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Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed and dismissed the order passed by the Container Corporation of India Ltd.

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Title: Loadstar Equipment Ltd. Vs Container Corporation of India Ltd.

Decision: 04.07.23

W.P.(C) 5040/2023 & CM APPL. 19721/2023

CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA

 HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD

Introduction

Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed and dismissed the order passed by the Container Corporation of India Ltd, disqualifying the petitioner from participating in the bidding of tender bearing reference no. CON/AREA1/TECH/FORKLIFT-20/2023, which was floated by Respondent No. 1 on their website vide NIT dated 08.02.2023.

Facts of the Case

The Respondent No. 1 invited applications on the government portal for bids from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)/authorized dealers through a two packet online open tendering system, at an estimated total cost of Rs. 38,11,40,000/-, for the design, manufacture, supply, and commissioning of 20 forklifts with a capacity of 35 tonnes at a specified terminal. This is the background to the current petition.

Respondent No.1/CONCOR subsequently issued a corrigendum in respect of the part of the NIT document which lays down qualification criterion for bidders. Accordingly, Clause 2.1(b) under Section II “General Instructions to Bidders” was added to the NIT document.

Upon examination of the bid documents in the technical stage, Respondent No.1 issued communications to the bidding parties on 23.03.2023 and again on 24.03.2023, calling upon them to submit additional documents to rectify discrepancies found in the documents, latest by 29.03.2023. and The Petitioner submitted their reply to the aforesaid communication and submitted documents to the Respondent vide emails dated 28.03.2023 and 29.03.2023

On a perusal of the documents submitted by the Petitioner, the Tender Evaluation Committee of Respondent No.1 found the Petitioner to be technically not qualified and rejected the bid of the Petitioner vide impugned communication dated 18.04.2023. The Petitioner thereafter addressed an email to the CMD of Respondent No. 1, stating that no reasons had been assigned for their disqualification, and requested the intervention of CMD of Respondent No. 1 to permit the Petitioner to give further clarifications. However, there was no response to this communication.

Being aggrieved by the decision of the Respondent No.1 dated 18.04.2023, disqualifying the Petitioner from the tender process, the Petitioner has filed the instant petition on 19.04.2023, challenging the impugned communication.

Analysis and Decision of the court

In accordance with Clause 2.1, a qualified bidder must have submitted at least one purchase order for a comparable good to at least one government department, CPSC, SPSC, public limited company, etc. during the previous three years and on or before the last day of the financial year immediately preceding the one for which the bid is being submitted. Additionally, it states that a bidder and an authorised dealer cannot submit separate bids for the same product or item in the same tender.

According to Clause 2.1, the manufacturer or an authorised dealer must demonstrate that they have successfully delivered or completed one purchase order in order to be taken into consideration for the tender. According to the certificate provided by APL Apollo Steel Pipes, M/s Excellent Engineering & Allied Service Private Limited provided the device produced by the petitioner.

The justification offered by Respondent No. 1 was that M/s Excellent Engineering & Allied Service Private Limited was the beneficiary of the certificate issued by APL Apollo Steel Pipes. This justification is inadmissible since the proof demonstrates that M/s Excellent Engineering & Allied Service Private Limited worked with Apollo Steel Pipes to complete the machine the petitioner built.

It is undeniably well established that judicial review of administrative acts, including those involving tenders, is severely constrained. However, judicial review may be used to stop arbitrary, unreasonable, and illogical behaviour.

The fundamental requirement of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution is now well established and has been upheld numerous times by the Apex Court. Non-arbitrariness in substance and essence is the lifeblood of fair play, and State actions are subject to judicial review to the extent that the State must act lawfully for a discernible reason and not arbitrarily. The Court must intervene in order to exercise its authority under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution if the State or an instrumentality of the State fails to behave reasonably or fairly in the awarding of contracts. Vice Chairman & Managing Director, City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and Others v. Shishir Realty Private Limited and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1141 a case decided by the Supreme Court, where it was held that “Fairness and the good faith standard ingrained in the contracts entered into by public authorities mandates such public authorities to conduct themselves in a non-arbitrary manner during the performance of their contractual obligations” and “The constitutional guarantee against arbitrariness as provided under Article 14, demands the State to act in a fair and reasonable manner unless public interest demands otherwise. However, the degree of compromise of any private legitimate interest must correspond proportionately to the public interest, so claimed”

