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Supreme Court Ruling on M/s Shewalkar Developers Ltd.: Legal Battle Over Land in Pachmarhi Wildlife Sanctuary

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CASE TITLE – T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India & ORS.

 M/S Shewalkar Developers Ltd. (Applicant)

CASE NUMBER – IA NO(S). 2930 OF 2010, 3963 OF 2017, 160714 OF 2019, 77320 OF 2023 AND 79064 OF 2023 IN WRIT PETITION(CIVIL) NO(S). 202 OF 1995

DATED ON – 16.05.2024

QUORUM – Justice Sandeep Mehta & Justice B.R. Gavai

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

These interlocutory applications have been preferred by the applicant M/s Shewalkar Developers Limited being aggrieved by the inaction of the Respondents in deciding the application filed by the Applicant seeking permission to construct a health/eco-resort on the subject land, Plot Nos. 14/3 and 14/4, falling in Sheet No. 20, Civil Station, Pachmarhi, District Hoshangabad, Madhya Pradesh. The total area of these two plots is around 59,265 sq. ft. and 49,675 sq. ft., respectively. The Applicant herein approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court by filing Writ Petition No. 14478 of 2006 seeking a direction to the respondents to favourably consider the prayer of the applicant. Vide order dated 22nd November, 2006, the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court permitted the applicant to approach the Central Empowered Committee(hereinafter being referred to as ‘CEC’) constituted under the directions given by this Court in Writ Petition(Civil) No. 202 of 1995. Consequently, the applicant preferred an application to the CEC seeking permission to construct the health/eco-resort on the land mentioned above asserting that the said chunk of land was not a forest land and had been acquired under valid title deeds and thus, the prayer for permission to construct may be allowed. However, the prayer made by the applicant was not accepted whereupon, the applications under consideration came to be filed before this Court. Much water has flown during pendency of the original application(I.A. No.2930 of 2010) which has remained pending for almost 14 years.

 

ISSUES

Whether plot No.14/3, 14/4 is excluded from the Panchmarhi Wildlife Sanctuary, and if so, can the Applicant proceed to construct their desired health/eco-resort on the subject land?

 

CONTENTIONS BY THE PETITIONER

The Learned Senior Counsel representing the Applicant drew the Court’s attention to an order dated 15th December, 2000 passed by the Department Officer (SDO), Pipariya on the application preferred by the applicant seeking mutation based on a registered sale deed dated 13th September, 1991 executed by the land owner Dennis Torry in favour of the applicant. The SDO accepted the said application taking note of the fact that Plot No.14 admeasuring 3,23,365 sq. ft. was entered in the name of Dennis Torry who sought and was granted permission to sell the plot in question, by the Government of Madhya Pradesh vide order dated 1st May, 1991. Thereafter, by a registered sale deed dated 13th September, 1991, Dennis Torry had sold the subject plots of land to Ashutosh Shewalkar on behalf of the applicant company. Consequently, the SDO directed that the land sold by Dennis Torry should be mutated in the name of M/s Shewalkar Developers Ltd. through Ashutosh Shewalkar, resident of Nagpur. There is no dispute that the aforesaid order passed by the jurisdictional Revenue Officer in favour of the applicant has not been questioned in any Court of law. The Learned Counsel also drew the Court’s attention to the report of the CEC dated 16th June, 2020, as per which the permission to construct has been denied to the applicant on the ground that the State of Madhya Pradesh had filed an affidavit stating that the land falls in the Pachmarhi Wildlife Sanctuary and that the same had been purchased in violation of the provisions of the Wild Life(Protection) Act, 1972. He contended that this objection raised by the State with reference to the Eco Sensitive Zone (hereinafter being referred to as ‘ESZ’) notification dated 9th August, 2017 is totally against the material available on record. He drew the Court’s attention to the site map dated 26th December, 2023(Annexure A-1 annexed with the compliance affidavit dated 12th February, 2024 filed by the respondent-State of Madhya Pradesh) to contend that as a matter of fact, the land owned by the applicant is located right on the periphery of the Nazul land, at a distance of about 10 kms. from the forest area and therefore, the same is well beyond the ESZ area. It is clear that the plots in question are located in the urban area of Pachmarhi and thus, there is no question of these plots being covered either under the wildlife sanctuary or the ESZ area. He thus urged that the applicant deserves the relief sought for.

