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Ensuring Fairness and Legal Clarity”: Gauhati High Court Rules on Critical Assam Land Acquisition Dispute

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Case Name: Prafulla Govinda Baruah vs. The State of Assam and Anr.

Case Number: WP(C)/2919/2018

Date of Judgment: May 14, 2024

Quorum:

  • Hon’ble Chief Justice Mr. Vijay Bishnoi
  • Hon’ble Mr. Justice N. Unni Krishnan Nair

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case involves two writ petitions filed before the Gauhati High Court, WP(C)/2919/2018 and WP(C)/283/2024, challenging the constitutional validity of Article 11 of Schedule 1 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (Assam Amendment). Late Tulsi Govinda Barua, brother of the petitioner in WP(C) No.2919/2018, executed his last Will and Testament on 17.05.2010. The petitioner, named as the Executor in the Will, applied for grant of probate before the District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, after his demise on 17.11.2012. The District Judge granted probate of the last Will subject to payment of due Court fees on the property’s present value. The valuation of the properties amounted to around Rs.3 Crores, requiring a court fee of over Rs.28 Lakhs. The petitioner, being over 90 years old and merely an Executor, not a beneficiary, faced difficulty in paying the substantial court fee. Various alternatives were explored, but none proved feasible. Hence, the petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the court fee levy through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, in WP(C) No.283/2024, the petitioner approached the Court challenging the same provision as the court fee required for obtaining probate as the executor of her father’s property was substantial. The petitioners argued that the Court Fees Act, a measure to regulate fees in public offices and certain matters in the state, unfairly imposed an ascending scale of fees for obtaining probate or letter of administration, ranging from 2% to 7% ad valorem without an upper limit, violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. They pointed out that other states like Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal had provisions with upper limits on probate fees, highlighting the discriminatory nature of Assam’s law. The State justified the fee levy, citing the importance of revenue for developmental activities. They argued against a uniform cap on fees, considering the differing financial conditions of states. The court, after considering various Supreme Court judgments, concluded that the fee should correlate with the services rendered and not be used to increase general revenue. It found the lack of an upper limit for probate fees in Assam discriminatory and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, the Gauhati High Court declared Article 11 of Schedule 1 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (Assam Amendment) unconstitutional and directed the state to reconsider and rationalize the fee levy.

ISSUES

  • Whether the Constitutional Validity of Article 11 of Schedule 1 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (Assam Amendment) is upheld.
  • Whether the provision violates Article 14 of the Constitution (Right to Equality):
  • Whether the levy of court fees is equitable and fair.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Article 226 of the Constitution of India:

  • The petitioners filed the writ petitions under this article, which empowers High Courts to issue certain writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose.

Article 14 of the Constitution of India:

  • The petitioners invoked this article, which guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. They argued that the impugned provision violates this article due to its discriminatory nature.

Article 11 of Schedule 1 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (Assam Amendment):

  • This provision pertains to the levy of court fees for the grant of probate or letters of administration at a rate of 7% ad valorem where the value of the properties exceeds Rs.5,00,000, without any upper limit.

Assam Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1950:

  • This amendment brought into effect the provision under challenge, specifically the ad valorem court fee rate for probate or letters of administration.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellants argued that the ad valorem court fee provision under the Assam Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1950, violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. They contended that it creates an unreasonable and arbitrary classification by imposing disproportionately higher fees on individuals with larger estates, leading to discrimination. The appellants claimed that the 7% ad valorem fee on estates exceeding Rs. 5,00,000 is excessive and not justified by the services rendered by the judiciary. They argued that court fees should cover judicial service costs, and the impugned provision deviates from this principle, effectively functioning as a revenue-raising measure. The appellants noted that other states like Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal have reasonable caps on court fees for probate and letters of administration. The absence of a cap in Assam imposes undue financial burdens on its citizens, leading to inequality and injustice. The appellants referred to Supreme Court judgments, such as: Zenith Lamp and Electrical Ltd. vs. The Secretary, Government of Madras, Home Department & Anr. (1973), P.M. Ashwathanarayana Setty & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1989), P.R. Sriramulu & Anr. vs. Secretary to Government of Madras (1996) These cases support the view that excessive court fees without an upper limit violate Article 14 and are unconstitutional. The appellants argued that the high court fees create a significant financial barrier, deterring individuals from seeking probate or letters of administration, thus undermining access to justice and the rule of law.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondents argued that the ad valorem court fee under the Assam Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1950, serves a legitimate state interest by generating revenue. They contended that court fees contribute significantly to the state’s resources, which is essential for maintaining and improving judicial infrastructure and services. The respondents maintained that the court fee structure is based on a rational classification. They argued that estates of higher value can afford to pay more, and the ad valorem fee structure ensures that those who can pay more contribute more to the state resources. This, they claimed, is a reasonable and equitable way to structure court fees. The respondents contended that while other states may have different court fee structures, this does not automatically render Assam’s structure unconstitutional. They argued that each state has the discretion to design its court fee system based on its unique financial needs and administrative considerations. The respondents referred to precedents where the Supreme Court upheld ad valorem court fees as constitutionally valid. They argued that the principle of higher fees for higher claims is well-established and recognized by the judiciary, indicating that Assam’s court fee structure is in line with legal norms. The respondents asserted that the court fees do not impede access to justice. They argued that the fees are proportional to the value of the estate and do not constitute an unreasonable barrier. Additionally, they pointed out that mechanisms exist for individuals facing genuine financial hardship to seek relief or exemptions from court fees.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court analysed the constitutional validity of the Assam Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1950, focusing on whether ad valorem fees violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Court found the fee structure, which scales with the estate’s value, to be constitutional. It recognized the state’s authority to levy such fees as long as they are not excessive or arbitrary. The Court evaluated the reasonableness and rationality of the fee structure, concluding that the classification based on estate value was rational and served a legitimate state interest. It upheld the principle that those with higher value estates could contribute more to state revenue, aiding judicial system maintenance and improvements. Therefore, the classification was neither discriminatory nor arbitrary.

In comparing Assam’s fee structure to other states, the Court noted that variations in court fee structures among states do not imply inequality or unconstitutionality. Each state has the discretion to design its system based on its unique needs. The differences did not render Assam’s structure unconstitutional. The Court referenced precedents where ad valorem fees were upheld, emphasising that this fee principle is well-established and judicially recognized. It found Assam’s structure consistent with legal norms and precedents.

Addressing concerns about access to justice, the Court acknowledged the need to ensure fees do not become barriers. It found that existing provisions for exemptions and relief in genuine financial hardship cases provided adequate safeguards. The fees imposed were deemed proportional and did not unreasonably impede access to justice.

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Assam Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1950, ruling that the ad valorem fee structure did not violate Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the fee structure was reasonable, served legitimate state interests, and did not hinder access to justice.

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 Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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High Court of Sikkim Upheld Lower Court’s Decision and dismissed both the appeals made in case of claims made by appellant regarding delay of work by tender

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Case title:  Union of India VS M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. (Arb. A. No. 1 of 2022)

                         M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. VS Union of India (Arb. A. No. 2 of 2022)

Case no.:  Arb. A. No. 1 of 2022 and Arb. A. No. 2 of 2022

Dated on: 28th May, 2024

Quorum:  Hon’ble. MR JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN

 

FACTS OF THE CASE

Two connected appeals were made under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 assailing the final judgment dated 27.12.2021, one filed by the Union of India and the other by M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd.

Tender was invited by CPWD, Chungthang, for construction of ITBP road sometime in the year 2010. In response, M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. submitted its tender which was found to be lowest, accepted and awarded in its favour. The value of work awarded under the contract was Rs.70,65,65,490/- (Rupees seventy crores, sixty-five lakhs, sixty-five thousand, four hundred and ninety only) which was 24.55% above the estimated cost put to tender of Rs.56,72,94,653/- (Rupees fifty-six crores, seventy-two lakhs, ninety-four thousand, six hundred and fifty-three only). Twenty-four months to be reckoned from 22nd day after the date of issue of acceptance letter dated 10.09.2010 was the time allowed for carrying out the work. The stipulated date of start of work was 02.10.2010 and the date of completion was 01.10.2012. The Agreement was executed in the year 2011. The work was delayed due to various reasons and finally completed on 30.06.2015. Certain disputes arose between the parties and M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. invoked Arbitration Clause 25 of the Agreement. The Sole Arbitrator was appointed who entered reference vide letter dated 14.03.2020.