Arbitrariness is the antithesis of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, and the State must operate in a fair and reasonable manner, as has been well-established and stated by the Apex Court. As previously stated, the bidder who is a manufacturer only needed to demonstrate that it has experience supplying at least one single purchase order of government departments, CPSEs, SPSEs, Public Listed Companies, ICD, DCT, MMLP, Ports, CFS, CTOs for similar item during the previous three financial years and current financial year last day of month prior to the one in which tender is invited.

A thorough study of Clauses 2.1, 5.4, and Annexures 10 and 11 of the NIT reveals that the maker must merely demonstrate that it has provided a machine that has been installed satisfactorily. In a similar vein, Annexure-14 stipulates that the maker must also provide the certificate.

Since the Petitioner has demonstrated that it satisfies the qualifying requirements, their bid shouldn’t have been turned down.

The Respondent No. 1 was instructed to open the Petitioner’s financial bid during the hearing, and it turned out that the Petitioner was the lowest bidder.

 Given the foregoing, the writ petition and any pending applications, if any, are approved. It is mandated that the Respondents go forward in line with the law.

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Delhi High Court dismissed the Regular First appeal filed, seeking partition of the property.

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Title: Smt. Sarita Dua vs Dr. Gautam Dev Sood & Ors.

Reserved on: 14.03.23

Pronounced on: 04.07.23

+ RFA(OS) 27/2022

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT

                 HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

Introduction

Delhi high court held that the petition for partition is not maintainable if the cancellation of existing Gift deed is not sought.

Facts of the case

The three plaintiffs, who were sisters, filed a lawsuit against the defendant seeking to divide the property bearing N-32, Greater Kailash, New Delhi (hence referred to as the suit property).

In order to profit himself, the late Dr. Vyas Dev Sood, the parties’ father, acquired the suit property on April 27, 1965, using his own money. He did this in the name of his wife, the late Smt. Raj Kumari Sood, and a two-story home was subsequently built there. He passed away on January 31, 2001, while the parties’ mother, Smt. Raj Kumari Sood, passed away in October 2004. They both passed away intestate, leaving behind two sons and three daughters: Dr. Devashish Kumar Sood, who is being represented by his legal heirs, and the three daughters who are the plaintiffs. The parties’ disagreements led to the filing of the lawsuit for partition and rendition of accounts.

Analysis and decision of the court

The court analysed and stated that the parties have agreed that the suit property was acquired in 1965 under the mother of the plaintiff through a recorded Sale Deed. The appellant/plaintiff asserts that the plaintiff’s father paid all of the money necessary for the acquisition of the suit property out of his own pocket. Therefore, in contrast to the father who was a de jure owner, the mother was just a de facto owner of the property. now the property was benami, the de jure ownership remained with the father until his passing. Thereafter, according to the law of succession, it passed to all of the legal heirs, who have now requested the property’s division. It also held that the basic argument behind the plea of benami transaction is that the father purchased the property out off his own funds and registered it in name of the mother, While the law creates a prohibition against the right to recover property held benami, the law has culled out certain exceptions to benami transactions under Section 3(2) of the Benami Act. the mother’s name was used in the recorded Sale Deed dated 27.04.1965 to acquire the subject property. Both the mother and father have passed away, and the father never asserted ownership of the land throughout his lifetime. The appellants have now contested the Sale Deed as being in violation of the Benami Transaction Act, approximately 50 years after the Sale Deed was executed. A claim of father-owned property that is so nebulous and unsupported by any information, including any explanation of the finances that can be traced to the father, has been rightfully dismissed as unsubstantiated. Section 3(2) of the Act, no doubt creates a presumption if the property is purchased in the name of wife or daughter, but this presumption would have arisen only if there was any basis to establish that father had purchased property benami in the name of his wife. Section 4 of the Act places a complete embargo on claiming any right if the transaction is per se benami i.e. the property is purchased in the name of one while the funds are paid by another. Section 4(2) of the Benami Act prohibits any suit on the basis of such transaction; no person can assert to be the real owner of such property held benami. The Apex Court in the case of R. Rajagopal Reddy (dead) by LRs and Ors vs Radmini Chandrasekaran (dead) by LRs (1995) 2 SCC 630 clarified the retrospective application of Section 4 and observed that Section 4 shall be applicable from the date it came into effect and no claim, suit or action preferred by the real owner, to enforce any right in respect of the property held benami, would lie/be admissible in any court. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sanjay Roy Vs. Sandeep Soni, (Supra) followed the judgement of Ramti Devi (Supra) and observed that Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 extinguishes the right in property on expiry of the period of limitation.

