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SUPREME COURT QUASHED THE JUDGEMENT OF HIGH COURT AND AWARDED THE EXTENSION OF TIME IN FILING THE WRITTEN STATEMENT.

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CASE NAME: ADITYA KHAITAN & ORS. VERSUS IL AND FS FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED

CASE NUMBER: CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6411-6418 OF 2023

DATED ON: OCTOBER 03, 2023

QUORUM: HON’BLE JUSTICE J.K. MAHESHWARI & JUSTICE K.V. VISWANATHAN

INTRODUCTION:

The appeals challenge the High Court’s decision to dismiss applications for taking on record their written statements in a civil suit. The court ruled that the 30-day period for filing written statements had expired on 08.03.2020. The court also ruled in Sagufa Ahmed and Others Vs. Upper Assam Plywood Products Private Limited and Others (2021) 2 SCC 317, since the orders of this that the order dated 23.03.2020, effective from 15.03.2020, would not benefit the applicants/defendants since the limitation period had expired. The court also ruled that the court’s orders under Article 142 of the Constitution of India only extended the period of limitation, not the period up to which delay can be condoned.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The plaintiff, IL and FS Financial Services Limited, filed a suit for recovery of money and consequential reliefs in C.S. No. 177 of 2019 against nine defendants. The 30-day period for filing written statements expired on 08.03.2020 and the condonable period of 90 days expired on 06.06.2020.

The appellants filed applications for the defendants on 20.01.2021, requesting an extension of the time for the defendants’ written statements. The reasons for this were the declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic, the Government of India’s advisories, the Disaster Management Act, the lockdown imposed by the Government of West Bengal, and the closure of the answering applicant’s office.

The affidavits relied on the court’s order dated 23.03.2020 and 10.07.2020, which extended the period of limitation until further orders. The plaintiffs opposed these applications, arguing that the orders would not help since the limitation period had expired before 15.03.2020. The plaintiff relied on the judgment of 18.09.2020 in Sagufa Ahmed to support its contention. The High Court accepted the plaintiff’s stand but did not take the written statements on record.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

Article-142: Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and unless as to discovery, etc.-

(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or orders so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.”

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

ORDER 5 RULE 1(1): Summons.— When a suit has been duly instituted, a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim and to file the written statement of his defence, if any, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on that defendant. Provided that no such summons shall be issued when a defendant has appeared at the presentation of plaint and admitted the plaintiff’s claim

Order 8 Rule 1:Written statement.- The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence:

Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other day, as may be specified by the court, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.”

ORDER 8 RULE 10: Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by Court.—Where any party from whom a written statement is required under rule 1 or rule 9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up.

COMMERCIAL COURT ACT:

Section – 16: Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in its application to commercial disputes-

(1) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule.

(2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value.

(3) Where any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), by the State Government is in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this Act shall prevail.

ISSUES RAISED:

  • Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the application for extension of time dated 20.01.2021 and in not taking the written statements on record.
  • Whether the appellants are allowed to file the written statement after the expiration the limited time period in the special circumstances or not.

CONTENTION OF APPELLANT:

Mr. Sanjoy Ghose, Senior Counsel for the appellants, used the judgment in Prakash Corporates vs. Dee Vee Projects Limited, (2022) 5 SCC 112, to argue that extraordinary measures are crucial in extraordinary circumstances. The court noted that orders of 23.03.2020, 06.05.2020, and 10.07.2020 were addressed in the same In re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation. The court distinguished Sagufa Ahmed’s case (supra) in paras 28.1, 28.2 and 33.4 of Prakash Corporates (supra), stating that the period envisaged in the order dated 23.09.2021 should be excluded from computing the period of limitation even for filing the written statement. The court ruled that the decision in Sagufa Ahmed is irrelevant to the present case, as the extended period expired on 06.06.2020.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:

Mr. Sahil Tagotra, learned Counsel for the Respondent reiterated the findings of the High Court and submitted that the applicants have forfeited their right to file the written statements and the hon’ble High Court justified in rejecting the application for extension of time dated 20.01.2021 and not taking the written statements on record.

COURT’S ANALYSIS:

The Supreme Court has extended the deadlines for statutes of limitations in cases related to the pandemic. The court took suo motu cognizance and issued orders under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, protecting parties’ rights and ensuring their remedies and defenses were not barred. The orders of 23.03.2020 and 08.03.2021 were issued in a case involving Sagufa Ahmed (supra), which extended the limitation prescribed under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 until further orders. The court also extended the period between 15.03.2020 and the lifting of lockdown in the jurisdictional area.