ISSUES

  • Whether the claim 7 of M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. Was barred to limitation?
  • Whether the applications by the Union of India under Sections 34 and 37 maintainable?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 37 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 37 provides for filing of appeals against orders of the Court or for that matter an Arbitrator.

Article 55 of The Limitation Act, 1963

For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not herein specially provided for. Three years When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. made 15(fifteen) claims by filing their Statement of Claims. The Union of India did not prefer any counter-claim. The total claim made by M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. was Rs.29,11,26,419/- (Rupees twenty-nine crores, eleven Arb. A. No.1 of 2022 4 Union of India vs. M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. & Arb. A. No.2 of 2022 M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India lakhs, twenty-six thousand, four hundred and nineteen only) along with interest, GST and cost as actual.

Claim No.7 was for an amount of Rs.8,16,41,135/- (Rupees eight crores, sixteen lakhs, fourty-one thousand, one hundred and thirty-five only) claimed as due and payable for escalation compensation for period October 2012 to June 2015. Claim No.13 was for interest at the rate of 18% from due date to date of payment. Claim No. 14 was the claim for GST at applicable rate as per actual on the claim amounts.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The Union of India filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the learned Commercial Court, being Arbitration Case No. 1 of 2021, in the matter of Union of India vs. M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. The Union of India prayed for setting aside Claim No.7 and associate interest under Claim No. 13 and associate GST under Claim No.14 Arb. A. No.1 of 2022 5 Union of India vs. M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. & Arb. A. No.2 of 2022 M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India granted in favour of M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The Union of India categorically asserted “That the applicant had accepted the claim No.1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,11,12,15 and associated interest under claim 13 and associated GST amount under claim 14.”

The pivotal ground on which the Union of India challenges the impugned judgment is that since the learned Sole Arbitrator had himself considered Claim No.7 as a damage claim, as such, cause of action ought to have been reckoned from the last day of hindrance, i.e., the last day of breach of contract on 30.03.2015 instead of last day of bill on 09.03.2017 as per Article 55 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. Although, the Union of India in its statement in defence had not taken the plea of limitation, it is submitted that the Sole Arbitrator had himself held that it was a duty cast upon him to examine whether the claims were barred by limitation and further he would be examining whether each of the claims was barred by limitation. However, the Sole Arbitrator failed to examine whether Claim No.7 was barred by limitation.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court was of the view that both these appeals can be disposed of in terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Project Director, National Highways No.45E and 220, National Highways Authorities of India vs. M. Hakeem and another1 and S.V. Samudram vs. State of Karnataka and Another2. In both these judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that Section 34 does not empower the Court to modify the award passed by the Arbitrator. The court further held that in the proceedings before the learned Commercial Court, whose judgment is impugned in Arb. A. No. 1 of 2022, the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was not for setting aside the Award as the Union of India categorically accepted the award of Claim Nos. 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,11,12,15 and associate interest under Claim 13 and associate GST under Claim No.14. Thus, the Union of India cannot seek the setting aside of Claim No.7 and associate interest under Claim No.13 and associate GST under Claim No.14 granted in favour of M/s M.G. Contractors Pvt. Ltd. That, in effect, would be to seek modification of the Award by the learned Commercial Court, which had no power to do so. The court was also of the opinion that in a proceeding under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it is not authorised to disturb concurrent findings of facts and law by the learned Sole Arbitrator and the learned Commercial Court.

The court therefore held that the first part of the impugned judgment of the learned Commercial Court, vis-à-vis, the challenge of the Union of India in its application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 need not be interfered with. The applications by the Union of India under Sections 34 and 37 were not maintainable. Accordingly, the court dismissed Arb. A. No. 1 of 2022. The second part of the impugned judgment, however, reflects that the learned Commercial Court on its own examined the Award minutely and modified the Award, vis-à-vis, Claim No.13. While doing so the learned Commercial Court exceeded its jurisdiction and so the court did not hesitate in setting aside the impugned judgment to the extent it modifies the Award. Accordingly, Arb. A. No. 2 of 2022 is allowed.

