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Delhi High Court granted compensation and set aside the order of the railway tribunal.

Title: RAM PRATAP & ANR vs UNION OF INDIA (MINISTRY OF RAILWAY)

Reserved on: 15.03.2023

Pronounced on: 05.07.2023

FAO 172/2014

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

Introduction

Delhi High court set aside the order passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi in OA(IIu)008/2013 and granted compensation to the appellants under section 23 of the railway claims tribunal act 1987.

Facts of the case

The appellants seek to challenge the decision made by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi in OA(IIu)008/2013, which dismissed the claim application they submitted. This appeal was filed in accordance with Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”).

The appellants’ knowledgeable counsel argued that the Tribunal had rejected the appellants’ claim even though the two travel tickets (for the forward and return voyage) had been found on the deceased individual.

In contrast, the respondent’s learned CGSC argued that the Tribunal correctly rejected the assertions that the deceased was a bona fide passenger and that the event an untoward incident occurred while defending the disputed order.

Analysis of the court

A review of the file would also demonstrate that the tickets were confirmed and discovered to have been issued on June 5, 2012, at 12:18. Even though the trip was started on that day with considerable delay, The appellants claimed in their testimony that after buying the tickets, the deceased went home for some personal matters before returning to travel later that evening. In the deceased should not be denied the status of having been a genuine passenger just because there was a small window of time between the time the tickets were issued and the journey was actually taken, according to this Court’s FAO 172/2014 Page 3 of 4 opinion. In addition, the Tribunal’s assertion that the claim averments are implausible since neither the deceased’s fellow passengers nor the authorities were informed of the occurrence is false and should be rejected given the circumstances of the case.

In light of the foregoing reasoning, this Court believes that the Tribunal erred in denying the appellants’ claim application. As a result, the appeal is granted and the contested ruling is reversed.

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Secured Creditors and the Rainbow Impact on IBC

Abstract

This article is based on the decision given by the hon’ble supreme court on STATE TAX OFFICER ( 1 ) VERSUS RAINBOW PAPERS LIMITED LNIND 2022 SC 596  and it will further dissect the legal question raised in this case along with the previous precedents of the hon’ble SC in similar cases.

The Verdict in this case basically held that the resolution plan proposed by the Committee of Creditors (COC) wouldn’t pass the scrutiny of law if the debtor fails to pay off the tax dues owed by him to the relevant tax authority, in such a case the Debtor is bound to liquidate its assets under section 53 of the IBC.

It goes without saying that the aforementioned judgement has raised worries within the insolvency sector, and as a result, the stakeholders have been considering what has to be done in order to comply with the aforementioned ruling.

Introduction

The controversy brought up in the judgement was outstanding taxes under the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act of 2003 (the “GVAT”) and how they conflicted with the waterfall system under Section 53 of the IBC. The waterfall mechanism, which is covered by Section 53 of the IBC, was only implemented as a legal tool to establish a hierarchy for prioritising the payment of obligations at the time of the corporate debtor’s liquidation. In essence, the dispute in the case is around outstanding claims from governmental bodies and privately secured debts. It is essential to review the ruling at this time and comprehend how it affects the IBC’s goal. Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (“GVAT Act”), according to the Supreme Court (“SC”), is not in conflict with or in contravention of Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”).

Analysis of the Court

In reaching the aforementioned conclusion, the Court made an important ruling by concluding that because the State Government has first charge over the property and is considered a “secured creditor” under the Gujarat Value Added Tax, 1974, it will also be treated as such under Section 53 (1) (b) (ii) of the IBC for liquidation purposes.

The State’s claim has been ruled to be untimely by the adjudicating authority (NCLT) and the appellate authority (NCLAT). Regulation 12 of the 2016 Regulations addresses the deadline for submitting a claim and supporting documentation, which is outlined in the public notification made according to Section 15 of the IBC. However, the time period is merely a guide and not required.

It also observed in the case of Vishal Saxena & Anr. v. Swami Deen Gupta where NCLT held that the time limit under Regulation 12 for submitting a claim is directory and not necessary in the matter of Resolution Professional. In its ruling and decision of June 10, 2021 in Assistant Commissioner of Customs v. Mathur Sabhapathy Vishwanathan, the NCLT adopted a similar stance. Thus, State’s claim cannot be rejected without violating the law.

The Adjudicating Authority may only approve the Resolution Plan, as approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC), if the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the Resolution Plan complies with Section 30(2) of the IBC. This is made clear by Section 31 of the IBC, which governs the approval of a Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority. The Resolution Plan cannot be authorised if it does not adhere to Section 30(2)’s standards.