The Supreme Court of India has issued directions to address the challenges faced by litigants during the COVID-19 pandemic. The order dated 08.03.2021 extended the period of limitation prescribed under general law or special laws, with effect from 15.03.2020 until further orders. The court believes that the order dated 15.03.2020 has served its purpose and should come to an end.

The court has also excluded the period from 15.03.2020 to 14.03.2021, allowing the balance period of limitation remaining as of 15.03.2020 to become available with effect from 15.03.2021. The period from 15.03.2020 to 14.03.2021 will also be excluded from computing periods prescribed under various laws. The government is also required to amend guidelines for containment zones, allowing for medical emergencies, essential goods and services, time-bound applications, and educational and job-related requirements.

The Court has directed that the period from 15.03.2020 to 14.03.2021 will be excluded from computing the period prescribed under various laws, including the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. This decision has a significant impact on the current controversy, as it excludes the period for computing outer limits within which the court or tribunal can condone delay.

The Court in Prakash Corporates (supra) also noted that the order of 08.03.2021 and subsequent orders by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges were not available for the Bench which decided Sagufa Ahmed’s case. The outer limit within which the court or tribunal can condone delay is 120 days from the date of summons.

JUDGEMENT:

As has been set out hereinabove, summons was served on 07.02.2020, but the 30 days period expired on 08.03.2020 and the outer limit of 120 days expired on 06.06.2020. The applicants filed for written statements and extension of time on 20.01.2021, and the High Court’s judgment needs to be set aside. The principle underlying the court’s orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021, and 23.09.2021, in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation would benefit the applicants-defendants.

The Appeals are allowed, and the written statements filed on 20.01.2021, are directed to be taken on record. The suit will proceed with the appeals, and the appeal stands allowed with no order as to costs.

 

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal falls into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

Click here to view the full judgement: ADITYA KHAITAN & ORS. VERSUS IL AND FS FINANCIAL SERVICES LIMITED

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

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SUPREME COURT UPHELD AND THE JUDGEMENT OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR ELECTRICITY AND SET ASIDE THE CIVIL APPEAL.

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CASE NAME: MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED VERSUS RATNAGIRI GAS AND POWER PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.

CASE NUMBER: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1922 OF 2023

DATED ON: NOVEMBER 09, 2023
QUORUM: HONOURABLE CIJ Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JUSTICE P.B.         PARDIWALA & JUSTICE MANOJ MISHRA.

INTRODUCTION

The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) in New Delhi dismissed an appeal against an order from the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) in 2013. The first respondent, Ratnagiri Gas And Power Private Limited, filed a petition against Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., seeking resolution of issues related to non-availability of domestic gas, alternate fuel contracts, and fixed charges. CERC held the appellant liable, which was upheld by APTEL. The court granted the appellant the liberty to move the court again if necessary. The first respondent filed an execution petition, seeking payment of Rs 5287.76 crores and Rs 1826 crores, in accordance with the APTEL order.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The first respondent, RGPPL, a joint venture of NTPC Ltd., Gas Authority of India Ltd, MSEB Holding Company, ICICI, IDBI, SBI, and Canara Bank, took over the assets of Dabhol Power Company Limited after its operations were closed down. The first respondent owns a gas-based generating station in Ratnagiri, Maharashtra, with 95% allocated to the State of Maharashtra and the rest to Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli. The appellant, MSEDCL, entered into a Power Purchase Agreement with the first respondent in 2007 for 25 years. The first respondent received gas supply from RIL until September 2011, but a decline in supply was attributed to low-yielding KG-D6 gas fields. The issue was raised with the Central Government and placed before the Empowered Group of Ministers on 24 December.

The first respondent entered into a Gas Supply Agreement/Gas Transportation Agreement with GAIL to supply Recycled Liquid Natural Gas under spot cargo. The appellant, however, refused to schedule power at the agreed rates, claiming that the first respondent failed to obtain their approval before entering into the agreement. The appellant argued that the declaration of capacity on RLNG was unilateral and arbitrary, violating Clause 5.9 of the Power Purchase Agreement. The first respondent filed a petition under Section 79 of the Electricity Act 2003 to resolve the issue of non-payment of fixed charges, the reservations of beneficiaries to enter alternate contractual arrangements for fuel, and the revision of the NAPAF.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT

Clause (4.3) Declared Capacity

“Primary Fuel for RGPPL is LNG/Natural gas and/or RLNG. Normally capacity of the station shall be declared on gas and/or RLNG for all three power blocks. However, if agreed by MSEDCL, RGPPL shall make arrangements of Liquid fuel(s) for the quantum required by MSEDCL. In such a case the capacity on liquid fuel shall also be taken into account for the purpose of Availability, Declared Capacity and PLF calculations till the time Liquid fuel(s) stock agreed/requisitioned by MSEDCL is available at site.”