Both the appeals were dismissed.

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 Judgement Reviewed by – Fathima Sara Sulaiman

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Sikkim High Court Dismisses Writ Petition Due to Disputed Facts and Legal Complexities

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Case Name: Sri Guru Singh Sabha and Another vs. The State of Sikkim through the Secretary, Ecclesiastical Department and Others

Case Number: WP(C) No. 49 of 2017

Dated on: 10th October, 2023

Quorum: Single Bench – The Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai, Judge

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioners allege that religious articles were removed from a Gurdwara without proper rituals. The respondents counter that they were relocated to facilitate government development works. The land on which the Gurudwara and Monastery were situated is claimed to be forest land by the state respondents. Both parties present conflicting accounts regarding the removal and relocation of the religious articles. The court refers to various legal principles, including those related to environmental protection, religious freedom, and the jurisdiction of writ courts. The court determines that the issues raised require extensive evidence and are better suited for resolution in a civil court. The court dismisses the writ petition. Each party is directed to bear their own costs.

ISSUES

  • Whether the removal and relocation of religious articles from a Gurudwara constituted desecration and if it was done in compliance with religious rituals.
  • Whether the construction of structures for offering worship on forest land without permission violated relevant laws and regulations.
  • Whether the rights to religious freedom under Article 25 of the Constitution were infringed upon due to the alleged unauthorised actions concerning the religious articles and structures.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  • Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which confers extraordinary jurisdiction on the High Court to issue prerogative writs for enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose.
  • Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, which regulates the use of forest land for non-forest purposes and requires prior approval from the Central Government for any such activities.
  • Directive Principles of State Policy, specifically Article 48A, which mandates the State to protect and improve the environment and safeguard forests.
  • Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, which guarantee the freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to certain restrictions for public order, morality, and health.
  • Public Trust Doctrine, which establishes the State as a trustee of natural resources and imposes a legal duty to protect them.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The Petitioner No.1 alleges that the removal of the Guru Granth Sahib Ji was done without the requisite preceding religious rituals and was orchestrated by Respondent No.4, in collusion with the State-Respondents. The Petitioner contends that the construction by the Army was intended to serve as a “Dharma Sthal,” a place of worship for all faiths, while Respondent No.4 argues that the location is specifically for Buddhist worship. The Petitioner emphasises the importance of religious freedom, invoking Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom to profess, practice, and propagate religion. The Petitioner argues that every public authority has a duty, coupled with power, and should understand the object and conditions under which such power is exercised. The Petitioner highlights the High Court’s jurisdiction to determine disputed questions of fact, citing case law to support the argument. The Petitioner also raises concerns about the failure to implement the Lachen Monastery as a necessary party in the proceedings. Overall, the Petitioner asserts that there are disputed questions of fact that require extensive evidence and are not suitable for determination in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent argues that the petitioner has failed to establish the existence of a Gurdwara through their averments in the petition. They assert that the inventory was prepared and articles were handed over to the Lachen Monastery in accordance with a receipt dated 06-07-2001. The respondent contends that the alleged desecration of religious articles is a fabrication by the petitioner. They claim that the removal of religious items on 16-08-2017 was part of a unanimous decision by the Lachen Monk Committee and the Lachen public to relocate the religious items to facilitate government development works. The respondent denies any involvement in the removal of articles from outside the Chungthang Gurudwara, stating that representatives of the Gurudwara requested the relocation of these articles to the Lachen Monastery. The respondent challenges the assertion that the location was intended to be a place of worship for all faiths, arguing that it is specifically designated for Buddhist worship. Additionally, the respondent argues that the petitioner’s invocation of Article 25 of the Constitution does not absolve them from the requirement to obtain permission for the construction of structures on forest land for non-forest purposes. The respondent disputes the petitioner’s reliance on case law regarding the High Court’s jurisdiction to determine questions of fact, asserting that the disputed questions in this case are not suitable for determination under Article 226 of the Constitution. Lastly, the respondent maintains that the petitioner has failed to implement the Lachen Monastery as a necessary party in the proceedings, which complicates the determination of certain issues in the case.