The hon’ble court also took note of, Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd.,

“A simple reading of Section 31 of the I&B Code would also make it abundantly clear that the corporate debtor, as well as its employees, members, creditors, guarantors, and other stakeholders, are bound by the resolution plan once it has been approved by the adjudicating authority and it has determined that the resolution plan as approved by CoC satisfies the requirements referred to in Subsection (2) of Section 30. Such a clause is necessary since one of the main goals of the I&B Code is to revive the corporate debtor and turn it into an operating business.”[1]

“The resolution plan submitted by the successful resolution applicant must include a number of provisions, including a payment provision for the costs of the insolvency resolution process and a payment provision for operational creditors’ debts, which must not be less than the amount that would be paid to those creditors in the event that the corporate debtor was liquidated in accordance with Section 53, or the amount that would have been paid had the amount to be distributed under that section been less. The resolution plan must also include provisions for paying the obligations of financial creditors who reject the resolution plan, which also must not be less than the sum paid to those creditors in accordance with Section 53, subsection (1), in the event that the corporate debtor is liquidated. To dispel confusion, Explanation 1 to Clause (b) of Subsection (2) of Section 30 of the I&B Code specifies that a distribution made in line with the terms of the aforementioned clause must be just and equitable to such creditors. The resolution plan must also include provisions for the administration of the corporate debtor’s affairs following approval, as well as for the execution and oversight of the resolution plan, Clause a(e) of sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the I&B Code also casts a duty on RP to examine that the resolution plan does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the time being in force.”[2]

A resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors in accordance with Subsection (4) of Section 30 of the IBC may, under Section 31 of the IBC, only be approved by the Adjudicating Authority if the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the resolution plan meets the conditions outlined in Subsection (2) of Section 30 of the IBC. The fulfilment of Sub-Section (2) of Section 30 of the IBC criteria is a prerequisite for the approval of a resolution plan.

The Central Government, any State Government, any statutory or other authority, any financial creditor, or any other creditor to whom a debt in respect of dues arising under any law currently in effect is owed would be bound by a resolution plan that is valid and complies with Sub-Section (2) of Section 30 of the IBC. When there are still unpaid statutory obligations owed by a corporate debtor, such a resolution plan would not be binding on the State.

It also held that a company must be liquidated and its assets sold and distributed in accordance with Section 53 of the IBC if it is unable to pay its debts, which should include any statutory obligations to the government and/or other authorities, and there is no plan that envisages dissipation of those debts in a phased manner, uniform proportional reduction.

In the opinion of the court, the Committee of Creditors—which may include financial institutions and other financial creditors—cannot secure its own obligations at the expense of any other obligations, including statutory obligations to any government or governmental authority. Section 48 of the GVAT Act is not in conflict with Section 53 of the IBC or any other IBC requirements. According to Section 53(1)(b)(ii), debts payable to a secured creditor—which, under the GVAT Act, would include the State—rank equally with other specified obligations, including debts related to workman’s compensation for the 24 months prior to the liquidation beginning date. the GVAT Act designates the State as a secured creditor. A creditor to whom a security interest is credited is referred to as a secured creditor in Section 3(30) of the IBC. Such a security interest might be established legally. Any government or governmental authority is not excluded from the IBC’s definition of secured creditor.

Thus, the Court allowed the appeal of the appellant and set aside the order of the tribunal.

Claims Countering the verdict

The legal position is quite poles apart from this verdict, as the apex court had already stated in its verdict in “PR Commissioner of Income Tax v. Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited”, where it categorically held that “IBC has overriding effect on the every existing law inconsistent to it including the Income tax law. Further, the Apex Court also took a note that because Income Tax debts are in the nature of Crown Debts, they do not take precedence even over secured creditors who are private individuals, citing the case of Dena Bank vs. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh and Co., reported in 2000 (5) SCC 694 [LNIND 2000 SC 721].”[3]

The Bombay High Court recently held that secured debt shall take priority over “Government” dues/tax dues in the case of M/s Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction v. M/s Tax Recovery Officer, 5 dated July 28, 2021. The court based this decision on the fact that the Income Tax Act makes no reference to the obligations of the Income Tax Department taking precedence over secured debt. The Revenue was not permitted to impede the petitioner’s rights as a secured creditor. The order for attachment was invalid.

The tax dues, being an input to the Consolidated Fund of India and of the States, clearly come within the ambit of section 53(1)(e) of the Code. If the Legislature, in its wisdom, assigned the fifth position in the order of priority to such dues, it is not for this Court to delve into or belittle the rationale underlying the same”[4]

A secured creditor often falls under the category of financial creditors. However, there may be circumstances in which even an operating debtor qualifies as a “secured creditor.” For instance, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal recognised an operational creditor as a secured creditor in the Concast Steel & Power Ltd. v. MSTC Limited case because of a pledge agreement that had been made with the corporate debtor.