 

CONTENTIONS BY THE RESPONDENT

The Learned Counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh urged that the plots in question are subject matter of litigation in the writ appeal pending before the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and thus, the applicant should await the outcome of the aforesaid writ appeal before seeking permission to construct the health/ecoresort on the land in question. They further brought in Mr. K. Parameshwar, learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the CEC submitted that in view of the ESZ notification dated 9th August, 2017, permission to raise a new construction on the land in question cannot be granted and whatever permissions are sought for, have to be routed through the CEC. Furthermore, The Learned Counsel appearing for the Union of India adopted the submissions advanced by the standing counsel for the State and learned Amicus Curiae.

COURT ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

After going through the facts presented before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, they noticed that It is not in dispute that the applicant herein was never impleaded in any of the proceedings before the Revenue Courts or the High Court as has been emphatically stated in Para-9 of the compliance affidavit dated 12th February, 2024. It is thus, clear that irrespective of the fact that the order passed by the District Collector dated 9th August, 2004, purportedly covers entire area of the Plot No. 14 and the transactions done in favour of and by Dennis Torry, the sale deed executed in favour of the applicant and the mutation made in its name had never been questioned in any Court of law. Neither the Revenue Department nor the State Government authorities took the trouble of impleading the applicant as party in any of the abovementioned litigations. The title acquired by the applicant over the subject plots not having been challenged, attainted finality and thus the State cannot claim a right thereupon simply because at some point of time, the plots came to be recorded as Nazul lands in the revenue records. The categoric stand in the compliance affidavit filed by the State(reproduced supra) fortifies the claim of the applicant that these plots are falling under the urban area. The Hon’ble Supreme Court were of the firm opinion that the permission sought by the Applicant for raising the construction of the health/ecoresort cannot be opposed only on account of the pendency of the writ appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. However, it can be said without a cavil of doubt that activities, if any, on the Plot Nos. 14/3 and 14/4 purchased by the applicant from Dennis Torry would have to be carried out strictly per the ESZ notification dated 9th August, 2017, issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. Furthermore, since the writ appeal pending before the Madhya Pradesh High Court arises out of the orders passed in relation to the title rights of Dennis Torry, from whom the applicant purchased the plots in question, the activities, if any, undertaken by the applicant on the said plot of land would also remain subject to the outcome of the said writ appeal.

Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed that the application filed by the Applicant for raising construction on plot Nos. 14/3 and 14/4 shall be decided objectively by the CEC/Competent Authority of the local body keeping in view the location of the land with reference to the notified boundaries of the ESZ, and that the Application shall be decided within a period of two months from today. And further stated that in the event of any adverse orders being passed, the applicant shall be at liberty to challenge the same as per law.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Gnaneswarran Beemarao

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Courts cannot entertain a petition once electoral process has begun as it obstructs the process: MP High Court

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Case Title : Moti Singh vs Election Commission Of India Through Chief Election Commissioner & Ors.

 Case no : Writ Petition No. 1039 of 2024

 Order no : 3rd May, 2024Moti Singh v. Election Commission of India Through Chief Election Commissioner & Ors.

 Quorum : Hon’ble Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Hon’ble Justice Gajendra Singh

 FACTS OF THE CASE

The Election commission of India on 16/03/2024 announced the General Elections for the House of People. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent filed their nominations before the said date in the prescribed format as required under Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. Indian National Congress declared Respondent No.4 as ‘approved candidate’ and the Appellate as a ‘substitute candidate’

On 29/04/2024 the approved candidate (respondent no.4) withdrew his nomination, following the Appellant submitted a request to declare him as the ‘approved candidate’ of INC. Subsequently the same was declined by the Returning Officer and he was deprived of his Legal right. As stating that it was necessary according to Sec 33(1) of the Representation of Peoples Act the candidate is supposed to submit the nomination with 10 proposers signatures.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Article 226 of the Indian Constitution : Clearly states that every High Court has the powers throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue writ or any order to any person or authority.
  2. Sub-Section (1) of Section 33 of The Representation of People Act , 1951 : A candidate not set up by a recognised political Party shall not be deemed to be duly nominated for election from the constituency unless the nomination paper is subscribed by 10 proposers being elector of the constituency. 
  3. Sub-Section(5) of Section 36 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 : The returning officer shall hold the scrutiny on the date appointed in this behalf under clause (b) of section 30 and shall not allow any adjournment of the proceedings except when such proceedings are interrupted or obstructed by riot or open violence or by causes beyond his control:

Provided that in case an objection is raised by the returning officer or is made by any other person the candidate concerned may be allowed time to rebut it not later than the next day but one following the date fixed for scrutiny, and the returning officer shall record his decision on the date to which the proceedings have been adjourned.

CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT

The counsel for the appellant argued that the Learned Judge had overlooked the Provisions of the Representation of the Peoples Act which mentioned that only one single signature was required. The appellant also submitted that according to Section 36(5) of the Act the candidate must be given one day’s time to collect the signatures yet the Returning Officer rejected the appellants claim.

As a result the Appellant claimed that he was entitled to contest in the parliamentary elections.

 CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT

The Respondent’s counsel requested the court to dismiss the Petition as the High Court cannot entertain a petition under article 226 of the constitution once the electoral process has begun as it would be obstructing the electoral process.

 COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT

The court after considering the facts and circumstances of the case dismissed the Appeal as to finding force in the contentions put forth by the Learned counsel of the Respondent.

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 JUDGMENT REVIEWED BY – Nagashree N M

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Employee’s Satisfaction with Wages Not Absolute, Doesn’t Preclude Them from Claiming Higher Wages [Majithia Wage Board Recommendations]: MP High Court

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Case title: Dainik Bhaskar v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Case no.: Misc. Petition No. 5093 Of 2022

Order on: 22nd April 2024

Quorum: Justice G.S. Ahluwalia

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the realm of employment disputes, the case law referenced above stands as a beacon, shedding light on the nuances of burden of proof, the significance of pleadings, and the weight of evidence in adjudicating matters of contention between employers and employees. Let’s delve deeper into the case, examining its facts, submissions, issues, court’s analysis, and eventual judgment.

The case revolves around a petition filed under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, seeking to quash an order passed by the Labour Court and subsequent recovery proceedings. The respondent, an employee, claimed disparity in wages compared to the recommendations of the Majithia Wage Board. The petitioner, the employer, contested these claims, arguing jurisdictional issues, non-compliance, and the validity of the reference order.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONERS

The petitioner, an employer, contests a claim filed by the respondent under Section 17(2) of The Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees Act, 1955. The respondent alleges wage disparity, claiming entitlement to higher wages based on the recommendations of the Majithia Wage Board. The petitioner denies the claim, citing jurisdictional issues, non-compliance, and the validity of the reference order. The Labour Court rules in favor of the respondent, directing the petitioner to pay the disputed amount. The petitioner challenges the decision, arguing various grounds including lack of pleading regarding wage satisfaction, jurisdictional issues, and failure to frame issues on the respondent’s declaration. The court evaluates the burden of proof, emphasizing the importance of pleadings and evidence. Despite the absence of pleading by the respondent, the court concludes that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction, ultimately upholding the Labour Court’s decision. The case underscores the significance of procedural compliance and burden of proof in employment disputes.

The Supreme Court in the case of Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 558 has held as under: There is another aspect of the matter which should be borne in mind. A distinction exists between burden of proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater force, where the question is, which party is to begin.

Burden of proof is used in three ways: (i) to indicate the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of the others. The elementary rule in Section 101 is inflexible. In terms of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the same.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The respondent, representing the employee, argued that the employer’s reliance on the employee’s declaration of satisfaction was untenable. They contended that the clause in question did not grant employers the authority to enforce lower wages through employee declarations. Instead, it ensured that employees retained the option of receiving higher wages as recommended by the Wage Board.

The petitioner contends that the respondent failed to specify their category or the classification of the Hoshangabad Unit in their statement of claim. They argue that the respondent’s claim of being a Dy./Assistant News Editor (DNE) would not fall under the recommendations of the Majithia Wage Board because DNEs, responsible for bringing out the city edition, hold different duties. The petitioner, conceding that this objection wasn’t raised in the Labour Court, argues that it’s a legal question admissible in this court.