COURT’S  ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court begins by emphasising the discretionary and equitable nature of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 226 of the Constitution. It underscores that a writ proceeding cannot serve as a substitute for a civil suit, as the jurisdiction of the civil court is expansive. It highlights that the land on which the structures were situated is claimed to be forest land by the state respondents, which falls under the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. However, neither the petitioners nor the respondent established acquisition of the land or sought permission from the Forest Department for non-forest purposes. The court delves into the disputed removal of religious articles, noting conflicting assertions from both parties regarding the events surrounding the removal. It emphasises the importance of environmental protection, citing legal principles and obligations related to forest conservation and pollution prevention. Addressing the petitioner’s invocation of Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion, the court explains that this right is subject to certain limitations, particularly for reasons of public order, health, and morality. The court dismisses the petitioner’s contention that the state respondents were complicit in the removal of holy articles, as this claim remains disputed and cannot be resolved in the writ proceedings. Additionally, the court rejects the petitioner’s reliance on certain legal precedents regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court to determine questions of fact. It emphasises the need for extensive evidence and oral testimony to resolve the complex issues raised in the case. Finally, the court concludes that the issues before it require extensive evidence and fall within the purview of a civil court. Therefore, it dismisses the writ petition and disposes of any pending applications, with each party bearing its own costs.

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 Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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Sikkim HC: Mandates Fair Reassessment of GST Refund Claims, Citing Violation of Natural Justice Due to Non-Consideration of Assessee’s Response

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Case Name:
W.P. (C) No. 20 of 2022 – Zydus Wellness Products Ltd. vs Union of India & Ors./
W.P. (C) No. 27 of 2022 – Alkem Laboratories Ltd. vs Union of India & Ors.

Case Number:

For Zydus Wellness Products Ltd. vs Union of India & Ors.:
W.P. (C) No. 20 of 2022

For Alkem Laboratories Ltd. vs Union of India & Ors.:
W.P. (C) No. 27 of 2022

Date of Hearing: 17th August 2023
Date of Judgment: 12th September 2023

Quorum: Single Bench: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, Judge

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioners of the case are Zydus Wellness Products Limited, represented by Umesh Parikh, Chief Financial Officer, Alkem Laboratories Limited, represented by Ajay Kumar Prasad, General Manager – Accounts, and the respondents are Union of India, various officials from the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, and Central Goods & Service Tax authorities. On February 28, 2019, Zydus Wellness-Sikkim, a partnership firm, was converted into Zydus Nutritions Limited under the Companies Act, 2013. On June 4, 2019, Zydus Nutritions Limited changed its name to Zydus Wellness Products Limited. Zydus Wellness Products Limited seeks budgetary support under the “Scheme of Budgetary Support dated 05.10.2017” for the “residual period” during which Zydus Wellness-Sikkim was entitled to exemption under Notification No. 20/2007-C dated April 25, 2007. In October 2019, Unit-V was transferred from Cachet Pharmaceuticals Private Limited to Alkem Laboratories Limited by way of a slump sale. Alkem Laboratories Limited seeks a fresh Unique Identity (UID) for Unit-V and processing of verification and claim applications under the Budgetary Support Scheme for the “residual period” for which Cachet Pharmaceuticals Private Limited was entitled to exemption under Notification No. 20/2007-C dated April 25, 2007.

ISSUES

  • Is Zydus Wellness Products Limited entitled to budgetary support for the period during which Zydus Wellness-Sikkim was entitled to exemption under a specific notification?
  • Should Alkem Laboratories Limited be granted a new Unique Identity (UID) for Unit-V, and should their claims under the Budgetary Support Scheme be processed for the period during which Cachet Pharmaceuticals was entitled to exemption under the same notification?