The appellants have cited as Manoj Arora v. Mamta Arora (Supra), in which the husband claimed to be the de jure owner of the two and launched a lawsuit against the wife seeking a declaration and an injunction homes that he had bought in the defendant, his wife’s name.

He had provided information on the source of the funds and the sums that he had used to pay for those properties. The Coordinate Bench of this Court noted that the action could not have been dismissed in accordance with Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC where there are explicit allegations in the plaint that the husband acquired the property in the name of his wife.

However, in this instance, neither the mother nor the father ever said that the father had bought the property benami (in the name of) the mother’s. In fact, the parties to the lawsuit did not claim the property was benami in the mother’s name while their parents were alive. Furthermore, neither in this lawsuit nor the prior civil litigation with case number CS (OS) 1912/2009 has any statement been requested in relation to the Sale Deed that was completed on April 27, 1965, in the mother’s name. Additionally, the plaintiffs have not revealed the origin of the cash.

The appellant in Ramti Devi v. Union of India (previous) understood that the Sale Deed had been executed and registered on January 29, 1947. When the appellant gained information that the instrument was being completed, the three-year limitation period outlined in Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, started to run. The 1966 lawsuit was rejected by the Apex Court as being time-barred since the 1959 lawsuit had been withdrawn and replaced by the 1966 lawsuit. This case is similar to the present petition where defendants had countered the claim of appellants for partition with asserting a right in their favour on the basis of two registered Gift Deeds dated 13.03.2000 and 11.03.2002, executed in their favour by the mother. The defendants in the prior litigation had argued for their exclusive claim to the suit property on the basis of the two Git Deeds, according to the appellant’s averments in paragraph 17, which are obviously evident. Therefore, the plaintiffs had knowledge of the two Gift Deeds from at least 2009. The cause of action to dispute the aforementioned Gift Deeds emerged in 2009 when the appellants became aware of the Gift Deeds, and according to Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the cause of action may only be contested three years after the date of knowledge. Therefore, we concur with the learned Single Judge’s conclusions that the case was barred by limitation.

The defendants, respondents, claimed that the current lawsuit for partition and rendition of accounts could not be maintained without first requesting the cancellation of the two gift deeds as their second defence. In the case of Prem Singh and Ors vs Birbal and Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 353 The Supreme Court established the need for setting aside a registered document and observed thus: “27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption.” The Coordinate Bench of this Court had stated in Anita Anand v. Gargi Kapur, (Supra), that the plaintiff would not be eligible for partition until he challenged the Gift Deed. The determination of the Gift Deed’s illegality would result in relief from division. Similar to this, the Supreme Court ruled in Ramti Devi v. Union of India (Supra) that a document that has been duly completed and registered stays valid and binds the parties unless it is properly revoked by the Court.

Thus, it has been held that the petition for partition is not maintainable if the cancellation of existing Gift deed is not sought.

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Delhi High court Dismissed the petition filed by TV 18 Broadcast, seeking Interim injunction.

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Title: TV 18 BROADCAST LTD. Vs BENNETT, COLEMAN AND COMPANY LIMITED

Judgement Delivered: 04.07.23

+ CS(COMM) 279/2022

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL

Introduction

Delhi High Court dismissed the petition filed by TV 18 Broadcast, seeking interim injunction on the use of term “Bhaiyaji” under class 41.