Clause (5.9) Gas Supply Agreement (GSA)/ Gas Transportation Agreement (GTA)

The gas supply agreement for 1.5 MMTPA R-LNG up to September 2009 is in place, sourced through Petronet LNG Ltd and re-gasified at their Dahej terminal. Commercial implications of the GSA/GTA contract will be signed separately with MSEDCL. The total gas/LNG will be procured through short-term and long-term contracts through GAIL, under GoI’s direction. RGPPL must obtain MSEDCL’s approval on contracting terms and price before entering the contract.

ELECTICITY ACT, 2003

SECTION-79: FUNCTION OF CENTRAL COMMISSION

(1) The Central Commission shall discharge the following functions :–

The Act regulates the tariffs of generating companies owned or controlled by the Central Government, those with a composite scheme for electricity generation and sale in multiple states, and inter-state transmission of electricity. It determines tariffs for inter-state transmission, issues licenses for transmission licensees and electricity traders, adjudicates disputes involving generating companies or transmission licensees, levies fees for the Act, specifies Grid Codes and Standards, enforces quality, continuity, and reliability of service by licensees, sets trading margins in inter-state electricity trading, and discharges other functions assigned under the Act.

(2) The Central Commission shall advise the Central Government on all or any of the following matters :–

The Central Commission is responsible for formulating National Electricity Policy and tariff policy, promoting competition, efficiency, and economy in the electricity industry, promoting investment, and addressing other government-referred matters. It ensures transparency and is guided by the National Electricity Policy, National Electricity Plan, and tariff policy.

ISSUSES RAISED:

  • whether the CERC and APTEL were justified in affixing liability to pay fixed charges on the appellant.
  • Whether the dispute in the particular case primarily turns on the terms of the Power Purchase Agreement or not.

CERC ORDER DATED 30 JULY 2023 AND APTEL JUDGEMENT AND FINAL ORDER DATED 22 APRIL 2015.

The CERC allowed a petition and held the appellant liable to pay fixed capacity charges under the Power Purchase Agreement. It  ruled that the appellant’s decision not to schedule RLNG influenced variable charges, not fixed charges. Further, the appeal in APTEL was made and they directed that if the appellant wanted to not pay for RLNG, it must compensate the first respondent, as it is liable under Article 5.2 of the PPA. No prior consent was required for liability to arise. APTEL dismissed the appeal. The Civil Appeal against APTEL’s decision was initially disposed of by this Court. Since the appellant was not facing any punitive action for recovery, and the appellant was granted the liberty to approach the court when needed.  The present appeal is before the Supreme Court of India.

APPELLANT’S CONTENTION

The appellant challenged APTEL’s judgment and final order, arguing that the CERC divided Clause 4.3 and Clause 5.9 of the PPA into two separate categories, absolving the appellant of paying for declared capacity due to RLNG. The placement of the prior approval clause in clause 5.9 suggests it applies to both clause 5.2 and clause 5.3 energy charges. The decision to adopt RLNG has commercial implications, so the prior approval requirement in clause 5.9 is invoked. The compartmentalization of clauses 4.3 and 5.9 is flawed, and the plant availability factor would be less than 70%, reducing capacity charges in accordance with CERC Regulations 2009.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

The first Respondent urged that, The appellant established a generating station to meet their electricity needs. After the failure of M/s Enron International and M/s Dabhol Power Company, the station was revived and its assets transferred to RGPPL. The appellant held 13.51% shares in the first respondent. The capacity declaration and demand for charges are in accordance with Clauses 4.3 and 5.2 of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). The PPA is valid for 25 years and the appellant is bound by Clauses 6.6. and 6.7, which stipulate paying 95% of charges during a dispute.

COURT’S ANALYSIS:

TERMS OF PPA

The PPA outlines two types of tariff charges for MSEDCL: capacity charges and energy charges. The former are fixed and subject to revision by the Government of India or Maharashtra, while the latter are calculated using a formula. MSEDCL must schedule energy sending from RGPPL and obtain approval from CERC for provisional billing. The total gas requirements are procured through GAIL, with RGPPL obtaining approval before entering into a GSA/GTA.