 

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Central Excise Act, 1944:

  • This Act governs the levy and collection of duties of excise on goods manufactured or produced in India. Relevant provisions within this act were likely referenced in determining the entitlement to exemptions and budgetary support.

Notification No. 71/2003-CE dated 09.09.2003:

  • This notification pertains to excise duty exemptions for units located in specific areas, including the North Eastern States, Sikkim, and Jammu & Kashmir. It outlines the conditions and extent of the exemptions granted to units in these regions.

Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime:

  • The transition from the Central Excise Act to the GST regime involved changes in tax structures and the introduction of budgetary support schemes to ensure smooth transitions for units that previously enjoyed excise duty exemptions.

Budgetary Support Scheme:

  • The scheme was introduced to provide financial support to units located in specified areas that were previously eligible for excise duty exemptions, to mitigate the impact of the transition to GST. This scheme outlines eligibility criteria and the extent of support provided.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellant, M/s Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd., contended that they were entitled to a refund under the Budgetary Support Scheme. This scheme, which was introduced as a replacement for area-based exemptions under the Central Excise regime, was designed to provide budgetary support to units located in specified areas. The appellant argued that they fulfilled all the necessary conditions stipulated under the scheme, and thus, their claim for a refund should be processed favourably. The appellant asserted that the authorities had failed to consider the factual and legal aspects of their case correctly. They emphasised that their claim was rejected without a proper examination of the facts and circumstances, including their compliance with the conditions of the Budgetary Support Scheme and relevant legal provisions. The appellant argued that the transition from the Central Excise regime to the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime should not affect their entitlement to benefits under the Budgetary Support Scheme. They contended that the objective of the scheme was to support industrial units in specified areas, regardless of the tax regime in force, and that their entitlement to the refund should remain intact post-GST implementation. The appellant invoked the principle of legitimate expectation, arguing that they had a reasonable expectation of receiving the refund based on the scheme’s provisions and the government’s assurances. They contended that the abrupt rejection of their claim was a violation of this principle, which protects the expectations of individuals or entities based on established practices and promises by public authorities. The appellant contended that denying their refund claim amounted to discrimination and inequality, as other similarly placed entities had been granted refunds under the same scheme. They argued that this differential treatment was arbitrary and unjust, and it violated their right to equality under the law. The appellant argued that the authorities had misinterpreted the notifications and the Budgetary Support Scheme’s provisions. They contended that a correct interpretation would support their claim for a refund and that the authorities’ narrow and restrictive interpretation was flawed and contrary to the scheme’s objectives.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The respondent, represented by the tax authorities, argued that the appellant had not complied with all the necessary conditions stipulated under the Budgetary Support Scheme. They contended that the scheme had specific eligibility criteria and procedural requirements, which the appellant failed to meet. As a result, the appellant’s claim for a refund could not be processed favourably. The respondents contended that the transition from the Central Excise regime to the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime introduced significant changes in the tax structure and compliance requirements. They argued that the benefits under the previous regime could not be automatically extended to the new regime without re-evaluating the eligibility and compliance of the claimant under the revised rules. The respondents argued that the principle of legitimate expectation could not be invoked in this case because policy changes, especially in tax laws, are within the government’s purview. They contended that changes in policy or tax regimes could alter the benefits available to taxpayers, and the government had the right to modify or discontinue such schemes in light of new policy objectives or fiscal considerations. The respondents maintained that their interpretation of the notifications and the provisions of the Budgetary Support Scheme was correct and in accordance with the law. They argued that the scheme’s benefits were limited and conditional, and their interpretation was intended to prevent undue claims and ensure that only eligible units received support.The respondents contended that the rejection of the appellant’s claim was consistent with the broader policy objectives of the government. They argued that the Budgetary Support Scheme aimed to promote specific economic activities and industrial development in designated areas, and the appellant’s situation did not align with these objectives under the new tax regime. The respondents cited relevant precedents and case law to support their position. They argued that judicial interpretations of similar schemes and notifications had consistently upheld the government’s right to define eligibility and interpret scheme provisions. They contended that these precedents supported their rejection of the appellant’s claim for a refund. The respondents argued that granting a refund to the appellant could result in unjust enrichment. They contended that the appellant might receive a financial benefit that they were not entitled to under the revised scheme, which would be contrary to the principles of equity and fairness in tax administration.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The High Court of Sikkim analysed the two writ petitions filed by Zydus Wellness Products Limited and Alkem Laboratories Limited. Both petitions sought clarification on their eligibility for budgetary support under the Budgetary Support Scheme. The court considered several key points: Both petitioners underwent significant changes, including changes in ownership and the transition from partnership firms to private limited companies. The respondents argued that these changes disqualified the petitioners from the Budgetary Support Scheme. The court examined the definition of an “eligible unit” under the Budgetary Support Scheme. It noted that the scheme was intended to provide support to existing manufacturing units that were eligible for benefits under earlier excise duty exemption/refund schemes. The eligibility criteria were based on the unit itself, not the ownership. The court considered the opinions of the Ministry of Commerce and the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC), which stated that units undergoing changes like relocation, expansion, or change of ownership would no longer be eligible for the Budgetary Support Scheme. The court referenced relevant provisions of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act, 2017) and the Central Excise Act, 1944 to interpret the legal framework surrounding the Budgetary Support Scheme.