Facts of the case

The plaintiff is a member of the largest media and entertainment conglomerate in India, the Network18 group. The plaintiff’s business operations include managing a number of television networks in India, including CNBC-TV18, CNN News18, and News18, which broadcast in fifteen different languages and 26 states across the nation. Additionally, the company operates entertainment and informational media channels as Colours, Nickelodeon, MTV, and History TV18. In addition of creating TV shows, the plaintiff is also involved in creating TV programme and one such program is named as “Bhaiyaji Kahin” and they adopted the device mark for the same with effect from 29th December 2016 under classes 38 and 41, Since then the show aired 1200 episodes and generated a revenue of Rs.16,26,42,000 alone in the year 2021-22.

The defendants used the trademark to launch “Bhaiya Ji Superhit” in January 2022, which was intended to use comedy and satire to highlight newsworthy topics. Due to the resemblance of the two parties’ trademarks and the nature of their respective shows, the plaintiff sent the defendant with a cease-and-desist letter dated January 10, 2022, ordering them to stop using the contested mark “Bhaiya Ji Superhit” among other things.

However, the defendant asked the plaintiff to drop the stop and desist letter, pointing out that there was no similarity between the defendant’s programme format and the plaintiff’s, nor was there any chance that the impugned mark and the plaintiff’s trademark would be confused.

Reiterating the arguments made in its initial cease and desist letter, the plaintiff once more sent the defendant a legal notice on February 24, 2022. The accusations mentioned in the notifications, however, were disputed by the defendant.

In order to prevent the defendant from violating the plaintiff’s trademarks, passing off, and other ancillary reliefs, the plaintiff brought the current lawsuit.

Analysis and Decision of the Court

The High Court held that, the “Bhaiyaji Kahin” mark used by the plaintiff is registered under classes 38 and 41. In contrast to the registration under class 38, the registration under class 41 contains a disclaimer about the term “Bhaiyaji”. There is no question in my opinion after reading the aforementioned classification that television shows, particularly those relating to news, belong in class 41 and not class 38. In reality, there is a blatant exclusion for television broadcasts in class 38. Telecommunication services, such as television transmission, are also included in class 38.

Therefore, names of television stations like Times Now, CNN News18, News18, and similar ones will be included in class 38. The subject of class 41 would be the titles of the shows that are shown on these networks. Therefore, class 41 would be the applicable class for finding infringement.

The name “Bhaiyaji” is the only commonality between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks. The terms “Kahin” used by the plaintiff and “Superhit” used by the defendant are not interchangeable. The plaintiff cannot prevent the defendant from using the term “Bhaiyaji” due to the disclaimer about the term under class 41. This is also made explicit by Section 28(2) of the Trade Marks Act, which states that all restrictions and conditions that are a part of the registration granted apply to the exclusive right to use a trademark.

In spite of this, the term “Bhaiyaji” is a well-known pronoun in several Indian states, such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and it literally means “brother”; as a result, it lacks distinction. The defendant has also provided enough evidence to the court to demonstrate that the term “Bhaiyaji” is commonly used in trade in India and is used in a number of radio and television broadcasts. Thus, in my initial assessment, “Bhaiyaji” is a generic phrase that is in common usage, and nobody has the exclusive right to use such generic words. According to Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the plaintiff is not entitled to exclusive rights over the mark “Bhaiyaji” in light of the aforementioned.

Attention has also been brought to the Plaintiff’s response to the examination report of the registry where they had applied for registration of the mark “Bhaiyaji Kahin” under class 41, while distinguishing it from “Bhaiya Aisa Kyun”, the Plaintiff has clearly taken a stand that their mark is not similar to the said mark and it is to be compared as a whole and cannot be dissected thus they cannot take contrary view on using of term “Bhaiyaji” by the defendant, it is not permissible to approbate and reprobate.