Conclusion

Thus it is advised that the Supreme Court must review the current ruling and clarify the law in light of this. It is obvious that if the existing legal situation is allowed to continue, it would harm the goal that the Code is meant to accomplish. As a result, the added responsibility of paying current or potential government and legislative dues is likely to deter any prospective resolution application. In the end, it could lead to fewer settlement requests, lower asset valuations, and higher haircuts for creditors.

[1] Para 65 Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd.

[2] Para 66 Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd.

[3] Para 4, PR Commissioner of Income Tax v. Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited

[4] Leo Edibles & Fats Limited v. Tax Recovery Officer, Writ Petition No. 8560 of 2018.

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petition

Delhi High Court dismissed the petition challenging the orders passed by the tribunal.

Title: DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs SUBHASH CHAND

Date of decision: July 5, 2023

+ W.P.(C) 8880/2023, CM APPLs. 33544/2023 & 33545/2023

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO

     HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA

Introduction

Delhi High Court dismissed the petition challenging the orders passed by the tribunal upholding the decision of the Disciplinary Authority dated 16.12.14, who had imposed the punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect.

Facts of the case

The Disciplinary Authority issued an order on December 16, 2014, which the Respondent challenged before the Tribunal. The Disciplinary Authority had imposed a punishment of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. In response to the appeal, the Appellate Authority amended the penalty decision by declaring that it will be reduced by one increment without having any cumulative impact in an order dated March 12, 2015. It appears that the respondent sought an additional remedy before the higher authority, which issued a decision on July 3, 2015 denying the proposed remedy.

It should be noted that a chargesheet dated July 26, 2012, was used to launch a departmental investigation against the respondent. It is a given that the Inquiry Officer concluded that the accusations brought against the respondent had not been established in his final judgement. The defendant received a notification from the Disciplinary Authority dated August 14, 2014 asking him to justify why he should not receive the penalty of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. The investigation report was then sent to the respondent by correspondence dated February 26, 2014. On August 14, 2014, the responder responded to the same.

Analysis and Decision of the court

The court held that – The respondent must be placed in the same position or stage as if no penalty had been meted out to them after the tribunal overturned the orders of the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority, and the Higher Authority.

In response to a particular question about whether the Disciplinary Authority had sent the respondent any disagreement notes prior to administering the punishment, the learned counsel for the petitioner responded in the negative. If that is the case, we concur with the Tribunal’s judgement in the contested order. We see no justification for interfering with the same. Thus the petition is dismissed.

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Delhi High Court Dismissed the appeal challenging the order of a district court due to lack of filing of written statement on time.

Title: SANTOSH KUMAR AGGARWAL vs M/S ALUCO PANEL LIMITED

Date of Decision: 05th July, 2023

+ RFA(COMM) 131/2023

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA

Introduction

Delhi High Court Dismissed the appeal challenging the order of a district court due to lack of filing of written statement on time thus defence for lack of territorial jurisdiction could not be raised.

Facts of the case

Present appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 11th November, 2022 passed by the learned District Judge in CS No.1235/2018 whereby the suit was decreed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff.

Analysis and Decision of the case

This Court determines that the appellant-defendant did not file the written statement or raise any defences despite participating throughout the suit processes, having heard the learned appellant’s counsel and having read the paper book. Despite the fact that an application under ruling IX Rule 7 CPC and an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC were both submitted on October 17, 2019, both on the grounds that the Court lacked geographical jurisdiction, the applications were both rejected by a detailed ruling dated October 13, 2022. It is established law that a written statement cannot be filed more than 120 days after it is due. (See: 2019 SCC 210, SCG Contract (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. As a result, the order dated 17th October, 2019 is in accordance with law.

Additionally, this Court believes that the defences of non-delivery of goods against bills nos. 10 and 30 and lack of jurisdiction in the current case are valid arguments. The Trial Court was unable to address the aforementioned defences since, in the current instance, the opportunity to provide a written statement had expired because it had not been submitted within the allotted time frame.

 Additionally, this Court also believes that the decision interpreting Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act prospectively renders the statute effective as of August 20, 2022. The aforementioned judgement offers no support to the appellant because the lawsuit in the current instance was filed in 2018.

As a result, the current appeal is dismissed together with any pending petitions since it lacks merit.

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Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed against the judgement passed by the single judge bench upholding the candidature of respondents

Title: MR KISHOR BANDEKAR AND ORS vs MR MAHESH CANDOLKAR AND ORS

Reserved on: 03rd July, 2023

Pronounced on: 06th July, 2023

+ LPA 504/2023 & CAV 312/2023, CM APPLs. 32400-32403/2023, 32711/2023

CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

Introduction

Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed against the judgement dated 02nd June, 2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 15097/2021, upholding the order dated 14th December, 2021 passed by Appellate Authority of All-India Chess Federation, New Delhi [“AICF”].