However, the court rejects this argument, stating that the classification of the respondent’s role isn’t purely legal but factual. They highlight that the definition of DNE encompasses duties beyond assisting the news editor, potentially including city edition responsibilities. The court notes the absence of evidence supporting the petitioner’s claim about the respondent’s duties, emphasizing that job titles alone don’t determine roles. Without proof of supervisory responsibilities or workers under the respondent, the court dismisses the petitioner’s argument.

The case law of Avishek Raja Vs. Sanjay Gupta (2017) 8 SCC 435 addressed the contentious issue of Clause 20(j) of the Award in conjunction with the provisions of the Act regarding newspaper employees’ wages. The Supreme Court clarified that the Act guarantees newspaper employees wages as recommended by the Wage Board and approved by the Central Government, which supersedes existing wage contracts. However, Section 16 allows employees to accept benefits more favorable than those notified under the Act. The court emphasized that the Act does not provide an option to receive less than what is due under the Act, as such an option would pertain to the doctrine of waiver.

The court also referred to the legislative history and purpose of the Act, highlighting its aim to provide minimum, if not fair, wages to newspaper employees. It drew a parallel with the decision in Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, which held that wages notified under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, were non-negotiable. The court quoted Para 4 of the Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. report, which stressed the importance of securing living wages for labourers, considering it conducive to the public interest and consistent with the directive principles of State policy in the Constitution. The court underscored that imposing restraints on freedom of contract to ensure minimum wages is justified to protect labourers from exploitation, even if they are willing to work for lower wages due to poverty and helplessness.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  1. Section 17 of the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955: This section deals with the recovery of money due from an employer and the resolution of disputes related to wages. Subsections (1) and (2) were particularly relevant in determining the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate the dispute.
  1. Clause 20(j) of the Recommendations of Majithia Wage Board: This clause pertains to declarations made by respondents regarding certain matters related to wage board recommendations. While not explicitly cited as a legal provision, it forms the basis of the dispute regarding the respondent’s declaration.
  1. Form C of The Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) And Miscellaneous Provisions Rules, 1955: This form outlines the procedure for filing an application under Section 17(1) of the Act, 1955. Although not directly cited as a legal provision, it was referenced to argue about the necessity of giving prior notice to the employer.
  2. Industrial Disputes Act: While not explicitly mentioned, the Industrial Disputes Act, particularly Section 10(1)(c) and 12(5), was referenced to argue about the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in relation to disputes over wages.

ISSUE –

  • Whether the respondent after giving a declaration that he is satisfied with the wages which he is getting, is estopped from claiming higher wages as per recommendations of Majithia Wage Board?
  • Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to try the reference, or the jurisdiction was with Industrial Tribunal?

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court determined that the respondent did not hold a managerial, administrative, or supervisory position based on the lack of evidence proving such roles. They emphasized that job titles alone do not determine the nature of duties performed and that the petitioner failed to provide evidence supporting their claim.

The court invoked Section 114 of the Evidence Act, allowing for adverse inference when a party withholds evidence that could be unfavorable to them. They cited previous Supreme Court rulings to support this inference and concluded that the petitioner’s failure to produce relevant documents warranted adverse inference.

The court addressed the jurisdictional question, ruling that the Labour Court had the authority to adjudicate the dispute under Section 17(2) of the Act, 1955. They clarified that the simultaneous exercise of power under other sections of the Industrial Disputes Act did not affect the Labour Court’s jurisdiction. The court dismissed the petitioner’s argument regarding the requirement of prior notice, stating that Section 17(2) of the Act, 1955 does not mandate such notice. They concluded that the petitioner’s contention lacked legal basis.

Regarding the alleged calculation error based on the wrong employee’s data, the court found that while there was a discrepancy in the annexed calculation chart, the Labour Court had considered the correct employee’s claim. Thus, they deemed the matter not requiring remittance.

The court rejected the petitioner’s claim of prejudice due to separate registration of cases, noting that neither party objected to this procedure, and separate consideration of each case was warranted.

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Judgement Reviewed by – Chiraag K A

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Police Constable cannot withdraw his resignation and cannot be reinstated to his position: Madhya Pradesh High Court

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Case Title: Madhav Prasad Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Case No: WP No. 938 of 2013

Decided on: 4th January, 2024

CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK AGARWAL

 Facts of the Case

The petitioner claimed to have resigned in 1994 citing ‘torture’ during his service. Despite submitting an application for reinstatement in 2010, it was rejected by the Director General of Police, Police Headquarters. The petitioner sought court intervention to instruct the authorities to reinstate him with all associated benefits and interest at a rate of 14% per annum.