Plaintiff has placed reliance on Shree Nath Heritage Liquor Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Allied Blender & Distillers Pvt. Ltd., 2015 OnLine Del 10164,  wherein the court upheld the interim order of the division bench in respect of the defendant using the mark “Collector’s Choice” as against the plaintiff’s registered mark of “Officer’s Choice” in respect of alcoholic beverages, but this reliance is flawed as the dominant word was officer and their was no disclaimer but in the present case the dominant word is “Bhaiyaji” and there is a disclaimer present thus the aforesaid judgement does not advance the case of the plaintiff. Aditya Birla Fashion & Retail Ltd. v. Under Armour, Inc., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2269, there was no disclaimer included in the registration issued in favour of the plaintiff as there is in the current case. as a result, the abovementioned judgement does not strengthen the plaintiff’s case.

Also, regarding the format of the show, the shows are quite different from each other both in terms of nature as well as the format. Therefore, in my prima facie view there is no likelihood of confusion between the two television shows. In view of the discussion above, the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of interim injunction. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

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Delhi High court rejected the Review petition filed by Statesman Limited seeks to review the judgement passed by the high court.

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Title: The StatesMan Limited vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.

Decision: 04.07.23

+ REVIEW PET. 516/2019 and CM APPL. 53531/2019, CM APPL. 12275/2022 in W.P.(C) 9497/2015

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

Introduction

The Delhi High court rejected the Review petition filed by Statesman Limited seeks to review the judgement passed by the high court dated 18.11.19 on the grounds that it does not address the issue of jurisdiction of the Authority under the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, (“the Working Journalists Act”) to pass the order dated 21 July 2015 forming subject matter of challenge in WP (C) 9497/2015.

Facts of the case

The application made under Section 17(1) of the Working Journalists Act by a few members of the Statesman Mazdoor Union is resolved by the order dated July 21, 2015. The stated applicants requested payment of arrears in accordance with the Majithia Wage Board’s recommendations. The petitioner-Statesman disputed their obligation to pay the applicants in accordance with the Wage Board’s recommendations on the grounds that they had incurred significant cash losses three years prior to the implementation of those recommendations, exempting them from the requirement to pay arrears. The Court has carefully considered the applicants’ case and rejected the petitioner’s argument that it was not the petitioner’s responsibility to pay the applicants as recommended by the wage board.

The petitioner conceded to the Authority’s authority and objected to its need to compensate the applicants-workers on a merits-based basis. After losing before the Authority, the petitioner used the current writ petition to appeal to this Court.

Analysis and Decision of the court

The Delhi High Court held that Even in the current writ suit, there is not even the slightest hint of a challenge to the Authority’s authority to hear the workmen’s claims and issue the ruling of July 21, 2015. Instead, extensive and numerous submissions have been made in an effort to prove that the petitioner was, in fact, experiencing significant losses three years prior to the Wage Board’s recommendations and was not, therefore, required to pay the applicants-workmen in accordance with those recommendations. The petitioner submitted a response to the writ petition after the respondents submitted a counter affidavit. There isn’t even a claim that the Authority lacked the authority to decide the applications of the journalists in the response. Instead, the response outlines how the petitioner believes the Authority should have resolved the aforementioned arguments.

The order dated July 21, 2015 lists the errors under the heading “Grounds for Setting Aside Impugned Order” in paragraph 11 of that document. In the aforementioned paragraph, the petitioner first explains why, in its opinion, it had actually experienced losses for three years; second, it explains why the petitioner’s net current assets could not be taken into account when determining whether the losses suffered by the petitioner were heavy; and third, it makes reference to Supreme Court decisions that, in the petitioner’s opinion, established the guidelines for identifying “heavy losses.”

Therefore, the written submissions do not only fail to raise any objections to the Authority’s competence or jurisdiction. decision on the petitions submitted by the applicant-journalists, but they also go so far as to assert that the Authority should have handled the cases differently than how it did. Therefore, there is a favourable claim regarding the Authority’s ability and authority to rule on the journalists’ application.

The petitioner also had approached the hon’ble SC with an SLP (C) 36133/2015 The Supreme Court did not interfere with the direction, of the learned Division Bench, to decide the writ petition expeditiously, and merely modified the order of pre-deposit by reducing it to ₹ 30 lakhs. This indicates that the argument of want of jurisdiction of the Authority to adjudicate on the claims of the respondent-workmen was not canvassed either before the Division Bench or even before the Supreme Court.