The first respondent argues that an alternate arrangement with GAIL and capacity declarations based on RLNG was necessary due to a nationwide fuel shortage. The appellant argues that the unilateral decision to declare capacity based on RLNG violated the mandatory approval requirement under clause 5.9 of the PPA, exempting it from liability to pay fixed capacity charges.

FACTUAL CONTEXT AND THE INTENTION OF PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT

The first respondent was established due to the failure of M/s Enron International and M/s Dabhol Power Company to meet Maharashtra’s energy needs. The tariff requirements were determined to preserve the unit’s viability. The appellant’s liability for the former is actual delivery agnostic, as long as the declared capacity is made in terms of the PPA.

The appellant’s interpretation of the PPA contradicts the original purpose and intendment of the parties, as it implies that capacity charges can be avoided and made subject to the appellant’s consent. A deviation from the plain terms of the contract is warranted only when it serves business efficacy better. The appellant’s arguments would require reading in implied terms contrary to the contractual provisions, which is permissible only in a narrow set of circumstances.

JUDGEMENT:

In the present context, bearing in mind the background of the establishment of the first respondent, and the shortfall of domestic gas for reasons beyond the control of the first respondent, such a deviation from the plain terms is not merited and militates against business efficacy as it has a detrimental impact on the viability of the first respondent.

The execution proceedings pursuant to the above-mentioned execution petition before the APTEL be continued. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal falls into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

Click here to view the full judgement: MAHARASHTRA STATE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LIMITED VERSUS RATNAGIRI GAS AND POWER PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.

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SUPREME COURT SET ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT OF HIGH COURT AND AWARDED BENEFIT OF DOUBT TO APPELLANT CONVICTED UNDER SECTION – 302 OF IPC.

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CASE NAME: PARSHURAM  VERSUS STATE OF M.P.

CASE NUMBER: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.—– OF 2023.  [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1718 of 2022]

DATED ON: NOVEMBER 03, 2023

Quorum: HONOURABLE JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI, JUSTICE B.V.            NAGARATHNA & JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA.

 INTODUCTION:

The appeals challenge the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior, which upheld the judgment and order of 30th March 2005, passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Shivpuri. The High Court convicted the appellants and sentencing them to life imprisonment for offences punishable under Section 302 and Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellants were also sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years, six months, three months, and three months for offences punishable under Section 323 and Section 148 of the IPC. The appeals seek to overturn the previous ruling.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The prosecution alleges that appellant Jalim Singh built a shed in a village that was damaged by a buffalo belonging to the complainant party. Singh beat and drove the buffalo away, then entered Chironji’s house and broke the doors and beat Madan, Leelabai, and Kailash. Chironji fled, and when he returned, he was informed about the incident. The case highlights the dangers of allowing others to exploit vulnerable situations.

On 6th October 2001, a group of people, including the complainant party, were on a tractor to lodge a complaint when accused persons, armed with lethal weapons, waylaid them and caused injuries. The original First Information Report was registered for offences punishable under Sections 307, 323, 452, 147, 148, and 149 of IPC. The accused persons, nine of whom denied charges, were arrested and charged in a land dispute case.

The trial court found that the prosecution’s evidence proved that the accused formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted the complainant and his family members, killing one in furtherance of their unlawful assembly. The trial court convicted and sentenced the accused, Parshuram & Others and Jalim Singh, with all sentences running concurrently.

LEGAL PROVISIONS:

INDIAN PENAL CODE

  • Section – 147 Punishment for Rioting;

Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

  • Section – 148 Rioting, armed with deadly weapon;

Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

  • Section – 149 Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object;

If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.

  • Section – 302 Punishment for murder;

Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

  • Section – 307 Attempt to murder;

Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

  • Attempts by Life Convicts: When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
  • Section – 323 Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt;

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

  • Section – 324 Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means;

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

  • Section – 326 Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means;

Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

ISSUES RAISED:

  1. whether the common object of the unlawful assembly was to cause the death of the deceased or not.
  1. whether, the prosecution has brought on record the real genesis of the incident or not.
  1. whether, the conviction under Section 302 of IPC would be tenable or not.

CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANTS:

Shri Malhotra argued that the High Court and trial court erred in convicting the appellants, claiming that the prosecution failed to attribute a specific role to them. He argued that the conviction under Section 302 of IPC would not be tenable without this information. The counsel argued that the appellant’s role was only holding the lathi, and no injuries caused the deceased’s death could be attributed to him. The counsel also argued that the trial court acquitted two accused persons who were attributed to holding hand-bombs, making the appellants conviction unsustainable. The counsel cited a recent judgment in Nand Lal and Others v. State of Chhattisgarh 2023 SCC Online SC 262, which ruled that non-explanation of injuries is fatal to the prosecution case. Shri Sirajudeen, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-Jalim Singh in appeal in the same case also advanced arguments on the same lines.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:

Shri Singh argued that both the trial court and the High Court found the prosecution’s case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the appellants were part of an unlawful assembly. He argued that the unlawful assembly’s purpose was to kill the complainant party members, and no interference was warranted in the trial court’s conviction. Singh also argued that the deceased’s injuries were caused by deadly weapons.

COURT’S ANALYSIS:

Chironji is the first informant about an incident involving accused persons assaulting Madan, Lila, and Kamlesh. They were waylaid by Mangal, Roopa, Sewak, Ram Sahai, Parshuram, Lakhan, Jalim, Diwan, Siya, and 4-5 others while on a tractor to the Police Station for complaint lodging. Sewak beat Gupti, Roopa stabbed him, and Lakhan stabbed Madan, causing him to become unconscious. Madan died at the Police Station.

In Masalti v. State of U.P. [1964] 8 SCR 133, a Constitution Bench discussed the law regarding conviction under Section 302 and Section 149 of IPC. The bench ruled that not all individuals in an unlawful assembly must be active for convicting, but must be a member of the assembly and have entertained the common object.

The appellants and accused persons claimed they first reported the attack by the complainant party, who assaulted them upon returning from the police station. They claimed they tried to save themselves, leading to a free fight resulting in injuries, including Madan’s death. The trial court ruled that the complainant party did not use fatal weapons, while the accused used fatal weapons. However, the court disagreed, as Ramrup @ Roopa sustained injuries with a sharp weapon.

In the case of Lakshmi Singh and Others v. State of Bihar (1976) 4 SCC 394, the court observed that non-explanation of injuries sustained by the accused during a murder case can lead to inferences such as the prosecution suppressing the genesis and origin of the occurrence, unreliable witnesses, and a defence version that explains the injuries, potentially tarnishing the prosecution case.

Witnesses are interested in the case, but the prosecution’s failure to explain the injuries sustained by three accused persons raises doubts about the incident’s true origin. A cross case was registered against the complainant party for the injuries sustained by the accused.
The accused claim the complainant party assaulted them after returning from the police station, leading to a fight resulting in injuries, including Madan’s death. The incident was caused by a buffalo, possibly to teach a lesson.

JUDGEMENT

The court considered the view that, the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt. The conviction under Section 302 IPC would not be sustainable. The prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the unlawful assembly had an intention to cause the death of the deceased. As such, we find that the case would fall under Part-II of Section 304 of IPC.

In the result, the appeals are disposed of with the following directions:

(i) The conviction under Section 302 IPC is altered to Part-II of Section 304 of IPC;

(ii) The appellants are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 years.

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal falls into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

Click here to view the full judgement: PARSHURAM VERSUS STATE OF M.P.

JUDGEMENT REVIEWED BY: ABHISHEK SINGH

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Cow Slaughter case: Supreme Court uphold High Court’s decision of quashing FIR, considering completely Illegal

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Cow Slaughter case: Supreme Court uphold High Court’s decision of quashing FIR, considering completely Illegal

CASE TITLE- Joshine Antony Vs Smt. Asifa Sultana & Ors.

CASE NUMBER- Criminal Appeal No(S). 1046 Of 2024 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No(S). 911 Of 2019)

DATED ON- 20.02.2024

QUORUM- Hon’ble Justice Abhay S. Oka and Hon’ble Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

FACTS OF THE CASE

The fifth respondent, who was the Assistant Director of the Veterinary Department, on information received from the appellant, entered the factory premises of the first to third respondents and opened two packets kept in ice and collected a sample of meat from the packets. The sample was put in the thermocol box and packed by putting ice around it. The seized sample was sent for analysis. The sample was collected not by a police officer but by the fifth respondent, who was the Assistant Director of the Veterinary Department. On the same day there was one more panchnama drawn in presence of an Assistant Sub-Inspector. The said panchnama records that the sample was already collected and has been sent for testing to the expert. It also records that the meat was stored in a cold storage, which was not functioning. Therefore, the seizure of three rooms and meat packets was made. The police officer did not collect any sample for sending it for analysis. Initially, the First Information Report was filed for offences punishable under Sections 420 and 429 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and later on, the provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964 were attracted. The High Court has quashed the First Information Report. Therefore, the appeal was sought before this court.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 420 of The India Penal Code, 1860