In response, the respondents argued that as the petitioner had voluntarily resigned to the Superintendent of Police, there was no provision for reinstatement after the acceptance of the resignation. Advocate Arnav Tiwari, representing the respondents, added that the petition was filed 19 years after the petitioner’s resignation was accepted in June 1994.

Issues

Whether the government allow an employee to retract an application for voluntary resignation from the service once it is accepted? Will an employee be reinstated to his position after submitting a voluntary resignation?

Court’s Analysis and Decision

The Court observed that despite counselling and initial resistance from the respondents to accept the petitioner’s resignation letter, he persisted in his decision for voluntary retirement, which was eventually accepted. Regarding the possibility of allowing an employee to withdraw such an application for voluntary resignation, the Court considered the precedent set in P. Lal v. Union of India (2003). In that case, the Supreme Court established that once the Government accepts the notice for voluntary retirement, the retirement becomes effective, and the employer-employee relationship is terminated.

“The law in regard to resignation is that concept is bilateral and requires acceptance and it follows that offer of resignation can be withdrawn before acceptance as is held by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Gopal Chandra Misra AIR 1978 SC 694, Ravindra Singh vs. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SLJ 65 (SC) and thus, it is evident that once resignation was made and it was accepted, then its withdrawal after acceptance is not permissible as held in case of G. Kailashapathi Rao vs. Committee of Bandlamudi Hanumayanama Hindu Degree Junior College for Women 1994 (2) SLR 554 (AP),” Justice Tiwari observed.

The Court thus ascertained that the respondents’ refusal to accept the the petitioner’s request to permit him to be reinstated could therefore not be faulted with. The plea was thus dismissed.

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Written by- Afshan Ahmad

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Madhya Pradesh High Court clarifies that instituting a suit against deceased persons is tantamount to a formal defect

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Title: Rajveer Singh Vs Secretary State of M.P. and 2 Ors Writ Petition No. 11364

Date of Decision: 09.10.2023

CORAM: Justice Pranay Verma

Introduction

This case pertains to a Revision filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) by the plaintiffs, challenging an order passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Dewas, in RCS No.49-A/2019. The order in question, dated 06.07.2023, rejected the plaintiffs’ application under Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC, seeking withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit.

Facts of the Case

On 20.03.2019, the plaintiffs initiated a legal action seeking a declaration of their title to a specific parcel of land and a permanent injunction. During the course of the proceedings, Smt. Abhaya Bai, the legal representative of a deceased defendant (defendant No. 2), moved an application for the dismissal of the suit on the grounds that it had been instituted against deceased individuals. Her application was dismissed by the trial Court on 15.12.2022, stating that Smt. Abhaya Bai was not a party to the suit.

Subsequently, on 08.05.2023, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the CPC, seeking to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit, arguing that the suit was null and void since it had been filed against deceased individuals. The trial Court rejected this application, asserting that the suit’s initiation against deceased persons did not constitute a formal defect and therefore did not warrant withdrawal.

Court’s Analysis and Decision

The central issue before the Court was whether instituting a suit against individuals who had already passed away before the suit’s initiation amounted to a formal defect that would permit withdrawal under Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the CPC. The Court referred to several legal precedents, including decisions of various High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The Court found that a suit filed against deceased individuals, under the belief that they were alive at the time of filing, was a nullity from its inception. Substitution of legal representatives in such cases was not permissible under Order 22 Rule 4 of the CPC. As the suit was essentially void, it could be withdrawn under Order 23 Rule 1(3) with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action.

In light of these findings, the Court set aside the trial Court’s order, allowed the plaintiffs’ application under Order 23 Rule 1(3) of the CPC, and granted them permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit as may be permissible under the law. The Revision was allowed, and no costs were imposed.

This judgment by the Madhya Pradesh High Court clarifies that instituting a suit against deceased persons is tantamount to a formal defect, allowing for the withdrawal of the suit and the initiation of a fresh suit on the same cause of action.

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Written by- Tarishi Verma

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