Even after reserving the judgement in 2018, the petitioner failed to file any written submission when given opportunity for the same. As a result, there was no challenge made to the Authority’s competence or jurisdiction to decide on the claims of the respondent-workmen in the writ petition’s only written submission.

Thus, neither the writ petition nor the response nor the written representations submitted by the petitioner contested the Authority’s competence or authority to decide on the claims of the respondent-journalists. In contrast, the petitioner made specific allegations in the written submissions it submitted to this court about how it believed the Authority should have handled the situation, even going so far as to request a remand to make sure the Authority handled the situation again properly. These allegations cannot be reconciled with the claim that the Authority lacked the authority to determine the respondents’ petitions; in fact, they are diametrically opposed to one another. It was in these circumstances that, in the judgment under review, this Court did not return any findings regarding the competence of the Authority to pass the order dated 21 July 2015.

In light of the above, this Court conducted a merits review of the case and determined that the defence of three years of continuous loss as a justification for not adhering to the Majithia Wage Board’s Award was inadmissible.

Ultimately, the Delhi High Court dismissed the petition and miscellaneous applications were disposed of accordingly.

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Delhi High court granted bail to an accused under the offence of Kidnapping, as per their authority under section 439 of CrPC.

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Title: Shah Alam vs State Govt. of NCT Delhi

Reserved: 01.06.2023

Pronounced: 07.06.2023

BAIL APPLN. 1033/2023

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN

Introduction

Delhi High court granted bail to an applicant under section 439 of CrPC seeking regular bail in FIR No.394/2020 under Sections 364A/365/342/323/506/102B/34 IPC.

Facts of the case

The mother of the victim on 03.09.2020 made a complaint to the police at 10:02 p.m. that the victim, her daughter, aged about 24 years went to HDFC Bank, Sector-02, Noida, U.P at about 01:30 p.m. with her ATM, passbook and cheque book and she has not returned home and despite searching for her, the victim could not be found. She suspected that some unknown person has kidnapped her daughter by luring her. On the basis of the said complaint, FIR was registered under Section 365 IPC.

The father of the victim also produced few video recordings as well as Whatsapp messages regarding the demand for ransom. On the basis of the statement of the father, Sections 364A/506/342/323/120B/34 IPC were also added in the case.

Search was made for the victim with the help of location and CDR of victim’s mobile number and the victim was recovered on 04.09.2020 from the custody of accused persons namely, Simpal Srivastav and her boyfriend Shah Alam (petitioner herein) from Village Chhalera, Sector-44, Noida (U.P). The said accused persons were arrested on 04.09.2020.

During investigation statement under Section 164 CrPC of the victim was recorded wherein she alleged that she was kidnapped by both the accused persons for ransom and she was also beaten by them. Her mobile phone was also taken by the accused person from which the calls were made and Whatsapp messages were sent demanding ransom. She was also threatened by the accused person and was wrongly confined.

Analysis of the court and decision

The Delhi High Court held that it is Suffice it to state that only the Magistrate’s powers, while handling petitions for the grant of bail, are governed by the punishment specified for the offence for which the bail is requested. An offence under section 364A IPC is punished with death or life in prison. Generally speaking, the Magistrate lacks the authority to issue bail unless the case is covered by the provisos attached to section 437 of the Code if the punishment specified is the life sentence or death penalty and the offence is only triable by the Court of Session (Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)) There are no such restrictions limiting the High Court’s or the Court of Session’s authority while using the Section 439 CrPC’s authority.

It could also be appropriate to cite the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s ruling in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40, which outlined the specific conditions under which a person facing trial’s freedom could be restricted as –

“The object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The Courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. Detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In India, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the propose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”

Thus, without getting into the specifics of the case at this time, the court believes that, in light of the explanation above, the petitioner has established a case for the granting of bail. As a result, the petition is granted, and upon presenting a personal bond in the amount of Rs. 20,000/- and one surety bond in the same amount, the petitioner is permitted to bail, subject to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court, CMM, or Duty Magistrate.

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