12 Jul

Punjab high court didn’t find interference under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

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TITLE: Tej Service Station through Parshotam Dass v Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited

Decided On-: May 10, 2023

FAO No. 7439 of 2014

CORAM: Hon’ble Justice Mr. Avneesh Jhingan

INTRODUCTION- This appeal was filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Deals with compensation of oil prices.

FACTS OF THE CASE-

The facts are that M/s Tej Service Station received a dealership in 1970 to sell petroleum products in Moga. There were three partners in the company at the time. A new dealership agreement was established between the parties on June 1, 1988, after one of the partners retired. One of the partners, Mr. Ram Tirath, retired from the partnership in 1998, and his son was admitted as a new partner. The Hindustan Petroleum Corporation (abbreviated “H.P.”) was asked for permission to amend the agreement in light of the new partnership deed.

The request was rejected, and the outlet agreement was terminated on June 8, 2001, citing a drop in sales and the appellant’s violation of Clause 47 of the terms and conditions by hiring a third party without the H.P.

The award from the arbitration hearings that were started at the appellant’s request is dated 27.11.2006. The only claim that was accepted was the one requesting compensation for the oil stock that was recovered and recorded on the day that HP took over the outlet. The compensation was to be calculated based on the February 2001 market prices. The settlement and payment were further ordered to be made within 30 days of the award. The appellant’s objections were dismissed on February 27, 2007, leading to the current appeal.

COURT ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The only complaint made by the appellant’s knowledgeable counsel is that the Arbitrator should have quantified the compensation for the stock that was in the outlet on the day it was taken over. On orders, he asserts that neither an execution nor a request for an explanation of the award under Section 33 of the Act have been made.Expert counsel representing respondents Nos. 1 and 2 defends the contested award.Both parties had access to the quantity of oil and the specifics of the recovered oil stock, and both parties were aware that the oil prices were under control in February 2001. The amount of compensation can be determined during the execution proceedings because the oil prices were under control at that time.

No case is made out for interference under Section 37 of the Act, the appeal is dismissed.

Written by– Steffi Desousa

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12 Jul

No substantial question of law – regular second appeal dismissed by Punjab High Court

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TITLE: Ram Kumar and Others v Naveen Kumar

Decided On-: March 14, 2023

RSA-867-2022 (O&M)

CORAM: Hon’ble Justice Ms. Alka Sarin

INTRODUCTION- The Plaintiff-Appellants have filed this regular second appeal in opposition to the concurrent findings of fact that were made by both Courts below and were included in the contested judgment and decrees.

FACTS OF THE CASE-

The plaintiff appellants claimed in their declaration and permanent injunction lawsuit that they were the owners and in possession of Khewat No. 36 Khasra No. 588, measuring 11 Kanals 7 Marlas and located in the revenue estate of Jhajjar, Tehsil and District Jhajjar. These brief facts are pertinent to the current lawsuit. According to an allegation, the plaintiff-appellants’ father built a house, which was later demolished because it was too old. The plaintiff-appellants then built five separate homes, where they have lived for the past 20 years or so. Furthermore, it was argued that the plaintiffs, appellants, owned a 50/227 share of the entire property.

The argument made was that because the agreement was unregistered, it did not grant the defendant-respondents any rights, titles, or interests and that they had no right to interfere with the plaintiff-appellants’ exclusive possession based on any sale deed. In their written statement, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 raised the defences of maintainability, locus standi, cause of action, and concealment of facts. On the merits, it was alleged that the plaintiff appellants own 50 shares out of a total of 227 shares, or 2 Kanals and 10 Marlas, of the total amount of land measuring 11 Kanals and 7 Marlas.

Additionally, it was claimed that the plaintiffs and appellants were Daya Chand’s heirs and that they held more of the suit land than their share of ownership, totaling 50/227 shares, or 2 Kanals and 10 Marlas.

In addition, it was claimed that defendant and respondent No.

agreement to sell relating to the 14 Marlas owned by Mohar Singh, from which some property had been bought in the name of the wife of the defendant-respondent No. 1. The defendant-respondents were further asserted to have limited their activities to his ownership and the scope of his rights under the agreement to sell dated 06.02.2013.

It was not filed a replication.

COURT ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The plaintiff-appellants’ knowledgeable attorney would argue that the lower courts erred in only partially deciding the case, that defendant-respondent No. 3 has no right, title, or interest in the suit property, and that a restraint order should have been issued against her as well.

Heard. The plaintiff-appellants failed to demonstrate their exclusive possession of the suit property, it was concurrently determined. I don’t see any reason to disagree with the concurrent findings of fact made by both courts below given the lack of any evidence demonstrating their exclusive possession over the suit property and the fact that the sale deed Ex.D/1 dated 25.03.2013 was validly executed. The plaintiff appellants have correctly been denied the relief of declaration, and they have additionally correctly only been granted the relief of an injunction against defendant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In light of the aforementioned, I do not think the current regular second appeal has any merit. No legal issue, much less any significant legal issue, arises for determination in the present which is wholly devoid of any merit

Written by– Steffi Desousa

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11 Jul

In complete violation of the guidelines set forth in the Section, the trial Court issued the impugned orders in a hasty manner observed by Punjab high court.