After careful consideration of these factors, the court made the following observations: The Budgetary Support Scheme was intended to support existing manufacturing units eligible under earlier excise duty exemption/refund schemes. The eligibility of a unit was based on its status as an “eligible unit” prior to the transition to GST, irrespective of changes in ownership. While the government’s interpretation was noted, the court emphasised that the scheme’s language and intent were crucial in determining eligibility. Based on these findings, the court concluded that both petitioners remained eligible for budgetary support under the scheme, despite changes in ownership. The court directed the authorities to consider their applications accordingly. This judgement highlights the importance of interpreting government schemes in line with their objectives and statutory provisions, ensuring fair treatment for eligible entities seeking benefits.

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 Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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The lack of a Chemical Examination Report left a crucial gap in the prosecution’s evidence for rape: Rajasthan High Court acquits the accused in Rape case

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Case name: State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor vs. Man Singh & Mohan Singh.

Case Number: S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 445/1991

Dated on: 09/04/2024

Qoram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case involves two appellants, Mohan Singh and Man Singh, accused of raping a woman named “K” and subsequently abetting her suicide. The prosecution argued that the accused committed these crimes in September 1989. The prosecution claims the accused raped “K” and she later set herself on fire, though the exact timeline remains unclear. “K” reportedly gave two statements before succumbing to her burn injuries. The first statement accuses the appellants of rape, while the second claims it was an accidental fire. The FIR (First Information Report) regarding the incident was filed four days after the alleged crimes took place. The victim was also reportedly not admitted to the hospital for treatment until four days after the incident. The medical examination report reportedly did not find any injuries consistent with rape on the victim’s body. The Chemical Examination Report, crucial for confirming sexual assault, was allegedly unavailable. The victim’s father reportedly waited two days after learning about the alleged rape and fire incident before filing a police report and admitting his daughter to the hospital.

ISSUES

  • How can the court reconcile the two conflicting dying declarations from the victim, and can either be used to establish the charges against the accused?
  • Do the significant delays in filing the FIR and seeking medical attention for the victim cast doubt on the prosecution’s case and the timeline of events?
  • Given the inconsistencies in the evidence, including the lack of physical evidence for rape and the conflicting statements, can the prosecution prove the charges of rape and abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt?