Facts of the Case

The Goa Chess Association [“GCA”] is a state-level sports organisation that is affiliated with both the AICF and the Sports Authority of Goa. It was established in accordance with the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The GCA’s Memorandum of Association (hence, “MoA”) and Rules and Regulations, all of which have been endorsed by the association’s General Body, serve as the framework for its governance.

A crucial adjustment to the GCA’s constitution was made by the General Body at its meeting on January 8th, 2017, raising the number of elected members of the Executive Committee from seven to twelve.

The GCA announced the elections for the Executive Committee on July 22, 2021. The list of accepted nomination forms was made public on August 5, 2021, and on August 10, 2021, the Presiding Officer (the “PO”) announced the names of the candidates elected to the North and South Goa Taluka Associations. The nomination forms of Respondents Nos. 1 through 4 were also ruled to be invalid, and a number of candidates from the talukas of Barder, Tiswadi, Ponda, and Salcete were found to have won their elections without opposition.

Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 contested the aforementioned PO disqualification of candidature before the AICF Ethics Commission in line with the AICF Code of Ethics. The Commission reversed PO’s decision through an order that was signed on October 19, 2021, and instructed that the voting procedure be completed within two weeks of the day that the order was received. The Appellants filed an appeal against this ruling with the AICF Appellate Authority, but it was denied on December 14 of that year, and the Ethics Commission’s judgement was upheld.

2.5. Invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950, the appellants filed W.P.(C) 15097/2021 after being dissatisfied with the Appellate Authority’s ruling.

However, on June 2, 2023, the learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal and upheld Appellate Authority’s decision.

Analysis & Decision of the court

The Delhi high court held that The General Body meeting on January 8, 2017, when it was decided to expand the number of elected members of the GCA’s Executive Committee, is where the dispute’s origins may be found. This choice was made in order to permit additional committee members who might aid in the growth of chess in Goa and broaden the association’s operations. The MoA and GCA Rules and Regulations modifications were authorised by the resolution that came out of this meeting. Twelve elected members and one nominated member from each associated Taluka Chess Association will make up the Executive Committee of the GCA, according to the updated bye-laws and MoA.

 The challenged ruling exhibits a careful consideration of the provisions of the MoA and Rules and Regulations of GCA. The prerequisites for a candidate, the election process, the tenure of the Committee members, and the mechanism for filling any vacancies on the Executive Committee are all outlined in Rule 42(i)(a) (extracted above). Additionally, it describes the election process, including the criteria for nominations, the review of nominations, and the roles of the President, Secretary, and designated Presiding Officer. Contrary to what Mr. Nayyar has emphasised, this clause does not support his allegation. The aim to expand the number of delegates is mentioned in the minutes of the meeting, but it is not stated expressly that these representatives should be equally divided across all talukas. That would imply that it is possible for a taluka to have more than one representative on the Executive Committee.

This viewpoint is reinforced by the modified Clause 13 of the Memorandum of Agreement, which stipulates that one delegate from each associated taluka should be a member of the Executive Committee, however it leaves open the possibility of electing an unlimited number of office holders from each taluka. The number of office bearers who can be chosen from a particular taluka is not limited under Rule 42(i)(a) of the GCA’s Rules and Regulations. The language employed in Rule 42(ii)(a), which requires that candidates for the Executive Committee elections be delegates with voting rights of and sponsored by Taluka Associations, supports the learned Single Judge’s view. According to this regulation, eligibility is dependent on being a delegate and instead of the number of representatives per taluka, voting rights.

Rule 42(i)(a), which is instrumental in the formation of Executive Committee comprising of both elected and nominated representatives, does not impose any limitations as canvassed by the Appellants. There is no requirement to guarantee that each taluka is represented on the Executive Committee under Rule 42(i)(a). This interpretation conforms to the erudite Single Judge’s opinion, which we also agree with.

We see no justification for interfering with the challenged finding relating to the PO’s judgement since we do not think the Appellants’ objection to the interpretation of such regulations has any validity. Therefore, the learned Single Judge’s opinion is still unchallengeable with regard to this matter as well. In conclusion, the erudite Single Judge’s interpretation based on the explicit wording employed in the GCA’s Rules and Regulations as well as the General Body resolution, appears to be accurate. Instead than restricting the number of office bearers per taluka, it appears that the stated requirements’ main goal is to increase representation and guarantee that each taluka has at least one delegate on the Executive Committee.

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