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TITLE: Balwinder Singh v State of Punjab

Decided On-: February 22, 2023

CRM-M-1037-2017 (O&M)

CORAM: Hon’ble Justice Mr. Aman Chaudhary

INTRODUCTION- The current petition was submitted under Section 482 CrPC to vacate the contested order made pursuant to Section 50 of the NDPS.

FACTS OF THE CASE-

The case’s facts state that a non-sikh middle-aged man dressed in mulla fashion was reported to be selling poppy husk in the village of Mavi Sappan by stuffing it onto both sides of an almond-colored “mare.” When the police party arrived, the man sat on the “mare” and forced it to flee through the jeeri crop, but he was caught after a chase, and 55 kg of poppy husk were found on him as well. FIR was consequently filed against him.

After the investigation was finished, a challan was presented, and charges were laid on December 21, 2015.

The “mare” was released on Superdari while the case was still pending by order dated August 22, 2014, issued by the Patiala Special Judge after the petitioner provided surety bonds worth Rs. 5 Lakh and filed documents pertaining to his land.

COURT ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The petitioner’s knowledgeable attorney would contend that the “mare” passed away on January 3, 2016, and that the Superdar (the defendant in the FIR) informed authorities of this fact by filing an affidavit dated August 9, 2016. His argument is that the trial Court erred by failing to follow the requirements of Section 446 of the CrPC, which stipulates that a show-cause notice must be issued by the Court before the bond is forfeited and the person is ordered to pay the amount of the penalty, which in the current case. Counsel relied on previous judgements

Learned State counsel opposes the petition and claims that while the affidavit was only filed on 09.08.2016, the “mare” had expired on 03.01.2016. The trial Court erred in passing the contested orders.

Forms of law must be followed before a person can be punished, as stated in the aforementioned provision, which mandates that a surety must first give a show cause notice before becoming liable to pay the penalty after the bond is forfeited. Only if the surety fails to provide sufficient justification will the court start the process of recovering the money. This Court determines that no such procedure was followed in the current case, and the trial Court issued the contested orders in a hasty manner that was wholly in violation of the rules set forth in Section 446 of the Criminal Procedure Code and without using due diligence. Lawfully speaking, the same are therefore unsupportable.

Petition allowed.

Written by– Steffi Desousa

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7 Jul

Consent- memo required to search a suspect: Punjab High court

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TITLE: Nand Kishore v State of Punjab

Decided On-: May 22, 2023

CRA-S-4625-SB-2015(O&M)

CORAM: Hon’ble Justice Mr. Haresh Manjua

INTRODUCTION – The conviction and sentence passed by the court of learned Judge Special Court, Pathankot on July 20, 2015, and July 21, 2015, respectively, have been contested in the current appeal. The appellant was found guilty under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, 1985. Defense pleads on Section 50 of the NDPS Act.

FACTS OF THE CASE-

Nand Kishore was apprehended as he approached on foot carrying a bag, lant by the police party led by SI Kuldeep Kumar in the area of Turi Wala Chowk, Police Station Division No. 2, Pathankot. SHO Kuldeep Kumar informed the suspect that he suspected the presence of intoxicating material on him and that a search would be conducted. The suspect could choose to have his search conducted by him, a Magistrate, or a gazetted officer. He had a plastic bag in his right hand and tried to turn around after spotting the police party but was apprehended. The accused executed consent memo Ex.PW2/A to have his search conducted by SHO Kuldeep Kumar. After the consent memo, SI Kuldeep Kumar (PW-2) conducted his search, and 1 Kg Charas was found on him. Consequently, Police Station Division No. 2 in Pathankot filed FIR No. 141 on September 28, 2013, against him in accordance with Section 20/61/85 of the NDPS Act, 1985. According to the judgment and order dated 20.07.2015/21.07.2015, the learned Trial Court found the appellant guilty and sentenced him as stated in para. 1 of this judgment is based on the evidence that was presented.

COURT ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The appellant’s knowledgeable attorney claims that the officer in this case failed to comply with Section 50 of the Act. When requesting to conduct the search of the appellant, he included himself (SI-Kuldeep Kumar PW2) as the search’s in charge. To bolster his argument, he cites a decision made by this court in a previous ruling.

While contending that the circumstances of the current case substantially complied with section 50 of the NDPS Act, learned State counsel disagrees with the arguments made on behalf of the appellant. It is clear from reading the judgment rendered by the court below that the Trial Court neglected to review the “memo of consent.”

Therefore, the appeal is granted. The conviction judgment from July 20, 2015, as well as the sentence order from July 21, 2015, against the appellant, are hereby vacated. Any pending applications will also be dismissed.

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has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

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