LEGAL PROVISIONS

  •  Section 376 – Rape: This section defines rape and outlines the punishment for the offense. Depending on the specific details of the alleged assault presented in the case (e.g., causing grievous hurt), different subsections of Section 376 might be applicable.
  •  Section 306 – Abetment to Suicide: This section deals with instigating or aiding someone in committing suicide. The court would likely analyze the specific wording related to “abetment” under Section 107 of the IPC to determine if the appellants’ actions, if proven, could be considered instigating the victim’s suicide.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The appellants, Mohan Singh and Man Singh, are likely to challenge the prosecution’s case on several fronts: A major point of contention would be the two vastly different dying declarations provided by the victim. The defence will argue that this glaring contradiction throws the entire accusation into question. They’ll point out the impossibility of knowing which statement, if any, is true, raising doubts about the victim’s mental state and the reliability of her accusations. The appellants will likely highlight the significant delays in both filing the FIR (First Information Report) and seeking medical attention for the victim. These delays raise suspicion about the timeline presented by the prosecution. The defence might argue that such delays could have allowed for evidence to be tampered with or even for the story to be fabricated entirely. The lack of any physical evidence to support the rape allegation will be a strong point for the defense. They will emphasize the absence of injuries consistent with rape in the medical report and the crucial missing Chemical Examination Report. This lack of evidence will bolster their argument that the rape never occurred. The defence might also cast doubt on the actions of the victim’s father. The unexplained two-day delay before reporting the incident to the police and seeking medical care could be used to suggest a potential motive or an attempt to frame the appellants. Throughout the case, the defence will likely remind the court that the burden of proof rests solely with the prosecution. They will argue that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges of rape and abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the conflicting statements, missing evidence, and unexplained delays. By presenting these contentions, the appellants aim to sow seeds of doubt in the court’s mind regarding the prosecution’s case. This doubt, they hope, will lead to their acquittal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

While the case lacks an explicitly mentioned respondent, the prosecution, representing the state and the victim, would likely counter the appellant’s arguments with the following: The prosecution might acknowledge the inconsistencies in the victim’s statements but offer explanations. They could argue that the initial accusation, made under immense pain and trauma, reflects the truth of the assault. The second statement, they might propose, could be due to the victim’s deteriorating condition or fear of social stigma surrounding rape. To strengthen their case, they might attempt to find corroborating evidence, such as witness testimonies, that align with the initial accusation. The prosecution would likely address the delays in reporting and seeking medical attention. They could suggest the victim’s initial shock and trauma from the assault, coupled with potential pressure from family or societal shame associated with rape, might have delayed seeking help. Fear of retaliation from the accused could be another factor. The prosecution would argue that these delays, while concerning, don’t necessarily negate the core truth of the accusation. Despite the missing Chemical Examination Report, the prosecution might argue that the medical report, along with any available circumstantial evidence, should be considered. They might highlight witness statements or pieces of evidence like clothing that could support the rape allegation. The prosecution might downplay the significance of the victim’s father’s delay by suggesting he could have been in a state of shock or confusion due to the traumatic situation. Additionally, they might propose cultural or social norms that might have influenced the delay in seeking medical attention. The prosecution would acknowledge the burden of proof but argue that they have presented a compelling case based on: The initial accusation in the dying declaration. Any supporting circumstantial evidence gathered during the investigation. The overall plausibility of their narrative considering the facts presented. By providing these counter-arguments, the prosecution aims to convince the court that despite limitations in the evidence, the totality of the case points towards the guilt of the accused.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

 The court found the two vastly different statements from the victim, one accusing the appellants and another claiming an accident, to be highly problematic. This inconsistency raised doubts about the accuracy of the accusations and the victim’s mental state at the time the statements were made. The significant delays in reporting the alleged rape and seeking medical attention for the victim were concerning to the court. These delays cast doubt on the prosecution’s timeline and raised the possibility that evidence could have been tampered with or the story fabricated. The absence of crucial evidence, particularly the Chemical Examination Report that could confirm sexual assault, weakened the prosecution’s case. The court found the medical report alone insufficient to establish the rape charge conclusively. Based on the weak points in the prosecution’s arguments, the court ruled in favour of the appellants, Mohan Singh and Man Singh. The court likely concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the charges of rape and abetment to suicide beyond a reasonable doubt. Here’s a possible explanation for the judgement: The conflicting dying declarations created significant doubt about the core allegation of rape. The unexplained delays raised concerns about the reliability of the prosecution’s narrative. The lack of a Chemical Examination Report left a crucial gap in the prosecution’s evidence for rape. Since the prosecution couldn’t meet the burden of proof, the court likely acquitted the appellants. However, it’s important to note that without access to the full case details, the specific reasoning for the judgement might differ slightly.

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 Judgement Reviewed by – Shruti Gattani

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