Section 429 of The Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 10 of Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that huge quantity of meat of cow was found in the custody of the first to third respondents and even before the investigation could proceed, that the High Court has interjected. He submitted that the offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1964 Act were attracted. various documents were also presented on record including the panchnama drawn. He submitted that the packets stored in the cold storage of the first to third respondents were deliberately labelled as “Super Fresh Frozen Boneless Buffalo Meat” and that is how Section 420 of the IPC was applied by the police. He further submitted that the sample collected from the cold storage of the first to third respondents was sent for DNA test, which revealed that the meat was of cow. The fifth respondent was duly authorized officer under Section 10 of the 1964 Act and he had authority to enter any premises and to inspect the said premises as he had a reason to believe that the offence under the 1964 Act has been committed. He submitted that the High Court has virtually conducted a mini trial.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The contentions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent is not explicitly given. However, the court heard the contentions of the respondent No. 1- No.3

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court analyzed the act of collection of sample by the Assistant Director was completely illegal. It is this sample which was sent for chemical analysis. Thus, the entire case of the prosecution is based on unauthorized and illegally collected sample of the meat. Therefore, the High Court was right when it interfered by quashing the First Information Report. Thus, the court found no error in the view taken by the High Court and the appeal got dismissed.

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

Judgement Reviewed By- Shreyasi Ghatak

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Cow Slaughter case: Supreme Court uphold High Court’s decision of quashing FIR, considering completely Illegal

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Cow Slaughter case: Supreme Court uphold High Court’s decision of quashing FIR, considering completely Illegal

CASE TITLE- Joshine Antony Vs Smt. Asifa Sultana & Ors.

CASE NUMBER- Criminal Appeal No(S). 1046 Of 2024 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No(S). 911 Of 2019)

DATED ON- 20.02.2024

QUORUM- Hon’ble Justice Abhay S. Oka and Hon’ble Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

FACTS OF THE CASE

The fifth respondent, who was the Assistant Director of the Veterinary Department, on information received from the appellant, entered the factory premises of the first to third respondents and opened two packets kept in ice and collected a sample of meat from the packets. The sample was put in the thermocol box and packed by putting ice around it. The seized sample was sent for analysis. The sample was collected not by a police officer but by the fifth respondent, who was the Assistant Director of the Veterinary Department. On the same day there was one more panchnama drawn in presence of an Assistant Sub-Inspector. The said panchnama records that the sample was already collected and has been sent for testing to the expert. It also records that the meat was stored in a cold storage, which was not functioning. Therefore, the seizure of three rooms and meat packets was made. The police officer did not collect any sample for sending it for analysis. Initially, the First Information Report was filed for offences punishable under Sections 420 and 429 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and later on, the provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964 were attracted. The High Court has quashed the First Information Report. Therefore, the appeal was sought before this court.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Section 420 of The India Penal Code, 1860

Section 429 of The Indian Penal Code, 1860

Section 10 of Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that huge quantity of meat of cow was found in the custody of the first to third respondents and even before the investigation could proceed, that the High Court has interjected. He submitted that the offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1964 Act were attracted. various documents were also presented on record including the panchnama drawn. He submitted that the packets stored in the cold storage of the first to third respondents were deliberately labelled as “Super Fresh Frozen Boneless Buffalo Meat” and that is how Section 420 of the IPC was applied by the police. He further submitted that the sample collected from the cold storage of the first to third respondents was sent for DNA test, which revealed that the meat was of cow. The fifth respondent was duly authorized officer under Section 10 of the 1964 Act and he had authority to enter any premises and to inspect the said premises as he had a reason to believe that the offence under the 1964 Act has been committed. He submitted that the High Court has virtually conducted a mini trial.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

The contentions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent is not explicitly given. However, the court heard the contentions of the respondent No. 1- No.3

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGEMENT

The court analyzed the act of collection of sample by the Assistant Director was completely illegal. It is this sample which was sent for chemical analysis. Thus, the entire case of the prosecution is based on unauthorized and illegally collected sample of the meat. Therefore, the High Court was right when it interfered by quashing the First Information Report. Thus, the court found no error in the view taken by the High Court and the appeal got dismissed.

“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”

Judgement Reviewed By- Shreyasi Ghatak

Click here to read the Judgement

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